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SUMMARY
This research looks at the legal regime governing foreign direct investment
(FDI) in Taiwan, and at the interaction between the Government's economic
policies, legal reform and FDI in the economic development of Taiwan. The
research for this thesis is focused on the period of 1945 to the present; however, a
study of the pre-1945 period is provided as a basis for analysing the post-1945
developments. There are three principal aims of this thesis. First, the thesis is
designed to illustrate how the economic success of Taiwan challenges traditional
views put forward in development theories and in law and development theories, in
particular. Secondly, the thesis considers the role of law in the development
process. By examining the evolution and operation of the FDI legal regime in
Taiwan in its economic, social, political and historical context, this research
suggests that the role of law is as a 'doorkeeper' for a country's development. If
consistent with a public-interest-oriented economic policy, an appropriate and well-
considered legal regime can help a country's development without risking its
economic sovereignty. Finally, this thesis examines Taiwan's current FDI regime
for its appropriateness. Using international law as a reference-point, a detailed
analysis is made of Taiwan's current FDI laws. The thesis suggests that certain of
these laws are out of date and that further legal reform is required.
The thesis concludes by slightly modifying the developmental model for law
and FDI which is put forward in Chapter 1, in order to emphasise the important role
of government economic policy in Taiwan's development. It is submitted that the
Government's choice of development strategy in each of Taiwan's different
development phases has been crucial to Taiwan's success. The thesis also
concludes that an appropriate legal regime remains important for a country's
development regardless of its development status.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Scope of the Research and Reasons for Undertaking it
This research looks at the legal regime governing foreign direct investment
(FDI) in Taiwan, and at the interaction between the Government's economic
policies, legal reform, and FDI in the economic development of Taiwan. Although
the main aim of this research is to discuss the ROC's laws, economic policies and
strategy regarding FDI after 1945 (when the ROC government moved to Taiwan
from the mainland), the thesis includes a study of Taiwan's pre-1945 economic
development, which is necessary as it provides a basis for understanding the overall
development process. The aims of this study are threefold. First, traditionally
development theory makes certain assumptions about the difficulties faced by
developing countries in pulling themselves out of subjugation by an oppressive
international economic system, and the exploitation role of multinational
enterprises through FDI. However, I shall seek to challenge these assumptions in
the context of Taiwan, and to consider how a State can use law to invite and control
FDI, without risking its sovereignty, to facilitate its economic development. As part
of doing so, I propose a development model, which will be discussed in the next
section, to explain the relationship between FDI, law and economic development.
Secondly, this research considers the role of law in encouraging and controlling
FDI in Taiwan by examining the operation of the legal regime in its appropriate
economic, social, political, and historical context. Finally, the current legal regime
governing FDI in Taiwan will be analysed and assessed with regard to possible
legal reform in the future.
21.1.1 Why is this Research Important?
The comprehensive study of FDI is one of those socio-scientific topics
which involves a study of complex historical, economical, political, social and legal
issues. But research to date has tended to concentrate on only one or two of these
factors. Some social scientists, such as Bierman (1984), Froot (1993), and Carr
(1969), seek to solve the investors' dilemma of maximizing profits and minimizing
the investment risk by using economic methods. Others, such as Chan (1995) and
Parry (1980), look at the issue from the host countries' view-point and try to
examine the impact of FDI on the host countries' economies by applying political
economy theories. There are, of course, legal scholars such as Sornarajah (1994)
and Silk (1994), who examine the question of how national and international law
regulates the problems raised by FDI at various levels.
There are probably three major reasons why FDI remains one of the most
controversial subjects in the development literature. First, it is a topic that is
frequently raised in political debate between developed and developing countries,
where its treatment is typically passionate rather than rational: many observers are
more concerned with "mounting emotionally laden attacks and defenses of the
process than examining it dispassionately" (Ranis and Schive, 1985: 85). Secondly,
there are so many qualitative as well as quantitative aspects that could be
legitimately considered when one talks about FDI. For example, the impact of FDI
in a country's economic development can be assessed by way of both qualitative
and quantitative methods. Thirdly, it is conceptually, as well as empirically,
extremely difficult to disentangle the contribution of FDI to a country's
development from that of so many other factors, including political, historical, and
legal factors, simultaneously at work within the development process. Because of
its complicated nature, few scholars have engaged in interdisciplinary research on
FDI. Especially, the relationship between FDI, economic development, and law has
remained a research subject which still needs much attention.
31.1.2 Why is the Case of Taiwan Important?
This research seeks to examine the interaction between FDI, legal reform,
and economic development in the context of Taiwan. There are a number of reasons
for choosing Taiwan as a research subject.
(A) Insufficient and Incomplete Research on Taiwan
First, Taiwan has long been characterized as an 'economic miracle' that has
produced an extremely rare combination of 'growth with equity' despite a constant
military threat from the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 1949. The role of
FDI has been significant in the growth process in Taiwan as the economy changed
from that of a pre-war colony to one of the contemporary world's most successful
cases of development. In spite of this, neither the interaction between Government
economic policy and FDI nor the contribution of law to economic development in
Taiwan has received the scholarly attention one might have expected. Furthermore,
because of Taiwan's difficult political status, lawyers in Taiwan tend only to study
municipal FDI laws; many important international law norms regarding the
treatment of FDI, whether deriving from customary international law or form
bilateral investment treaties, are hardly mentioned.
Internationally, few non-Taiwanese scholars have studied Taiwan. Since
social scientists in the West formerly regarded the history of Taiwan as Chinese
local history, the study of Taiwan has long been an offshoot of Chinese studies. As
Taiwan came to be recognised as one of the so-called 'Four Little Dragons', or
'Newly Industrialising Countries' (NIC5), in the 1 980s, scholars in the West have
started to discuss the reasons for the success of post-war development in Taiwan
from the point of view of economics, employing a great number of mathematical
instruments and models. However, most of them start their research from the year
1945. Fix (1988: 58) has pointed out that if the history of the Japanese period is not
also studied fully, the development of Taiwan in the twentieth century cannot be
4understood; and if the unique historical process involved in this development is not
borne in mind, it is impossible to analyse social and economical changes in post-
war Taiwan. Economic development is a continuous process and ignoring the pre-.
war history of Taiwan means that one cannot fully understand the progression of
Taiwan's development. In addition, although there has recently been a trend in the
West to separate the study of the economic development of Taiwan from that of
mainland China, the place of law in the development process in Taiwan has
continued to be neglected as a specific topic. It is not surprising therefore that there
is little literature about the role of law in Taiwan's economic development.
(B) The Success of Taiwan Challenges the Traditional Theory of Development
The second reason for studying the case of Taiwan is that, because of the
combination of political repression and economic liberalisation, its success "poses a
challenge to development theory as a whole and to law and development in
particular" (Adelman and Paliwala, 1993: 14). Rather than development theory, I
will suggest below that Taiwan's success is instead consistent with one of the
modern economic theories concerning foreign direct investment. Why does the
success of Taiwan challenge both the theory of development and the theory of law
and development? Before these questions can be answered, one has to know
development theory and the theory of law and development.
(i) The Theories of Development
Development is a term with no generally-accepted definition (Black, 1991:
115).1 Most commonly, national development is cast in economic images
(Richardson, 1978: 3). The concept of economic development, however, is not
The UNDP (1990: 10) defined human development as "a process of enlarging people's choices"
and the 1986 UN General Assembly Declaration on the Right to Development (Resolution
41/128) states "that development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political
process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire polulation and
of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development
and in the fair distribution benefits resulting thereform".
5unproblematic because different advocates of development theory have different
ideas about what development is and what it should be.
Explanations of development can generally be classified into five schools of
thought: the neoclassical conservatives, the liberal internationalists, social
democrats (vulgar dependentistas), radical dependency theorists (dependentistas),
and classical Marxists.2
 In brief, the neoclassical conservatives, notably Posner
(1986: 1-2), emphasise the beneficial role of the free market, open economies, and
privatisation, and argue that development should be equated with industrialization
and rapid economic growth. The liberal internationalists, such as Bergsten (1978:
373-3 79), argue that economic growth does riot equal de'ielopment arn see
development as "growth with distribution" (Biersteker, 1987: 19). The social
democrats (vulgar dependentistas), such as Seers (1972: 123), emphasise external
and internal institutional and political constraints on economic development and
stress that development must accomplish the satisfaction of basic needs,
"incorporating a reduction in absolute levels of poverty, unemployment, and
inequality".
At the other end of the spectrum, the radical dependentistas, such as Frank
(1979: xi), Amin (1976: 38), Cardoso and Faletto (1978: 10), and Richardson
(1978: 4-11), assert that development of "peripheral" countries is virtually
impossible in a global political economy dominated by capitalist relations3 and that
2 For extensive surveys of development theory and practice, see Brookfield (1975), Adelman and
Paliwala (1993: 7-10), Hettne (1995: 12-14), Peet (1991: 43-51), Seidman (1994: 57-141),
Biersteker (1987: 11-51), Todaro (1989: 363-398), Brewer (1990: 161-199), and Todaro
(1997: Chapter 3).
The world system theory was based upon the works of radical dependency theories and formulated
by American political economic scholar Immanuel Wallerstein. He distinguishes three main
"zones" in the global stratification system: an advanced "core", an exploited "periphery", and
an intermediate "semi-periphery". Wallerstein's global core contains a disproportionate share
of high-productivity, well-paid economic activities. The strong economic base both supports
and is supported by strong states that also promote national cultural integration and cultural
modernisation. The periphery contains a disproportionate share of low-productivity, low-paid
economic activities. Their weak economic base means that peripheral economies are unable to
maintain national independence and national integration in the face of external penetration.
6development is "a consequence of a people's frontal attack on the oppression,
exploitation, and poverty that they suffer at the hands of the dominant classes and
their system" (Cockeroft, Frank and Johnson, 1972: xvi). Thus they suggest that
development is the creation of socialism or autocentric self-reliance. At the same
time, classical Marxists, such as Warren (1973: 3-35) and Brewer (1990: 291), view
development as an "inevitable process consisting of successive stages arising from
the dialectical resolution of class conflict" (Adelman and Paliwala, 1993: 5), and
refer to the term 'development' as capitalist development, i.e. capitalism.
Although some may be more satisfactory thai others, I ha'rt restratioris
about each of the above theories of development because most development theory
is not truly global. However, this research will not try to determine which approach
most closely approximates to the global 'truth' for a slightly different reason. This
is that development has qualitative dimensions, such as human rights and cultural
identity,4
 which are difficult to assess. These dimensions are not only quantitatively
difficult to assess, but also impossible to compare with other qualitative elements.
How does one weigh a unit of industrialisation against a unit of liberty? It cannot be
done. So it is not suprising to see Adelman and Paliwala (1993: 10) state: "After
four decades of development theory and practice, ... contradictions are little
changed.... The complexities and contradictions of development resist easy
classification or incorporation under the rubric of a single theory".
Nevertheless, one of the aims of this research is to demonstrate how the
success of Taiwan challenges traditional views in development theory. Few
The semi-periphery contains a mix of high-productivity and low-productivity economic
activities. Semi-peripheral states usually are either losing a past effectiveness or gaining a
future effectiveness, often drawing on national cultural traditions to mobilise domestic support
for economic modernisation. The middle zone acts partly as a buffer against direct political
conflict between core and periphery, and partly as a bridge for upward and downward mobility
between them (Wallerstein, 1974: 346-357; 1979: 95-118). Evan (1985: 192-226) idenfied the
semi-peripheral states as "newly industrialising countries".
Thus, Bondzi-Simpson (1988: 643-645) has argued that economic development cannot be pursued
at the expense of human rights and cultural identity.
7international entities have such an ambiguous diplomatic status, or such difficulty
maintaining their external political autonomy as Taiwan. Yet, at the same time, few
have achieved such rapid economic growth. Taiwan's formal external affiliations
with international organisations remain fragile, but its economic (informal) ties to
other societies remain robust. Furthermore, as will become obvious in the following
Chapters, economic development in the case of Taiwan not only means economic
growth but also growth with equality, something which does not completely fall
into any of the above development theories. Taiwan does not have a laissez-faire
economy, as described by neoconservatives, nor does it have class conflicts as
asserted by the radical dependentistas or Marxists. Rather, the most important aim
of economic development in Taiwan is a combined one: the accumulation of
national wealth together with the improvement of its citizens' standard of living. It
serves both 'state-centered' and 'people centered' definitions of development. The
following economic and social indicators give some evidence of growth with
equality in Taiwan:
- The per capita GNP rose from US$ 196 in 1952 to US$ 12,872 in 1996
(TSDB, 1997: 32).
- Foreign exchange settlements rose from minus US$ 87.5 million in 1952 to
plus US$ 17.6 billion in 1996 (TSDB, 1997: 187).
- The unemployment rate fell from 4.4 % in 1952 to 2.6 % in 1996 (TSDB,
1997: 3).
- The enrolment rate of elementary school graduates into junior high school
rose from 34.85% in 1952-53 to 98.89% in 1996-97 (TSDB, 1997: 266).
- The wealth difference ratio between the richest 20 % and the poorest 20 %
in Taiwan rose by only 0.01 from 5.33 in 1964 to 5.34 in 1996 (CEPD,
1997: 6).
8(ii) The Theories of Law and Development
A second aim of this thesis is to illustrate how the case of Taiwan
challenges traditional theories of law and development.
The question of the role of law in the development process invokes
disagreement amongst scholars. The instrumentalists, such as Seidman (1972: 686
and 1994: 125), argue that the utility of state-made rules (particular legislation) can
foster development and the norms provided by law are a precondition for successful
development. They have stressed that institutions play a central role in defining
societies, their economies and their politics (March and Olsen, 1989: 2). The state
and the legal order shape the institutions that allocate resources and empower
oligarchies (Seidman, 1994: 31). Societies can purposefully change institutions
only by altering the norms that define them: "rules are the midwives of
organization" (Wunsch and Owolu, 1990: 10). From an instrumentalist perspective,
the law can be moulded and manipulated by the developing states to influence,
directly or indirectly, social behaviour in a non-contradictory fashion.
By contrast, others have suggested that in practice law does not have that
capacity. Dhavan (1992: 10) argues that law tends to address national development
rather than the development needs of individuals. Consequently, ruling interests
have the opportunity to define national needs in terms that advance their self-
interest. Tushnet (1985: 683) and Singer (1984: 1) caution that laws too often
benefit only the rich and powerful. The term 'economic development' has
frequently been used by autocratic leaders as a poor excuse for dictatorial regimes,
colonialism and opportunism (Ghai, 1993: 51-75); where the rights and freedoms of
people, and the proper use of natural resources and environmental protection have
been regularly subordinated to the imperatives of industrialisation. These authors
question whether the legal development is actually contributing to freedom,
equality, participation, and shared rationality (Trubek and Galanter, 1974: 1063-
91064). They argue that the goals of legal instrumentalism are noble, but that the
methods remain dubious, "especially when the lessons of dependency theory are
borne in mind" (Adelman and Paliwala, 1993: 14). Adelman and Paliwala (1993:
13) claim that legal institutions are not panaceas for all development ills: class
conflict or socio-cultural relations may affect the functionality of the law.
It is certainly true that political decisions and law-making form
complementary parts of a single, complex, interrelated process (Lowi, 1987: 1070),
and that this creates the possibility of abuse of the legislative process by vested
interests capable of influencing government policy. Nor is law a panacea for all
social evils. Nonetheless, in my view, law can foster development if the political
purpose of the law is to serve the public interest. Its success in doing so depends
upon (i) there being an appropriate political system, (ii) that the system adopts the
right goals for achieving economic development, and (iii) that it frames laws
capable of effectively achieving those goals. As to (i), the quest for social and
national development must ensure that an appropriate political system is locally
rooted, popularly accepted, and capable of responding to the public interest
(Bondzi-Simpson, 1992: 4). Regarding (ii), any form of appropriate social and
national development must also involve an economic environment that encourages
efficient and skilful use of human and natural resources. In particular, the legal
system of developing countries must devise appropriate commercial and labour
relations regimes for both public and private transactions (Bondzi-Simpson, 1992:
5). In order to achieve those goals, the law is required both to encourage economic
activity and at the same time to curb opportunistic behavior and to control or
compensate for negative effects (iii). It must be practical, i.e. capable of
implementation, 5
 and it has to be adjustable in accordance with national
development needs.
Seidman (1994: 43) states that because "the devil is in the details", the instrumental use of law
requires careful formulation to ensure effective implementation.
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It is a hard task but, in my view, not an impossible one. Taiwan, in
particular, provides distinctive opportunities for re-examining the role of law in
national development. The development process of Taiwan involves a high degree
of control over the national (labour) market and extensive state intervention to take
advantage of international political and economic conditions. Law is used in
Taiwan as a instrument to facilitate the implementation and achievement of the
Government's policies, and to serve the needs of national development and the
needs of the public interest. The role of law in Taiwan's development challenges
the liberal assertion that authoritarianism is incompatible with capital accumulation
and challenges the necessity of imposing constitutionalism, the rule of law, freedom
and human rights as preconditions to sustain market mechanisms. By looking in
this thesis at each development phase in Taiwan, I will examine the role of law in
Taiwan's development process and see how Government policy through law has
shaped and reshaped Taiwan's economic development; and how the Government
constantly utilises legal reforms to provide greater participation (e.g. through land
reform), as well as to meet existing development needs, and to create a favourable
environment to ensure future development.
(C) Taiwan 's Experience Understood in Terms of Economic Theories
Concerning Foreign Direct In vestment
In terms of the relationship between FDI, law and economic development,
the case of Taiwan appears to demonstrate the validity of one particular economic
theory of FDI. This is the third reason to choose Taiwan as a case study.
Foreign investment is one form of economic transaction between countries
(Richardson, 1978: 13).6 A combination of fear and welcome towards foreign
investment can often be observed in developing countries. As Hirscbman (1969: 3)
6 Richardson (1978: 13) suggests that economic transactions among countries take three principal
forms - foreign trade, private investment, and foreign aid. For details, see also Katzenstein
(1975: 1024-1034).
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has noted, foreign investment "shares to a very high degree the ambiguity of most
human inventions and institutions: it has considerable potential for both good and
evil". The conflicts between different economic theories have had an impact in
shaping legal attitudes toward FDI.
The classical economic theory of FDI takes the view that FDI is wholly
beneficial to the host country's development. It believes that economic
development can be facilitated by FDI transfers that add to the available stocks of
capital, knowledge, and technology. This classical theory has a strong hold over the
policies underlying the international law principles on FDI. The preambles of
bilateral investment treaties all contain similar statements: "such investment will be
conducive to stimulating business initiative and increasing prosperity". 7
 In addition,
the classical theory can be observed in diverse instruments, including the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals
of Other States (ICSID Convention), 8 the Convention establishing the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agreement (MIGA)9 and the 1992 World Bank's Guidelines
For instance, the Taipei-Thailand Investment Protection Agreement (1996) and the ROC-Paraguay
Investment Guarantee Agreement (1992).
The preamble of the ICSID Convention states that the Contracting States believe that provision for
the settlement of disputes arising from FDI will increase flows of foreign investment which are
beneficial to the economic development of the developing countries. For the text, see 575
U.N.T.S. 159; 4 I.L.M [1965] 532.
The preamble of the MIGA Convention states that to devise a scheme for the insurance of foreign
investment is necessary because it will faciliate the flow of FDI into developing countries,
especially when there is a decrease of such flow due to risk perceptions of FDI (Shihata, 1988:
356).
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on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment! 0 Furthermore, the classical theory
has also affect the thinking of arbitral tribunals.1'
By contrast, the dependentistas assert that FDI cannot bring any meaningful
economic development to the host country, and full economic development can
never be achieved as long as developing countries are tied to the principal
economies through foreign investment. 12 Their recommendation is to get rid of FDI
rather than to attract it. This theory has been popular in the Latin American
countries and forms a part of the political programmes of governments (Manley,
1991: 80-110). Nationalisations in Chile, Peru, and Jamaica were influenced and
purportedly justified by these theories'3
Other theorists adopt a middle path; they believe that FDI through MNEs
could have harmful results in certain circumstances but assert that, properly
harnessed, MNEs could be engines that fuel the growth of the developing world
(Sornarajah, 1994: 46). This view has received support from many American and
European scholars.' 4 The theory has affected the legislation governing FDI in many
developing countries which have set up screening bodies that permit entry or give
incentives to selectively approved investments. On the international plane, the
10 The 1992 World Bank's Guidelines states that it recognises "that a greater flow of foreign direct
investment brings substantial benefits to bear on the world economy and on the economies of
developing countries in particular, in terms of improving the long term efficiency of the host
country through greater competition, transfer of capital, technology and managerial skills and
enhancement of market access and interms of the expansion of internaitonal trade" (31 J.L.M
[1992] 1379).
H For example, after referring to the ICSID Convention's preamble, the tribunal in Amco v.
Indonesia said that "... to protect investments is to protect the general interest of development
and developing countries" 23 I.L.M [1984] 351.
12 For details of these theories, see Peet (1991); Hettne (1988: 12-14); Evans (1979); Biersteker
(1987: 3-5 1).
13 For an assessment of the capacity of these justifications to influence the law, see Manley (1991:
100).
14 See, for example, Bergsten, Horst, and Moran (1978).
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theory challenges many classical propositions relating to FDI in international law.
As Sornarajah (1994: 48-49) states:
"The effect of the acceptance of the new theory is that foreign investment is entitled to
protection only on a selective basis, dependent on the extent of the benefit it brings the host
state and the extent to which it had behaved as a good corporate citizen in promoting the
economic objective of the host state."
In terms of international law, the validity of national legislation governing FDI is
based upon the principle of the sovereignty (including economic sovereignty) of
states. However, the increasing levels of administrative control over FDI involved
in such legislation creates greater potential for conflict between the goals of foreign
investors and the host State (TJNCTC, 1992: 6-7). Traditional international law, in
accordance with classical principles, sought to protect FDI through imposing
minimum standards of treatment and insulating FDI from treatment in accordance
with some or all of the host's municipal laws. Host States, by contrast, have sought
to increase municipal control over foreign investments on the basis of international
economic sovereignty (These issues are discussed in detail in Chapter 11).
According to the third, or moderate, theory of FDI, outlined above, law is an
instrument through which development in all its dimensions may be pursued. While
it is certainly true that nearly every economy in the world has imposed restrictions
on the operation of foreign investment, the multinational enterprise "is not an
unprotected, misused pawn of omnipotent nations; it is a powerful player in the
international business game" (Robock, Simmond, and Zwick, 1977: 277). The laws
relating to foreign investment should be regarded as a device for developing
countries to balance the trade-off between costs and benefits. They should also be
regarded as a 'doorkeeper', employed to attract more foreign investment without
risking sovereignty.
Taiwan's success is evidence in favour of this balanced approach. There has
been considerable State regulation and intervention accompanying the process of
industralisation in Taiwan (Chu, 1989: 647; Naya and Ramsteeter, 1988: 57). An
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approach which mixes regulation of and receptiveness to FDI in Taiwan reflects the
moderate theory of foreign investment. In this thesis, I will explain how the ROC
government has changed its attitude towards FDI in accordance with Taiwan's
economic situation; and how the Government uses state regulation to both control
and attract FDI, in order to help Taiwan's economic development. Reference will
also be made to international law principles when examining the ROC's treatment
of foreign investment in Taiwan.
1.1.3 Is Taiwan A Developing Country?
In the context of the theories discussed above, one comment that may be
made is that the conflicts between the various development theories, as between the
economic theories concerning FDI, often reflect differences of value and interest
amongst the developing and developed world. Because this research focuses on
Taiwan, it is important to know where Taiwan stands: is Taiwan a developing
country? Relatedly, another important question is - what is a developing country?
There is no single standard or criterion defining a developing country for the
purposes of international economic law. One has to look at this question in the
context of individual international organizations and also, of course, in the specific
context of the domestic law of particular states.
Economic indictors, such as per capita gross national product (GNP), the
percentage average annual growth rate of GNP, the percentage average annual rate
of inflation and life expectancy at birth are often used to evaluate the performance
of countries (IBRD, 1989: 164). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) distinguishes between the following types of developing
country by reference to the GNP criterion: low-income countries and territories
(LICs) whose per capita GNP is under US$ 675; low middle-income countries and
territories (LMICs) whose per capita GNP is between US$ 676 and US$ 2,695;
upper middle-income countries and territories (UMICs) whose per capita GNP is
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between US$ 2,696 and US$ 8,355, and high-income countries (1-liCs), whose per
capita GNP is over US$ 8,355 (OECD, 1996a: 5). The range provided by the World
Bank is slightly different and is as follows: LICs, under US$ 725; MICs, US$ 725
to under US$ 8,956; and high-income economies (HIEs), over US$ 8,956 (IBRD,
1996, vol. 1: 188). 15 Of course, classification by income does not necessarily reflect
development status. Other economic indictors used by international agencies to
compare and categorise countries include the degree of industrialisation of a nation
and the availability and affordability of social services such as educat'or arid
(Bondzi-Simpson, 1992: 2). The per capita GNP in Taiwan in 1996 was US$
12,872, ranked 25th highest among countries with a population of over 1 million in
the world (CEPD, 1997: 4). It thus belongs to the HIC/I-IIE category according to
the OECD and the World Bank criteria.
For the purposes of the GATT and now its successor organization, the
World Trade Organisation (WTO), there has been no clearly-accepted definition of
a developing country (McGovern, 1995: 9.211).16 States have been allowed to
claim that status themselves, in a process of self-selection. On this basis, countries
which are similar to Taiwan in terms of economic development, including Korea
and Singapore, have been accepted as developing States. Therefore although
Taiwan for political reasons has not yet gained admittance to either the GATT or
the WTO, nevertheless it is apparent by analogy that it would probably be
considered a developing country in terms of international practice in the area of
trade.
15 In the World Bank's classification, low and middle-income economies are referred to as
'developing economies' (World Bank, 1995: viii).
16 
"There is no formal definition of a developing country. There is an informal group of such
countries, the chairman of which invites new Members to join if they claim that status. The
system worked satisfactorily under GATT. ... developing countries ... include(d) countries such
as Korea and Singapore. The same approach will be adopted under the WTO and is proving
controversial only in the case of China, for which the issue is likely to be made explicit in the
instrument by which it joins the WTO." (McGovern, 1995: 9.21-1)
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Taiwan is one of a group of developing countries which has sought to use
FDI as part of its general development strategy. But is it really any longer a
developing country? Clearly, the economy of Taiwan has undergone a major
change since 1945, but certainly at the beginning of the period of this study, Taiwan
was a developing country. Even now, in terms of the practice of GATT, the WTO,
the OECD and the World Bank, Taiwan would be entitled to treatment as a
developing county, albeit a high-income one which is characterised by a high level
of exports of manufactures. However, if it continues to maintain the rapid economic
growth it has experienced in recent years, Taiwan at some point will graduate from
this category altogether.
1.2. Theoretical Assumptions Concerning the Relationship between
FDI, Economic Development and Law
Law is a driving force behind the economy and the economy is a driving
force behind law. In the previous section, I suggest that traditional development
theory is inadequate when applied to Taiwan. As an alternative, therefore, the
following triangular model is proposed for explaining the relationship between FDI,
economic development, and law.
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Figure 1.1 Foreign Direct Investment: Legal and Economic
Interaction Model
In this diagram, "Law" refers to the laws, regulations etc. governing FDI.
The arrows are indicators of influence. The model is intended to express the four
following propositions:
1. FDI can facilitate economic development only if the appropriate laws are
adopted.
2. As FDI facilitates economic development, and the level of economic
development changes, the Government responds with new laws or legal
reforms in order to encourage further economic development. The content of
these laws is shaped by the levels of economic development.
3. The restrictions and incentives provided for by law (and by legal reforms)
affect the performance of FDI. Consequently, the performance of FDI affects
the performance of a country's economic development.
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4. In the case of Taiwan, appropriate liberalisation of the law leads to more
inflows of FDI, which leads to further successful economic development.
The model formulated above is, it is hoped, substantiated by the practice of
Taiwan as examined in this thesis.
1.3 Objectives of this Research
Virtually every economy in the world has imposed restrictions on the
operation of foreign investment. However, one might expect that a country seeking
to encourage large-scale foreign investment would choose to adopt an investment
regime which is very open towards foreign investment. Conversely, one might
expect that a country pursuing a process of economic development which largely
ignores foreign investment would not develop its foreign investment regime in such
a way as to be particularly attractive to foreign investors.
Apart from considering Taiwan's development in light of the model
described in the previous section, this research is also concerned, in particular, with
the contribution of the legal regime governing FDI to economic development in
Taiwan. A primary objective of the research is to ask to what extent does the
character of Taiwan's foreign investment regime contribute to Taiwan's economic
development? In addressing this question, I will first survey Taiwan's economic
development up to 1945, in order to provide the contextual background for analysis
of Taiwan's development after 1945, and to illustrate how Taiwan's early economic
regulation and policy was dependent particularly upon its political and
constitutional status. Secondly, I will look at the role of FDI in the economic
development strategy of Taiwan from 1945 to the present. The operation of the
legal regime will be examined in its appropriate economic, social, political and
historical context. Finally, I will analyse in some detail the current legal regime
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governing FDI in Taiwan, with appropriate references to international legal norms
governing FDI.
However, it is important to emphasise that this research, which is focused
on Taiwan, may not disclose a successful development model for other developing
countries. As one of the newly industrialisied economies (NIBs), Taiwan's success
is the outcome of its historically-shaped institutional, economic and political
circumstances. These conditions are almost impossible to reproduce. Because of
Taiwan's desperate political situation in the 1950s, US aid financed 25 to 30 per
cent of the Government's consolidated budget expenditure, including the defence
budget, for nearly two decades.' 7 US aid totalled roughly 7 per cent of Taiwan's
GNP, at times reaching almost two thirds of Taiwan's total investment (see Chapter
4). Simultaneously, Taiwan benefited from relatively large-scale foreign
investment, mainly in labour-intensive manufacturing industries (see Chapter 5).
The Korean War in the 1 950s provided a major market for Taiwanese products
required for the United States' offshore procurement programme (see Chapter 4).
Stimulated by the success of land reform in the 1950s (see Chapter 4), Taiwan had
built the necessary economic foundations to benefit from the rapid market growth
generated by the Vietnam War in the 1 960s (see Chapter 6). In the view of some,
Taiwan at the same time "wisely refrained" from pursuing democratisation at the
same time as economic development (Jacoby, 1966: 125-126); instead it provided a
stable political framework for economic development, and let political reforms
come later (see Chapter 8).
Although the development model for Taiwan is unlikely to be copied by
other developing countries, policy-makers can still learn from Taiwan's experience,
especially its experience in dealing with FDI. By using the problem-solving
17 Taiwan's armed forces, about 600,000 strong, incorporated the largest percentage of the adult
population of any country in the world (equivalent to a US military force of some 10-11
million men). Its military expenditures constituted 9-1 1 per cent of the GNP, also the highest
percentage in the world (Jacoby, 1966: 119-125).
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strategies regarding economic development which were implemented by Taiwan,
an invaluable source of information can be provided for other developing countries.
Information about the strategies that Taiwan tried, and how well they worked, can
provide indications regarding possible strategies that may be pursued in other
developing countries. Taiwan's experience can also shed light on the potential
social costs and benefits of these various strategies.
1.4 Organisation of Study
Apart from the introduction (Chapter 1), and the conclusion (Chapter 12),
this research is divided into three main Parts. Overall, this research is organised
chronologically because the economic and legal development of Taiwan, in the
context of FDI, involves social change and the interaction of various factors which
cannot be fully understood unless a historical context is provided.
Part One examines the economic development of Taiwan before 1945. It is
clear that FDI in Taiwan in any meaningful sense did not begin before that date.
However, this research seeks to integrate economic policy, law and economic
development. The thesis is not concerned solely with the laws governing foreign
investment in Taiwan, but also addresses the issue of foreign investment in the
broader development of Taiwan. Therefore, Part One will provide the background
to Taiwan's development since 1945. The Chapters in Part I set out the principal
geographical features of Taiwan, its early development and the period of
colonisation by Japan (Chapters 2 to 3).
Chapter 2 examines the historical and economic background of Taiwan
under successive political regimes before 1895. It also evaluates the geographical
setting and many of the policies adopted by different political regimes that have
contributed to its economic and political evolution.
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Chapter 3 surveys the economic development of Taiwan as a Japanese
colony from 1895 to 1945, and the capital inflows during this colonial period. The
Chapter concentrates on the system of economic control exercised by the Japanese,
and is especially concerned with the economic measures adopted by the Japanese
which laid the foundations for Taiwan's post-war development.
Part Two of the thesis examines the interaction between law, policy and
economic development in the context of FDI from 1945 to 1983. This Part places
heavy emphasis on the Government's economic policies, and on its policies
regarding FDI in particular. This emphasis is necessary, of course, because
economic policy determines in principle the forms of FDI which a State wishes to
attract. In addition, economic policy may affect the results of legal reform and may
affect the likelihood of successfully attracting substantial inflows of FDI. Part Two
is divided into four chapters in accordance with Taiwan's four major economic
development phases.
Chapter 4 looks at Taiwan's post-war political and economic situation from
1945 to 1952. This Chapter focuses on how the Government adopted economic
policies to stabilise its economy after it lost the civil war, and on the
implementation of the land reforms which were to have a significant influence on
Taiwan's later success. The Government's economic doctrine - Sun Mm Chu I - is
also introduced in this Chapter, with a discussion of how it affected the
Government's policy as a whole and its policies on FDI in particular.
Chapters 5 through Chapter 7 examine law, policy, and FDI during the
primary import-substitution phase, primary export-substitution phase, and
secondary import and export substitution phase, respectively. Each Chapter
contains a brief analysis of the then current legal regime governing FDI in Taiwan.
The legal analysis is presented in the context of a broader analysis of social,
political and economic development of Taiwan. The chief purpose of these
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Chapters is to explore how the Government used law to facilitate its economic
policies, how actual FDI responded to the Government's various policy and legal
reforms, and how FDI assisted Taiwan's economic development.
After looking at the historical foundations of the present system and at the
policies that have contributed to its evolution, a detailed analysis of the current
legal regime governing FDI in Taiwan is presented in Part Three. This Part also
contains critical comments on current FDI laws as well as suggestions for further
legal reform. Part Three comprises Chapters 8 to 11.
Chapter 8 discusses the interaction of law, policy, and FDI from 1984 to the
present. The purpose of this Chapter is to shed light on Taiwan's current economic
policies and to show their impact on legal reform and on FDI performance in
Taiwan. 1984 is chosen as the cut-off point between Part Two and Three because
the Government first employed a version of its modern economic policies following
the 1970s oil crises. The essential nature of these policies have remained unchanged
from then until the present day.
Chapter 9 discusses two different types of FDI in Taiwan, known as FIA
and non-FIA investment, and examines various forms of business activity involving
FDI in Taiwan and the legal constraints affecting those forms. The differences
between FIA and Non-FIA investment usefully illustrate the Government's
qualified welcome of FDI; in addition, discussion of regulatory control of FDI and
the survey of forms of business activity is used as an introduction for further
analysis of Taiwan's legal framework in Chapters 10 and 11.
Chapter 10 deals with the concept of FDI, under both domestic investment
laws and under bilateral investment treaties concluded by Taiwan, and also with
residence aspects related to FDI. The purpose of this Chapter is to investigate the
eligibility of FDI in Taiwan and the legal requirements for admission and to set out
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the formal and substantive rules governing the admission of FDI and the formation
of business organisations which carry out investment activities.
Chapter 11 focuses on the form and content of the legal treatment of FDI,
especially regarding incentives and protection for investors. The analysis of the
municipal laws is integrated with a discussion of relevant rules of international law.
The question of the protection of foreign nationals, including the standard of
treatment for foreign investment and the possibility of expropriation of foreign
property, is examined. Other specific legal measures, such as repatriation privileges
and the waiver of securities and Company Law requirements, are considered.
Finally, when disputes arise regarding an investment, the question of what kinds of
mechanisms are available to foreign investors in Taiwan is reviewed.
1.5 Methodology
The research for this thesis was carried out from 1993 up to the date of
submission. Except for some information gathered from the 1997 Government
economic records and from newspapers, books and articles, available data is as at
the end of 1996. The law is also stated as it stood in 1996, although any very recent
legal developments known to the author are included. The selection of data for
inclusion in the thesis was based on its representative character for the subject area
or areas it covers.
A few informal interviews were conducted by the author during the course
of this research. The interviewees included academic experts, lawyers, and
government officers in Taiwan. Although the texts of the interviews are not cited
directly in this work, the thesis would not have been completed without the
stimulation and inspiration provided by the interviewees.
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For this study, I have referred to both primary and secondary sources which
related to the topic. They were collected in Taiwan and Britain from the following:
- Board of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs: Taipei, Taiwan.
- Industrial Development & Investment Centre, Ministry of Economic Affairs:
Taipei, Taiwan.
- Investment Commission, Ministry of Economics Affairs: Taipei, Taiwan.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Taipei, Taiwan
- Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive YUan: Taipei,
Taiwan.
- Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission: Taipei, Taiwan.
- Science-based Industrial Park Administration: Hsinchu, Taiwan.
- Institute of European and American Studies, Academic Sinica: Taipei, Taiwan.
- Institute of Economics, Academic Sinica: Taipei, Taiwan.
- Chung-hua Institute of Economics: Taipei, Taiwan.
- National Central Library: Taipei, Taiwan.
- Taipei City Library, Central Library: Taipei, Taiwan.
- Legislative YUan Library: Taipei, Taiwan.
- Taipei Representative Office in the U.K.: London.
- Majestic Trading Co., Ltd. (Taiwan Trade & Investment Service): London.
- Main Library and Harding Law Library, University of Binningham: Birmingham.
- Central Campus Library, University of Warwick: Coventry.
- Cambridge University Library and Squire Law Library: Cambridge.
- Bodleian library, Oxford University: Oxford.
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- Library of LSE, University of London: London.
- Library of SOAS, University of London: London.
- Library of Institute of Advanced Legal Studies: London.
There has been no use of questionnaires in the research conducted for this
thesis.
Finally, this work represents a scheme of analysis that involves reference to
historical, political, social and, of course, economic factors in all the important
areas of this study namely, foreign investment, economic development and their
legal regulation. It uses a multi-disciplinary methodology encompassing various
socio-scientific disciplines in addition to law.
1.6 Limitations of the Research
It is important to state that this research is not directed at attempting to find
out precisely, based on mathematical methods or quantitative findings, how much
of the developmental success of Taiwan can be attributed to FDI. Instead, it is
assumed that FDI, when under the control of the host state's laws, can help that
country's economic development, at least to a certain degree. The thesis is
concerned with an assessment of how FDI has responded to the Government's
policies as implemented through legal reforms, in association with many other
internal and international factors determining Taiwan's economic performance.
While it seems clear that the role of FDI in any particular economy cannot be
assessed independently of the overall working of the economic system, this thesis
will concern itself with the general development process in Taiwan only to the
extent necessary.
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1.6.1 International Law Regarding Foreign Direct Investment in Taiwan
A host state's treatment of foreign investment can involve a consideration of
issues of international law. However, there is no extensive analysis of international
questions in this thesis. Normally, even though the municipal law maybe the
primary concern of scholars researching FDI in a particular country, one would also
expect to find many relevant multilateral and bilateral treaties. However, due to
political and legal reasons, this is not the case with Taiwan. Because the 'ROC' is
not recognised as a sovereign state by most countries, Taiwan is excluded from
virtually all multilateral investment treaties and from relevant international
organisations. This is true even for bilateral investment treaties. Other States have
been reluctant to enter into bilateral investment treaties with Taiwan because of the
implications this may have for their non-recognition of Taiwan and because of the
potentially harmful effects on their relationship with the People's Republic of
China. Taiwan has concluded only 10 bilateral investment agreements as at August
1997. Therefore, many of the usual international law references are missing from
this thesis. However, rules of customary or general international law remain
relevant to the treatment of FDI in Taiwan.
This complex situation also affects the mechanisms for dispute settlement in
Taiwan (see Chapter 11). Normally, the internationalisation of dispute settlement
involving foreign investment is a prominent feature. Again, Taiwan is in an unusual
position: legally speaking, it has been excluded from the World Bank, ICSID, and
MIGA. Therefore, the techniques and methods of dispute settlement available under
the auspices of these institutions, can not be applied in the case of foreign
investment in Taiwan.
However, although Taiwan is excluded from all relevant international
organisations and is not a party to relevant international treaties, the general rules of
customary international law regarding the treatment of foreign investments, as
27
stated above, remain applicable to foreign investments in Taiwan. I will thus refer
to the relevant rules of customary international law as appropriate.
The reason this thesis does not deal with issues arising from the Agreement
on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), which is part of the WTO Code,'8
is because, under the informal consensus between WTO Members, Taiwan may get
admission to the WTO only after the PRC has joined the organisation (FCJ, August
1, 1997). Although joining international organisations remains the Government's
target (see Chapter 8), unfortunately it is unlikely that Taiwan will be granted
Membership in the WTO in the foreseeable future. Therefore, there is no practical
reason in this thesis for discuss TRIMs.
1.7 Terminology and Languages
1.7.1 Terminology
The use of certain terms employed in this thesis requires explanation.
(A) Foreign Direct Investment:
In a broad sense, foreign investment includes governmental and non-
governmental, and short- and long-term movement of assets (Schive, 1994: 413-
4l4).' In other words, foreign investment comprises both portfolio and direct
investment. Foreign direct investment in this thesis means the phenomenon of non-
governmental long-term assets movement. In addition, the word 'direct' not only
means the foreigner invests in a business in the host country but also that he
controls that business. In contrast, portfolio investment is a "movement of money
s See, generally, Trebilcock and Howse (1995).
19 Oman (1995: 73) has stated that FDI "comprises short- and long-term debt as well as equity and
reinvested earnings".
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for the purpose of buying shares in a company formed or functioning in another
country" (Sonarajah, 1994: 4)2O The distinguishing element between portfolio and
direct investment is that direct investment "cormotes a certain degree of control
over management decisions", whereas portfolio investment does not (Billet, 1993:
12). Portfolio investment includes ownership of government bonds and foreign
securities, for example, and will not be of further concern here. Further discussion
of the definition of FDI with reference to academic writers, international
instruments, and the laws of the ROC can be found in Chapter 10.
(B) Taiwan:
The Republic of China (RU C; also known as Taiwan) government currently
controls the Taiwan, Penghu (Pescadores), Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu areas and
the South Sea Islands. Officially, the ROC also comprises the Chinese Mainland,
and Taiwan is its smallest province (Gb, 1993 a: 3), comprising the main island of
Taiwan (Formosa) and the surrounding eighty-five islands, primarily the Penghu
Archipelago. Kinmen and Matsu are part of Fukien Province. The South Sea
Islands are uninhabited and form part of no province: they consist mainly of coral
reefs, sandbars and islets (DGBAS, 1989: 1).
For political reasons, since 1949 when the Nationalists were defeated by the
Communists and moved the ROC government to Taiwan, the name 'Taiwan' has
gradually displaced the official name 'Republic of China' among international
organisations and in other contexts. Nowadays, when people mention 'Taiwan' as a
country's name, they frequently do not mean 'Taiwan island' but the 'Republic of
China on Taiwan' or the 'present governmental home of the ROC'. Therefore, in
20 Shihata (1993: 2) gives portfolio investments a more elaborate description. He asserts that
portfolio investments are those investments "made through debt and equity instruments. The
debt instruments include bonds, commerical paper and certificates of deposits, while the equity
instruments are composed of country funds (both closed and opened ended), external stock
offerings (through US and global depository receipts) and direct purchases of shares in
emerging capital markets by external residents".
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order to avoid misunderstanding, and to resolve the conflicting truths of geography,
history and politics, it is necessary to define the term 'Taiwan' as used in this
thesis. In this study, 'Taiwan', before 1949, refers to geographical Taiwan (i.e.
Taiwan island), while 'Taiwan' after 1949 refers to the political entity known as
Taiwan (i.e. the Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu areas).
(C) Taiwanese:
Like the English in New Zealand, the Han Chinese formed a settler's culture
on the island of Taiwan. For the purposes of this thesis, the 21.3 million people
who live on Taiwan today2 ' are all considered to be Taiwanese no matter when they
arrived. They comprise: (1) 'aboriginal Taiwanese' (Yuan-chu-min), i.e.
descendents of the aborigines who inhabited the island before Han Chinese arrived
(see Chapter 2), and who still maintain their indigenous culture; (2) 'original
Taiwanese' (Pen-shen-jen), i.e. the southern Fukienese and Hakka people (K'ojen,
'guest people') who migrated to Taiwan before 1949, and their descendants, and (3)
'continental Taiwanese' (Wai-shen-jen) i.e., immigrants from continental China
after 1945 and their descendants.
In order to remain consistent with the definition of 'Taiwan' employed in
this research, before 1949 the term 'Taiwanese' includes the Han Chinese and
aborigines who lived on geographic Taiwan. However, the term 'Taiwanese' after
1949 comprises all people who live in political Taiwan.
(C) Japanese:
The term 'Japanese' refers to 'naichUin' (mainlanders) including those who
initially lived in Japan but then came to reside in Taiwan for short-term or long-
term purposes, as well as their descendants.
21 At end of 1996, Taiwan's population stood at 21.4 million (CEPD, 1997: 2; TSDB, 1997: 8).
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1.7.2 Languages
The use of languages in this thesis also needs to be mentioned. Language
may be seen as an indication of historical heritage (Gallin, 1966: 18). Because
Taiwan has been ruled by different regimes at different times, with different
languages and legal systems, it has been decided in this thesis to use terms in the
official language employed in Taiwan during the given period.
The terms for the institutions and agencies of the Ch'ing period will be
translated according to Mandarin Chinese; those of the Japanese period according
to Japanese. For example, the Pao-chia system in Ch'ing Taiwan was called hoko
in Taiwan when it was a colony of Japan, although the characters are the same.
Due to the fact that the official language in Taiwan is Mandarin Chinese, all
Chinese words used in the post-war period are in Mandarin rather than in the local
Taiwanese (Min-nan-hua) or Hakka languages. 22
 Mandarin Chinese is romanised
according to the Wade-Giles system rather than the Pinyin system which is used
extensively in the People's Republic of China, with the exception of certain well-
established place names, i.e., Peking for Pei-ching.
Most Chinese and all Japanese terms used in this thesis can be found in the
glossary. Where a Chinese word appears only once in the text and is immediately
explained there, it does not appear in the glossary of Chinese words.
22 Like Mandarin, Taiwanese and Hakka are usually referred to as dialects of Chinese. Taiwanese,
also called Min-nan-hua, is a Fukienese language like Amoy. Hakka is spoken by the Hakka
people (k'ojen, 'guest people') who originated in Kwangtung provence on Mainland China.
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PART ONE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN
PRIOR 1945
Foreign investment is closely linked with a country's economic
development. At the same time a country's economic development is affected by
various geographical and historical factors including natural resources and political
development. Thus, one should not neglect the importance of discussing a country's
early development, because it forms the basis for its modem development. During
its early history Taiwan was, for a long time, neglected by the Chinese Empire
because of its geographical setting. Before Taiwan was returned to the ROC in
accordance with the Cairo Declaration of 1945, Taiwan had been ruled by Dutch,
Cheng, Ch'ing and Japanese rulers. It would not be too exaggerated to say that the
history of Taiwan was a record of subjection to aggression, dismemberment and
humiliation by foreign powers. Different rulers in Taiwan have adopted different
economic policies which were determined solely by their own interests.
The main purpose of Part I is to outline these different economic policies
under the various rulers and to analyse how they affected Taiwan's economic
development. In doing this, it is first necessary to mention the geographical features
of Taiwan and to outline its early political and economic development before
Taiwan became one of Japan's colonies in 1895. We will then look at the social
conditions and economic policy that the Japanese adopted during the colonial
period and which significantly affected Taiwan's later economic development.
Thus, this Part falls into two Chapters. Chapter 2 provides background information
about Taiwan and deals with its economic and political situation before 1895.
Chapter 3 examines the Japanese colonial economic strategy and how that strategy
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shaped Taiwan's infrastructure in a way which was later to help Taiwan's post-war
recovery and transformation which will be illustrated in Part II.
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Chapter 2
Economic Development of Taiwan: Early History
Taiwan in 1996 was the third largest holder of foreign reserves and the
fourteenth greatest trading nation in the world (Chien, 1996). To appreciate fuiiy
how Taiwan has developed since the 1 890s, it is essential first to take a long look
backward. The purpose of this chapter is briefly to describe the economic
conditions existing at the end of the nineteenth century and to review the economic
and early political forces that helped to create these conditions. Geographical
features, such as location and natural resources, will first be introduced to provide a
general idea of Taiwan's natural condition. these factors have played a significant
part in its history: for example, Taiwan's unique geographic location has caused it
to change hands many times. In the second part of this chapter, political and
economic development during Taiwan's early history will be considered.
2.1 Geographical Features
2.1.1 Location and Size
It is useful to begin with some background information. Taiwan, a 'tobacco-
leaf-shaped' island, lies between 1 19°18'03" and 124°34'09" East Longitude, and
21°45'25" and 25°56'21" North Latitude (DGBAS, 1989: 1). It is almost exactly
bisected by the Tropic of Cancer, about 100 miles (160 kilometres) off the
Southeast coast of the Chinese mainland, some 665 miles (1070 kilometres) south
of Japan, and 217 miles (350 kilometres) north of the Philippine Archipelago (Gb,
1993b: 5). With a land area of approximately 14,000 square miles (36,000 square
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kilometres), Taiwan is closest in size to the Netherlands among European countries
(Wan, 1981: 131; TBMOC, 1991: 7).
The total area of the Penghu Archipelago, formerly known as the
Pescadores, is only about 50 square miles, consisting of sixty-four islets (Hsieh,
1964:6; TVA, 1994: 34). Scattered slightly east-of-centre in the Taiwan Strait, the
Penghu Archipelago occupies an important strategic position, separating Taiwan
from the Chinese mainland (U.S. Department of Navy, 1 944b: 1,4).
Kinmen and Mastu are two island groups just off the south-eastern coast of
the Chinese mainland (DGBAS, 1994). Kinmen consists of 12 islets covering an
area of 150.45 square kilometres. Mastu is situated outside the mouth of the Mm
river, with an area of about 28.8 square kilometres (11.12 square miles) (Gb,
1993a: 6-7; GlO, 1993b: 6).
2.1.2 Natural Resources and Climate
Taiwan has limited natural resources. The most important mineral resource
of the island is coal 1 . Because most coal seams are extremely thin and slope steeply,
only one-third of the reserve is economically recoverable (Hsieh, 1964: 106-111;
Rhynsburger, 1956: 152-53). The primary natural resource of Taiwan island is
therefore agricultural rather than mineral. Agricultural production depends on soil
fertility and climate conditions. Unfortunately, because only one-fourth of Taiwan's
total area is arable, 2 and because the soil has been cultivated continuously and
intensively for centuries, the available land is limited in both quantity and quality
(Ho, 1978: 1).
'Taiwan lies in the same geological belt as the other important oil-producing areas in the Far East.
In recent years small amounts of oil and nature gas reserves have been discovered in
surrounding waters and islands (KPMG, 1995: 7), and many geologists believe that the
prospect of finding additional oil and gas reserves in Taiwan or off its coast is quite good (Ho,
1978: 1).
2 Approximately three-fifths of Taiwan island is covered with lush-forested mountains (KPMG,
1995: 7).
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The sub-tropical (in the north) and tropical (in the south) climate extends
Taiwan's growing season, and allows the cultivation of several harvests a year
(KPMG, 1995: 7). The island enjoys a mean annual rainfall of more than 100
inches (2,500 millimetres) (TBMOC, 1991: 7; DGBS, 1994). However, as Taiwan
lies in the path of the east Asia monsoon system, rainfall varies both geographically
and seasonally; southern Taiwan suffers from frequent droughts, and northern
Taiwan suffers from occasional floods (Ho, 1978: 1-2; GlO, 1993b: 6). Typhoons
frequently hit Taiwan between July and September, and between 80 and 85 per cent
of the annual rainfall comes during the late spring and summer months (Chen,
1950: 5).
2.2 Early Political and Economic Development in Taiwan (Pre-
1895)
Taiwan's geographic location has caused it to change hands many times.
Taiwanese history is generally divided into four periods before Taiwan was handed
over to the Japanese in 1895. The divisions reflect changes in political control:
prehistorical, Dutch colonisation, conquest by Koxinga, and rule by Ch'ing empire.
Historically, as we will see in this section, Taiwan had a traditional peasant
economy. Toward the end of the seventeenth century, mainland Chinese peasants
began to migrate to Taiwan in large numbers, providing the manpower to settle the
island (1 993b, GlO: 7). Over the following two centuries, population, cultivated
land, and output increased slowly but steadily (Ho, 1978: 22). The economy was
traditional in the sense that it was based on traditional agricultural methods, was
fragmented, and was not highly commercialised. During the nineteenth century,
Taiwan was partially opened to foreign traders. However, contacts with the outside
world were limited to the treaty ports. For all practical purposes, at the end of the
nineteenth century Taiwan remained a closed, self-sufficient economy.
36
2.2.1 Early Settlements
Before the commencement of migration by mainland Han Chinese in the
seventeenth century, Taiwan was home to indigenous tribes. 3 Unfortunately, there
is no record of the origins of Taiwan's indigenous peoples (Hsieh, 1964: 125;
Lumley, 1976: 41; Ts'ao, 1980: 40). There are two major theories about the origins
of the indigenous tribes. Some scholars, including Alvarez (1927: 248), Lin (1930),
Liao (1951: 151) and Shih (1980: 14-16), have claimed that the indigenous people
came from Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines, a claim based upon their
language structure and cultural characteristics. Others, such as Ling (1958), Kano
(1948) and Chen (1972), have used archaeological research to suggest that the first
migration very likely came from the southern Chinese mainland. Whatever their
beginnings, the productive activities of all the indigenous tribes were connected
closely with the land; subsistence was provided 'by huntIng, fishIng, or farming
(Tuan, 1992: 30).
Historically Taiwan was first mentioned in the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. -
A.D. 221) chronicles, Hang-shu (the 'Book of History') and Tang-shih. The
inhabitants of Taiwan were described as Tao-i (island savages) in the two books
(Lumley, 1976: 41). There were no Han Chinese (Han-ren) settlers on this island at
that time (Ibid). In 1430, Taiwan4
 was claimed by Cheng Ho, the seafaring eunuch
and magistrate, in the name of the Emperor of China (TBMOC, 1991: 7). Although
precisely when the Han Chinese immigrated to Taiwan remains unknown,5
Taiwan's nine indigenous tribes, which immigrated at different times from differing places, and the
later-arriving Han Chinese have made the island 'an anthropologist's laboratory' (Cheng,
1994: 3). The nine major aboriginal tribes in Taiwan are the Atayal, Saisiyat, Bunun, Tsou,
Paiwan, Rukai, Puyuma, Ami, and Yami (Gb, 1993a: 8). Only the Yami tribe live outside
Taiwan, on Orchid Island (Gb, 1993b: 10).
Pescadores had been made a part of Chinese territory earlier than was Taiwan, in 1171 during the
Sung dynasty (1127-1279) (TVA, 1994: 34).
At least some Han Chinese from the southern Fukien Province of China (Ch'Uan-chou) migrated to
the Pescadores in the twelfth century (McAleavy, 1968: 333-334). The Mongol empire in
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presumably the earliest Han Chinese to reach Taiwan were fishermen and traders,
mostly from the southern Chinese mainland (Shih, 1980: 27-28; Ts'ao, 1980: 41-
44; Kuo, 1973: 21-22; Tuan, 1992: 30; Wang, 1992: 27-28). Japanese pirates also
visited the island occasionally. Primarily, however, the early economic history of
Taiwan is a story of migration and land settlement.6
During the Ming dynasty (1386-1644), a 'maritime prohibition policy' (hai-
chin jen-t 'sa) prohibited trade outside China by sea. Consequently, Taiwan became
an ideal shelter for Chinese and Japanese pirate-traders 7 (Tuan, 1992: 30; Hung,
1981: 25-34). The only significant flow of immigration in the Ming dynasty was
from the southern Fukien province of China during the famine of 1620, when the
famous pirate-trader Cheng Chi-lung 8 led over ten thousand starving victims to the
southern coast of Taiwan. Some of these refugees later returned to Fukien coast,
while others decided remain (Huang, 1969; Lien, 1918). With the backing of the
settlers, Cheng Ch'eng-kung, the son of Cheng Chi-lung, would go on to establish
the Cheng regime on Taiwan in 1662 (see Chapter 2.2.3 below).
Apart from the Han Chinese, the other group which attempted to claim the
island during this period was the Japanese. Japan regarded Taiwan as a base for
trading with and invading China because of its geographical location9
 (Lumley,
China (A.D. 1280-1368) later installed a local administrative official on the Pescadores (Wang,
1992: 28).
6 For discussion of Taiwan's economic history during this early period, see Davidson (1903); Wills
(1972); Wu (1956: 89-188); Nakamura (1954: 54-69); Iwao (1955: 53-60).
Under the 'maritime prohibition policy', the administrative office in the Pescadores was abolished
and the Han people were moved back to the Chinese mainland. For the sole purpose of
eliminating pirates, Ming forces were sent as far as the Pescadores and Taiwan, but the only
contact Ming had with Taiwan was thus occasional policing of the area (Ts'ao, 1980: 44-47;
Hung, 1981: 25-34; Wang, 1992: 29).
8 Cheng Chi-lung appears in the records of the Dutch East India Company as a pirate chief who
'terrorises the whole of the China coast' (Lumley, 1976: 42).
During the sixteen century Japanese traders and pirates dominated the seas of Southeast Asia. Both
forms of contact with Taiwan virtually ceased in the seclusion period (Hunter, 1989: 39).
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1976: 42; Wang, 1992: 29). In 1598 the shogun of the Tokugawa dynasty sent
Murayama, the governor of Nagasaki, to conquer the island.'° He landed at Keelung
with a force of between 3,000 and 4,000 soldiers, but it appears that the indigenous
population resisted and he failed" (Lumley, 1976: 42). However, the Japanese
continued to trade with the Chinese mainland (despite a maritime prohibition
operating in China) by smuggling transactions through Taiwan until the Bakufu'2
ordered the 'closing of Japan' (sakoku) in 1639 (Takekoshi, 1907: 49-53; Hung,
1981: 34-35, 60; Hunter, 1989: 40).
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Western powers began to
penetrate to China by sea. In 1590, the Portuguese 'discovered' Taiwan, calling it
'Ilha Formosa', or 'beautiful island' (Ts'ao, 1980: 51; Shih, 1980: 52). Under this
name, Taiwan was introduced to the Western world. After establishing a settlement
in the northern part of the island the Portuguese left (Hsieh, 1964: 140).
Because of Taiwan's strategic importance with respect to trade with China
and Japan, it became a target for control by the European maritime powers (Wang,
1992: 30). The Spanish came to Taiwan in 1626. They built forts at Keelung
harbour (which the Spanish named 'Santissima Trinidad') in 1626 and Tamshui
harbour (which the Spanish named 'Castillo') in 1629. The Spanish established
administrative headquarters on the north-eastern part of Taiwan, which was not at
that time occupied by the Dutch. In 1642, however, the Dutch drove them out.
Among the European powers, therefore, it was to be the Dutch who had the most
10 For centuries Japan had a dual system of rule, comprising a reigning emperor based at Kyoto and
a military government whose seat was normally outside the capital. Many of the military rulers
were granted by the emperor the title of shogun (Hunter, 1989:3). Shogun is an abbreviation of
seii-taishogun, meaning literally 'the great General who subdues barbarians' (Ibid: 14).
Some historians assert that the Japanese failed to conquer Taiwan because Murayama's fleet
encountered a typhoon (Wang, 1992: 30).
12 The shogun presided over a military administration known as the Bakufu (Hunter, 1989: 3).
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significant influence on Taiwan. The presence of the Portuguese and Spanish
proved to be fleeting (Hsü, 1975: 54-59, 77-78; Hung, 1981: 50-56).
2.2.2 Taiwan's Economy During the Dutch Commercial Period (1624-1662)
The Dutch occupied Taiwan from 1624 to 1662' s in an attempt to gain a
foothold in the China market,' 4
 creating the first alien, colonial regime over the
island (Wang, 1992: 31). At first, in 1622, the Dutch had occupied the Pescadores.
That move aroused the opposition of Ming China, and the subsequent conflict was
resolved in 1624 by an agreement that required the Dutch to abandon the
Pescadores but allowed them to occupy Taiwan, accompanied by a mutual
understanding that the Dutch would be permitted to trade with China (Beckmann,
1973: 34-36; Ts'ao, 1980: 56-57; Shih, 1980: 56-58). Because the Spanish had
established another regime in northern Taiwan (1626-1642) and the Pescadores
remained the jurisdiction of Ming China, Taiwan, as defined today, was
simultaneously subject to three sovereigns.
The Dutch constructed forts at Tainan, on the southern Taiwan coast, as
their headquarters (Hsü, 1975: 54). They controlled Taiwan through the vehicle of
the Dutch East India Company, which not only was a trading organisation but also
had the task of governing the island.' 5 The Dutch government gave the company
full power to rule and tax the indigenous tribes and the Han Chinese on Taiwan
(Hsieh, 1964: 141). Since the company was entrusted with diplomatic,
13 In fact, the Dutch occupied only the southern part of Taiwan in 1624. They extended their
territorial claim to the northern part of Taiwan in 1642 (P'eng and Huang, 1976: 6).
14 The Dutch occupation of Taiwan was motivated chiefly by the prospect of mercantile profits,
rather than an extension of territorial power (Angelino, 1931: 3). However, in light of evidence
that the Dutch language was taught to the indigenous people and that education was extended
to the women (Lumley, 1976: 42), it is possible that the Dutch might subsequently have
intended a permanent occupation.
15 With a small number of personnel, the company's governor of Taiwan and his council exercised
all administrative and judicial functions under the supervision of the East India government
(the central government) in Batavia (Jakarta) (Beckmann, 1973: 45-47; Shih, 1980: 80-86).
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administrative, judicial, and other functions of sovereignty by the Dutch
govermnent, in tenns of international law the Dutch Republic exercised authority
over Taiwan (Angelino, 1931: 2-3; Yanaihara, 1933: 316). Under the administration
of the company, the island quickly became a trading centre for Dutch, Chinese, and
Japanese merchants. No money was involved in these exchanges - transactions took
the form of bartering. In trade with China, the Dutch used silver as money; the
Dutch received the silver from Japan to whom they sold Chinese goods (Hsieh,
1964: 143).
Because the Dutch valued Taiwan primarily for its strategic location and the
possibility of mercantile profits, little attention was paid to developing the island's
resources. Agriculture was primitive, but sufficiently productive to create a small
surplus, and some rice and sugar were exported. Besides farming, the other major
economic activity was hunting, which supplied a flourishing trade in deerskins.'6
The Chinese population in Taiwan more than quadrupled between 1624 and
165O.' This indicates that a substantial number of Chinese moved to Taiwan
during the Dutch period. Immigration during this period is perhaps not surprising,
because at that time China was in the turmoil of a dynastic change, from the Ming
to the Ch'ing. By contrast, the civil war between the Ming and the Manchus had
enabled the Dutch to lay the foundations for their colony in Taiwan with the
minimum of internal unrest (Lumley, 1976: 42).
16 With the extinction of the deer population in the latter part of the seventeenth century, this trade
eventually came to an end (Nakamura, 1959: 24-42).
'' When the Dutch arrived in Taiwan, they reported a Chinese population (largely concentrated in
the vicinity of Tainan) of 25,000 (Davidson, 1903: 13). In the 1650s the Chinese population in
the Tainan area was about 100,000. Scholars assume that the figures probably underestimate
the Chinese population in Taiwan at that time (Ho, 1978; 9).
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In 1656 the Dutch reported that 7,187 hectares of land was cultivated.' 8
 A
significant proportion of that land was planted with sugar cane, 19 exceeding the
requirements of the island's population. This was because ocean-going vessels
extended the market for sugar beyond the confines of the island. Therefore, even in
this early period, some specialisation of production was evident (Iwao, 1955: 56).
Characteristically, colonial powers find that in order to make a profit from a
colony, trade is more efficient than agriculture, and taxation is more effective still
(Beckmami, 1973: 45-47; Shih, 1980: 80-86). Taxing the inhabitants of the colony
involves little capital and no risk. The Dutch East India Company recognised this
fact, and imposed heavy taxes on the people of Taiwan (Hsieh, 1964: 144). Before
the Dutch arrived on the island, the Chinese in Taiwan enjoyed free trade with the
Japanese and were untaxed. The Dutch established a tax on exports, at that time
mainly on deerskins and sugar. Because of the tax, Japanese and Dutch relations
deteriorated to the point that trade between the two countries was discontinued
(Riess, 1897: 14-16).
The Dutch also imposed a land tax, varied in accordance with different
20	 .grades of land. In addition, the Dutch required Taiwanese people to pay fees for
protection from attack by the indigenous tribes (Hsieh, 1964: 144). Moreover, every
inhabitant, including Han Chinese and members of the indigenous tribes, who had
reached the age of seven years had to pay a poll tax (Ho, 1978: 10). Apart from the
taxes mentioned above, each hunter had to pay a license fee for hunting (Chow,
1956: 64). Other taxes were numerous: even fishermen were obliged to turn over a
18 Some scholars has suggested that this figure may be underestimated, since some cultivated land
undoubtedly escaped the Dutch registration (Ho, 1978: 9).
19 The Dutch reported 1,573 out of 7,187 hectares of cultivated land was used for growing sugar
cane (Tuan, 1992: 32).
20 Farms were classified as upper, middle, and low grade by the Dutch (Ho, 1978: 9).
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portion of their catch to the Dutch company and to pay fees on all shipments of fish
out of Taiwan (J-Isieh, 1964: 144).
During the late years of Dutch rule, as Dutch trade with China became
difficult because of problems in acquiring merchandise from wartime China, Dutch
interest in the island gradually decreased (Angelino, 1931: 5). In 1662, the Dutch
were finally ousted from Taiwan by the Cheng forces (Beckmann, 1973; 56).
2.2.3 Taiwan's Economy during the Cheng Regime Period (1 662-1683)
During the seventeenth century, when the Manchus invaded China and
toppled the Ming dynasty, Taiwan became an island of refuge for patriotic Ming
loyalists, led by Cheng Cheng-kung, who established the island's first
(independent) Chinese government 2 ' (TBMOC, 1991: 7). Cheng introduced
Chinese laws and customs and the Chinese form of government and transplanted
Chinese tradition to the island (Hung, 1981: 123-27, 177-79, 229-38; HsU, 1975:
80). With Cheng came not only his army and its dependants, but also those who
shared his political allegiance (Ts'ao, 1954: 76). Others were attracted by the
inducement of free land and the exemption of land tax for three years (Davidson,
1903: 50-5 1; Kuo, 1954: 56-58).
When Cheng's regime ended in 1683, the Chinese population was estimated
at between 200,000 and 350,000 (Ho, 1978: 10). Most of the immigrants probably
came to Taiwan either with Cheng in 1661 or immediately after his arrival, because
in later years the Manchus ordered the withdrawal of all mainland inhabitants living
21 Although Taiwan was claimed by the Chinese in 1430 during the Ming dynasty, Taiwan was not
part of one of the provinces of China until the Ch'ing dynasty. Also, there was no Chinese
government in Taiwan until 1662. The struggle between the Ming dynasty and the Manchu
forces ended with the establishment of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1644. Cheng Cheng-kung and his
army of 25,000 represented the last major force still loyal to the Ming dynasty (Ho, 1978: 10).
However, the Ming government no longer existed in China when Cheng's forces attacked the
Dutch on Taiwan in 1661. Therefore, after 1662 the Cheng government became, defacto, the
supreme authority on the island. Subsequently, Taiwan was recognised as an independent state
by Europeans (P'eng and Huang, 1976: 9-10, 23; Hsieh, 1964: 151).
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within ten miles of the coastline toward the interior in order to prevent Cheng from
receiving supplies and other assistance (Ho, 1978: 10; Hsieh, 1964: 152).
Emigration to Taiwan from the Chinese mainland was also prohibited.22
During Cheng's regime, the development of agriculture was emphasised in
order that the island should become self-sufficient in food. Koxinga (as Cheng is
known in the West) quartered his troops with farmers, explaining that in peace
soldiers would work on the land. It may be claimed that Koxinga's soldier-farmer
policy laid the essential foundation of Chinese colonisation in Taiwan, just as in the
1950s Chen Cheng's 'Land to the Tiller' policy formed the basis for Taiwan's
present economic strength (Lumley, 1976: 44). During the period of rule by the
Cheng Cheng-kung family, the farm tax was kept at the same level as that imposed
by the Dutch, even though Cheng's time saw improved methods of cultivation and
increased production. A poll tax was collected from whoever reached the age of ten
years (Ho, 1978: 11). The taxes imposed by the Cheng family were still considered
too high by the Ch'ing dynasty when it later took over the island (Hsieh, 1964: 144,
152).
The Han Chinese on Taiwan, unlike those in China, did not despise the
West and thus maintained a pragmatic relationship with European powers.23
Manufacturing was also promoted during Cheng's regime. Sugar refining was
encouraged, and the manufacture of tiles began. Instead of the traditional baking
method, a sun-drying method was used; this laid the foundation for a salt
production industry on the island. Some shipbuilding was initiated (Hsieh, 1964:
152). Brisk trade was carried on with neighbouring areas. Under Cheng's efficient
22 And, in practice, made difficult as well as illegal by the Manchu maritime prohibition of 1656,
which obstructed travel to Taiwan (Wang, 1992: 34).
23 The traditional Chinese regarded Westerns as 'barbarians' and considered that international trade
should be subsumed under the tributary system (Hung, 1981: 208-210). After Ch'ing China
conquered Taiwan in 1683, Taiwan's prosperous international trade ended (Hsü, 1975: 102).
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administration, the foundations for Taiwan's later economic development were
established.
In 1683, the Ch'ing dynasty government attacked Taiwan, and the ruler
Cheng Ko-shuang, the grandson of Cheng Cheng-kung, unconditionally
surrendered to the Manchus (Ch'ing dynasty) (Ho, 1978: 10; Hsieh, 1964: 153).
The Cheng family regime lasted from 1662 to 1683, only one-tenth of the time
covered by the Ch'ing dynasty, which ruled on Taiwan from 1683 to 1895. During
the Cheng period, because of hostility between the Ch'ing and the Cheng Taiwan
was effectively an independent state; under the Ch'ing dynasty Taiwan was part of
Fukein province in China (Hsieh, 1964: 151).
2.2.4 Taiwan's Economy in the Ch'ing Dynasty (1683-1895)
From 1683, when Taiwan was incorporated as a prefecture of the Chinese
empire, until 1895 when it was ceded to Japan, the island remained under the rule
of the Ch'ing dynasty. Taiwan experienced a significant degree of economic change
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During this period, the traditional
agricultural mode of production that existed in mainland China was gradually
reproduced in Taiwan as thousands of Chinese migrated, sometimes illegally, to the
island.24
The Chinese immigrants were either seasonal workers from Kwangtung or
permanent settlers from the southern coast of Fukien (Tuan, 1992: 38-39). The
arrival of these settlers provided Taiwan with the additional manpower needed to
exploit its natural resources. In 1811, when each household was required by the
24 Unrest and revolt in Taiwan would sometimes lead the Manchus to prohibit migration from
mainland China to Taiwan (Tai, 1979: 274). Until 1760 immigrants were not allowed to bring
their families. On occasion they were given permission to send for their families once they
became settled (Wang, 1992: 43-44).
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pao-chia system25
 to register its members, a Chinese population of 2,003,861 was
recorded (Ho, 1978: 11).
Although Chinese agricultural techniques were traditional, their introduction
to and adoption by Taiwan in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was
undoubtedly a major development in Taiwan's economic history. At the same time,
the traditional approach was not conducive to technological change, and
productivity increased only slowly in the Ch'ing period (Myres, 1972: 373-75).
Despite this, the Chinese immigrant farmers still generated a small surplus for
export.
Sugar, as an export item, was more significant than rice. It is common
knowledge that in the Ch'ing period Taiwan supplied north China with sugar and
that substantial quantities were also exported to Japan. The crushing of cane was
done by stone rollers in primitive mills, of which 1,400 existed in the nineteenth
century (Myres, 1891: 16). The sugar industry remained in a primitive state until
the Japanese modernised it with new production techniques and mechanisation in
the early decades of the twentieth century. Sugar forfeited its position as leading
export to tea in the 1 870s, and indeed for much of the last half of the nineteenth
century the level of activity in the tea industry determined the general economic
prosperity of the island. Unlike sugar, the tea industry developed as a direct
consequence of the opening of trade with the West (Myres, 1891: 18): in 1866,
John Dodd, a British trader, was successful in producing oolong tea in Taiwan that
was acceptable on the world market (Ho, 1978: 21).
Until the last half of the nineteenth century, Taiwan's external trade was
solely in the hands of Chinese merchants, operating largely from Amoy. 26
 The legal
25 The pao-chia system is a mutual responsibility scheme for holding both the village and the family
responsible for the conduct of their members.
26 Amoy is situated opposite Kinman and is part of Fukien province.
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exclusion of foreign merchants from Taiwan ended in 1858, when the Treaty of
Tientsin27 designated Anping as a treaty port. Subsequent treaties forced other
Taiwanese ports open to foreign trade.28
The Manchu (Ch'ing) government, consistent with its behaviour in other
parts of China, showed little interest in developing or modernising Taiwan. The
only significant attempt by the government to promote economic development
came toward the end of the nineteenth century. In 1887, the Manchu government
altered its attitude toward the island, in response to the French threat to Taiwan,29
and elevated it from a prefecture to a province (Chang, 1980: 233- 35). Liu Ming-
ch'uan was appointed Taiwan's first governor. Instead of being prohibited or
passively allowed, immigration was actively encouraged. During this time the area
of cultivated land on the island expanded northward, where previously it had been
confined to the south (Hsieh, 1964: 153-154). The seven years of Liu's
administration (1884-1891)° represented the first and only serious effort by a
Ch'ing official to modernise the island3 ' and to provide it with the bare minimum
of infrastructure needed for economic development. Numerous ambitious economic
projects were initiated by the governor (Chu, 1963: 37-53), but all Liu's projects
were eventually concluded successfully only later by the Japanese (see Chapter 3
27 The Treaty of Tientsin were concluded at Tientsin, China, June 26-29, 1858, between China on
one side, and the United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia on the other. Under its terms
China opened eleven more ports in addition to those opened on the mainland under the Treaty
of Nanking (1842); permitted legations at Peking; allowed trade; and permitted Christian
missions to the interior of China (Hertslet and Parkes, 1908: 86- 97).
28 In 1860 the Treaty of Peking opened Tamshui as a treaty port, and three years later Keelung was
added as a supplementary port to Tamshui and Takao (present day Kaohsiung) and as a
supplementary port to Anping (Hertslet and Parkes, 1908: 112-114).
29 The French landed in Indo-china in 1859, and in 1884 proposed the occupation of Taiwan
following the peace treaty at the end of the Franco-Chinese war (Lumley, 1976: 45).
30 From 1884 to 1887, Liu, then the governor of Fukien, administered Taiwan as a prefecture of
Fukien.
31 Through Liu's efforts Taiwan was to build the first railway in China (Lumley, 1976: 46).
'I'
below). The lack of political and financial support from Peking was probably the
main reason for Liu's failure.
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Chapter 3
Capital Inflow and Economic Development in Taiwan
During the Japanese Colonial Period, 1895-1945
This chapter focuses on Taiwan's economic development during the
Japanese colonial period, 1895-1945, and the manner in which the Japanese
colonial government operated Taiwan's economy.
Japanese imperialism rose in the second half of eighteenth century at a time
when the Ch'ing dynasty in China was confronted by large-scale uprisings within
China. Internal disorder severely crippled the capacity of the Ch'ing empire to cope
with the growing strength of the foreign countries surrounding China. When the
Ch'ing rulers lost the Sino-Japanese war, Taiwan became Japan's first colony. The
Japanese had no intention to develop Taiwan's industry. In order to fulfil the
economic slogan of 'an agricultural Taiwan and an industrial Japan', the Japanese
intensified Taiwan's agriculture and improve its relevant infrastructure. The
majority of capital inflow during this period was from Japan. It played a crucial part
in developing Taiwan's production infrastructure, which was later to help Taiwan's
post-World War II recovery and industrial development, to be discussed further in
Chapter 4.
3.1. The Rise of Japanese Imperialism and the Japanese
Occupation of Taiwan
The distinctive nature of Taiwan's colonial experience can be traced back to
the unique features of Japanese capitalism and imperialism and the ways in which
they impacted on Taiwan. The origins of Japan's imperial ambitions lie in Western
imperialism,' of which Japan was itself a victim (Myres and Peattie, 1984;
Cumings, 1984: 1-40). During the nineteenth century, the European and American
Powers had forced China and Japan to sign unequal treaties ceding extraterritorial
rights and controls over Chinese and Japanese tariffs. 2 However, the Japanese
response differed from that of China. In 1868 the Japanese overthrew the 250-year-
old Tokugawa shogunate and restored the Meiji emperor, thus ending Japan's 200-
year commitment to an isolationist policy (Allen, 1963: 29). Their overriding goal
was 'national wealth and military strength' (fukoku kyoehei) in order to retain
independence and to achieve security. Internal development and full independence
were intertwined objectives (Gold, 1 988b: 102).
Gold (1988b: 102) has argued that it would be an error to explain Japanese imperialism by a
simplistic application of Lenin's (1939) analysis of Western imperialism. Lenin asserts that
imperialism is first an economic phenomenon: international monopoly-capital "colonises" the
world through markets, investments and materials; State action comes afterwards. Gold has
claimed that in the case of Japan, the two phases occurred simultaneously. The initial impetus
behind Japan's imperialist activities was not only economic but also political. Capitalism in
Japan was still fragile, owing to the economy's shortage of materials, capital and technology,
when the nation embarked on imperialist ventures.
2 In the Treaty of Aigun of 1858, the Ch'ing government signed away the Wu-su-li (Ussuri) area to
the Tsar (Halliday, 1975: 16). In 1875 Russia and Japan signed a treaty under which Japan
renounced its claims to any part of Sakhalin in return for possession of the Kurile Island
(Amidon, 1959). British attempts to force China to allow British merchants to sell opium in
China led to the First Opium War of 1840-42 (Halliday, 1975: 16). Ch'ing China lost the war
and was obliged to sign the Treaty of Nanking (1842). The treaty compelled China, among
other things, to open five ports to British trade, to extend official recognition and diplomatic
relations on an equal basis, and to pay reparations (Article II, III, IV, V and VI of the Treaty).
After the granting of privileges to Britain in China, other Western countries made similar
demands. The Ch'ing government responded to these demands by signing treaties which
provided foreign countries variously with leased territories, or extra-territoriality, or foreign
control of custom tariffs, or the exercise of foreign authority over Chinese territories (I-Isieh,
1985: 9). These were the so-called 'unequal treaties' which the Chinese subsequently sought to
annul over about half a century. Most of the unequal treaties were abolished as the result of the
Second World War, in which China was one of the Allies. The United States and Britian
abolished their extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, in accordance with their treaties with
China dated 11 January 1943 (Hsieh, 1985: 22- 23).
In 1854 American Commodore Perry had forced Japan to open two ports to Americans
(Lumley, 1976: 45). There were the first Japanese treaties with Western powers (Halliday,
1975: 18). Agreements similar to Peny's followed with other powers. The 'opening of the
ports' came in 1858, when Japan was obliged to sign unequal economic with the United States,
followed in rapid order by Holland, Russia, Britian and France. These treaties exposed Japan to
foreign trade on very unfavourable terms (Halliday, 1975: 17).
Analysing the primary sources of Western power, Japan's new leaders
undertook a thorough restructuring of the nation's political and social system.
Central to this project was economic development, particularly industrialisation. In
the absence of an indigenous capitalist class, the Meiji state itself set goals for
capital accumulation, investment, and production. After establishing several new
enterprises, it sold some of them off to local private investors, most of whom were
large bankers (Hirschmeier, 1964).
The need for raw materials to fuel its growing industry and population was
one impetus for Japan's abandonment of isolationism. It appears, however, that
there was no similar search for foreign investments and markets in order to resolve
problems of capital surplus and a falling rate of profits. Other, primarily political
and military, reasons offer better explanations for Japan's change of orientation
(Duus, 1984: 125-7 1). Japan wanted to establish a cordon sanitaire, which included
Korea and China, against Western imperialists (Gold, 1990: 33). It was also
determined to demonstrate to the West that it was a power to reckon with; Japan
had successfully industrialised and militarised and felt it deserved to be treated as
an equal. Further, it wanted to regain sovereignty and tariff autonomy. 3 Establishing
overseas colonies, as the Western powers had done, would be convincing proof of
its achievements. There was also an element of missionary zeal in this: Japan would
teach other Asians the benefits of modernisation (Takekoshi, 1907).
Few areas of the world remained to be colonised, and Japan was not in a
position to wrest a colony from a Western power. However, Japan could gain
territories nominally controlled by its weak neighbour, China. Thus Japan's
colonial ambitions focused on Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria (Gold, 1988a: 102).
Although Japan was not colonised by any of the Western powers, between 1853 and 1868 various
Western powers forced the Bakufu (central government) to enter into diplomatic relations and
to open major ports to trade. The Western powers also landed several thousand troops in Japan
and engaged in a number of sizeable military operations, including the opening of the Straits of
Shimonoseki in 1864 (Halliday, 1975: 18).
By 1895, Taiwan was ripe for Japanese conquest. The Japanese regarded the
island as an independent territory separate from mainland China, which indeed had
been ruled briefly by the Japanese in the past (Wu, 1990: 270-72; Mukoyama,
1987: 15-18). In 1874, the Japanese had sought to take Taiwan from China, and had
forced China to make explicit its then vaguely-formulated claim to the island
(Long, 1991: 23; Gold, 1990: 33).
The first Sino-Japanese war over Korea broke out in 1894 (Allen, 1963:
170). China was engaged in putting down a rebellion in Korea, which it still treated
as a tributary. Japan joined the war, notionally to protect Korean independence but
in reality to further its own interests in Korea and China (Long, 1991: 23-24; Gold,
1990: 33). The war was fought at sea and in Manchuria, and ended in the defeat of
Imperial China (Ho, 1978: 91). Following the negotiations that ensued at
Shimonoseki, the Ch'ing government ceded Taiwan to Japan 5 (Lumley, 1976: 47).
For the next fifty years, Taiwan was a Japanese colony.
The Japanese colonisation of Taiwan differed from the earlier phase of
Dutch colonisation in a number of ways. First, the Dutch colonised Taiwan in the
seventeenth century for immediate commercial profit; political sovereignty was
only a secondary consideration. The Japanese, by contrast, considered political
control to be more important than commercialisation. Secondly, Protestant
missionary clergymen played a central role in administration during the Dutch
period. The policeman, however, was the most important figure in the fulfilment of
colonial aims during the Japanese period. Thirdly, the Dutch authorities paid more
Japan declared war against China on 3 August, 1894, and a British Proclamation of Neutrality was
issued on the 7th of the same month (Parry, 1979: vol. 181: 217).
In the peace agreement formalised as the 'Treaty of Shimonoseki' of 17 April 1895, Japan secured
recognition of Korean independence (Article 1), the opening of four more treaty ports (Article
6), the right of Japanese nationals to build factories in China (Article 6), a sizeable indemnity
(Article 4), and the cession of Taiwan, the Pescadores, and the Liaodong Peninsula to Japan
(Gold, 1990: 33; Long, 1991: 24; Pariy, 1979: vol. 181, p. 217- 224; MacMurray, 1921: 18).
attention to Taiwan's exports than to her imports. In the Japanese period, however,
Taiwan's trade was centred on imports of manufactured goods, and on the export of
agricultural raw material to Japan. Fourthly, during the Dutch colonial phase
foreign trade was mainly in 'goods', in contrast to the Japanese period when that
trade was centred on 'capital' (Hsieh, 1964: 162).
Over the course of five decades, the Japanese effected profound changes in
Taiwan. As Ho (1978: 25) has stated, "The transition from a neglected Chinese
province to a Japanese colony in effect turned Taiwan from an essentially closed to
an open economy, and economic development was a consequence of this opening-
up process." Most importantly, the Japanese colonial government, with objectives
vastly different to those of the Imperial Chinese government, was actively involved
in developing the island. Under colonialism, Taiwan experienced a period of steady
growth (Ho, 1978: 26). In the light of its continued growth after World War II,
Taiwan's economic development under Japanese may seem less significant. But,
even today, many less-developed countries have not been able to sustain a growth
rate comparable to that achieved by colonial Taiwan. The rate of growth achieved
by Taiwan during the colonial period was a major advance upon its earlier pattern
of development (Ho, 1978: 26-28).
3.2. Industrialisation during the Japanese Colonial Period
The colonial occupation of Taiwan can be divided into four stages, each
covering approximately a decade. The first decade of Japanese rule was spent in
pacification, the next four decades in modemisation.
3.2.1 Initial Measures
During the first stage of modernisation (i.e., the second decade), the
Japanese made a land survey, standardised the measurement and money systems,
brought under government monopoly the manufacture and sale of a number of
important products, introduced strict police control, began collecting census data,
and made an ethnological study of the indigenous inhabitants. The first four
measures, in particular, helped to create a stable base for subsequent economic
development.
In order to administer land taxes effectively, the clarification of land
ownership throughout the island was essential (Tu'an, 1992; 62; Hsieh, 1964: 163-
164). The Japanese established a land survey bureau to carry out this policy. After
the survey was completed, the unit of land measurement was standardised, land
ownership was clarified and tax collection became efficient. The survey was not
limited to the agricultural land, but included forested areas also. As a result of the
survey, the Japanese authorities gained precise data necessary for economy
planning. In general, the Japanese authorities did not confiscate any land which
they required, but paid large sums for it. By the end of the Japanese period,
ownership of nearly 80 per cent of cultivated land and nearly 95 per cent of forested
land in Taiwan lay in the hands of the Japanese government (I-Jsieh, 1964: 164).
The Japanese policies of standardising the measurement of commercial
goods and of setting up a money system were designed to promote the goal of
Japanisation (Tu'an, 1992: 62-63). During Chinese rule, units of measurement had
differed from place to place in Taiwan. In 1895 the Japanese system of
measurement was introduced, and in 1911 the Japanese currency was adopted
(Hsieh, 1964: 164).
In order to increase its revenues, the Japanese monopolised industries
producing salt, camphor, opium, tobacco, and alcoholic beverages in Taiwan. These
monopolies were responsible for two-thirds of the Japanese income from Taiwan
(Hsieh, 164: 164).
The investigation of land ownership in Taiwan, standardisation of measures
and money, and the monopolies assured over certain products all depended on the
colonial government, especially on the police. The Japanese installed the hoko
system of local commiftees, based on the traditional Chinese 'pao-chia' system6
(Long, 1991: 27). The hoko system demanded joint responsibility from every 100
households to prevent crime, organise community services and to prevent
subversion (Ch'en, 1970: 144-48). Although hoko members were Taiwanese, the
Japanese police were able to keep a close watch on the elected leaders (Gold,
1988a: 103). The police had a great deal of power, and were central to Japan's
success in controlling Taiwan. They were charged not only with keeping order, but
also with assigning permission to cultivate certain crops, arranging for the use of
irrigation facilities, recruiting soldiers, collecting taxes, conducting censuses,
employing labour for road-building, and supervising work (Hsieh, 1964: 163).
3.2.2 The Second Stage - Expansion of Transportation in Taiwan
As a corollary of industrialisation, it was essential to increase Taiwan's
transportation facilities. The government subsidised a steamship company, which
operated a line between Taiwan and Japan. Later the company operated additional
lines to other parts of Asia, and in time a second company entered the shipping
business. Recognising their importance to Taiwan's economy, the Japanese
modernised the island's seventeen harbours (Gold, 1990: 36).
Nearly a decade before the Japanese took over Taiwan, the Chinese built a
62-mile railroad in the north. The Japanese government built a new, 250 miles line,
connecting the two largest ports, Keelung on the northern coast with Kaohsiung on
the south-western tip, and passing through a number of other major cities (Hsieh,
1964: 165-166; Gold, 1990: 36).
6 
'Pao-chia' is a conventional Imperial Chinese method of control in which 'neighbourhood'
committees act as the state's eyes and ears at a grassroots level.
The construction of highways in Taiwan was begun by a Japanese
expeditionary army. The first highway was completed in 1913. At the end of the
Japanese period, Taiwan had about 2500 miles of highway (Hsieh, 1964; 167).
3.2.3 The Third Stage - A New Irrigation System and the Intensification of
Agriculture
In the development of Taiwan's agriculture, the key to overcoming the
handicap of uneven rainfall has been irrigation. The Japanese provided that key
when they began to use cement for building dams. The Japanese started to build the
Chia-nan irrigation system in 1920 and completed it in 1930. This irrigation system
converted 67,050 acres of poor land, which previously had suffered from floods and
drought, into the most fertile farmland of the country. The reservoir constructed as
part of the system was sufficient to irrigate about 457,000 acres of land, and was
one of the largest reservoirs in the Far East (Hsieh, 1964: 168-169).
After the system became operative, the land used for growing rice increased
by more than 74 per cent, and that used for producing sugar-cane by 30 per cent
(Sun, 1956). With irrigation the production of rice per unit area nearly doubled, and
the total rice production increased more than three times (Hsieh, 1964: 171). The
value of sugar cane production per unit area almost tripled and the value of its total
production rose more than 300 per cent (Hsieh, 1964: 170). This intensification of
Taiwan's agricultural production was a deliberate Japanese policy, undertaken for
the sake of Japan's own interests.
(A) Rice
The Japanese not only built an irrigation system; but also, with the intention
to feed Japan's large population, they established new agricultural experimental
stations and paid small subsidies to new rice producers. On the basis of the increase
in both acreage and production, one might conclude that Taiwanese farmers were
much better off than they had been before. They were certainly more productive.
However, as Gradjdanzev (1942: 54-56) has pointed out, the actual cost of
production was more than 33 per cent higher. The farmer increasingly needed
money to pay taxes and to defray the cost of irrigation and fertilisers. Thus the
additional wealth they generated was not retained by the agricultural industry.
(B) Sugar
The huge increase in production of sugar cane and the development of the
sugar industry are considered two of the most spectacular achievements of the
Japanese occupation of Taiwan. A special sugar bureau was established in 1902,
and at the same time a sugar industry encouragement ordinance was promulgated.
The Japanese government granted subsidies to encourage the industry. Within 30
years (1905-1935), the sugar-cane producing area increased almost five-fold, the
total production thirteen-fold, and the yield per acre went up by a factor of two and
four-tenths (Hsieh, 1964: 173). Apart from irrigation, much of this increase was
attributable to World War I, and the consequent increase in demand for sugar.
During the war the Japanese increased the area used for the cultivation of sugar
cane in Taiwan to more than six times that in 1902.
3.2.4 The Fourth Stage - Industrial Development
In accordance with the Japanese policy of 'An agricultural Taiwan and an
industrial Japan', the Japanese did not at first seek to develop Taiwan's industry to
any great degree. Initial advances were mainly in the area of sugar refinement.
Other activities followed in time, however, and by 1939 the gross production levels
of industry and agriculture were about equal, with industry slightly ahead (PDAF,
1950: 30-3 1).
At the beginning of the Japanese period only 24 factories existed in Taiwan;
30 years later the number had risen more than fifty-fold (Hsieh, 1964: 177). In the
following decade that figure itself nearly tripled. However, the factories were in
general small. Not until World War II compelled the Japanese to develop the
island's chemical, metal and other strategic industries did Taiwan's industries
become major operations (Chow, 1958: 68).
Long before World War II, the Japanese realised that the key to the island's
industrial development was cheap hydroelectric power. A project was devised in
1931 for the utilisation of Sun Moon Lake, and the Cho-shui River which drains it,
to generate power (Hsieh, 1964: 177). The Sun Moon power plant is perhaps the
greatest achievement of the Japanese in Taiwan. With it the Japanese laid the
foundation for further industrialisation of the island, by creating the capacity to
support aluminium, chemical, and steel alloy plants.
3.3. Japanese Economic Strategy in Taiwan during the Colonial
Period
It is useful to think of Taiwan's colonial economy as comprising two
sectors: agriculture and non-agriculture. The strategy of the colonial authorities was
to develop Taiwan in order to complement Japan; thus emphasis was placed on the
economic integration of the two territories. The practical effect of this was that
Taiwan became an agricultural appendage of Japan, helping to feed its growing
industrial population. The agricultural sector produced and exported sugar and rice
to Japan (Allen, 1963: 111). Japan, in turn, exported manufactured (consumer and
capital) goods to Taiwan's non-agricultural sector. Taiwan's non-agricultural sector
then used these imported goods to generate industrial products and commercial
services for Taiwan's agricultural sector. We can represent the economic structure
as follows:
Figure 3.1 Japanese Triangular Model
Japan
Manufacturing
Sugar/Rice	 Goods
Taiwan	 Taiwan Non-
Agricultural	 agricultural
Sector	 Sector
ucts/Seniices
The economic objective of the this triangular mode of operation was for Japan to
extract from Taiwan what Paauw and Fei (1973: 5) have termed an "export
surplus", i.e. "the surplus from exports over and above imports required to maintain
the existing level of production". Part of the surplus was reinvested to increase
Taiwan's productive capacity, but much of it was transferred to Japan (Ho, 1978:
32).
Taiwan's triangular mode of operation, and its success in generating an
"export surplus", are evident from its trade statistics. Nearly all Taiwan's exports
were primary products, such as rice and sugar (see Table A). Between 1900 and
1939 Taiwan's export volume increased more than 18-fold, and by the late 1920s
Japan was already absorbing 80-90 per cent of this growing trade (PBAS, 4-11;
DG: The Annual Taiwan Trade Statistics; GI: The Trade of China). Imports
increased less rapidly, but a preponderant share of them also came from Japan: 68
per cent in the 1910s and 1920s, and over 80 per cent in the 1930s (ibid). However,
up to 70 per cent of Taiwan's imports were industrial in nature, and nearly all were
supplied by Japan (see Table 3.1).
The strength of the economic bond between Taiwan and Japan, and the
significance of one to the other, are best seen by examining Taiwan's two major
export items, rice and sugar. 7 Taiwan was Japan's major supplier of sugar. Nearly
all Taiwan's rice and sugar exports went to Japan. In every year over 90 per cent of
Taiwan's sugar output was exported, and in the 1930s it provided nearly 75 per cent
of the sugar consumed in Japan (Lockwood, 1954: 536). As Taiwan was densely
populated and because rice was its staple food, it was in a less favourable position
to supply rice to Japan on a large scale. Nevertheless, in the 1930s about half of
Taiwan's rice output was exported to Japan, accounting for over 30 per cent of
Japan's import requirements (Ho, 1978: 31).
Taiwan was an economic asset to Japan not only because it was a source of
food and raw materials, but also because Japan was able to obtain Taiwan's primary
products without exchanging an equivalent value of manufactured goods. Except
for the first decade of its occupation, Taiwan exported substantially more than it
imported (Ho, 1978: 31). 8
 Because Taiwan's trade was mostly with Japan, the
export surplus was essentially to Japan's advantage.
These two commodities, by value, accounted for 50-70 per cent of Taiwan's total exports in the
colonial period (Ho, 1978: 31).
8 From 1916 to 1944 Taiwan's export surplus as a share of its exports averaged 26 per cent (ibid).
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Table 3.1: Comparison of Exports and Imports, 1900-39
(Annual averages as percentage of total)
1900-1909 19 10-1919 1920-1929 1930-1939
EXPORTS
Food	 76.2	 77.3	 82.9	 84.5
Rice	 23.2	 14.5	 19.1	 25.9
Sugar	 27.8	 50.6	 50.6	 46.8
Other	 25.2	 12.2	 13.2	 11.8
	
Other primary	 21.2	 11.5	 9.7	 8.7
products
Mfg. misc, products	 2.6	 11.2	 7.4	 6.8
IMPORTS
	
Food and other	 29.2	 28.2	 31.4	 34.1
primary products
	
Mfg. misc, goods
	 70.8	 61.8	 58.6	 65.9
3.4. The Colonial Government and the System of Economic
Control
Economic growth in the colonial period was initiated and sustained through
government efforts. Besides maintaining stability and order, and importing the
intermediate goods which are so vital for economic development, the colonial
government also introduced several economic programmes designed to promote
development through its fiscal instruments and the preferential treatment of
Japanese investors. As well as all this, the government influenced income
distribution and ensured that the 'export surplus' generated by the economy
remained in Japanese control (Ho, 1978: 32).
Source: Taiwan Government-General, The Annual Taiwan Statistics. 1937 and 1938 are excluded
because trade data for these years are incomplete.
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The colonial government had two principal economic objectives: (1) to
promote the production and export of sugar and rice and (2) to keep economic
power in Japanese hands. These objectives followed from the government's
commitments to developing Taiwan's economy to complement Japan's, and to
making colonisation 'profitable', by generating an ongoing export surplus. In
practice, they meant the government was committed to making the triangular mode
of operation work and be profitable for Japan. Much of what the Japanese colonial
government did in Taiwan can be explained, directly or indirectly, in terms of these
objectives (Ho, 1978: 32; Ranis and Schive, 1985:88).
The Government-General (Sotokufu) was the island's foremost investor
during the colonial period. On average it allocated 40 per cent of its total current
expenditures to capital fonnation. This amounted to 20 per cent of the exhaustive
expenditures of all levels of government. The largest share of fixed capital went to
transport and communications (Taiwan Government-General Statistic Book). Next
in importance was its direct investment in agriculture (Ho, 1978: 35).
Besides promoting agricultural production and exports, the colonial
government's second concern was to keep economic power in Taiwan under
Japanese control. Both openly and covertly, the government encouraged the
concentration of economic power in the corporate sector and tried to ensure that this
sector was owned and controlled by Japanese. The most effective way for Japan to
maintain Taiwan's dependence was to cut Taiwan's trade relations with other
countries. The most convenient means to this end was to increase the customs duty
on Taiwan's trade with other countries. In 1910 the Japanese abolished the customs
barrier between Japan and Taiwan, and at the same time raised Taiwan's trade
tariffs on imports from third parties (Chang, 1951: 60). It is worth noting here that
between 1897 and 1944 there were only 12 years in which imports exceeded
exports; there were 36 years in which exports outstripped imports. Imports from
Japan were handled by the Japanese, but exports from Taiwan to Japan were also
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monopolised by the Japanese. Thus the native inhabitants of Taiwan in practice had
no foreign trade, only trade within the island and with Japan.
The sugar companies which dominated Taiwan's corporate sector were
well-supported by the colonial government. In 1905, by government decree, the
sugar-producing areas in Taiwan were divided into supply regions, with each region
assigned to a refinery. The effect of the decree was to confer monopolies on the
sugar companies. In 1909, the colonial government encouraged the fonnation of a
sugar cartel, known later as the Taiwan Sugar Association, which was gi'en the
power to regulate the industry. The government supported this arrangement by
restricting the expansion of existing factories and the construction of new refineries.
With these privileges, the monopolistic structure of the industry was guaranteed.
The cartel arrangement suited both the sugar companies and the government. Sugar
companies were able to maximise their joint profits and the government, by
allowing the cartel to exist, was in a strong position to influence and control the
industry. At times, even such internal financial decisions as the size of dividend
payments could not be made without government approval (U.S. Department of
Navy, 1944a). More importantly, in macroeconomic terms the government was able
to exploit a monopolistic industrial structure more easily to influence the size of the
export surplus and the savings ratio.
The emergence of an indigenous industrial class in Taiwan was never
encouraged; in fact, Japanese policy was to discourage its appearance. Until 1924
Taiwanese were not allowed to organise or operate corporations unless there was
Japanese participation (Chang, 1955: 96). Even after this restriction was rescinded,
Taiwanese were reluctant to seek entry into the corporate sector because of its
domination by Japanese companies. Thus the sector continued to be monopolised
by Japanese interests. Through its power to regulate and license, and by granting
exclusive privileges to Japanese companies, the government successfully kept
economic power away from the Taiwanese.
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3.5. Capital Inflow during the Japanese Colonial Period
Capital for Taiwan's industry came initially from Japan. However, as the
economy developed, it was financed increasingly from within the island. The flow
of capital from Japan to Taiwan's non-agricultural sector was most important in the
decade immediately after Japan took control. It is uncertain how much capital
moved from Japan to Taiwan in this early period, but the balance of merchandise
trade is indicative of the magnitude. Apart from 1913, Taiwan did not have an
annual trade deficit after 1908. But between 1897 and 1908, Taiwan incurred a total
deficit of 34.5 million yen (Annual Taiwan Trade Statistics).
That a substantial amount of Japanese industrial capital moved into Taiwan
before 1910 is suggested also by other evidence. Between 1900 and 1906, the
colonial government issued 25 million yen of par value bonds, nearly all of which
were absorbed by Japan. More than half the receipts from government bond sales
were used to construct the railroad network in Taiwan (Huang, Chang and Lee,
1951). Initially, Japanese were attracted to invest in Taiwan's sugar industry by the
government's promise of a guaranteed dividend of 6 per cent on their investments.
Subsequently, high profits in the sugar industry attracted further investment, so that
by 1910 five of the six major sugar companies that were to dominate Taiwan's
manufacturing sector had been established. It is not known how much Japanese
capital went into these private ventures, but it was probably in the order of 20-3 0
million yen. The first fully modern sugar refinery was constructed and equipped in
1901 at a total cost of 850,000 yen (Davidson, 1903: 453). By 1910 there were
fifteen modern refineries. Altogether, from 1896 to 1910, it is estimated that around
80 million yen of Japanese capital flowed into Taiwan (Ho, 1978: 84).
The Sotokufu offered financial inducements to solicit direct investment by
Japanese companies on the island. After the turn of the century, and especially
following the stimulus provided by the defeat of Russia, private corporations began
actively to invest, particularly in sugar refining (Chang and Myres, 1963: 443-44).
Japanese law was applied as far as possible in Taiwan during the colonial
period, although the Governor-General retained the power to modify and limit its
applicability (Gold, 1990: 41). The Sotokufu used its legal power to protect the
interests and dominance of Japanese investors and to circumscribe Taiwanese
participation in the developing industrial sector. By more or less tying peasants to
the land, and by coercing them into providing sugar cane at fixed prices to specified
mills, it guaranteed a steady supply of raw materials to Japanese refineries. Further,
through limiting the number of mills that could be set up in a geographical area, it
protected existing investors, usually Japanese. In the industrial sector, Executive
Law No. 16 prohibited companies that only had Chinese investors from using the
word kaisha (company) in their name (Gold, 1988a: 106). This meant that purely
Taiwanese firms had to maintain antiquated forms of ownership and management,
whereas modern companies were required to have a significant Japanese presence
(Shih, 1980: 316). This law was abolished in 1924. Table 3.2 illustrates the results
of the law: the overwhelming dominance of Japanese interests in companies limited
by shares, i.e. the bulk of the industrial sector. Once Japanese corporations began to
invest in Taiwan, their sheer magnitude and state-backed economic power was so
great as to make effective Taiwanese competition highly unlikely. Therefore, even
though the rules for establishing companies were liberalised in 1923 (facilitating
entry of Taiwanese entrepreneurs into the modern sector), Taiwanese companies
remained subordinate to Japanese business. Moreover, the indigenous entrepreneurs
continued to be prevented from forming joint venture companies without Japanese
participation, since such companies were required by law to have Japanese partners
(Chang, 1955: 74-128; Ranis and Schive, 1985: 89). For these reasons, the
traditional Chinese-owned sugar mills were quickly wiped out (Chang and Myres,
1963: 445). And any 'Taiwanese' firm of consequence was in reality controlled by
Japanese.
Investment by countries other than Japan was negligible during the colonial
period. Two American firms maintained offices in Taiwan for the purpose of
buying tea, and the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company had a branch office in Taihoku
(Taipei). The only non-Japanese industrial interest was Tokki Gomei Kaisha, a
sulphur mine owned by a British national. Aside from these minor foreign direct
investments, Taiwan also borrowed US$ 22.8 million (45.7 million yen) from a
New York banking syndicate in 1931 to help construct a power plant on Lake
Jitsugetsutan (Sun Moon Lake). This is the only known non-Japanese foreign loan
received by Taiwan before Word War II (Ho, 1978: 83).
Table 3.2
Types of Companies Owned by Taiwanese and Japanese, 192910
Company Type	 Total Capital	 Japan%	 Taiwan%	 Other%
Limited by shares	 287,939	 78.40%	 19.8 1%	 1.79%
Mixed partnership	 16,567	 67.97%	 32.03%	 -
Unlimited liability	 7,941	 23 .59%	 76.4 1%	 -
Total	 312,447	 76.46%	 21.89%	 1.65%
3.6. Capital Inflow and Economic Development in Taiwan during
the Colonial Period
Japanese colonial policy both encouraged and favoured investment by
Japanese companies, which accounted for most of the island's industrial activity by
the time of the Second World War (Lim, 1991: 63-64). Japanese investment
10 Source: Chang (1955: 96). Mixed partnership companies are those where some shareholders have
limited liability, some do not.
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between 1895 and 1945 was chiefly focused on rice and sugar processing for export
to the Japanese market. As a direct result, export of rice and sugar to Japan
increased markedly, with Taiwan's share of total Japanese sugar imports, for
example, increasing from 8.7 percent in 1903 to 81 percent in 1935 (Ranis and
Schive, 1985: 88). Like other colonising countries, the Japanese concentrated on the
exploiting the natural resources of Taiwan" and had an "Agricultural Taiwan,
Industrial Japan" blueprint. This trend was not an exclusive one: Ranis and Schive
(1985: 88) have observed that, although the traditional colonial exchange of rice
and sugar for textiles and fertiliser was the dominant transactional flow, food
processing became an increasingly important activity. 12 However, there was little
encouragement of domestic industry beyond the processing of agricultural goods
for export and the construction and operation of utilities required to support those
processing activities. Japanese FDI during the colonial period should be regarded as
private, but was strongly encouraged by tariff protection and subsidies which,
viewed as part of the colonial policy, provided substantial competitive advantages
to Japanese investors over potential Taiwanese producers.
In the 193 Os, Japan changed her colonial policies as she re-militarised. War
preparations forced Japan to widen the island's industrial base beyond food
processing (Huang, 1989: 98). In addition, Japan re-evaluated the strategic
importance of Taiwan in geopolitical terms, leading to Japanese investments in
heavy industries such as cement, chemicals, pulp and paper, fertilizer, petroleum
refining, and metallurgy. Employment in these activities doubled between 1930 and
1939. Manufacturing output grew at 6.6 per cent aimually during the thirties,
Patterns of colonial investment and resource flow in most LDCs involve the colony supplying the
colonising country with primary products; in return, the colonising country supplies the colony
with manufactured consumer goods.
12 By 1930, close to 20 per cent of Taiwan's national income was being generated within industry,
with food processing accounting for 75 per cent of industrial output and 55 per cent of
industrial employment. For detailed discussion, see Ho (1978) and Mizoguchi (1979).
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although food processing remained the dominant activity within the total
manufacturing sector (Ranis and Schive, 1985: 88).
PART TWO
LAW, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN TAIWAN,
1945-1983
The interaction between law and the economy in Taiwan will be examined
in Part II, through discussion of the Government' s economic policies at different
development phases, especially in the context of FDI. Government policy has
played a crucial role in shaping the pattern of economic development in Taiwan.
During its economic development, Taiwan' s Governments have adopted various
strategies with a particular view to promoting industrialisation. These strategies
were primarily dictated by circumstances, and their points of emphasis often varied
as circumstances changed. Because its FDI policy is part of the Taiwan
Government' s macroeconomic policy, the FDI policy has been modified in each
economic development phase and FDI law has been reformed accordingly. The
purpose of Part II is to answer two questions: first, what were the Government' s
attitudes, strategies and policies regarding FDI in Taiwan, and how did these relate
to development of the economy as a whole? Secondly, how did the Government,
under differing economic circumstances, use legal incentives to attract and control
FDI in order to fulfil its economic goal of industrialisation? Although a colmtry' s
economic development is a continuous historical process, for the purposes of
analysis I shall, in this Part, divide the economic development of Taiwan into four
phases: post-war recovery (1945-1952), primary import-substitution phase (1953-
1960), primary export-substitution phase (1961-1972), and secondary import and
export substitution phase (1973-1983).
Chapter 4
Government Policy Regarding Economic Development and
FDI during the Post-War Recovery, 1945-1952
After the Japanese withdrew from Taiwan, there was a hiatus without any
FDI to speak of. Nonetheless, despite the initial absence of FDI it may fairly be said
that the Government's policy of stabilising the post-war economy between 1945
and 1952 laid down the economic foundation for FDI in later development. The
purpose of this chapter is to examine the political and economic conditions in
Taiwan immediately after World War II, together with the KMT government's
strategies for economic recovery after the conclusion of the civil war. It will be seen
that two factors, in particular, made the painful post-war process of rehabilitation
and reconstruction in Taiwan less difficult, and helped in laying down the basis for
economic development later on. One was the success of land ownership reform; the
other was American aid. The Government's programme of land reform is closely
related to the Min-Sheng philosophy, which underpins the economic doctrines of
the KMT. The programme's success was essential to the ability of the Taiwanese
people to participate in, and receive the distributive benefits of, the Government's
economic reforms. Early political and economic stabilisation also owed a lot to
American aid. Aid programmes not only helped Taiwan with its economic needs,
but also facilitated a psychological security. Finally in this chapter, the reasons for,
and method of, the Government's adoption of an import substitution policy in this
period will also be discussed.
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4.1 Post-war Political and Economic Development in Taiwan:
1945-1949
In the Cairo Declaration of 1943, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Chinese Paramount-General Chiang
Kai-shek undertook to return to China those territories, including Taiwan, which
had been seized from it by Japan.' The Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945,
reaffirmed this intent. 2
 At the end of World War jj,3 Taiwan reverted to Chinese
rule and became a province of the Republic of China (McAleavy: 1968: 333).
General Ch'en Yi, a former Fukien governor, was appointed by Paramount-General
Chiang Kai-shek as the first governor of Taiwan in 1945 (Lumley, 1976: 54).
During the previous fifty years of Japanese colonisation, the colonial
government oversaw a 'green revolution', promoted public health improvements
that reduced the mortality rate by more than one-half, and built a modern
infrastructure of finance, transport, and education that facilitated commercialisation
and rapid export growth (Myres, 1973: 33-41; I-Jo, 1978: 25-40). In 1939, Taiwan's
'Under Article 2 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895), Taiwan had in 1895 been annexed
by Japan in perpetuity (Parry, 1979, vol. 181: 217-224; MacMurray, 1921: 18; [1907] A.J.I.L.,
1962, vol. 1 supp. : 378- 383; GBFCO, vol. 87: 799; Hertslet and Parkes, 1908, vol. 1: 362-
368). The Cairo Conference took place on November 22-26, 1943. The participants issued a
declaration rejecting all desire for territorial expansion and affirming the intention of their
countries to demand the unconditional surrender of Japan. They pledged that Japan would be
deprived of all Pacific islands occupied since 1914; that all territory seized from China, such as
Taiwan, the Pescadores, and Manchuria, would be restored; and that Korea would be granted
independence (Gold, 1990: 49; Sainsbury, 1985: 321; U.S. Department of State, 1961: 448-
449).
2 The Potsdam Conference was held at Potsdam, Germany from July 17- August 2, 1945. The chief
participants were U.S. President Harry S. Truman, British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill
(or Clement Attlee, who became Prime Minister during the conference), and Soviet Union
Marshal losif Vissarionovich Stalin. The conference mainly discussed the substance and
procedures of the peace settlements in Europe, and determined that peace treaties would be
drawn up. In the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945, the Allies reconfirmed the status of
Taiwan. (Butler and Pelly, 1984: 709-710; Klalkowski, 1963: 312). For more information
about the Potsdam Conference, see U.S. Department of State (1960), Feis (1960) and Gormly
(1990).
Taiwan was formally restored to China on October 25, 1945.
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highly productive farms were exporting large amounts of sugar, rice, tea and
bananas, mostly to Japan. The per capita value of Taiwan's external trade in that
year was thirty-nine times that of China, and one and a half times that of Japan
itself (Barclay, 1954: 33; Meisner, 1963: 95). Under Japanese rule the island had
known little abject poverty, and the Gross National Product (GNP) had increased
by 8 per cent per annum since 1930, placing living standards far higher than on the
Chinese mainland - although Chinese living standards rose substantially before the
Japanese entered the Second World War (Lumley, 1976: 55). Urbanisation and
industrialisation, however, made little headway in what remained a largely agrarian
society (Myres, 1990: 17-18).
At the start of the Second World War, Taiwan was the oldest and wealthiest
Japanese colony (Hsieh, 1985: 28). After the war, Taiwan's economy was left in
ruins by the Allies' bombing and by the general neglect of the Japanese colonial
government during the war. Li and Yeh (1967: 3 1-32) reported that during the war
about three-fourths of industrial productive capacity and two-thirds of power-
generating capacity were destroyed. Agricultural production in 1945 and 1946 was
below one-half the peak reached in the colonial period (BOT, 1951; Ho: 1978:
104). On the one hand, with respect to internal capital resources, war-related
damage to industrial capacity and infrastructure had significantly reduced the
island's capital stock. The repatriation of Japanese administrators, managers,
technicians, and skilled labourers at the end of the war intensified post-war
dislocation because their management methods and technology could not be
replaced quickly (Ho, 1978: 103). On the other hand, from the point of view of
external capital resources, after decades of intermittent warfare the mainland's
economy was in disarray (Gold, 1990: 50). In order to isolate Taiwan economically
from deteriorating conditions on the mainland, the government attempted to adjust
the rate of exchange between the Taiwan currency (t 'ai-pi) and the mainland
Icurrency (f'a-pi), and to regulate the flow of funds from the mainland to Taiwan4
(Chou, 1963: 31-38). The government also banned unauthorised wage and price
increases and instituted the compulsory purchase of gold, silver, and foreign
exchange (Gold, 1990: 52). Despite those efforts, the Taipei wholesale price index5
still increased by 260 per cent in 1946, 360 per cent in 1947, 520 per cent in 1948,
and 3500 per cent in 1949 (PBAS, 1960: 36). Accelerating inflation was extremely
damaging to the confidence and morale of the people. The Nationalist government,6
unfortunately, paid relatively little attention and could not give any assistance to the
new province as it was struggling against the Communists 7 in mainland China
between 1945 and 1949 (McAleavy, 1968: 333-34; Ho, 1978: 103; Hsieh, 1985:
28-29).
In politics, initial mismanagement cost the Nationalist government much
goodwill among the Taiwanese. It is said that initially the Taiwanese had eagerly
welcomed the Nationalists and the Chinese army as liberators in 1945, and had
looked forward to participating as full citizens of the ROC (Gold, 1990: 50;
Lumley, 1976: 55-56). But Governor Ch'en Yi, who was appointed by the
Nationalist government in Nanking, seems to have cared little for the Taiwanese.
He introduced a harsh, authoritarian regime of social control, and in fact treated
' In the meantime, to gain control of the economic situation, the KMT government on the mainland
inaugurated a new currency, the gold yuan (chin-yuan), at the value of one gold yuan to three
million old yuan (J"a-pi) (Gold, 1990: 52).
The Taipei wholesale price index is a simple geometric average of the wholesale prices of fifty
domestically-produced and imported commodities (PBAS, 1960: 36).
6 The terms 'Nationalist', 'Kuomintang' and 'KMT' are used interchangeably in this thesis.
' The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was formally instituted in 1921 (Hu, 1951: 4- 7). In 1935,
Mao Tse-tung emerged as party leader. In June 1945 he was formally confirmed as chairman
of the CCP, and he held this post until his death in 1976 (Hsieh, 1985: 19).
The factor which caused the outbreak of the Chinese civil war in August 1945 was the Manchuria
crisis; both the KMT government and the CCP tried to get the final control over Manchuria.
The situation became more complicated when the Soviet Union also joined the race for
Manchuria, motivated by its strategic and economic significance (Hsieh, 1985: 22- 25).
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Taiwanese as second-class people. 9
 His discriminatory policy antagonised the
native population and provoked tension between the latter and the 1.5 million
mainlanders (military and civilian) who came to the island after World War II
(Hsieh, 1985: 28-29). The nationalists from the mainland spoke standard Chinese
(kuo-yu), the official language. By contrast, the Taiwanese in general spoke the
Fukinese dialect (fu-chou-hua) of their ancestors and found standard Chinese
unintelligible. The language and culture difference made the gaps between pen-
sheng-jen (i.e. those who already lived in Taiwan before 1945) and wai-sheng-jen
(those who came to Taiwan after 1945) ever wider. Soon the resentment exploded
in violence. In the spring of 1947 there was an uprising, the so called '2-28
Incident', which the Nationalist garrison crushed with considerable severity.'0
Figures for the total number of victims island-wide range from 10,000 to 20,000
(Kerr, 1965: 310). The '2-28 Incident' became an international scandal, and had a
profound effect on the Taiwanese." It was one of the events which alienated
American sympathy from the Kuomintang (McAleavy, 1968: 334). Many
Taiwanese (pen-sheng-jen) became apolitical following the '2-28 Incident', yet
remain bitter towards the wai-sheng-jen even today.
During the next few years of civil war, living standards in Taiwan declined,
runaway inflation consumed existing wealth, unemployment worsened, and an
invasion from the mainland by the Chinese Communists seemed imminent (Myres,
The early activities of the Nationalist government in Taiwan during 1945-1949 have been
extensively critised by scholars, such as Kerr (1965), Gold (1990), Lumley (1976) and I-Isieh
(1985).
10 For details of the '2-28 Incident', see Mendel (1970), Shen-keng tzu-liao-shih (1983), Shih
(1980), Department of State (1949: 309), Historical Research Commission of Taiwan Province
(1967), Lumley (1976) and Gold (1990).
"One consequence was that a few of the Taiwanese who had been active in the uprising escaped to
Hong Kong, United States, Japan and some European countries, where they advocated an
independent state of Taiwan, governed by Taiwanese (pen-sheng-jen) only, and appealed to the
memory of the uprising to stimulate Taiwanese antipathy toward KMT rule. Although a new
Chinese Governor, Wei Tao-ming, was appointed in May 1947, he was unable to repair the
damage caused by the uprising (Hsieh, 1985 28- 9).
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1990: 18). As Ho (1978: 103) summarises it, Taiwan drifted aimlessly for several
years following World War II. In 1949, however, when China's civil war came to
an end and the Communists defeated Kuomintang forces and gained control of the
mainland, the Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan (Tien, 1992: 3). Panikkar
(1981: 107) has argued that if the Americans had been able to carry everything
before them in Korea' 2 they might have been tempted to encourage Chiang Kai-
shek to attack the mainland and thus precipitate a major international war. Yet this
was not the general perception of the Taiwanese, many of whom believed that the
Communists would strike at any moment, and when that happened no help would
be forthcoming from America. Indeed, U.S. President Harry S. Truman had
declared, on 5 January 1950, that the U.S. government, "according to the Cairo
Declaration, accepts the view that Taiwan belongs to China" and that "the United
States will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict
in China. The United States will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese
forces on Formosa" (US Government, 1959: 79; McAleavy, 1968: 334). In other
words, the US government would not have prevented a Communist take-over of
Taiwan had it happened.' 3
 However, the sudden outbreak of the Korean War
motivated the US to reshape its China policy (Cooper, 1995: 20). To prevent the
12 The Korean War broke out on 25 June 1950 as North Korean forces launched an attack on South
Korea. See Panikkar (1981: 102-116). Panikkar was in China as Ambassador of India to the
National Government at Nanking, and later to the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Peking,
between 1948 and 1952. Regarding U.S. and U.N. involvement in the Korean war, see e.g.
Foot (1985), Kaufirian (1986), Stairs (1974), Gardner (1972), Cotton and Neary (1989),
Bowett (1982) and Higgins (1970).
' Though it wanted to see a strong and united China, the U.S. was not especially concerned with
who (Chiang Kal-shek or Mao Tse-tung) or which political party (the KMT or the CCP) would
gain control of China. The U.S. believed that although the Chinese people were temporarily
controlled by the CCP in the interests of Soviet imperialism, the Chinese people would
ultimately "reassert themselves and throw off the foreign yoke" (Acheson, 1949; Gupta, 1969:
2 18-30). The U.S. 'wait and see' attitude towards the Communist government caused US-ROC
relations to reach their lowest point at that period, between the moment of the release of the US
White Paper on China on 5 August 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950
(Clubb: 1974: 1365-1409). The US reshaped its China policy after the sudden outbreak of the
Korean War (Congressional Quarterly, 1967: 48). Its new policy towards China, and the
American aid to Taiwan will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 4.2. For more information
on US-ROC relations, see, e.g. Chung (1971), Barnds (1977), Graebner, (1977), Cohen,
Friedman, Hinton and Whiting (1971), Bueler (1971) and Tsou (1963).
war from spreading further, on 27 June 1950 President Truman announced the
decision to "neutralise" the Taiwan Strait by ordering the Seventh Fleet "to prevent
any attack on Taiwan" (US Government, 1959: 2468; Chiu, 1979: 221). He also
reversed the US view of the legal status of Taiwan: "The determination of the
future status of Taiwan must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace
settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations" (Ibid).'4
1953 is the earliest year in which official information is available about FDI
in Taiwan (TSDB, 1997). Official records do not disclose any evidence of FDI in
Taiwan between 1945 and 1952. One of the reasons for this may be that the
Nationalist government was fighting a civil war with the Communists during this
period. Only after 1949, when the Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan, did
the reconstruction of Taiwan begin in earnest. One can also assume that, because of
the civil war, the whole of China (including Taiwan) was a very high risk area for
foreign investors. There was probably no, or at least very little, foreign investment
in Taiwan during the period. The further absence of official records regarding FDI
between 1949 and 1952 is probably due to the fact that the KMT government was
still very unstable during its first few years in Taiwan.
It may be useful at this juncture to mention a number of vital assets,
facilitating order and progress in its economy, that Taiwan could count on. First, the
colonial education system left Taiwan with one of the most literate populations in
" Despite the fact that, under the terms of the Cairo declaration, Taiwan was returned to the ROC
and after 1945 administered by the government of the ROC, several options had been
suggested for the disposition of the island. For instance, in 1950, the US proposed that Taiwan
could (a) continue as a province of and the seat of government of the ROC; (b) be placed under
UN trusteeship; or (c) become an independent nation. The ambiguity of Taiwan's legal status
grew more complicated when the PRC's Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, filed a complaint
against the ROC's position on the island to the President of the Security Council and the UN
Secretary-General on 24 August 1950. His complaint demanded the immediate expulsion of
the ROC delegates from the United Nations and its associated bodies because they 'illegally'
occupied these positions. For a full account of the development of the 'China Issue', see
United Nations, General Assembly Official Records, 1949-1971, and United Nations
Yearbook, same period. The dispute over the 'China Issue' has also been addressed by scholars
thternationally: see, e.g., Hsieh (1985); Chiu (1979); Larkin (1971).
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 - a great advantage to any developing country. 16
 Secondly, notwithstanding
wartime damage, Taiwan's infrastructure in 1945 was sufficient to rank the island
as one of the most developed areas in China (Long, 1991: 77). Thirdly, many of the
institutions created during the colonial period' 7
 could be quickly revived. Fourthly,
its agriculture was, after Japan's, the most advanced in the Far East (Ho, 1978:
104). Finally, owing to the stability it enjoyed during the colonial period, Taiwan at
the time of World War II had an extremely well-ordered society. Indeed Taiwan in
1945 was probably a better-organised society with fewer signs of social
disintegration than any of the other political units which were governed by the
Nationalist government.
4.2 Post-war Recovery: The Government's Economic Policies,
1949-1952
Besides Taiwan's favourable inheritance, from the Japanese colonial period,
there were several developments between 1949 and 1950 that had a tremendous
influence on Taiwan's post-war recovery and economic development.
First, there were a large number of mainlanders who took refuge in Taiwan
in the late 1940s' 8
 when the Nationalist government's position, on the mainland,
became clearly untenable. Among the refugees was a small group of talented
' In 1952, the earliest year for which data are available, the literacy rate was 58 per cent in Taiwan
(TSDB, 1997: 10).
16 The expressions 'developing country' and 'less-developed country' are used interchangeably in
this thesis.
17 Such as agriculture experimental stations, credit co-operatives, the farmers' association, and
various banking facilities.
18 From 1946 to 1950, more than 1 million mainland armed forces and civilians arrived in Taiwan
(Ho, 1978: 105), living among 6 million Taiwanese (Hsieh, 1985: 29). Total population
increased up to 8.4 million by 1953 (Hsieh and Lee, 1966; TSDB, 1997: 8).
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officials, technicians, managers and entrepreneurs. Their arrival enabled Taiwan to
partially fill the human resources gap created by the departure of the Japanese in
1946 (Ho, 1978: 104-105), and to minimise problems associated with replacing the
Japanese presence (Fei, Ranis and Kuo, 1979: 26).
Secondly, certain military developments affected the psychological mood of
the Taiwanese, leading to a more positive environment for economic regeneration.
Initially, President Chiang Kai-shek and his followers thought Taiwan would be a
temporary refuge, a military and political base for their recovery of the mainland.
However, defeat shattered the morale of Chiang' s followers, who still had to face
the uncertain fate of a widely-expected Communist military assault (Tien, 1992: 3).
Transformation was effected by the outbreak of the Korean War which (as was
noted earlier) forced the Truman administration to alter American policy regarding
Taiwan.' 9
 On June 27 1950, President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to patrol
the Taiwan Straits and to assist Taiwan in the event of any military action by the
Chinese Communists.2° This change of policy not only made the island militarily
more secure and prevented the possible annihilation of the Nationalist forces by the
Communists, but gave the Taiwan people a significant and much-needed
psychological lift (Ho, 1978: 105; Tien, 1992: 3; Hsieh, 1985: 82-84). The military
assistance from the U.S. saved Taiwan's inhabitants from the terror and destruction
of war, and made post-war recovery and development less difficult.
Thirdly, the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or KMT) established an
emergency regime in Taiwan. 2 ' On May 10, 1948, as the civil war was nearing its
19 The US government was convinced of two things by the Korean War. First, of the aggressive
nature of the Chinese Communists. Secondly, of the strategic importance of Taiwan to US
security interests against the Soviet Union in the Pacific Ocean (Hsieh, 1985: 83-84).
20 This instruction was enshrined in treaty form in late 1954 with the signing of the US-ROC Mutual
Defence Treaty, which was essential to the security and stability required to attract investment
(Klein, 1992: 257; Hartland-Thunberg, 1990: 114).
21 In December 1948, Chiang had sent a trusted General, Ch'en Ch'eng (1897-1965), to be Taiwan's
new governor and had assigned his eldest son Chiang Ching-kuo (1906-1988) to head the
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end, the ROC government on the mainland promulgated the Temporary Provisions
Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion (tung-yuan-k 'an-luan shih-
ch'i lin-shih t'iao-k'uan), commonly known as 'the temporary provisions'. These
provisions, designated as supplements to the Constitution, 22
 were subsequently
extended to Taiwan.23 Further, in January 1950 President Chiang Kai-shek24 issued
an emergency decree that applied the 1934 martial law (chieh-yen ling) to Taiwan.
The authorities justified these two emergency measures on the basis that China's
civil war remained technically unfinished; Taiwan was to be treated as a combat
area (Tien, 1992: 7).
The emergency measures suspended many important articles of the ROC
Constitution (Hu, 1985: 8-19). The temporary provisions extended virtually
unlimited power to the ROC's president at the expense of the constitutional
authority of the Legislative Yuan and the Executive YUan (the Cabinet). 25 The
provincial Party organisation. The head office of KMT (tsung-ts'ai office) was moved to Taipei
in August 1949, and on December 9, 1949 the KMT government moved its temporary Capital
from Chungking, Szechuan to Taipei, Taiwan (Gold, 1990: 53-54).
22 The Constitution of the ROC, originally drafted in 1936 and adopted by the National Assembly on
December 25, 1946, promulgated by the National Government on January 1, 1947, and came
into effect on 25 December, 1947. It was, and still is, the fundamental law of the ROC. It is
also regarded as the mandate on which the Government's rule is based. The Constitution is
modelled most closely upon that of Germany, with departures from that model which reflect
the legal and political traditions of China, and the teachings of Dr. Sun - especially his
philosophy of Sun Mm Chu I (T'sui, 1959: Chapter 13-15).
23 The temporary provisions were passed by the National Assembly on Taiwan on 18 April 1948
(Linatel, 1991: 8-9).
24 Chiang Kai-shek retired from the presidency in January 1949 after a disastrous defeat by the
Communists at the Battle of Huai-hai. But from his position as tsung-ts'ai and supreme
commander, Chiang continued to run the Government. He resumed the presidency in March
1950 (Gold, 1990: 53, 55).
25 The ROC Constitution reaffirmed Dr. Sun Yat-sen's San Mm Chu I (Three Principles of the
People), which I will discuss in Chapter 4.2.1, as the basic philosophy of the state. It called for
a division of power between five government bodies of Yüans: the executive (the Cabinet), the
legislature (the law-enacting organ), the judiciary (the agency to interpret the Constitution and
serve as a court of last resort), the control (the agency exercising the power of administrative
impeachment and of supervising officials), and the body responsible for the civil service
examination. It also enshrined the people's rights of initiative, referendum, election and recall.
The fundamental national policies outlined in the Constitution comprise six sections: national
defence, foreign affairs, national economy, social security, education and culture, and frontier
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president not only served for an unlimited term but also had enormous power over
the appointment of key government personnel. He was empowered to create extra-
constitutional institutions, such as the National Security Council (kuo-an-hui) and
the Garrison Command (ching-pei-tsung-pu), to perform emergency functions.26
The martial law severely restricted the protection of individual rights and liberties
guaranteed in the 1946 Constitution (Gold, 1990: 54). Under the martial law decree,
the military acquired extraordinary power over matters normally of civilian concern
(Tien, 1992: 7). During 1950-86, an estimated 10,000 civilian cases were tried by
military courts (Tien, 1989: 111). Martial law was widely viewed as a symbol of
political repression. 27
 Yet, it is noteworthy that what the Government did was in
keeping with an old Chinese proverb: 'luan-shih yung chung-tien', which means the
government should carry out severe punishment under strict laws during times of
anarchy and disorder in order to maintain national security and social order.
Certainly, the ingredients for disorder were present: as the mainlanders began to
emigrate to Taiwan at the end of the 1 940s a number of Communist secret agents,
capitalising on local dissatisfaction with the Nationalist government of the ROC,
started to infiltrate into the island. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to
assess whether such incursions upon basic liberties were justified, strict social
control appears to have been regarded by the Government as necessary to maintain
regions (Article 137- 169 of the ROC Constitution; China Year Book, 1979: 635- 653). The
Constitution may be amended directly by the National Assembly (the agency responsible for
amending the Constitution and for electing the President and Vice President) or upon the
proposal of the Legislative Yuan to the National Assembly (Article 174 of the ROC
Constitution; ibid).
26 In accordance with the procedure prescribed in para. I of Article 174 of the Constitution, the
provisions empowered the President: "during the Period of Communist Rebellion, by
resolution of the Executive Yuan Council, to take emergency measures to avert an imminent
danger to the security of the State or of the people, or to cope with any serious financial or
economic crisis, without being subject to the procedural restrictions prescribed in Article 39 or
Article 43 of the Constitution" (China Year Book, 1979: 651- 52).
27 On the institutionalisation and effects of martial law, see Kagan (1982: 48-54) and Peng (1971:
473-473).
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a steady society, without which the recovery would have been more difficult and
economic development delayed.28
The fourth significant factor in post-war recovery was that the U.S. assisted
Taiwan not only militarily, but also economically. U.S. aid permitted Taiwan to
grow and to remain relatively stable while maintaining an unusually large military
establishment. U.S. aid, as will be discussed in the next section (Chapter 4.2.2), was
critically important to Taiwan's development.
With the sudden rapid increase in population and a change in the political
situation between 1949 and 1950, the impact upon Taiwan's economy was
enormous. In order to feed and clothe a much-enlarged population, it was necessary
both for the process of industrialisation to begin, and for Taiwan to recover its pre-
war levels of agricultural production (Huang, 1986: 108). In the meantime, the
Japanese triangular pattern of resource use based on food exports, as practised in
Taiwan between 1895 and 1945,29 required modification, because of the loss of the
protected Japanese market.
The Government adopted a balanced strategy of joint agricultural and
industrial growth. Its approach was characterised by the government's own slogan:
'Developing agriculture by virtue of industry and fostering industry by virtue of
agriculture' (Ho, 1978: 105; Hsing, 1971: 185). The Sino-American Joint
Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) and the Productive Enterprises
Control Commission in Taiwan District instituted a comprehensive programme to
step up agricultural and industrial production (Hsing, 1971: 151-152). The first
28 In October 1986, the KMT Central Standing Committee decided to suspend the martial law
decree. This decision went into effect during the following year (July 14, 1987). Thenceforth,
all civilian suspects would be tried in regular courts while the power of the Garrison Command
was subject to new restrictions. It is believed that Taiwanese society has since become greatly
liberalised (lien, 1992: 13). Ihe temporary provisions were suspended in May 1991 by the
President Lee Teng-hui (see Chapter 8 below).
29.-,
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phase was land reform, by means of the 37.5 per cent Land-Rent Reduction
Programme. As will be seen in Chapter 4.2.1(B), the successful implementation of
an extensive rent-reduction and land-redistribution programme strengthened
agriculture as a preliminary to industrialisation.
To shift its economic centre of gravity from agriculture to industry, Taiwan
adopted policies that were to a large extent dictated by circumstances. In the early
1950s inflation kept the New Taiwan dollar 3° (NT$ or hsing t'ai-pi) over-valued,
and imports exceeded exports by growing margins. In order to prevent the hyper-
inflation and a balance-of-payment crisis, and to restore the normal market
mechanism, the government decided to introduce drastic monetary reform, and to
impose a system of strict controls over imports and foreign exchange as supporting
measures (Hsing, 1971: 151). This was one of the five phases of Taiwan's
economic development - an early phase of import substitution. A strategy was
developed to encourage the domestic production of consumer goods and of some
intermediate goods that had previously been imported 3 ' (Ho, 1978: 106-107).
After the Japanese surrendered in 1945, the KMT government confiscated
former Japanese industrial assets and reorganised them into state enterprises. The
decolonisation process in Taiwan, therefore, not only eliminated the foreign
presence but provided the ruling regime with key economic as well as political
resources, which proved to be crucial in implementing successful land reform in
1952 and in controlling the economy during the following years (Huang, 1989: 98).
Because of the success of land reform, agricultural productivity increased.
Agricultural and processed agricultural goods were the principal earners of foreign
exchange in the 1950s, and helped to finance the initial capital and raw materials
30 The New Taiwan dollar was first issued in June 1949 (Lin, 1973: 31-32).
' By the mid-1950s, the early phase of import substitution had ended and the economy turned
sluggish. The government was again forced to rethink and to modify its industrialisation
strategy (Ho, 1978: 106). The manner in which it did so will be discussed further details in the
next chapter. (Chapter 5)
imports required by the growing industrial sectors. By 1953, with the exception of
export-oriented products, 'outputs of most products had surpassed their pre-war
peaks by sizeable margins' (MEA, Industry of Free China, 1959: January; PBAS,
1946: 793-815; Chang and Shih, 1975: 291; dough, 1978: 72). The real income
per head in 1953 was only slightly below the 1935-36 average (Hsing, 1971: 152;
Hsieh and Lee, 1966). These statistical data show that 1952 was a very important
turning point between the end of post-war recovery and the beginning of true
development. The changing times would soon receive signal acknowledgement,
with the Government's decision to create the Industrial Development Commission
(IDC) under the auspices of the Economic Stabilisation Board in July 1953, and
embarked on the first Four-Year Economic Plan in the same year (Hsing, 1971:
152-3).
4.2.1 Economic Doctrine and Land Reform
Taiwan's economic strategy and gradual political liberalisation between the
early 1 950s and early 1 990s appears to a significant extent to have flowed from the
broad doctrines, embraced by the KMT of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's San Mm Chu I, known
to the West as the 'Three Principles of the People' (Nationalism, Democracy and
People's Livelihood). In the political realm, Sun advocated the idea of tutelary
democracy in which a vanguard party would gradually educate the people so that
they could finally exercise full self-government. In the economic sphere, Sunist
doctrine held that the state should play a leading role in promoting economic
growth and change, controlling the business sector (especially foreign capital) to
ensure its contribution to national development, and stimulating a rising standard of
living and equitable distribution of income (D. Chang, 1989: 11-32; C. Chang,
1989; Gregor, Chang and Zimmerman, 1981; Metzger, 1987: 19-81; Myres, 1987:
1003-1022). This is not to say that San Mm Chu Iprovided an operational guideline
for Taiwan's policies. However, it certainly constituted a broad signpost and
L.J
legitimating motif for the considerable economic and political reforms which the
KMT implemented in Taiwan.
The main purpose of this section is to study the essence of the ROC's
ideological roots, Sun Mm Chu I; together with its relationship to the ROC's policy
of economic development, and its significance in the formation of the government's
strategy for land reform.
(A) Economic Doctrine and Policies - Three Principles of the People (San Mm
Chu I,) and the Min-sheng Philosophy32
As mentioned in the previous section (Chapter 4.2), Dr. Sun Yet-sen's33
ideas have served as a reference-point for policymakers in the ROC (Gregor, Chang
and Zimmerman, 1981: Chapter 1). Dr. Sun drew up theoretical schemes of
government, combining Western and Chinese elements. 34 According to Dr. Sun, the
32 For details about Dr. Sun Yat-sen and The Three Principles of the People, which have been
thoroughly discussed by scholars, see Sun (1928), d'Elia (1931), Wilbur (1976), Schiffrmn
(1957). I shall focus on the main elements of the Min-sheng principle in this thesis, as it is
more directly relevant to economic development.
Dr. Sun Yat-sen was born on November 12, 1866, and died on 12 March 1925 (Wilbur, 1976: vii;
Gangulee, 1945: XXii). He was a man devoted to a single cause - the political reform of his
country. Reform was his life's ambition (Wilbur, 1976: 9). Dr. Sun spent lifetime trying to
reshape his country's political system according to his vision. He also drafted imaginative
plans for China's economic development, plans which were impossible to achieve in his own
day, but which presaged the schemes for international co-operation in assisting
underdeveloped countries. He also had compassion for the poor and oppressed, though his
ideas for changing their condition were essentially those of a reformist rather than of a social
revolutionary (Wilbur, 1976: 8). He was one of the founders of the Nationalist Party
(Kuomintang or KMT). He brought an end to the Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty in the Autumn of
1911, and established the Chinese Republic (Wilbur, 1976: 18-19). He was later canonised as
Kuo Fu, the Father of the Country. To the Chinese he has become a symbol of the virtuous
patriot (Wilbur, 1976: vii). He is now the only modern hero shared by the Mainland and
Taiwan. Their common celebrations of Sun's memory, insists Schiffrmn (1980: 27), 'could
prove a useful psychological bridge if they are ever to be reunited peacefully'. For
bibliographical sketches of Dr. Sun and his political philosophy, see Tan (1972: 116- 223),
Boorman (1970: 170- 189) and Chong (1967).
Although born in the Kwan-tung, Dr. Sun spent much of his childhood in Hawaii, where he was
educated at a college founded by Church of England missionaries. He seems to have been
much influenced by Christian teaching and Western ideas there. Sun had also learned Chinese
classical history during his childhood (Hsieh, 1985: 73).
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formation of the San Mm Chu I ideology was inspired by Abraham Lincoln's
famous phrase, "Government of the people, by the people and for the people"
(KMT Central Committee, 1976: 29). He planned an audacious economic
transformation for China, aiming to achieve a better life for all classes, while
preventing the abuses of capitalism and the inter-class conflicts he observed abroad.
He believed in the power of education and sought to encourage the dissemination of
ideas and political thought (Wilbur, 1976: 286).
In one of his speeches on January 4, 1922 in Kwei-lin, Dr Sin described
France and the United States as old-fashioned republics. "The Chinese", he said,
"should build a new type of republic". "To build a new country requires putting
into effect his Three Principles of the People (San Mm Chu 1)". These, according to
Dr. Sun, were first, Min-tsu (the Principle of Nationalism), 35 meaning equality
among the races,36
 with none dominating over others; secondly, Min-ch 'uan (the
Principle of Democracy), meaning equality among the people of a nation, with no
minority oppressing the majority and everyone enjoying his natural rights; and
thirdly, Min-sheng (the Principle of People's Livelihood), referring to economic
equality in terms of absence of exploitation of the poor by the rich (KFCC, 3: 233-
35; Wilbur, 1976: 120). In other words, the Three Principles of the People mean
government 'of the people, by the people, and for the people' - that is, a state
belonging to all the people, a government controlled by all the people, with rights
and benefits for the enjoyment of everyone. 37 If this is achieved, the people will not
Nationalism (or min-tsu) means literally 'people's race', and has been more generally held to
mean 'national solidarity' (Hsieh, 1985: 59).
36 There were five major ethnic groups in China: the Hans, the Mongols, the Manchus, the Moslems
and the Tibetans. The Hans regarded themselves as the authentic Chinese. Thus, both Mongol
rule in China during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and the Manchu dynasty from 1664
until 1911 were considered to be alien. Dr. Sun was not against the 'alien' rule of the Manchus.
What he actually opposed was their thability to govern China. In view of their inflexible
opposition to any institutional or social reform, Sun was convinced that China needed to
undergo a total transformation with the abolition of the monarchic system.
According to Dr. Sun, this ideology is identical to the French Revolutionary slogan: 'Liberty,
Equality and Fraternity' (Shih, 1961: 13).
only have a share in state production, but they will have a share in eveiything.
When citizens share everything in the state, the society truly reaches the goal of the
Min-sheng principle, which is Confucius' highest political aspiration of the ideal
world of ta-t'ung, or t'ien-hsia wei-kung, meaning the 'Great Commonwealth'38
(Gangulee, 1945: 91; 1-lsieh, 1985: 59).
Dr. Sun argued that the social and economic structures of China must be
readjusted in order to provide the above conditions, without which political
institutions caimot function in the interests of the masses. He particularly stressed
what he called the Principle of Livelihood, because it concerns the life of the
nation. Neither nationalism nor democracy can survive unless citizens are assured
of reasonable material welfare. The principle involves two radical measures: the
equalisation of land, and the control of capital. These are regarded as necessary for
the protection of the interests of the peasantry and the working class (Gangulee,
1945: xxxiii), and for the ultimate aim of the Min-sheng principle, of equalising the
financial resources in society (Gangulee, 1945: 90). He emphasised the importance
of avoiding the social inequities arising from unregulated capitalism, and attempted
to specify how this might be achieved - by establishing state enterprises in the area
of railways, utilities, and other large-scale industries, 39 and through a rather vaguely
defined taxation theory derived from John Steward Mill and the American Henry
George, involving the taxation of future rises in land value. Although termed
38 Unfortunately, Dr. Sun's manuscript on "The Three Principles of The People" perished in flames
when his headquarters were destroyed in 1922, but its main thesis was made available to his
followers in a series of lectures he delivered spread over a period from January 24th to August
1924 of that year (Schiffrin, 1980: 253). From the stenographic notes of these lectures San Mm
Chu I was published after his death. In this book the Republic of China found not only a call
for the rebirth of the nation, but also a programme of action (Gangulee, 1945: XV). For a
detailed study of the Three Principles, see Price (1927). Price translated San Mm Chu I into
English. His translation was later abridged and edited by the History Commission of the KMT
for the compilation of the KMT history. Most of Sun's writings and his speeches are to be
found in Sun (1956).
This approach might explain why the KMT government insisted upon retaining control over
critical industrial production and services like energy and water in the early 1950s (Myres,
1990: 43).
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'equalisation of land rights', he viewed the scheme as "essentially urban rather than
agrarian, and preventative rather than remedial" (Schiffrmn, 1957: 549-64; Chiang,
1974: 147-99). It did not envisage the general nationalisation of land for
redistribution purpose, but instead was directed toward restricting the unearned
profits made by private owners whose land, as often happens during the
modernisation of cities, had vastly increased in value by reason of its situation and
the development of industries and communications through the labour of the
community. By these techniques, Dr. Sun hoped that the main evils of capitalism
40
would be avoided (McAleavy, 1968: 176-77). He also held that, since China was
traditionally an agrarian society, it was essential to tackle the problems caused by
unequal distribution of land ownership. To this end, he proposed the 'Land to the
Tiller' programme, intending that the man who worked the land would also own it
and thereby be assured of having the means of providing for himself and his family.
Dr. Sun's favoured scheme, for equalisation of property, was to be achieved
by two means - (1) taxation based on the owner's declared valuation of land,
accompanied by a right on the part of the government to purchase it at that value,
and (2) government appropriation of unearned investment which is due to general
socio-economic improvement. He believed this was much fairer than the
nationalisation of property practised in Europe and America, which amounted
simply to confiscation (KFCC, 1:211; Schiffrmn, 1957: 549-64; Wilbur, 1976: 245).
He still saw the ideal solution in terms of Henry George's method. 'Equalisation of
land rights' was effectively a taxation device to prevent future speculation in land,
particularly in cities, and to give the govenunent the option of buying back land
from large owners (Schiffrmn, 1980: 256).
40 The 'equalisation of land rights' was a scheme based on Henry George's thesis that the private
appropriation of increases in land values was the cause of modern social inequities (Flsieh,
1985: 62). Dr. Sun maintained that his doctrine was a special branch of socialism suitable to
Chinese conditions: a programme by which China could, in the course of its modernisation,
avoid the social evils and injustices that had attended the industrialisation of the capitalist
nations of the West (Boorman, 1970: 187).
The economic doctrines of the Kuomingtang government may be said in
many ways to reflect the Three Principles of Livelihood, containing as they do the
two fundamental aspects of equalisation of land and regulation of capital. Since the
ownership of land at that time was confined to only a few, the state should enact
laws for the utilisation, expropriation, and taxation of land. Under such laws,
private landowners were required to declare the value of their land to the
government. It would be taxed according to the value so declared and the
government was empowered to buy it at that price in case of necessity (Gangulee,
1945: 96); for example, in order to build new roads. Private industries, whether
belonging to Chinese or foreign nationals, which are either monopolistic in
character or beyond the capacity of private individuals to develop - such as power,
railways, and shipbuilding - were to be undertaken by the state, so that privately-
owned capital should not control the economic life of the people (Gangulee, 1945:
96-7). Thus, in accordance with Dr. Sun's policies the state should have some
control over the state's essential industries. At the same time, everyone would in
principle be guaranteed sufficient food, clothing and other necessities, as well as the
right to develop their own enterprises. Dr. Sun advocated regulation of capital and
state ownership of large-scale industry. He proposed borrowing development
capital from abroad. He also expected to use "foreign brains and experience" to
manage new industries. The goal was to "use existing foreign capital to build up a
future Communist society in China" 4 ' (Schiffrmn, 1980: 257).
The KMT government's economic ideology was, and remains today, to
promote economic development within a mixed economy which includes key
features of socialism as well as capitalism. It advocates a more balanced ownership
of land, a more equitable distribution of wealth and income, state enterprises in
41 Communism in this context owed more to Confucius' vision of the 'great commonwealth' than to
Marxism-Leninism. Though he claimed that his doctrine of the People's Livelihood was both
socialism and communism, Dr. Sun averred that Marxism, while meriting study as a form of
Western socialism, was not only impracticable in China but also demonstrably erroneous in its
thesis of surplus value and the class struggle (Boorman, 1970: 187).
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certain industries, and state control of private industries. But it also believes in
private property, profit incentive, and competition (Ho, 1978: 117). In brief, one
general precept, that there must be planning within the context of a free economy, is
a channelling principle through which many specific policy recommendations flow
(Wo, 1981: 134). The government must not only take action to encourage the
private sector's development, but should also allow free markets to function and
permit the existence of private property. Myres has (1990: 45) suggested that such a
mixture of concerns required the achievement of the following four objectives:
(i)	 Most resources should be privately owned and managed except for those
resources and activities that government deems necessary to manage on
behalf of society, such as electricity, communications, national defence and
social services.
(ii)	 Policies should produce sustained, high economic growth rates but under
conditions of social and economic stability.
(iii) New wealth should not be created at the expense of others, and all groups
should be able to share the flow of benefits from development.
(iv)	 Economic growth should not be associated with distortions that lead to
scarcities of resources or goods and services.
In order to achieve these objectives, various policies needed to be initiated,
refined, and abandoned as conditions dictated. In the course of the chapters below
(Chapter 5-8), I will examine the Government economic policies in different
development phases and to consider how those policies were initiated, refined, and
abandoned as circumstances changed, with particular reference to Dr. Sun's Mm-
Sheng philosophy and the use of foreign capital to help Taiwan's economic
development.
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(B) Land Reform
Probably the most important initial policy for restructuring incentives was
the land reform that was carried out between 1949 and 1953. This extensive
programme, involving changes in land distribution, conditions of tenancy, and rent,
was effected in three stages: compulsory rent reduction, the sale of public land to
actual tillers and the compulsory sale of private land to actual tillers (Koo, 1968:
Chapter 3).
HsU (1975: 769-773) ascribed the collapse of the KMT regime on the
mainland to five factors:
1. Deceptive military strength
2. Inflation and economic collapse
3. Loss of public confidence and respect
4. Failure of American mediation and aid
5. Retardation of social and economic reforms
It seems likely that the second, the third and the fifth factors were in part affected
by KMT's failure to instigate a proper land reform in the mainland areas they
controlled. This perception is reflected in Long's (1991: 77-79) criticism that the
KMT on the mainland represented the interests of the landlord-gentry class, which
prevented the KMT from putting into effect Dr. Sun's 'Land to the Tiller' ideology.
There was little doubt that the communists' success in winning popular support in
China, whose population was overwhelmingly dominated by landless peasants, was
in large measure due to their concerted efforts to redistribute land.
The KMT was anxious not to make the same mistake on Taiwan. Learning
from its disastrous experience on the Chinese Mainland, it sought to use land
reform to blunt the appeal of Communism among the peasantry as well as eliminate
the Taiwanese landlord class as a competing elite (Thompson, 1984: 558). With the
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emergence of small farmers as the dominant class, the KMT, in Hsiao's words
(1 988b: 8), "turned the rural sector from a potential source of political unrest into a
fundamentally conservative social base".
In April 1949, soon after the Nationalist government moved to Taiwan, a
programme to reduce rent was initiated. With the benefit of records collected by the
Japanese, the programme was completed within three months42 (Lin, 1973: 31-32;
Gold, 1990: 52). It was subsequently supplemented and reinforced by the 1951
Farm Rent Reduction to 37.5 Per Cent Act, 43 which made the relationship between
tenants and landlords explicit. Farm rents were fixed at a maximum 37.5 per cent of
the total annual yield of the main crops.44 There were also provisions for the
temporary reduction of rent in times of crop failure, for written contracts, and for
the establishment of procedures to settle disputes between tenant and landlord
(RGLPFLTP Articles 8, 9, 12, 13 and 15).
42 Cadastral surveys done by the Japanese during the colonial period provided the data necessary to
implement land reform (dough, 1978: 73).
u Passed by the Legislative Yuan on May 25, 1951.
Cheung (1967: 90-98) and Tang (1961: 33-44; 221) have argued that rental restriction in Taiwan
was not a fixed but a percentage restriction, i.e., the rent share was reduced to 37.5 per cent of
the actual yield and not of a standard yield. Their interpretation may be due to the ambiguous
wording of the 1949 Regulation Governing the Lease of Private Farm Land in Taiwan
Province (RGLPFLTP). The relevant part of Article 2 of the Regulations reads as follows:
"Farm rent shall not exceed 37.5 per cent of the total annual yield of the main crops. If the rent
originally agreed upon is greater than 37.5 per cent, it shall be reduced to 37.5 per cent; and if
it is less than 37.5 per cent, it shall remain unchanged.
The 'main crops' referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be chiefly the crop customarily
accepted as payment for rent. The standard amount of the total annual yield of the main crop
shall be appraised with reference to relevant data in the light of actual local conditions by the
Hsien or Municipal 37.5% Rent Campaign Committee [done in May 1949] and the results of
the appraisal shall be submitted to the Provincial Government for approval."
While the first part of Article 2 seems to suggest that actual yield was to be used in
determining rent, the last part of Article 2 makes it quite explicit that a standard yield was to be
used.
SIn 1951, the government began the second stage of reform, the transfer of
land ownership to actual tillers, when it began to sell public land to tenants (Tang,
1961: chap 3 and pp. 215-20; Clough, 1978: 73). More than fifty per cent of the
farmland owned by the central and provincial government was eventually affected
by this policy. 45 Cultivators of public land, and other tenant farmers, were given
first and second priority respectively to purchase public land. The price of the
public land was set at 2.5 times the annual yield of principal crops46
 and was to be
paid in twenty instalments over a period of ten years. By 1958, about 71,000
hectares of this land had been sold and distributed (Ho, 1978: 161).
The most dramatic part of Taiwan's land reform was the land-to-the-tiller
programme. That a farmer should own the land he tills is a political objective of the
Nationalist government (see Chapter 4.2.1(A) above). The 1953 Land-to-the-Tiller
Act (LA) and the Regulations Governing the Implementation of the Land-to-the-
Tiller Act in Taiwan were the legal bases for the programme.47 They codified the
redistribution of privately-held farmlands (Long, 1991: 78).
Under the code, land was graded for quality and classified by owner. There
were 26 grades for paddy land and 26 grades for dry land (Ho, 1978: 161). The LA
limited landholdings to roughly three chia48 (2.9 hectares) of medium quality (7th-
12th grade) of paddy land or its equivalent, while the government compulsorily
purchased all land held in excess of that size for redistribution to other rural
Most of the land retained by the government was land operated by the government-owned Taiwan
Sugar Corporation (Ho, 1978: 161).
46 The yield used to determine land price was not the actual yield, but the standard yield assigned by
the local government to that grade of land for tax purposes. In most instances the standard
yield was lower than the actual yield (Ho, 1978: 161).
The Land-to-the-Tiller Act was passed by the Legislative Yuan on January 20, 1953. The
Regulations Governing the Implementation of the Land-to-the-Tiller Act were promulgated by
the Taiwan Provincial Government on April 23, 1953.
1 chia = 0.9699 hectares = 2.4 acres.
households49
 (Koo, 1968: Chapter 3; Clough, 1978: 73; LA Articles 8, 10 and 11).
Perhaps the most successful feature of the reform was the method of landlord
compensation adopted by the government. The price paid for the land was 2.5 times
its annual yield. Landowners were paid 70 per cent of the purchase price in
Commodity Bonds; i.e. ten-year bearer government bonds, redeemable in either rice
or sweet potato, depending on whether the land was paddy-field or dry (Long,
1991: 78). The Bonds paid a 4 per cent annual interest. 50 The balance of 30 per cent
was paid in shares of stock in four government enterprises 5 ' shortly to be transferred
to the private sector52 (Clough, 1978: 73).
The land was then sold to its former tenant farmers at the same price at
which it had been purchased. The new farming class received government loans to
purchase their land (Myres, 1990: 46). They paid for the land in ten annual
instalments and a 4 per cent annual interest in rice (for paddy land) and in sweet
potatoes, converted to cash (for dry land) (Clough, 1978: 73; Ho, 1978: 162-3). The
credit matched the terms of the government's own 'land bonds in kind'
(Commodity Bonds) (Long, 1991: 78-79).
The compulsory purchase of farmland and its re-sale to tenants began in
May 1953 and was completed in December of the same year. In total, nearly
However, if the landlord cultivated as well as leased his land, he was permitted to retain the land
he cultivated (i.e., operated with no more than the normal seasonal hired help) even if in excess
of the retention limit (LA Articles 8, 10, 11).
50	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .The principal and interest were to be amortised in 20 equal semi-annual instalments (Ho, 1978:
162).
' Yang (1970: Chapter 4) reports that 98 per cent of 500 surveyed former average-landlords and 91
per cent of 75 surveyed former large-landlords sold their stocks soon after receiving them. In
the long term, this behaviour was to weaken the landowners' economic position.
52 The four enterprises, all confiscated from the Japanese, were the Taiwan Cement Corporation,
Taiwan Pulp and Paper Corporation, Taiwan Industrial and Mining Corporation, and the
Taiwan Agricultural and Forestry Development Corporation. In 1954 the government began to
transfer these firms to private ownership amidst a flurry of stock price manipulation (Gold,
1990: 71).
0144,000 hectares of land changed hands (Tang, 1961: 289, 292-93; Chen, 1961:
311). Between 1949 and 1953, the percentage of land under owner-cultivation grew
from 51 to 79 per cent, while tenant-farmed land dropped from 42 to 21 per cent
(PDAF, Taiwan Agricultural Yearbook, 1954).
Taiwan's land reform brought about two basic changes in agriculture: (1) a
sizeable number of share-croppers became owner-cultivators, and (2) a ceiling was
placed on rent (Ho, 1978: 164). One important effect of these changes was the
elimination of share-cropping. 53
 More than any other reform it encouraged
increased agricultural productivity, since new owner-operators had strong
incentives to increase their incomes by working longer hours, increasing multiple
cropping, and adopting technological innovations (dough, 1978: 73). Stimulated
by the reforms, agricultural production rose 43 per cent from 1952 to 1960. Rice
yields increased by 25 per cent per hectare in that period (Long, 1991: 79; Long,
1989; TSDB, 1997: 66-67).
Apart from giving tenants and small farmers the opportunity to purchase
property of their own, the land reforms also had the effect of directing rural
landlords into urban businesses. Both groups had considerable incentive to use their
financial and physical resources efficiently because of the new opportunities now
available to them. Land reform greatly improved the distribution of income, and
helped to promote better management of the land and to raise productivity (Myres,
1990: 46). Tang (1961: 149) has estimated that as much as 13 per cent of Taiwan's
1952 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was redistributed. The reform also enabled
the government to control and to keep down the price of rice over the next decade.
In addition, it was a useful stimulus to domestic investment, as the government
began to divest itself of its commanding role in the industrial economy (Long,
1991: 78). The government was efficient in exploiting the agricultural surplus to
Many have argued that sharecropping leads to an inefficient combination of resources (Johnson,
1950; Sen, 1966: 445-46; Adams and Rask, 1968: 935-37; Georgescu-Roegen, 1960: 23-26).
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finance its early industrialisation. Low rice prices set by the government meant that
land taxes, paid in kind, were in effect high. The farmers were forced to sell part of
the rice harvest via the so-called 'rice-fertiliser barter'. 54 The government, through
the Farmers' Associations, acquired rice and provided fertiliser at a fixed ratio
between the two products. In this system of unequal exchange the government,
which monopolised fertiliser through delivering it to the farmer in exchange for
cheap rice, made a large profit from the transaction (Bello and Rosenfeld, 1990:
184). Wang and Apthorpe's (1974: 11, 148) criticism, that the government took a
substantial chunk of the farmer's remaining production, thus seems a valid one. The
farmers needed to pay a land tax, a water fee, and other taxes, though the amount
was less than the rent to the landlord had been before land reform. Yet this
controversial system provided the government with ample supplies of rice 55 to take
care of the armed forces, the civilian government employees, and their dependents,
as well as a surplus to dispose of on the open market as a means of influencing
prices (Huang, 1986: 108; dough, 1978: 74-75). Its control of such a huge segment
of the rice harvest practically eliminated the free market in rice, since, whenever the
price went too high, the Provincial Food Bureau would release its stock onto the
market until the price moved back to the level desired by the government (Hsing,
1971: 175). The government's dominance of the rice market was important in
enabling the ROd to hold the average annual price increase between 1953 and 1974
to 7.5 per cent, a better record than that of many developing countries (TSDB,
1993: 167; TSDB, 1966: 161, 299). At a macroeconomic level, this meant that
resources were transferred more rapidly from the countryside to the cities (Long,
1991: 80).
The rice-fertiliser barter scheme was abolished in 1972.
In upshot, the government gained control of 40 per cent of the marketable supply (Hsing, 1971:
175).
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Land reform has the potential to be a powerful influence in the economic
life of any country. Taiwan's land reform is often cited as a model for developing
countries, and has attracted much interest in recent years from, for example, the
Philippines (Long, 1991: 79). It is worth mentioning three points which were
crucial to its success: (1) The land survey carried out during the Japanese period
provided an important data base with which to administer the land reform. (2)
Landowners received compensation for their land. Because they were in principle
hedged against inflation, the payment in bonds and stocks made the compulsory
purchase of land more palatable to landlords. (3) The KMT government arrived in
Taiwan as an 'outsider', with no tie or commitments to the indigenous Taiwan
gentry. Because they lacked such ties, the landowners, who preferred not to sell
their lands, had no political means with which to resist the reforms. Taiwan
therefore enjoyed greater political flexibility regarding land reform than do most
developing countries, since the Government did not depend on the landlord class
for support (Ho, 1978: 162; Long, 1991: 77-8).
Because of the success of land reform in the early 1 950s, the former tenant
farmers now owned the land they tilled; consequently agricultural productivity
increased - an important boost for Taiwan's suddenly-enlarged population. At the
same time, the interest of former landlords was diverted from agriculture to
industry in the wake of the reforms. This new demographic group was to be an
essential component in Taiwan's industrial development.
4.2.2 American Aid - A Driving Force of Taiwan's Early Economic
Development
In the 1950s, following its commitment to the KMT after the outbreak of
the Korean War, the United States became an influential agent in Taiwan's
economy. Except for a limited quantity of surplus agricultural commodities, no
U.S. economic aid has been committed to Taiwan since June 30, 1965 (I-Jo, 1978:
7',
111). From 1951 to 1967, the U.S. provided Taiwan with a total of US$ 4.1 billion
in aid, playing a decisive role in Taiwan's economic development in general, and in
its industrial development in particular (U.S., I-louse Foreign Affairs Committee,
1967: 63). The legal framework for the U.S. aid was provided by the Sino-
American Mutual Security Treaty, under which the General Economic Aid (GEA)
originally consisted of Defence Support, Technical Co-operation and Direct Force
Support (Using, 1971: 191; Hsieh, 1985: 86). The objective of the aid was
originally to stabilise Taiwan's economy, and later to help develop Taiwan's
economic development. Between 1949 and 1967, Taiwan received US$ 425 (or
US$ 187 if military assistance is excluded) per capita (Ho, 1978: 111). In 1960,
Taiwan's per capita income was only US$ 143 (TSDB, 1997: 34). Since the mid-
1950s, an increasing proportion of U.S. economic aid to Taiwan has been in the
form of loans rather than of grants, while military assistance has been nearly
exclusively in the form of grants. 56
 The amounts of both economic and military aid
declined steadily in the 1960s (I-Jo, 1978: 111). In 1962, aid came under the
administration of the Agency for International Development (AID), formally
established in 1961; grants previously provided under 'Defence Support', and loans
under the 'Development Loan Fund', were unified under the heading of
'Development Loan', while the category of 'Technical Co-operation' grants were
redesignated as 'Development Grant' (ilsing, 1971: 191). In addition to these
categories of aid, the U.S. also provided surplus agricultural commodities. This
form of aid, made available under U.S. Public Law 480 (Pub. L 480) from 1955
onwards, was administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (Lin, 1967: 295-
318; Long, 1991: 80). It accounted for 25 per cent of U.S. aid obligations (Gold,
1990: 69).
56 Most heavy equipment, planes, ships, and vehicles were supplied by the US as a grant. The
Development Loan Fund (DLF) was established in 1957, to offer financial assistance to those
development projects that were considered technically and economically feasible, but which
were not eligible for assistance under GEA (Hsing, 1971: 191).
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During the period 195 1-65, raw materials accounted for the greatest portion
of aid deliveries by far (TSDB, 1997: 234). However, if we break down the project
aid by sector, it is noticeable that the allocation to electricity and transportation
increased steadily (TSDB, 1997: 230). As a nation of free enterprise relying on
private initiative, the U.S. was not an enthusiastic supplier of direct aid to
agriculture and to individual mining and manufacturing industries. 57 However, the
U.S. aid authority rightly identified the development of electricity, transportation,
and other infrastructure facilities as a key to economic development. As Jacoby
(1966: 179-180) pointed out, inadequacy of infrastructure facilities was a serious
bottle-neck to development, and this accounts for the drastic change in percentage
allocation of project aid in favour of electricity and transportation between 1961
and 1965 (Hsing, 1971: 193-194).
Foreign aid increased the resources available to Taiwan, and helped to
lessen the conflict between Taiwan's economic and military objectives. Taiwan,
since 1949, has had to support, on a per capita basis, one of the world's largest
armies. 58
 The government has justified this unusually large military presence on the
grounds that it is engaged in a 'civil war' and that a large army is needed not only
to protect Taiwan from communist attacks but also to fulfil its foremost political
goal: eventual reoccupation of (or more recently, reunification with) the Chinese
mainland. In the 1950s, and in most of the 1960s, Taiwan's military establishment
consistently absorbed about 12 per cent of its GNP, or about 80 to 90 per cent of the
central government's expenditure (Hsieh, 1985: 119; Lumley, 1976: 86). Of
countries surveyed by the United Nations, only South Vietnam and Jordan were in
the same category as Taiwan, and both were involved in active wars (UN:
The U.S. did attach great importance to the rehabilitation of agriculture's in the early 1950s. Once
this was achieved, however, its concern shifted to the modernisation of industry and the
industrial infrastructure. (Hsing, 1971: 193).
58 Although the KMT government has never officially disclosed the size of its army, independent
estimates have consistently placed Taiwan's military strength in the 1950s and 1960s at around
550,000-600,000 (London Institute for Strategic Studies).
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Yearbook of National Accounts; IBRD, 1968: world table 6). From 1951 to 1967
the United States gave US$ 2.4 billion, out of the US$ 4.1 billion total U.S. aid, in
military assistance 'necessary to carry out mutual US-ROC obligations' (Long,
1991: 80). The economic aid from the U.S. enabled the KMT government to defend
Taiwan without undue strain on the economy.59
In Taiwan, foreign aid contributed to economic development in several
related ways:6° it helped to control inflation, relaxed a binding foreign exchange
constraint, and permitted a high level of capital formation (Ho, 1978: 111). These
effects will now be considered.
(A) Stabilisation
U.S. aid, in the early 1950s, played a critically important stabilising role and
helped the rather battered Taiwanese economy to recover after World War II. As
was mentioned earlier, Taiwan's inflation in the early 1950s was very high. In order
to help industries recover from the war, the government expanded bank credit and
doubled the money supply (Ho, 1978: 112). As a consequence prices soared. To
increase public confidence in the newly-introduced New Taiwan dollars (NT$), the
The tension between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan continued even though the U.S. 7th Fleet
patrolled the Taiwan Strait. The first Quemoy crisis broke out in September 1954 and dragged
on for nine months, caused mainly by an attack by the Chinese Communists on Quemoy and
Matsu. The Communists were said to have fired 17,243 rounds of shells at Quemoy, and
indeed continued its bombardment even after the crisis. The second Quemoy crisis broke on 23
August 1958. During the second crisis, Chinese Communists fired about haifa million shells in
44 days; in all 571,959 rounds of explosive shells during 1958. The heavy bombardment was
said to be an attempt to blockade Quemoy's re-supply line from Taiwan. For more information
concerning the two crises, and relations between the two Chinese rivals and the United States
during the period, see Gurtov (1976: 49-103), Tsou (1959), Lewis (1962: 13-19), George and
Smoke (1974: 266-389), and Clubb (1959: 517-53 1).
60 It is inconceivable that, in an economy devastated by war and with ensuing large trade deficits,
any significant progress could have been made without foreign aid. This is not only true for
Taiwan but also true for post-war Western Europe and Japan. Lumley (1976: 84- 85)
calculated that if the U.S. did not restore economic aid in 1950, the actual GNP of Taiwan in
1964 would not have been reached until 1980, and the per capita GNP would not have been
produced until 1995. The relationship of foreign aid to economic development has been
studied extensively in the literature. See, for example, Chenery and Bruno (1962: 79-103),
Chenery and Strout (1966: 679-732), Ranis (1973) and Bhagwati and Eckaus (1970).
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government directed the Bank of Taiwan to redeem short-term time deposits in
gold; which caused a large net outflow of non-monetary gold (valued at US$ 50.8
million in 1950) from Taiwan6 ' (Wang, 1994: 112). Additionally, the government's
attempt to absorb excessive liquidity in the economy by offering realistic interest
rates to bank depositors proved to be a reasonably effective anti-inflationary policy
(Irvine and Emery: 1966, 29-39). In the spring of 1950, the Bank of Taiwan had
begun to raise interest rates on its deposits. By attracting floating funds and thus
limiting spending, it broke the back of post-war inflation (Myres, 1990: 33). With
rates of 9 per cent a month, time deposits in the banking system increased
dramatically, rising from NT$ 2.3 million in March 1950 to NT$ 33.3 million in
June 1950 (BOT, TFSM, 1954: 17; Wang, 1994: 113). Bank deposits continued to
grow during the next three years, while simultaneously the rate of price increases
greatly declined. Such a solution could only operate in the short term, however,
because of the unwanted side-effect that credit costs were too high to undertake
new investment and expansion. The government subsequently moved to lower its
loan rates, although it continued to charge higher interest rates for businesses and
individuals than for public enterprises (Myres, 1990: 33).
However, the main reason why inflation was kept within controllable limits
was the resumption of U.S. aid in the latter part of the 1950s (Ho, 1978: 113). The
severe inflation of the late 1940s - prices rose by 3400 per cent in 1949 alone - was
reined in to 9 per cent by 1953 with the help of foreign aid inflows (Ranis and
Schive, 1985: 90). U.S. economic aid provided Taiwan with large amounts of
chemical fertiliser, wheat, and cotton, the daily necessities and raw materials
needed to stabilise and rehabilitate the economy. Although inflation was high in
1955-56 and again in 1959-60, in both cases the causes of instability were poor
61 This wasteful use of government gold, at a time when Taiwan was in desperate need of foreign
exchange, was halted in December 1950 (Wang, 1994: 112).
weather62 and increased military expenditures63
 (Ho, 1978: 114). Indeed, without
U.S. aid, price increases during these two periods could easily have gone out of
control.
(B) Foreign Exchange Relief
Chenery (1962: 79-103; 1966: 679-732) has argued that foreign aid is
primarily a gap filler. Specifically, it can be used to remedy a deficiency in either
reserves or foreign exchange (Ho, 1978: 114). In the context of Taiwan, an obvious
deficiency was the lack of foreign exchange. By filling the foreign exchange gap,
U.S. aid relieved this constraint on the economy, and permitted a higher rate of
economic growth and a fuller utilisation of other productive inputs in the economy
(Jacoby, 1966: 124; Ho, 1965: 63- 142; Liang, 1970: 36- 44; Liang and Lee, 1972:
27- 35). During 1951-1955, over 40 per cent of Taiwan's imports were aid-financed
(Ho, 1978: 115).
The contribution of foreign aid to investment in Taiwan was also substantial
(McKinnon, 1964: 388- 409). In the 1950s, nearly 40 per cent of gross domestic
capital formation was financed by foreign savings; almost all of that came in the
form of U.S. aid (DGBAS, 1970: 136- 151). The availability of foreign aid not only
increased foreign savings, but also made possible the fuller utilisation of domestic
savings (McKinnon, 1964: 388-409). Taiwan's domestic production and U.S. aid
"formed a fungible pool of resources" that was used to support private and
government consumption and investment (Ho, 1978: 116).
62 Because Taiwan in the 1950s was primarily agrarian, its economic health depended, to an unusual
extent, on the weather. Since the government lacked an adequate reserve of either food or
foreign exchange, it was unable to stabilise the market for any extended period of time. Thus
any weather condition that adversely affected agricultural production had far-reaching
economic effects and inevitably caused prices to rise.
63 Taiwan's defence spending increased sharply during these periods due to communist forces
attacking Quemoy.
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(C) Capital Formulation
Because it was a government-to-government programme, U.S. economic aid
had considerable impact upon the Government's economic policies, and on how
these policies were implemented. In the 1950s, because of large military costs, the
Government's domestic revenues were not sufficient to cover its total expenditures,
with the deficits financed mainly by U.S. aid (Jacoby, 1966: table C. 12).
One suspects that the KMT government would have preferred the public
sector to spearhead Taiwan's economic development because that would have
strengthened its control of the island. However, for several reasons a different
approach was followed. In the 1950s and for much of the 1960s the government's
economic projects were limited primarily to those financed by U.S. aid. On the
other hand, AID was strongly committed to the growth of the private sector, and
used its influence and resources to improve the climate for private investment
(Jacoby, 1966: 138; Hsing, 1971: 199-120). The private sector would not have
become Taiwan's mainspring source of economic growth without AID's influence
and active intervention (Jacoby, 1966: 138). AiD helped to create a more conducive
environment for the expansion of private industries, by (1) financing government
projects, (2) inducing the government to liberalise its economic policies, and (3)
laying a constraining hand on military expenditures (Ho, 1978: 117). In terms of
direct assistance, however, AID provided little to the private sector. The
preponderance of economic aid was given to the public sector 65
 (mainly to
infrastructure and human resources). U.S. aid to the public enterprises was used to
64 The economic ideology of the KMT government includes features of socialism and capitalism. It
advocates a more balanced ownership of land, state enterprises in certain industries, and state
control of private industries. It also believes in private property, profit incentive, and
competition. When the KMT governed the mainland, it established public enterprises in
competition with the private sector on numerous occasions. This behaviour suggests that the
KMT government was not strongly predisposed to develop the private sector (Ho, 1978: 117).
65 From 1951 to 1965, 67 per cent of all aid was allocated to public enterprises or agencies, 27 per
cent to mixed public and private enterprises, and only 6 per cent to purely private enterprises
(Jacoby: 1966, 51).
Aincrease the productivity of private industrial investments, and helped to ensure the
expansion of the private sector (Jacoby, 1966: 52).
On a number of occasions AID offered to increase the level of aid if certain
government actions were taken and threatened to reduce it if the government failed
to act66 (Jacoby, 1966: 134-35). In particular, AID brought intense pressure to bear
upon the KNT government to hold down its military spending. Its efforts to
influence the Government were not always successful: the KMT government
adhered to its preference for the military and continued to enlarge its military
budget, although at a less rapid rate (Ho, 1978: 118).
AID was more successful in persuading the KMT government to develop
economic policies that were developmental rather than control-oriented. During the
late 1940s and the early 1950s, the Government had imposed a large number of
temporary regulations and controls. These included a multiple-exchange rate
system, import and foreign exchange controls, hidden subsidies, and rationing and
administrative pricing of certain goods and services, in addition to various
bureaucratic obstacles to private business (Ho, 1978: 119). Because these controls
created distortions and inefficiencies in the economy, their presence reduced the
productivity of investment and thus inhibited economic development. AID, in 1958,
argued for a relaxation of economic controls and an improvement in the climate for
private investment. The government eased the regulations on foreign investment
and overseas Chinese investment, and simplified the multiple-exchange rate system
in 1959 (Ho, 1978: 119). In the subsequent four years (1960-63), the KMT
government introduced other important reforms: among others, a statute for the
encouragement of investment, the conversion of the multiple exchange rate system
to a single rate, the relaxation of trade and exchange controls, and the simplification
of business laws and regulations. The combined effect of these actions permitted
66 The most notable example of this was AID's attempt in 1959-60 to induce the KMT government
to adopt the 19-Point Programme of Economic and Financial Reform (see Chapter 6).
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the economy to pursue an outward-looking growth strategy, one that has been given
much of the credit for Taiwan's growth in the 1960s and the early 1970s. Economic
aid from the US ended in 1965, stimulating the KMT government to intensify its
efforts at economic development (Liu, 1985: 161): trade and exchange controls
were further relaxed, the government became more receptive to Japanese
investments, industrial sites and export-processing zones were created, and positive
measures to promote exports were adopted (Ho, 1978: 119-120).
From the moment it retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the Nationalist
government pursued three major objectives - rapid economic growth, stable prices,
and a strong military presence. Without foreign aid to remedy the deficiencies
constraining the economy, it is unlikely that these conflicting objectives could have
been achieved. There is no doubt that U.S. aid had an immense impact on Taiwan,
albeit not always beneficially. Politically, it made possible the survival of the KMT
government in Taiwan. Economically and socially, it helped to restore stability and
facilitated the development of a viable private sector and a growing middle class.
4.2.3 Government Economic Policies and FDI during the Early Import
Substitution Phase, 1949-1952
Economic stability was the Government's primary concern in 1949. In May
of that year it established the Taiwan Production Board (TPB), with the primary
aim of stabilising the economy through promoting various initiatives. It was chaired
by the provincial governor. With the addition of an Industrial and Financial
Committee in early 1950, its activities expanded beyond co-ordinating production,
supply, and trade (Gold, 1990: 68). In 1953 the TPB was absorbed into the
Economic Stabilisation Board (ESB), established in 1951 on American advice. The
ESB's function was to review and co-ordinate trade, payments, and monetary and
fiscal policies, in order to control inflation, with a subcommittee making specific
decisions about Taiwan's import requirements and the part to be financed by U.S.
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aid (Hsing, 1971: 184). The ESB included an Industrial Development Commission
(IDC) which was responsible for overseeing the formation and implementation of
economic plans adopted by the Government from 1953 onwards. The ESB was
chaired by the governor and later by the premier. By moving the chief economic
agency from provincial to national level, the ESB increased its power and merged
the identity of the central government with the island (Gold, 1990: 68).
During the 1950s many newly independent countries, most of which were
less-developed, were created from former colonial states. 67 Almost all of these new
countries were plagued with population pressures, general food shortages,
government budget deficits, foreign exchange shortages, and inflationary pressures.
It followed that economic development became their first priority (San, 1991: 32;
Hsieh, 1992: 16). One popular development strategy among these agriculture-
oriented countries was the implementation of an import substitution policy. The
justification was two-fold. First, the terms of trade for importation of agricultural
goods from less-developed countries (LDCs) to industrial countries had
deteriorated over the past century. The LDC should therefore not rely on the export
of agricultural goods to develop its economy, but should develop its own industries,
and the 'infant industry' in its own country should be protected accordingly (Hou,
1987). Secondly, in light of the great depression which occurred in the U.S. in the
1930s, and of the Government response during that decade, as well as the
promotion of a welfare state policy in the U.K. after World War II, many believed
that public enterprises could, and should, play a significant role in stabilising the
economy through job creation (San, 1991: 32-33). Clearly, there was a
complementary match between the promotion of public enterprises and the
implementation of import substitution, which soon led to the flowering of 'public
infant industries' in many of the LDCs in Asia and Latin America.
67 
e.g. Nigeria, Uganda, North Vietnam, Ghana, Kenya.
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For the KMT government, the island's loss of its traditional export market
in Japan and mainland China, together with high levels of inflation and chronic
balance-of-payments deficits, dictated an import-substituting economic course
(Huang, 1989: 98-99). Therefore, in the 1 950s Taiwan followed an inward-looking
development strategy based on import substitution in manufacturing.68
Many public-related enterprises established by the Japanese were controlled
by the ROC government after 1945. At that time, the principal endorsed by Dr. Sun,
"enhance the nation's capital and constrain the accumulation of private capital",
was a central doctrine of government policy. Within the government, however,
there was a division between those who favoured continued state dominance of the
economy, based on its ownership of dozens of confiscated Japanese enterprises in
several sectors,69
 and those who advocated a greater range of activity for the private
sector. Both sides could claim legitimacy in terms of Dr. Sun's vague instructions
on the restriction or regulation of capital (chieh-chih tzu-pen) (Chiang, 1947:
Chapter 4; Ts'ui, 1959: Chapter 22). Sun had written that the state should own
enterprises in key sectors related to national defence, natural monopolies, or where
capital requirements were so great that private entrepreneurs could not afford the
risk (Gold, 1990: 67). Everything else could be left to private capital. Alighting on
compromise, the KMT government did not hasten to privatise government-owned
public enterprises, but encouraged the development of an otherwise weak private
sector in Taiwan (San, 1991: 33). This balance changed over the decade: in the
early 1950s, the more state-centred cadres received greater support; in the latter part
of the decade, coinciding with U.S. pressure, free enterprise came to the fore (Gold,
1990: 68).
68 Top priorities were (cotton) textile and fertiliser industries, since textiles and fertilisers were two
major imports at that time (Hsing, 1971: 188).
69 These enterprises included sugar, aluminium, fertiliser, alkali, shipbuilding, brickmaking,
machinery, power, cement, paper, mining, printing, hemp, textiles, tea, food processing,
banking, and finance. See Shih (1980: 711).
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To promote import substitution, various measures were introduced by the
government in order to protect the development of domestic enterprises and to
conserve foreign exchange reserves (San, 1991: 33). Among those measures, the
most important were tariffs protection, import controls, and multiple exchange rate
controls. 70
(A) Tarjffs Protection
The tariff schedule enacted in 1948 was revised in 1955, 1959, and 1965
(Hsing, 1971: 210). In the 1948 schedule, over 60 per cent of items listed incurred
tariffs of above 30 per cent (Tao, 1969: 174-75). Between 1948 and 1955, the
average nominal tariff for all imports rose from 20 per cent to nearly 45 per cent71
(Tao: 1969: 175-78). In general, tariff rates for consumer goods 72 were higher than
for other goods (Hsing, 1971: 212). Estimates of effective tariff rates, the more
appropriate measure of protection, 73
 indicate that they were indeed substantially
higher even than the nominal rates, and that protection was greater for non-durable
consumer goods than for either intermediate 74
 or capital goods (Liu, 1970: 379-466;
70 Exchange and trade regulations are regularly reviewed in the IMF's: Annual Report of Exchange
Restrictions. The U.S. Department of Commerce has also published periodic surveys of
Taiwan's exchange and trade controls. See e.g., World Trade Information Service and
Overseas Business Report. A useful survey of Taiwan's exchange and trade regulations is in
Chang (1965: Chapter 7).
71 The revision in 1955 largely represented a belated adjustment to the withdrawal of ROC from
General Agreement on Tariffs and trade (GATT) in 1950, and also reflected the desire of the
Government to raise revenue to tide over financial difficulties in the early 1950s. For
discussion of Taiwan's withdrawal from GAiT, see Chapter 5.1 below.
72 Consumer goods are products used directly to satisfy human needs or desires, as opposed to
capital goods, used to produced some other products or services. Consumer goods are
generally classified into two major categories according to the degree of durability: (1)
durables, such as passenger cars and appliances; (2) non-durables, such as food and clothing
(Greenwald, 1983: 71-72; Ammer and Ammer, 1984: 98-99; Pearce, 1992: 78).
Effective rate of protection is defined by Pearce (1992: 123) as "the increment in value added,
made possible by the tariff structure, as a proportion of the free trade value added".
An intermediate good is a good which is used at some point in the production process of other
goods, rather than final consumption; for example, steel and wood. For a detailed definition,
see Ruggles and Ruggles (1956).
WI
Hsing, 1971: 238-66; Sun, 1966; Lee and Liang, 1971: 69-96). This discrimination
clearly evidences the Government's intention to encourage consumption of
domestically-produced end products.
(B) Import Controls
The Government used a system of import quotas to control foreign trade.
After 1951 imports were classified into four categories: (a) permissible, (b)
controlled, (c) suspended, and (a) prohibited. 75 Of the approximately 500 groups of
commodities classified during the early 1950s, 55 per cent were in the permissible
category, 40 per cent in the suspended and controlled categories, and 5 per cent in
the prohibited category (Ho, 1978: 191). The matter was complicated by the fact
that commodity quotas had first to be classified within the categories above, and by
the requirement that applications for imports had to be screened and approved on a
case by case basis (Hsing, 1971: 205).
Hsia (1954: 24-27) has compared domestic prices and import costs of
selected raw materials in 1953, concluding that domestic prices were higher than
import costs inclusive of tariffs by substantial margins in all cases. This indicates
that during the early 1 950s direct licensing under quotas was an effective constraint
on imports.
(C) Multiple Exchange Rate Controls
Formally, there was only one official fixed exchange rate to settle external
transactions, known as the basic rate of exchange, which was revised upwards at
intervals; but for a long time it was applicable only to public exports and imports,
and to a limited range of private exports. For the bulk of private exports, and all
The permissible category included essential capital equipment, raw materials, and essential
consumer goods, all of which were importable within the prescribed quotas (Hsing, 1971:
205). Items in the controlled category were to be granted import licences only if comparable
goods were not produced domestically (Long, 1991: 82).
private imports, 'exchange certificates' were issued to effect exchange settlements
between the Bank of Taiwan and both exporters and importers, with the price fixed
in terms of local currency - generally called the 'exchange certificate rate' - at a rate
higher than the basic exchange rate (Hsing, 1971: 206). In addition, there were
certain other discriminatory exchange rates. For example, the complex multiple
exchange rate system applied different exchange rates to different types of imports
(San, 1991: 33). Under this system, a hidden tax was utilised in the exchange rates
in order to discourage the importation of luxury or consumer goods and to subsidise
the importation of basic raw materials and industrial products (San, 1991: 33).
These exchange and trade controls promoted import substitution by effectively
sealing off many of Taiwan's consumer goods markets from foreign competition,
and by conserving foreign exchange for capital and raw material imports (Hsia,
1954: 24-27; Lin, 1973: 51).
While this system achieved the aim of encouraging import substitution, one
should observe that it had many detrimental effects. The interests of private
exporters were damaged by the Government's exchange control approach. This was
not only because 20 per cent of their export proceeds had to be sold at the lower
basic official exchange rate, but also because even the exchange certificate rate was
much lower than the prevailing black market rate. Only private importers of raw
materials and industrial goods were able to profit from the exchange rationing. At
first, this opportunity was limited. Only licensed import merchants were entitled to
foreign exchange for private imports, and quotas were allotted according to their
respective past business records. But the system quickly became inefficient. Many
former import merchants, though no longer in business, continued to receive
exchange quotas, and sold their 'exchange certificates' to whoever offered the
highest price. Importers continued to make unearned incomes at the expense of
exporters. The effect of the multiple exchange rate mechanisms was to create new
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vested interests, and to protect existing inefficient industrial enterprises (Hsing,
1971: 207).
In essence, during the 1 950s the government kept the NT$ over-valued, and
maintained a multiple exchange system that applied lower rates to exports than to
imports; and within imports, rather lower rates to capital equipment and raw
materials (when purchased by end users) than to other goods (IMF, Annual Report
on Exchange Restrictions). The over-valued NT$ also proved to be detrimental to
efficient economic growth and aggravated the balance-of-payment problem. (Ho,
1978: 194). It may have increased the level to imports; because an undervalued
foreign exchange encouraged local industrialists not only to import capital
equipment but also to develop industries that were dependent on imports for raw
materials. The major difficult and the most damaging effect of the over-valued NT$
was that it penalised exports and discouraged development of export-competing
industries. Once the early phase of import substitution was completed, it became
increasingly difficult to maintain a rapid rate of industrialisation.
Owing to the small size of the domestic market, import substitution, once
begun, was achieved quickly in those industries where a mastery of the required
technology was relatively simple (Ho, 1978: 189). From 1949 to 1952,
manufacturing production increased at an average rate of 22 per cent a year (Ho,
1978: 187). Lin, (1973: 68), drawing on Chenery (1960: 639-41) and Lewis (1969:
20-21), has estimated that over 91 per cent of the increase in non-food
manufacturing production from 1937 to 1952 can be attributed to import
substitution. Therefore, during the early phase of import substitution, although
Taiwan was still a 'dual economy', 76 the Government's approach appears to have
been effective. Its strategy of import-substituting industrialisation during the 1 950s
76 Rutherford (1992: 130) defines a 'dual economy' as a national economy with both a rich modern
sector and a poor traditional sector. Originally this term was used to describe many colonial
economies, such as Indonesia, Zambia and India, after the Second World War. For details, see
Boeke (1953), Simonies and Simonies (1971) and Averitt (1968).
Uallowed existing and new firms to develop strong domestic positions free from
import competition. A group of Taiwanese and mainland industrialists began to
achieve success in some light industries, especially textiles (Huang, 1989: 99).
Most US investors in the late 1940s were not interested in immediate
investment in post-war Asia because the possibilities for profit in the domestic
market loomed so large (Schurmann, 1973: 115). Rather, they wanted unrestricted
access to Asian markets only as a guarantee of future expansion in that direction.
Even in the late 1940s and 1950s businessmen did not see Taiwan as a significant
market or source of cheap labour, but rather as a symbol of an overall commitment
to Pacific expansionism77
 (Barrett, 1988: 134).
During this post-war period, Taiwan desperately needed raw materials for
its post-war recovery. Government FDI policy in this period was to welcome
investment in food, clothes, chemistry and cement (Wu, 1993: 7). However, the
nature of Taiwan's economic and political condition inhibited the arrival of FDI.
Economically, the market was too small; the economy was unstable; the industry
was backward; strict import, export, and foreign exchange controls meant that profit
could not be guaranteed; and because of protectionism, there were no specific FDI
incentives for investors. Politically, the future of Taiwan was uncertain. The KMT
government had just lost a civil war and Taiwan was still under the serious threat of
war. As mentioned in Chapter 4.1, political stabilisation was one of the important
considerations for investors at that time. Taiwan had virtually nothing to offer
foreign investors (Gold, 1990: 126). Therefore, it is not surprising that there was
very little FDI in Taiwan during this post-war recovery period. The few investments
Taiwan had at this period were from overseas Chinese (Wu, 1993: 6). The motives
behind these investments went beyond the purely economic. Those who invested in
The specific reasons why American investors were not attracted to Taiwan until the late I 960s
have been explored in Barret and Whyte (1982: 1046-89) and Schreiber (1970).
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Taiwan in this period thereby signified support for the Nationalist government
(Gold, 1988a: 197).
4.3 Conclusion
As I explained in Chapter 4.2,2(A), U.S. aid not only helped Taiwan to
survive during this difficult period, but also acted as a stimulus by helping to
promote and support private sector involvement. More importantly, the AID
mission also helped to pry open the Taiwanese economy to private foreign
participation. Between 1951 and 1965, U.S. aid accounted for about 34 per cent of
total gross investment in the Taiwan economy (Jacoby, 1966: 38). The nature of
Taiwan's economy and its political-military situation in this period had inhibited
the arrival of FDI in Taiwan. Indeed, most of the FDI coming into Taiwan during
that time was from overseas Chinese. Only after U.S. aid had helped to stabilise the
economy did these flows begin to increase appreciably (Simon, 1990: 149).
To summarise, between 1949 and 1952, the Nationalist government made
full use of U.S. economic aid to reverse its economic and social disadvantages. It
sold considerable property to private enterprise and initiated a programme of
agrarian land reform. In order to encourage the investment in both public and
private sectors, interest rates were maintained by the monetary authorities at
artificially low levels (Yeh, 1994: 46). As a result, by 1952-53, production and
distribution reached pre-war levels. By the end of this phase there was both
optimism and concern over the economic future of Taiwan (Myres, 1990: 18). On
the one hand, agricultural output had increased and the small manufacturing and
services sectors had greatly expanded their productive capacity. On the other hand,
the Nationalist government still relied extensively upon U.S. economic aid, which
provided the country with much-needed raw materials for agricultural and industrial
I I
production. In addition, the government allocated almost half of its budget to
support the large military establishment.
Yet, on the whole, the optimism seemed justified, largely because the policy
of import substitution had so far been successful. Import substitution called for
strict controls to over-value the NT$, to ration foreign exchange to preferred
importers, and to regulate all foreign trade under quotas and tariffs. It protected
infant domestic industries from foreign competition. However, much remained to
be achieved. Though Taiwan's economic growth indicators in the early 1950s were
impressive, there were no tangible signs that economic dualism had begun to
disappear. Despite the Government's efforts to begin the first phase of
industrialisation, agriculture still contributed a larger share to GNP than did
manufacturing, generating the highest value of exports, and employing at least half
of the labour force. The pace of urban growth remained very weak, while the
population continued to increase at the rate of 3.5 per cent per year (TSDB, 1997:
8).
1.1.3
Chapter 5
Law, Policy and FDI during the Primary Import-
Substitution Phase, 1953-1960
The beginning of a country's efforts to make the transition from colonialism to
developed status is customarily assigned to the year of its political independence.
For a number of reasons, however, 1953 is more appropriately regarded as the
starting-point for Taiwan's transition than 1945 (when Taiwan became independent
of Japan) or 1949 (when Taiwan became politically separated from mainland
China). First, an economic system that was independent of the mainland economy
did not begin to emerge until late 1949. Secondly, the Taiwanese economy did not
recover from the bomb damage sustained during War World II until about 1951.1
Real income per head only reached pre-war peak levels (of 1935 and 1936) in
1953.2 Thirdly, 1953 was the year in which the Government promulgated its first
Four-Year Economic Plan.3
According to the Government's official position, Taiwan's economic policy
is to let market forces take their course. That is a highly over-simplified and
exaggerated statement. Taiwan's Government has long had and still has a high
degree of economic control (Scitovsky, 1990: 135). This reflects the Min-sheng
'By 1951, agricultural and industrial output had reached 1937 levels (Sun and Lee, 1985: 59).
2 For detailed information, see Japan Economic Federation (1939) and Tax Division of the
Governor's Office of Taiwan (1955).
Although 1953 is taken as marking the end of post-war recovery and the beginning of positive
development in later years, there were important elements which helped Taiwan's economic
development and which were already in place before 1953. For example, the influx of talented
officials, managers, and entrepreneurs from the mainland in the late 1940s minimised problems
associated with replacing the Japanese colonial presence (Fei, Ranis and Kuo, 1979: 26).
Taiwan also possessed an unusually good physical and institutional infrastructure by 1953. It
had a solid base of human resources to go along with the more common features of a surplus of
labour on limited arable land.
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philosophy behind Taiwan's economic policies - there must be planning within the
context of a free economy. Economic planning in Taiwan followed almost
immediately upon the arrival of the US economic aid mission. The Four-Year
Economic Plans, started in 1953, were used to fully utilise US aid and to implement
the Government's growth policies. There were six Four-Year Economic Plans, i.e.
1953-56, 1957-60, 1961-64, 1965-68, 1969-1972, and 1973-1976 (Hsing, 1971:
154). Li (1976: 93) and Lumley (1976: 89) have criticised the ESB's First Plan as
"a rather crude effort" encompassing only agricultural and industrial reconstruction.
The Government soon realised that the utilisation of aid funds should be linked to a
programme of economic development (Lumley, 1976: 102-103). The Second Plan
added separate communications projects together with special projects such as the
Shih-men Reservoir, tidal land reclamation, vocational assistance for retired
servicemen, and public housing. It specified measures for achieving the targets set,
something the First Plan had not done (Li, 1976: 93). The essence of the plan was a
linking together of applications for AID money (Gold, 1990: 70). It is not
surprising that the first two plans, under ESB, were largely lists of desired projects
that might be funded by aid donors with only scant reference to the rest of the
economy (Woronff, 1992: 67).
During this stage, the Government decided to adopt the primary import-
substitution pattern which is almost invariably identified with early post-
independence policies of developing countries. During the primary import-
substitution period, domestic industrialisation was the focus of attention (Ranis and
Schive, 1985: 89-90). The creation of a domestic industry, and the accompanying
appearance of a new indigenous industrial entrepreneurial class, was supported by a
programme of direct protection and subsidies; introduced with the aim of diverting
consumption away from imported to domestically-produced items. Import-
substitution was made imperative by the loss of Taiwan's traditional markets
following the war and its consequent independence from Japan, as well as the
Idisruption occasioned by evacuation and separation from the mainland (Lim, 1991:
64). It was characterised by the diversion of traditional export proceeds away from
further expansion of the colonial economic triangle established by the Japanese, and
towards investment which was intended to replace previously imported industrial
consumer goods with domestically-produced consumer goods (Fei, Ranis and Kuo,
1979: 26-27). Liang and Liang (1976) have shown that this primary import-
substitution period, whether defined in horizontal or vertical terms, 4
 came to an end
by the late 1950s or early 1960s.
To promote economic development, the Government adopted a policy of
'cultivating industiy through agriculture, and developing agriculture through
industry' (Yeh, 1994: 50). In the area of agricultural development, land reform was
continued and a 'Land-to-the-Tiller' programme was instituted in 1953 (see
Chapter 4 above). At the same time, assistance was provided to the farmers for
enhancing farming techniques and increasing agricultural production so as to
improve the supply of foodstuffs and provide raw materials for processed
agricultural products (Yeh, 1994: 51). Exports to earn foreign exchange were
thereby strengthened and in turn financed imports of the equipment and raw
materials needed to develop industry. In industry, due to the shortage of foreign
exchange and technical manpower, the Government selected manufacturing
industries with relatively low technology levels, relatively small capital
requirements, and high labour-intensiveness as its main focus for support and
development - industries such as textiles, glass, cement, wood products, paper,
flour, edible oil, plastic, bicycles, and sewing machines - in order to generate
substitutes for imported products (Sun and Lee, 1985: 59-60). To effectively foster
the development of these industries, the Government adopted protectionist
Ratios of imports of nondurable consumer goods to total imports, and to total supply, both went up
around 1960 (Liang and Liang, 1976).
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measures such as import tariffs, import controls, multi-tiered foreign exchange
rates, and restrictions on foreign exchange.
5.1 Protectionist Measures
The average nominal import tariffs rate almost doubled between 1948 and
1955, as a result of ROC's withdrawal from GATT. 5
 While the Government also
hoped to augment its revenue by increasing tariff rates (Tao, 1969: 109), its main
aim was protectionism. This may be seen from the fact that import controls became
even tighter in the mid-1950s, as many commodities were switched from the
'permissible' to the 'suspended' and 'controlled' categories (TSDB, 1997).
By prohibiting the importation of luxury goods and controlling the imports
of other consumer goods, the Government hoped to conserve foreign exchange for
capital and raw material imports. In this respect the exchange and trade controls
were largely successful. 6 Industrial production anti investment were encouraged by
another aspect of the system. The multiple exchange rate system (see Chapter 4
above) applied an appreciably lower rate to imported capital equipment and raw
ROC was one of the original Contracting Parties to GATT, which it signed in 1948 (Brown, 1950:
75-157; Jackson, 1969: 650; Wilcox, 1972: 42; MOEA, 1987: 9). However, after the
Nationalist Party moved to Taiwan and the Communist Party took over the mainland China,
the treaty became inappropriate for a number of reasons. The Chinese Communist government
refused to carry out the GATT obligations promised by the ROC government. In addition, the
negotiated tariff concessions would apply to all exports, and thus the beneficiary would
primarily be the mainland. Taiwan hardly benefited from the concession as Taiwan's exports
were very little (due to the Government's policy of import substitution rather than export
expansion at that time) (Hsiao, 1989: 39; Chou, 1968: 655; China Times, June 20, 1988;
Hartland-Thunberg, 1990: 112). To avoid Communist China taking advantage of GATT
membership, the ROC, after consulting with Department of State of the United States, notified
the General-Secretary of the United Nations on 6 March, 1950 that the ROC would withdraw
from GAIT (GAIT document GATT/CP/54, 8 March, 1950). In accordance with Article 5 of
the 'Protocol of Provisional Application of the GAIT', this withdrawal became effective on 5
May, 1950 (GAIT-Status of Legal Instruments, Geneva, November 1986). For more
information about the relationship between GATT and Taiwan, see Ho (1992, chapter 3).
6 During 1952-60 capital goods imports accounted for 23 per cent of total imports, agricultural and
industrial raw material imports 67 per cent, and consumer goods imports only 10 per cent
(ISDB, 1997: 193).
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materials than to other transactions, and over-valued the NT$ 7 (Shih, 1994: 91).
Although Taiwan's import substitution policy encouraged industrialisation, it did
not solve the balance of payments problem. The reason for this was that although
import substitution altered the import structure by decreasing imports of consumer
goods and stimulating imports of intermediate and capital goods, it did not reduce
the total demand for imports (DGBAS, 1970: 156-157). Consequently, a large
deficit on goods and services, amounting to almost 40 per cent of total imports,
persisted through the 1950s (IMF, Balance of Payments Yearbook). The deficit was
financed primarily by U.S. aid (Ho, 1978: 194).
As I discussed in Chapter 4, the system that existed from 1949 to 1958 set a
favourable exchange rate for importing goods essential for economic development,
applied a general exchange rate to bulk exports of the Government and highly
profitable private exports, and applied a still more favourable exchange rate to other
exports. This control system was both "supply restrictive" for exporters and "cost
restrictive" for importers, so that the fixed multiple exchange rate favoured
different parties, particularly the Government (Myres, 1990: 46). The system
worked reasonably well in the early 1950s to reduce imports, transfer excessive
trade profits to the Government, promote the growth of government-protected
industries, and stabilise a minimum level of living for the people. Managing this
system required only that Government periodically adjust the dual rates as internal
prices changed (Myres, 1990: 46). Thus the regime facilitated economic profits to
importers, revenue gains for the Government, and profits for the protected
industries.
However, by the middle of the 1950s, these highly effective protectionist
measures were beginning to have deleterious side-effects. As industrial production
' The exchange rate applied to essential raw materials and capital equipment imported by end users
was NT$ 15.65 per US$ in 1953 and NT$ 36.38 per US$ in 1958. During this period, the
average market rate per US$ was NT$ 26.49 in 1953 and NT$ 46.58 in 1958 (Ho, 1978: 193).
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expanded, the finite domestic market for textiles, wood products, and rubber/plastic
goods became saturated (Gold, 1990: 72; Long, 1991: 82; Shih, 1994: 92). The
rates of capital utilisation in many important manufacturing industries were very
low (San, 1991: 34). Between 1955 and 1959 manufacturing and services failed to
generate enough new employment to reduce the serious underemployment that
existed, and domestic demand did not expand rapidly enough to buy goods and
services at prices that enabled firms to remain at full capacity and cover costs. As a
corollary, inventories began to rise and overall growth began to decline (from 9 per
cent in the early 1950s to 6.5 per cent in the late 1950s) (Chan and Clark, 1992: 82;
Myres, 1990: 18-19). In addition, the Government's policy of keeping interest rates
artificially low not only created a significant inflationary pressure in the commodity
markets, but also failed to attract domestic savings into the capital market. As a
result, scarce investible capital was often wasted and misallocated (San, 1991: 34).
Price wars ensued, and as production declined so too did demand for the few
locally-made capital goods (Gold, 1990: 72). Meanwhile, rigid foreign exchange
controls requiring the immediate surrender of all foreign exchange receipts to the
BOT discouraged exports (San, 1991: 34). The multiple exchange rate system, by
favouring imports of essential raw materials and capital goods, made export
competitiveness hard to achieve (Long, 1991: 82). K. Y. Yin, 8 a leading politician
during the 1950s, has pointed out that the over-valued NT$ lowered the cost of
imported goods excessively. Because imports were so restricted and scarce in
supply, there was a large discrepancy between the domestic market price of
imported goods and their actual cost to importers. Windfall profits were earned by
8 K. Y. Yin, also known as Chung-jung Yin, held a number of posts more or less concurrently,
including Minister of Economic Affairs (1965-1966); General Manager of the Central Trust of
China (1961-1966); Deputy Chairman of TPB (1960-1965); Secretary General of ESB (1968-
1969) and Convenor of IDC; Chairman of the Foreign Exchange and Trade Control
Commission; Vice-chairman of the Council on U.S. Aid; and Chairman of the Board of the
BOT. Yin dominated and forged the broad lines of Taiwan's economic path in the 1950s. The
reform of the foreign exchange system which commenced in 1958 was largely due to his
foresight and advocacy (Gold, 1990: 68; Myres, 1990: 46; Chiang, 1994: 22 and 25 October
1994; China Yearbook, 1960-61: 871; 196 1-62: 892).
those lucky enough to obtain their quota of foreign exchange, while entrepreneurs
engaged in production who were dependent upon imported raw materials or
intermediate goods were penalised (Myres, 1990: 46). However, the Government
adamantly refused to "reflate the economy through deficit financing lest inflation be
rekindled" (Myres, 1990: 18-19). Instead, it opted for a different course to
reallocate scarce resources and to promote sustained economic development.
5.2 Foreign Exchange and Trade Reform
Starting in 1955, the Government strove to simplify its foreign trade and
exchange controls (Hsing, 1971: 207). After a hard-fought baffle between reformers
and those who favoured the status quo, a three-stage reform of the foreign exchange
regime began on April 12, 1958, and was completed on August 10, 1959 (Shih,
1994: 94). This reform restructured economic incentives in a number of ways. In
1958, the use of the 'exchange certificate' mechanism was extended to virtually all
external transactions, and exporters were legally permitted to market their
'exchange certificates' at whatever rate they could command 9 (Hsing, 1971: 207).
Furthermore, the manufacturers of exportable goods using imported raw materials
were provided with adequate exchange for the direct import of materials and
equipment, amounting in many cases to more than the value of their exports. As a
result, the market rate of 'exchange certificates' was gradually brought down and
stabilised. This was followed by the merging of the basic official exchange rate and
the official 'exchange certificate rate' to form a new basic official exchange rate of
NT$ 36.38 per US$ on August 10, 1959b0 (Myres, 1990: 46; Hsing, 1971: 207).
Although the BOT remained in a position to buy any quantity of 'exchange certificates' turned in
by their holders at the official rate, and to sell them whenever it considered the market rate too
far out of line.
'° For major changes in official exchange rates during the period of 1951-63, see Hsing (1971, 226-
229).
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This last move ended the confusion caused by the multiple exchange rate system.
Taiwan had finally adopted a single exchange-rate system. Under the new system,
the Government changed from its original passive stance, of conserving foreign
exchange reserves, to one of aggressively creating foreign exchange reserves.
By moving to the single exchange rate, the Government effectively
devalued the NT$ to promote exports" (San, 1991: 34). With the evolution of the
exchange-control system, the degree of import control had increased from 1953 to
1956, but was reduced from 1956 to 1960 following the simplification measures
(Hsing, 1971; 207-208). However, the changes were not without risks. Higher-
priced imports might generate some price inflation. Other events also threatened to
cause inflation: an off-shore artilleiy exchange with Communist China in August
195812 and a giant typhoon that destroyed much of the 1959 crop endangered the
economic home front (I-Jo, 1978: 114). In order to prevent current spending from
forcing up prices, the Government in the mid-S Os decided to raise surtaxes, and to
abolish the low interest rate policy.' 3 Interest rates were subsequently adjusted
several times in an effort to curb domestic inflation. As a result, indebtedness of
firms jumped in 1960, and many business failures occurred.' 4 But demand deposits
shot up from NT$ 925 million in 1960 to NT$ 2,800 million in 1961, as higher
interest rates were paid on savings (Myres, 1990: 47). Moreover, the consumer
"The NT dollar rate applicable to most traded goods and services was devalued in 1958 from US$
1: NT$ 15.55 to US$ 1: NT$ 24.68. In 1960 it was further devalued, and a unified exchange
rate of US$ 1: NT$ 40 introduced (Long, 1991: 83; Shih, 1994: 94).
12 The Communists have never abandoned the threat to attack Taiwan with armed forces. Before
1961, there were several important battles such as the Battle of Kinmen (Quemoy) in 1949, and
the Kinmen and Matsu Crisis of 1958. Although the Communists' shelling of Kinmen and
Matsu continued on an odd-number-day basis, there was a gradual relaxation of tension
between two regimes (Ma, 1991: 1).
The Government decided to abolish the low interest rate was due to the suggestion of S. C.
Tsiang, who is now Emeritus Professor of Cornell University and Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of the Chung-hua Institution of Economic Research (CIER) (San, 1991: 34, 62).
' See, e.g., Lin (1973: 79).
price index was curbed.' 5
 Scarce investment capital was then allocated in such a
way as to ensure fair returns on investment projects (San, 1991: 34). I shall return
to this in the next section. In July 1957 the BOT began supplying low-cost export
loans to manufacturers on the condition that they would undertake the development
of markets abroad. Loans for manufacturers of exports rapidly expanded in the late
1960s and 1970s (Myres, 1990: 35-36). With inflation under control, economic
activity resumed (Myres, 1990: 47).
In the meantime, the Government began expanding the list of allowed
imports and reducing tariffs. The degree of import control was lowered between
1956 and 1960, with almost all 'suspended imports' being reclassified as
'controlled imports'.' 6 At the same time, the tariff rates of 1955 were lowered in
1959 for 13 of the 15 commodity groups; they would be further reduced in 1965
(Tao, 1969: 174-175). In addition, import merchants were no longer given fixed
quotas on a case by case basis, but were allowed to apply freely for the import of
different categories of commodities within respective total quotas. These total
quotas were themselves eventually abolished (Hsing, 1971: 207).
In January 1960, the Government enumerated a '19-Point Programme of
Economic and Financial Reform' (hereinafter '19-Point Programme') to help
achieve a higher target of rapid industrialisation (Wang, 1985: 109). One of the
most important aspects of this programme was the enactment, in September 1960,
of the Statute for Encouragement of Investment (SEI). Because the main purpose of
the 19-Point Programme was to promote Taiwan's exports, which is the theme of
Chapter 6, I shall discuss the 19-Point Reform and the SEI in that chapter.
' The consumer price index was 18.8 per cent in 1953, 11.7 per cent in 1954, 9.9 per cent in 1955,
10.5 per cent in 1956, and 7.5 per cent in 1957 (San, 1991: 34; TSDB, 1997: 165).
16 Total import products in the 'controlled' category increased from 9.35 per cent in 1956 to 40.13
per cent in 1960. Import products in the 'suspended' category decreased from 36.64 per cent in
1956 to 0.32 per cent in 1960 (TSDB, 1997).
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5.3 Investment Incentives
The Government policies outlined above completed the reform of the
foreign trade control system that brought Taiwan to the threshold of a new era of
export expansion. The economy had begun to experience export-led growth. In
order to keep the economy on its new course, the Government began to introduce
incentives to promote greater domestic saving and investment and to attract more
foreign investment.
In order to encourage a high rate of savings by households, private
enterprises, and public enterprises, the Government adopted two strategies. The first
strategy, already used in the early 1 950s and repeated later by the Government, was
to raise interest rates for time deposits in banks to ensure positive real rates of
return. This strategy proved to be successful, as the ratio of savings to GNP rose
from 14.6 per cent in 1955 to 17.8 per cent in 1960, and continued to rise to a peak
of 38.5 per cent in 1986 and 1987 (TSDB, 1997: 56). The second strategy was to
introduce new tax incentives. In September 1960, for example, the Government
exempted recipients of interest earned from time deposits of two years or longer
from paying any income tax 17 on that interest (Myres, 1990: 48).
As part of the domestic investment programme, private industries were
assigned increasingly larger weight. In 1953, the Government transferred four
public corporations to private hands' 8 to pay for the land relinquished by former
land-owners under the Land-to-the-Tiller Programme (see Chapter 4 above). This
move both encouraged private investment and helped to move the attention of
former land-owners from agriculture to industry. In the meantime, as an associated
incentive, the Government restrained the expansion of activities of public
' Article 23 of the 1960 SE!.
8 This included the Taiwan Cement Corporation, which became one of the largest and most
profitable private enterprises in later years (Hsing, 1971: 189).
corporations in order to reserve new investment opportunities for private
entrepreneurs. Thus, while retaining overall planning control of industrial
development, the Government sought to "enlist private initiative instead of stifling
it"(Hsing, 1971: 188-189).
The Government also created new incentives for businesses to invest. As
was mentioned in the previous section, in September 1960 the Government passed
the Statute for Encouragement of Investment (SET). Tax benefits included: five-year
tax exemptions or accelerated deprecation of fixed assets; investment credits
ranging from 10 to 15 per cent; preferential rates on corporation tax ranging from
22 to 25 per cent; and deduction of up to 15 per cent of money paid for acquiring
share certificates in any tax year (Sun, 1985: 2). These will be detailed further in
Chapter 6.1.2. Exporters also began receiving tax incentives when purchasing raw
materials from abroad and importing machinery for producing for exports (Myres,
1990: 48). All this involved a considerable loss of revenue for the Government, but
it appears that the incentive given to businesses to undertake more investment and
expand sales generated compensating tax revenue of similar or greater levels
(Myres, 1990: 49).
5.4 Government Policies on FDI and Laws on Foreign Investment
The Government's role in the investment process was vital. Indirectly, it
introduced incentives to influence both the size and direction of investment.
Directly, general government and government enterprises together accounted for 54
per cent of total fixed investment in 1955-1960, and 40 per cent in 1961-1973
(DGBAS, 1973: 210).
One of the stated implications of the Min-sheng Principles was to make
controlled use of foreign capital to develop domestic wealth-producing assets and
human capital. For this reason, the ROC government had a more positive attitude
towards foreign investment in Taiwan's early development stage than many other
developing countries. During the primary import-substitution period, foreign capital
inflow was mainly in the form of official concessional aid (Lim, 1991: 64; Fei,
Ranis and Kuo, 1979: 28; Ranis and Schive, 1985: 90), mostly from the United
States which had a political interest in stabilising Taiwan's economy and promoting
its growth. A temporary surge of U.S. foreign assistance played an important role in
facilitating the structural changes in the Government's economic development
strategy, from import substitution to export substitution, that occurred between
1959-1961 (see Chapter 6 below). Foreign aid was required to provide raw material
imports in order to permit fuller utilisation of existing industrial capacity. It was
also needed to help overcome serious inflationary pressures and foreign exchange
shortages. The aid flows provided Taiwan's policy makers with both psychological
reassurance and the necessary foreign exchange and domestic credit resources to
survive the difficult period of transition in economic policy at the end of the 1 950s
(Ranis and Schive, 1985: 92).
Apart from temporary official aid from the US, the Government also hoped
to attract FDI to help domestic development. During the early 1950s, the ROC's
national income was very low; per capita income was less than US$ 200.19 The
average savings rate was around 10 per cent of national income. 20
 A savings rate as
low as this could not possibly meet the nation's financing needs in the early stages
of economic development. Thus it was necessary to attract considerable foreign
investment. Moreover, the foreign technology that followed was also essential to
help improve domestic manufacturing techniques (Sun and Lee, 1985: 78).
' The per capita GNP in Taiwan was US$ 196 in 1952 and US$ 203 in 1955 (TSDB, 1997: 32).
20 The average savings rate was 11.9 per cent of national income in 1952 and 11.2 per cent in 1955
(TSDB, 1997: 56).
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Foreign investment and technical co-operation could also create job
opportunities, improve managerial skills, open overseas markets and relieve the
shortages of foreign exchange. In view of all this, as early as July 14, 1954 the
Government thought to make use of external private capital by promulgating the
Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals (SIFN), followed by the Statute for
Investment by Overseas Chinese (SIOC) on November 19, 1955 (Myres, 1990: 49;
Hsing, 1971: 217; IDIC, 1996: SIFN; IDIC, 1996: SIOC). However, the main
provisions of these Statutes related to the remittance of investment earnings and
repatriation of capital by investors, and to possible disadvantageous effects on local
industries (Hsing, 1971: 217). Partly under the pressure of influential domestic
industrialists, the Government's attitude towards these two problems was initially
rather conservative, and the relevant terms stated in these Statutes were not very
attractive to potential investors. With the impending phase-out of U.S. aid in the
late 1950s, the Government gradually adopted a more forward-looking and positive
attitude towards foreign private investment (Hsing, 1971: 21 8). The Government
began to make efforts to improve investment incentives in order to attract more
FDI, and attempted to direct FDI toward preferred industries, primarily those in
manufacturing (Ho, 1978: 239). This led to revision of the SIFN on December 14,
195921 and of the SIOC on March 26, 1960.22 The revised laws encouraged foreign
investment to locate in Taiwan by instituting a greater range of statutory protection
for investments, and by making it possible for the investor to apply each year to
remit foreign exchange to his home country. Article 13 of 1959 SIFN, for example,
stipulated that foreign investors could apply for repatriation of capital for any
amount up to 15 per cent of the total sum invested. Such application could only be
21 After its initial promulgation, SIFN was amended on December 14, 1959, January 8, 1968, June
22, 1968, July 27, 1979, April 3, 1980, May 9, 1980, May 11, 1983, May 14, 1986, and May
26, 1989 (IDIC, 1996: SIFN).
22 After its initial promulgation, SIOC was amended on March 26, 1960, January 8, 1968, June 22,
1968, July 18, 1979, May 9, 1980, May 11, 1983, June 2, 1986, and May 26, 1989 (IDIC,
1996: SIOC).
made two years after Government approval of the original investment plan. But
even that 15 per cent share could be raised if the Government approved, with
approval largely depending upon the available foreign exchange reserves.
Moreover, investors could apply for the remittance of the whole amount of
investment earnings (net profit or interest) two years after the completion of the
approved investment in accordance with the Article 13 of the 1959 SIFN and
Article 12 of the 1960 SIOC. The remittance of investment earnings had been
limited to 15 per cent of the investment capital in the 1954 SIFN and 1955 SIOC.
The amended laws also gave extensive protection against expropriation. Article 16
of the 1959 SIFN and Article 15 of the 1960 SIOC guaranteed investors that the
enterprise would not be subject to requisition or expropriation for a period of 20
years after commencement of business, as long as the investor continued to hold 51
per cent or more of the total capital. 23 The guarantee against requisition or
expropriation had been only 10 years in the 1955 SIOC.
More importantly, the Government promulgated the Statute for
Encouragement of Investment (SE!) on September 10, 1960, and its Enforcement
Rules (ERSEI) on January 11, 1961 (IDIC, 1990: SET; IDIC, 1990: ERSE!). The
SE! provided a variety of incentives, and covered not only investments by foreign
nationals and overseas Chinese, but also those by local residents: reflecting the
recognition that, in the long run, it is more important to encourage domestic savings
and investment than to bring in investment from abroad. The major aim of the 1960
SE! was to eliminate existing laws and regulations that hampered investment
activity and to stimulate investment through tax deductions and exemptions (Sun
and Lee, 1985: 79). This will be further discussed in Chapter 6.
23 Article 16 of the 1959 SIFN: "In case the investor's investment is 51 per cent or more of the total
capital of the enterprise in which he invests, such an enterprise shall not be subject to
requisition or expropriation for a period of twenty years after commencement of business as
long as the investor continues to hold 45 per cent or more of the total capital."
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It should be mentioned here that, at a time when many developing countries
were concluding state contracts in natural resources or other sectors, 24 Taiwan was
not. This was largely because the country does not have extensive natural resources
sectors (see Chapter 2 above). Furthermore, compared with Malaysia, Indonesia
and African countries, Taiwan had more sophisticated human resources (for reasons
discussed in Chapter 4 above) than many other developing countries, and so was
able to carry out many infrastructure projects without foreign contractors.
5.5 Ff1 during the Primary Import-Substitution Phase
Before analysing FDI in Taiwan, three important points need to be made.
First, the term FDI, as used in Taiwan's statistical data does not take account of the
problem of 'control'. In other words, as long as the invested capital is not entirely
owned by a ROC citizen, it is treated as foreign investment. Some famous
companies in Taiwan, such as Ta-tung Company and Taiwan Cement Company,
two of Taiwan's top ten private businesses, are counted as FDI companies because
those companies have some foreign capital, even though the amount of invested
capital is very little, and whether or not the investment is from overseas Chinese
(Bello and Rosenfels, 1990: 237; Cohen, 1989). Therefore the effects of FDI on
Taiwan's economy are very often over-estimated by statistical data. Secondly, the
amount of approved FDI may differ from the amount of FDI actually contributed
by foreign investors because approved FDI does not always come eventually to
Taiwan. Many scholars like to analyse approved FDI because the relevant
information is more complete and easier to obtain than is information regarding the
FDI that actually arrived. One must distinguish the two. For example, FDI
applications were approved for the establishment of China Steel Company and
China Shipbuilding Company, but the actual investment did not arrive in either case
24 For state contracts, see, generally, Paasivrta (1990), Sornarajah (1990), and Kuusi (1976).
(Schive, 1994: 415). In general, the amount of approved FDI is more than twice
that of arrived FDI (see table 5.1). Thirdly, the Investment Commission's statistics
do not include investment through branches in Taiwan (Liu, 1994: 132).
The earliest FDI approved by the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA)
was an investment made by the American company, General Electic (GE) in 1953
(Schive, 1994: 416).25 However, the total amount of FDI arriving in Taiwan during
the 1950s was very little and irregular (TSDB, 1997: 242). This is probably due to a
number of reasons: (1) The Government adopted an import-substitution policy in
this period. This was unattractive to foreign investors because the size of the
domestic market in Taiwan was too small for significant profit (YU, 1985: 13). (2)
Owing to a lack of foreign exchange, the Government employed a strict import
controls system in the 1 950s. (3) These controls were relaxed only with respect to
Overseas Chinese. Following the 1952 "Rules Governing Encouragement of
Overseas Chinese, Hong Kong Chinese and Macau Chinese Establishing
Productive Enterprises", and the 1952 "Rules Governing Products Imported for
Establishing Productive Enterprises Against Self-Provided Foreign Exchange",
Overseas Chinese were allowed to import products in 'controlled' and 'suspended'
categories against their self-provided foreign exchange as capital stock (TIER,
1993: 17; Yu, 1985: 12). However, quite apart from their limited application, even
these legal incentives produced only an unstable inflow of foreign capital in the
1950s, as many overseas Chinese investors were opportunists rather than long-term
investors (Schive, 1994: 416). The 1952 Rules were consequently annulled in 1958
(Chiang, 1994; YU, 1985: 13). Their role can probably explain why the amount of
arrived FDI increased dramatically from US$ 2.4 million in 1957 to US$ 11.71
million in 1958, then dropped sharply to US$ 3.78 million in 1959 (see table 5.1).
(4) In the 195 Os, private investors were uncertain of Taiwan's political and
economic future. After the Chinese Communist army attacked Quemoy in late
25 The first MOEA-approved investment made by overseas Chinese was in 1952 (Yu, 1985: 12).
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1954, private investment plunged. As a share of total fixed investment, it declined
from 63 per cent in 1954 to 46 per cent in 1955, in a period when total arrived FDI
declined from US$ 9.91 million to US$ 0.51 million (see table 5.1). Private
investors did not become confident in Taiwan again until the Nationalist army
decisively repulsed a second major communist assault on Quemoy in 1959 (Ho,
1978: 235).
Between 1953 and 1960, FDI by non-Chinese foreigners amounted to 70 per
cent (62 per cent from the US and 8 per cent from Japan) of total foreign
investment, with only 30 per cent made by overseas Chinese (see table 5.2). During
this period, 80 per cent of overseas Chinese invested in construction and services,
within which banking played a very important role. The virtual absence of non-
overseas Chinese FDI in construction and services was due to restrictions against
branch banking by non-Chinese investors, and to the fact that investment in
construction and public utilities was off-limits to such foreigners unless they were
willing to waive their foreign exchange settlement privileges (Rartis and Schive,
1985: 103-105). In contrast, non-Chinese foreign investors invested mainly in
import-substitution light industries, in order to exploit Taiwan's cheap labour
supply (IDIC: Industry and Investment, October 1994: 4). This discriminatory
treatment reflected the fact that the Government was at that time not confident
enough to open its domestic market equally to foreign and overseas Chinese
investors.
5.6 Conclusion
The foregoing discussion suggests that much of Taiwan's initial success can
be attributed to the relative mildness and flexibility of its regime of primary import-
substitution. The policies Taiwan chose during the 1950s to effect the desired re-
direction of resources seem quite standard for developing countries (Fei, Ranis and
Kuo, 1979: 26). Deficit financing by Government and substantial rates of inflation
accompanied the classic phenomena of over-valued exchange rates, protective
exchange controls, import licensing, and low interest rates, all slanted to assist the
new industrial entrepreneurial class (Fei, Ranis and Kuo, 1979: 27). By LDC
standards, however, Taiwan experienced a relatively mild version of this primary
import-substitution policy package (Ranis and Schive, 1985: 90). The Government
started further economic reform in the late 1 950s in order to enhance production
efficiency. The foreign exchange and trade reform was successful, in that it led to
Taiwan's rapid growth of foreign trade in the 1960s. Although FDI during this
period was not very important in terms of the amount of investment capital, the
Government at least realised the importance of FDI and amended its investment law
governing foreign investors. This helped Taiwan's economic development a great
deal in the primary export-substitution phase which will be examined in the next
chapter.
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Table 5.1 A Comparison of Approved FDI and Arrived FDI in Taiwan26
Amount unit: US$ 1.000.000
Year	 Approved	 FDI	 Arrived FDI2'
1952	 1.07	 0.62
1953	 3.70	 2.11
1954	 2.22	 9.91
1955	 4.60	 0.51
1956	 3.49	 0.66
1957	 1.62	 2.40
1958	 2.52	 11.71
1959	 0.69	 3.78
1960	 15.47	 5.77
1961	 14.30	 9.46
1962	 5.20	 8.98
1963	 18.05	 15.23
1964	 19.90	 15.57
1965	 41.61	 10.51
1966	 29.28	 9.59
1967	 57.01	 27.87
1968	 89.89	 27.89
1969	 109.44	 51.52
1970	 138.90	 61.93
1971	 162.96	 52.63
1972	 126.66	 36.37
1973	 248.85	 67.79
1974	 189.38	 104.05
1975	 118.17	 70.57
1976	 141.52	 90.71
1977	 163.91	 76.50
1978	 212.93	 129.74
1979	 328.83	 120.86
1980	 465.96	 190.83
1981	 395.76	 156.50
1982	 380.01	 149.18
1983	 404.47	 175.40
1984	 558.74	 231.59
1985	 702.46	 343.68
1986	 770.38	 350.22
1987	 1418.80	 847.92
1988	 1182.54	 1231.36
1989	 2418.30	 -
1990	 2301.77	 -
1991	 1778.42	 -
1992	 1461.37	 -
1993	 1213.48	 -
1994	 1630.72	 -
1995	 2925.34	 -
1996	 2460.84	 -
26 Source: The Central Bank of Taiwan (1996) Balance of Payments; Council of Economic Planning
and Development (1996); Investment Commission, MOEA (1996) Statistics on Overseas
Chinese & Foreign Investment, Technical Co-operation, Outward Investment, Outward
Technical Co-operation.
27 Unfortunately, even through private channels, the amounts of arrived PD! between 1989 and 1996
are not yet publicly available at time of writing.
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Table 5.2 Overseas Chinese & Private Foreign Investment in Approvals28
PFI*
amount
	
23(70)
23(30)
amount
	
373(71)
case
	
564(47)
13 58(63)
675(47)
amount
	
9544(91)
case
	
2323(71)
amount
	
8079(90)
case
	
1626(84)
amount
	
19377(87)
case
	
52 15(68)
Amount unit: US$ 1,000,000 (%)
Japan	 wop Others
2(8)	 0(0)
10(13)	 1(1)
87(16)	 (1)	 29(6)
376(3 1)	 16(l)	 28(2)
369(17)	 2.iÔ$	 230(11)
370(26) 46(3)
	
86(6)
3224(31) 1703(16) 2 107(20)
1063(35) 2O(11) 459(15)
2177(24) 1U(t3) 2238(25)
615(32) 2*4(l) 505(26)
5 859(26)
2435(32)	 3(7)	 1115(15)
* OCI is abbreviated for overseas Chinese investment; PFI is abbreviated for private
foreign investment.
28 Source: TSDB (1997: 242-244); The Central Bank of Taiwan (1996) Balance of Payments;
Council of Economic Planning and Development (1996); Investment Commission, MOEA
(1996) Statistics on Overseas Chinese & Foreign Investment, Technical Co-operation,
Outward Investment, Outward Technical Co-operation.
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Chapter 6
Law, Policy and FDI during the Primary Export-
Substitution Phase, 1961-1972
At the end of the primary import-substitution phase, most developing
countries are confronted with two choices. One is to continue import substitution
and extend it into heavy industries; the other is to attempt to shift the focus of
industrial activity toward export-led markets (Chan and Clark, 1992: 83). The
majority of developing countries in Latin America and Asia followed the first
course. Taiwan belongs to that small group of exceptions which moved into a
primary export-substitution pattern (Huang, 1989: 99, Ranis and Schive, 1985: 92;
Ho, 1978: 187). The primary objectives of Taiwan's economic policies in the 1960s
were export promotion and encouragement of investment in labour-intensive
industries. As will be shown in the succeeding sections, export expansion was a
decisive factor in the successful, rapid industrial growth of the 1 960s and 1 970s.
Gold (1990: 74-76) has analysized the reasons why Taiwan opted for a
different approach from Latin American countries in the 1960s. First, the
Government in Taiwan played a major direct role in the economy. It dominated the
heights' of the economy and directly controlled a sizeable and crucial portion of
industrial output. Little FDI was linked to the state sector. Extensive import
prohibitions severely restricted a foreign presence. Thus, unlike most Latin
American countries, any new policies to resolve import-substitution problems
The state's presence in the economy must be evaluated not only in quantitative terms but also in
terms of its qualitative relationship to the rest of the economy. The tremendous influence of the
state sector stems from the fact that it controls the "commanding heights of the economy", to
use Lenin's terms, either by monopolizing public utilities or by occupying the leading
positions in key oligopolistic sectors (Bello and Rosenfeld, 1990: 233; Huang, 1986: 137-138).
would not have to consider the wishes of the multinational enterprises (MNEs).2
Secondly, Taiwan had been isolated from the world capitalist system since 1949.
On the one hand, substantial material, financial and military aid from the US meant
Taiwan had no need to trade with other countries. One the other hand, protectionist
measures during the primary import-substitution phase limited the foreign presence
in Taiwan (see Chapter 4 and 5 above). Lacking both domestic foreign interests and
external economic pressures, the Government had more flexibility to determine its
relationship with the outside, especially given U.S. cooperation and assistance. By
contrast, the Latin American economies had been incorporated into the world
system for a long time through FDI, finance, and trade, and the governments'
ability to implement policies was therefore more constrained. Thirdly, the
Government in Taiwan was dominant economically and politically, as well as
internally united. There was little chance of popular resistance to its policies.
However, Latin American governments were in a weak position regarding their
own civil societies and economies. In addition to these considerations, moreover,
there is one important factor - mentioned in the previous chapter - that Gold has
missed: the size of the domestic market in Taiwan was very limited. As that
domestic market became saturated, the need for foreign exchange earnings grew
urgent in the late 1 950s and new policies favouring export expansion were required.
Indeed, although Taiwan's economic development made considerable
advances during the 195 Os, the domestic market for products of its manufacturing
industries had reached saturation point by the end of the decade. In order to
maintain growth, either the manufacturing sector had to move into intermediate and
capital goods production in order to replace imports of those products, or the
recently established import-substitution activities, primarily in non-durable
consumer goods, had to penetrate the world market (Ho, 1978: 195). The former
2 
use the term, multinational enterprise (MNE), broadly to describe 'a corporation or enterprise that
owns and controls productive activities in more than one country'.
option would require a great deal of capital in order to develop capital-intensive
high-technology industries. The latter choice, being the policy adopted by Japan
between 1900 and 1920, needed cheap labour in order to develop labour-intensive
light industries (Shih, 1994: 92-93). But, given the existing highly protectionist
policy and the prevailing industrial environment, neither alternative seemed likely
to succeed. At the same time, the US aid policy was changing gradually so that it
could not be depended upon over the long term, and the need for self-sufficient
growth became more pressing year by year (Sun and Lee, 1985: 60).
In view of this, the Government decided to abandon continued development
of primary import-substitution, and switched its efforts to promoting the export of
products of labour-intensive industries in order to expand the scale of production
(Sun and Lee, 1985: 66). With encouragement from the local US AID Mission, 3
 the
Government began in 1958 to rationalize the existing import-substitution policy
package and to reduce, if not remove, some of its discriminatory features against
the export sector (Ho, 1978: 195). Freed from these bonds, local businessmen could
act more effectively (Woronoff, 1992: 67).
It is important to emphasise that export-oriented substitution did not mean
the end of import-substitution industries, but rather the evolution of a close
relationship whereby local capital now produced, largely for export, the parts,
components, and finished goods that were previously produced for domestic
consumption. Towards this end, the Government took the lead in opening new
foreign markets, soliciting FDI, linking domestic and foreign capital, and fine-
tuning the investment climate (Gold, 1988a: 185).
The reforms were made partly because U.S. advisers threatened a reduction in aid should the
Government not adopt the reform package, while offering a US$ 20-30 million 'carrot' for
prompt implementation; and partly because many Western-trained economists and government
officers supported the new policies (Jacoby, 1966: 134-135; Hsing, 1971: 199; Gold, 1990: 77;
Long, 1991: 83; Huang, 1989: 99; Woronoff, 1992: 66-67).
6.1 Financial and Economic Reform
Between 1958 and 1963 the Government initiated numerous refonns and
new programmes, with two central aims: the encouragement of private investment
and the promotion of exports. These two strategies were to prove highly effective in
helping to bring about rapid industrialisation (Long, 1991: 83).
6.1.1 19-Point Programme
One of the most significant developments in this period was the adoption of
the 19-Point Programme of Financial and Economic Reform (hereafter referred to
as the 19-Point Programme) by the Executive Yuan in January 196O. This
programme included proposals to encourage savings and private investment,
remove controls and hidden subsidies, strengthen the tax system and tax
administration, improve the Government's budget system, develop money and
capital markets, establish a unitary foreign exchange rate, liberalise controls on
exchange and trade, promote the development of trade, raise public utility rates,
reduce tariffs on imported inputs, revise import duties, provide rebates if the
products were exported, liberalise trade regulations, and retain military
expenditures (Jacoby, 1966: 134-135; Gold, 1990: 77; Lin, 1973: Chapter 5; Sun,
1969: 26-38; Fong, 1968: 365-425; Wang, 1985: 109).
The most important of the financial reforms was the abolition of the
complex multiple exchange rate system. This measure, accompanied by devaluation
of the New Taiwan dollar, ended one of the most discriminatory features of
Taiwan's import-substitution policy. The local currency was pegged at US$1: NT$
"The 19-Point Programme derived from an 8-Point Programme proposed by the AID Mission in
1959 in order to speed economic development and push Taiwan toward 'graduation' from
foreign aid. This 8-Point Programme included: a non-inflationary, fiscal and monetary policy,
tax reform, unification of foreign exchange rates, liberalized exchange controlls, establishment
of a utilities commission and of investment banking machinery, and also the sale of
government enterprises to private owners (Jacoby, 1966: 134-135). The 19-Point Programme
was incorporated in Taiwan's third Four Year Plan (1961-1964) (Shih, 1994: 93).
_-, I
40 until 1973, and only after September 1985 did it rise appreciably from what was
by then an artificially low level (Long, 1991: 83).
The 19-Point Programme covered a range of further liberalisation measures.
The allocation of foreign exchange for permissible imports was simplified and
rationalised. Some goods on the controlled and suspended lists were decontrolled,
and more stringent criteria were established to screen products for the controlled list
(Ho, 1978: 196). Between 1957 and 1970 a total of 1,471 items that had been on the
restricted import list were removed (Lin, 1973: 93). With these actions the
Government reduced the level of protection on a large number of non-durable
consumer goods and relied increasingly on tariffs rather than quotas to restrict
imports (Hsing, 1971: 242-243). Import duties were also slashed. By 1965, the
average import tariff rate had fallen to 35 per cent, from 47 per cent in 1955 (Long,
1991: 83).
Existing export promotion schemes were expanded and strengthened and
new ones introduced. Loans from the public sector banks to exporters were offered
at low preferential rates, and credit was made easier for exporters (Sun and Lee,
1985: 61; Long, 1991: 83; Kuo, Ranis and Fei, 1981: 79-80; Shih, 1994: 94). One
of the most important export promotion schemes to be introduced was the tax
rebate system, which avoided complicated administrative procedures. The
Government helped exporters by remitting various taxes and rebating taxes incurred
on materials re-exported in the form of manufactured products 5 (Long, 1991: 83;
Ho, 1978: 196; Kuo, Ranis, and Fei, 1981: 75-76). Under this system, the local
producers of these materials could sell them to the exporter at the lower world
price, and would then be entitled to claim the amount of tariff duties and other taxes
that the exporter would have paid had he imported instead (Ni, 1987: 265-267).
This tax incentive was first introduced in the early 1950s for imported materials used in a few
exportable handicraft exports. It was expended eventually to all exports with the remission
broadened to include, besides custom duties, commodity tax, defense surtax, harbour dues, salt
tax, and slaughter tax (Ho, 1978: 196; Hsing, 1971: 213).
This had the effect of encouraging Taiwan's exporters to be internationally
competitive while protecting domestic materials producers (Chin, 1988: 100).
Taxes on imported materials for manufactured exports were permitted to be unpaid
for the intervening period before re-export, upon a guarantee being provided by
financial institutions, or upon the factories themselves handing in government
bonds of equivalent value to the responsible agency (Hsing, 1971: 213). From NT$
39.3 million in 1956, remission of taxes on raw materials used in producing
industrial exports climbed rapidly to NT$ 303 million in 1960, NT$ 1,496 million
in 1964, and NT$ 2,320 million in 19676 (DSMOF, 1980; Lin, 1973: 104).
Correspondingly, the nominal rate of protection 7 dropped considerably in the 1 960s
(Kuo, 1979: Appendix II A). Income taxes were also reduced to encourage capital
formation (Long, 1991: 83). As a result of the Statute for Encouragement of
Investment (see Chapter 6.1.2 below) and the tax and duty rebates for export
activities, a large proportion of the gross tax burden was reduced (Kuo, Ranis and
Fei, 1981: 75). To regulate production and to promote the orderly expansion of
export industries, the Government approved and supported the formation of export
cartels8
 and, on occasion, it also restricted investments in overexpanded industries
(Hsing, 1971: 203; Lin, 1973: appendix table A-26). The success of the 19-Point
Programme was a major factor leading to Taiwan's rapid growth in foreign trade
during the 1960s and to the island's success as an 'economic miracle'.
6 Note that the official exchange rate for the US dollar was NT$ 24.78 in 1956 and NT$ 40.10 in
1967, while the market rate was NT$ 38.35 and NT$ 41.50 respectively in the two years (Lin,
1973: 104).
The nominal rate of protection is 'the actual amount of protection accorded to domestic suppliers
of a final product when a tariff is applied to a competing imported final product' (Pass, Lowes
and Davies, 1988: 359). A higher rate of nominal protection means a higher degree of
protection (Kuo, Ranis and Fei, 1981: 77).
8 In 1972, industries with cartel arrangements included cotton and wollen texiles, paper, steel
products, rubber products, monosodium glutamate, cement, canned mushrooms and asparagus,
and citronella oil. Production was regulated by the allocation of export quotas (Ho, 1978: 196).
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6.1.2 1960 Statute for Encouragement of Investment
The Statute for Encouragement of Investment (SEI) was promuglated in
1960. The SEI,9
 which aimed to facilitate the acquisition of plant sites 10
 and to
provide production incentives through tax exemptions and deductions, was enacted
pursuant to the 19-Point Programme (Kuo, Ranis and Fei, 1981: 75). It offered
various incentives to both domestic and foreign investors, and has since become a
standard package of investment incentives offered by developing countries (Long,
1991: 83). It dealt with three main areas: (1) tax benefits (including a five-year tax
exemption from business income tax) and other incentives (such as accelerated
depreciation) to encourage domestic and overseas investors (Chapter II of SET); (2)
facilities for acquiring adequate plant sites (Chapter III of SEI); and (3)
coordination between development of public and private enterprises (Chapter IV of
SET). In the SEI, a five-year tax holiday was the strongest production incentive for
those new enterprises which were operating in target industries ('productive
enterprises" 1 ) or for those existing enterprises which expanded productive capacity
by 30 per cent (Article 5). Those productive enterprises would also benefit from a
reduced top rate of corporate income tax, of 15 per cent, and the maximum rate of
income tax was not to exceed 18 per cent of its total annual income, compared to
32.5 per cent for ordinary profit-seeking enterprises (Article 15). Productive
The SE! was promulgated on September 10, 1960 and amended on January 4, 1965, June, 1965,
March 31, 1967, December 30, 1970, March 22, 1973, December 29, 1973, December 30,
1974, July 26, 1977, December 30, 1978, January 19, 1979, July 20, 1979, December 30,
1980, July 26, 1982, December 30, 1984 and January 26, 1987 (IDIC, 1990: SE!). The SE!
was annulled on December 31, 1990 and replaced by Statute for Upgrading Industries.
'° Besides the tax concessions, the Statute also removed several serious obstacles imposed by the
existing land reform legislation on the acquisition of land for industrial use (Ho, 1978: 243).
'Productive enterprises', according to Article 3 of the 1960 SEI, included Manufacturing,
Handicraft, Mining, Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery, Animal Husbandry, Transportation,
Warehousing, Public Utilities, Public Housing Construction, Technical Services, and Heavy
Machinery. In 1967, revision of the SE! added international tourism to the list. 'Public Facility
Construction and Development' was added in 1984, in order to encourage private investment
in public facilities within urban plan areas.
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enterprises with foreign currency debt were allowed to set aside up to 7 per cent of
pre-tax profits as a reserve against foreign exchange rate fluctuation. The stamp tax
was waived or reduced in many cases (Article 28, 32, and 38). In addition, for all
enterprises, re-invested profits of up to 25 per cent of total income were allowed to
be offset against tax, as were 2 per cent of annual export proceeds (Article 29).
Unquestionably, these incentives helped to create an environment more conducive
to export production. When combined with the launch of the 19-Point Programme,
the SEI established a new economic policy regime for Taiwan (Huang, 1989: 99).
Major changes in other regulations' 2 were contained in Regulations Governing Sale
and Purchase of Foreign Exchange Certificates,' 3 Regulations Governing the
Application for Import Exchange by Private Traders,' 4 Criteria Governing the
Control of Imports,' 5
 Regulations for Promoting Exports of Products Processed
with Imported Raw Materials, 16
 and Regulations Governing the Offsetting or
Refund of Duties and Taxes on the Raw Materials of Export Products.'7
Despite these measures, the response of industry to export expansion in the early
1960s was not very fast (Kuo, Ranis and Fei, 1981: 75). Thus further reforms
followed. The SEI itself was revised in 1965, 1967 and 1970, and its scope
expanded (see Chapter 6.2.1 below). In 1962 the Statute for Technical Cooperation
(STC) was promulgate& 8
 pursuant to para. 2, Article 4 of the SIOC and SIFN.'9
12 For discussions of these reforms, see Sun (1969: 26-38); Chou (1969); Fong (1968: 365-425) and
Lin (1973).
' Promulgated on April 14, 1958, and revised on December 12, 1958, and August 8 1959.
' Promulgated on April 13, 1958, and revised on July 27, 1960.
15 Promulgated on July 27, 1960.
16 Promulgated on September 12, 1959.
17 Promulgated on December 26, 1958.
' Promulgated on August 9, 1962 and amended on May 29, 1964.
' Para. 2, Article 4 of the SIOC and SIFN: 'Cooperation in the form of furnishing technical know-
how or patent rights not as capital stock shall be prescribed by other law.'
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This law was aimed at bringing in foreign teclmology and making it take root in
Taiwan (Sun and Lee, 1985: 79). In 1965 bonded warehouse2° and bonded factory2'
systems were instituted. 22 By Feburary 1968 nine financial institutions were
authorised to set up fourteen bonded factories and seventy-nine bonded warehouses.
Imported materials for the production of various exportable goods were brought
under this scheme (Hsing, 1971: 213). Additionally, in 1965 the Government
established regulations to allow for the designation of export processing zones
(EPZs) (see Chapter 6.3 below). This led to the creation of Taiwan's three EPZs,
which have played a major role in promoting FDI in Taiwan (Sun and Lee, 1985:
79). Since this time, Taiwan's economy has become increasingly reliant on exports
for its growth.
The Government revised its tax laws in 1969. It is worth rLotilig that
Taiwan's tax system was characterised by an excessive dependence on indirect
taxes,23
 which on the whole were not only regressive but also inelastic in yield as
income rose (Ho, 1978: 240). The problem was worsened by the fact that a series of
ambiguities and obvious inconsistencies in the tax laws encouraged many business
20 A warehouse that is approved and registered by Customs to store bonded goods is a bonded
warehouse (Article 1 of the Regulation Governing the Establishment and Management of
Bonded Warehouses). In accordance with Article 35 of the Customs Law, when goods arrive at
a port in ROC, the consignee may apply to the Customs for entry into a bonded warehouse, and
these goods may be re-exported free of import duty.
21 In accordance with Article 35-1 of the Customs Law, export processing factories may be
registered as bonded factories under Customs supervision. All imported raw materials stored
and used in such bonded factories for manufacturing or processing into finished products for
export were exempt from customs duty.
22 The systems were backed by Regulations Governing the Establishment and Management of
Bonded Warehouse promulgated in October 1965. It was amended per the Decree of the
Ministry of Finance, Ref. No. Tai-Tsai-Kuan-79 1234537, dated September 4, 1990 and Ref.
No. Tai-Tsai-Kuan-841729900, dated January 10, 1996 (IDIC, RGEMBW, 1996).
23 Indirect taxes produced nearly 80 per cent of Taiwan's total tax revenue in the 1950s and 1960s.
(Executive Yuan Tax Reform Comission, 1970: Part I, p.56). United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNClAD) found Taiwan's tax system to be the most dependent on
indirect taxes of the 32 LDCs it investigated (UNCTAD, 1967).
enterprises to evade business income tax and thus kept its yield low.24
 In the late
1 960s the Government became convinced that if it were to play a more active role
in the economy, the revenue system had to be improved and made more dependent
on direct taxes. In early 1969 the income tax laws were revised and a new rate
structure promulgated. 25 In effect, the tax reform reduced the tax burden on small
businesses and individuals with relatively low income, and increased the income
tax on larger firms and persons with high income (I-To, 1978: 242) - partly offsetting
the benefits to large firms of the SET reforms at the beginning of the decade.
The Government also made an important institutional reform in the 1960s.
In 1963, to prepare for AID's gradual withdrawal, the Council of International
Economic Cooperation and Development (CIECD) was established out of the ESB,
and was finally institutionalised in the Economic Planning Council (EPC) of 1973
and in today's Council for Economic Planning and Development (CPED) of 1977
(Woronoff, 1992: 67). The CIECD was a centralised development agency, under
the control of the Premier, that amalgamated the Council for US Aid (CUSA) and
three planning groups (industrial, agricultural, and communications) (Gold, 1990:
78; Hsing, 1971: 189). The CIECD, which formulated the fourth (1 965-1968) and
fifth (1969-1972) plans as well as a Ten-Year Plan (1965-1974), coordinated the
policies of the relevant ministries and oversaw the implementation of selected
projects (Woronoff, 1992: 67). It was originally charged with the formulation,
integration, and coordination of economic development plans, and with
negotiations for external financial and technical assistance (Myres, 1990: 53). More
generally, it represented a commitment by the Government to centralised planning
24 For example, unlike the treatment accorded corporations, the undistributed profits of
unincorporated enterprises were considered personal income and therefore were subject to the
personal income tax as well. Since those in this category could not pay the business income tax
without also being liable for personal income tax, there was a built-in incentive for
unincorporated enterprises to avoid paying either of these taxes.
25 For a more detailed disscussion of the adopted revisions, see the report of the Executive Yuan Tax
Reform Commission (1970, Part I, Consolidated Report: 45-104).
and coordination as well as to "Taiwan's new position in the world economy
outside the US economic womb" (Gold, 1990: 78). The Government also took
measures to promote the private sector, such as establishing the Industrial
Development and Investment Centre (IDIC) and the China Development
Corporation (Gold, 1990. 77-78).
With the guidance of these policies and the continued prosperity of the
world economy, exports increased rapidly. Products such as textiles, plywood,
plastics, and electrical goods became major forces in exports leading to the ROC
economy's high level of growth and properity in the 1 960s (Lee, 1984). From 1961
to 1972 - the period of the third, fourth, and fifth Four-Year Economic Plans - the
annual export growth averaged 27.4 per cent, while the average annual rate of
inflation was only 3.3 per cent, thereby achieving the dual goals of stability and
growth (TSDB, 1997: 204). At the same time industry became the main component
of economic production, and the proportion of industrial production in the net
domestic product grew from 24.9 per cent in 1960 to 40.4 per cent in 1972 (TSDB,
1997: 80). The Third, Fourth and Fifth Four-Year Economic Plans incorporated the
19-Point Programme as well as the 1960 SET, and offered incentives to stimulate
private investment, both domestic and international (Kuo, Ranis, and Fei, 1981:
74). By 1965, when U.S. assistance to Taiwan was terminated, FDI had begun to
achieve its own momentum. Eventually, FDI replaced aid as the catalytic element
in Taiwan's development (Simon, 1987; Simon, 1990: 148).
6.2 Government Policy and the Reform of the Laws of Foerign
Investment
Before discussing the Government's policies on FDI between 1961 and
1972, several economic and political developments of the time need to be noted.
First, negotiations for the termination of US aid began in the early 1 960s, leading to
the virtual cessation of aid flows in 1965. As US aid came to an end, FDI
increasingly took its place in importance (Ranis and Schive, 1985: 93). Secondly, in
the 1960s, the Government's economic policy was guided by the need to keep
economic growth going after the exhaustion of the import-substitution
industrialisation process of the 1 950s (Bello and Rosenfeld, 1990: 246). The
Government therefore sought to combine cheap Taiwanese labour with foreign
capital in order to achieve its export-substitution policy and associated
industrialisation. Thirdly, the Government wanted to secure Taiwan's position in
the world economy (Woronoff, 1992: 78). Attracting foreign capital was seen by
the Government as a way to enmesh foreign interests with the interests of Taiwan,
making it more difficult for mainland China to isolate Taiwan internationally
(Huang, 1986: 192-193). Hence, the Government adopted an 'open' policy towards
FDI in the 1960s, using both export orientation and FDI to stimulate
industrialisation (Kuo, Ranis, and Fei, 1981: 73-74).
This policy was dependent on the belief that FDI makes an important
contribution to economic development. FDI has not only provided an effective
channel for capital, industrial know-how, management and marketing to enter the
country, but has also resourced initiatives for new branches of industry, vocational
training, market analyses, and the financial sector (Cälli, 1980). In order to facilitate
FDI, the Government enacted several regulations designed to promote foreign and
domestic investment; and a number of government agencies, such as the Investment
Commission, IDIC, and Working Group for Helping Hong Kong and Macao
Chinese to Invest in Taiwan, were established to provide services and help to
investors (Wu, 1993: 31; Woronoff, 1992: 78). The Government especially
welcomed FDI in export-oriented industries and different incentives, such as cheap
credit and rebates on imported components and raw materials, were made available
to exporters (see Chapter 6.1 above) in part to attract FDI (MOEA, Taiwan
Industrial Panorama, 1994: vol 153: 4). Investment procedures were simplified and
export processing zones (see Chapter 6.3 below) were also instituted as part of the
package to attract foreign investors.
Together with these economic policies, the Government also implemented
legal reform of its investment laws during the 1960s to complement its FDI policy.
6.2.1 The Revision of Statute for Encouragement of Investment
The Government amended the SEI in 1965 (twice), 1967 and again in 1970
in order to remove difficulties encountered in the encouragement of investment
since the introduction of the law in 1960. For example, the revised 1965 SEI
exempted shareholders from consolidated income tax if the enterprise re-invests its
undistributed earnings for capital increase (Article 13). It permitted accelerated
depreciation against business income tax for machinery and equipment acquired for
the purpose of increasing the enterprise's productive or service capacity (Article
12). The revised law also exempted import duties on machinery or equipment not
domestically available, which is imported by productive enterprises especially for
the purpose of research, development, experiment or quality inspection (Article
21(111)). At the same time, however, Article 15 of 1965 SEI raised the maximum
tax rate of business income tax to 25 per cent of an enterprise's total annual income.
This maximum rate was revised up from 18 per cent in 1960, but in the revised law
was limited to 22 per cent for those enterprises satisfying the needs for
development of economic and national defence industries which were capital-
intensive andlor technology-intensive. The differentiation in the maximum tax rate
was intended to encourage investment on key industries: it may, however, be
doubted whether a 3 per cent difference would have had much incentive effect,
especially since the net rate was still higher than that in 1960. Non-resident alien
and foreign business enterprises' withholding tax was also increased from 10 to 15
per cent (Article 16). The tax rate was revised up with an eye for encouraging
foreign investors to settle in Taiwan.
Apart from the above-mentioned amendments, one important addition to the
1965 SEI was legislation authorising the Government to transfer public-owned
enterprises to private ownership and to use the proceeds for the establishment of a
development fund (chapter IV of the 1965 SEI). Under these provisions, the
Government would be able to generate financial sources to support key industries
other than public works. Another important addition was the so-called 'most
favourable' clause. It was anticipated that other laws might be inconsistent with the
encouragement provisions in the SEI - and even, in some instances, more
advantageous to an investor. To prevent possible confusion, and to ensure full legal
protection of investors' interests, a proviso was added to the effect that provisions
most favourable to the investor shall apply (Article 2).
In 1970, more investment incentives were inserted in the revised SEI. For
example, a 15 per cent tax reduction was permitted to a company limited by shares
which publicly lists its shares on the stock market (Article 24). A 50 per cent
reduction of deeds tax pertaining to property used for productive purposes was also
allowed (Article 22), and land value increment tax for productive enterprises was
allowed to be paid over five years by instalment (Article 19). Other incentives
included an instalment payment and one year deferred payment of customs duties
on machinery or equipment imported by productive enterprises for their own use
(Article 21(I)); together with deduction of the purchase value of registered stocks or
corporate bonds of three or more years' maturity from taxable income for the third
year of continuous holding provided that the deduction does not exceed 25 per cent
of income for that year and of the remaining balance, if any, in two subsequent
years (Article 20). One of the important changes in the 1970 amendments allowed
qualified productive enterprises to select either a five-year holiday from income tax
or to depreciate fixed assets on the basis of an accelerated service life (Article 6).
The amended SEI provided more tax benefits to specified productive enterprises
and individuals. CIECD continued to modify and improve the investment climate
as the situation demanded. The SEI was revised more than a dozen times by 1980
(Gold, 1990: 78).
6.2.2 The Revision of the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals and of
Statute for Investment by Overseas Chinese
The Government also revised the SIFN (twice) and the SIOC in 1968. The
1968 amendment of both laws was meant to remove the restrictions on domicile
and on Chinese nationality for overseas investors in Taiwan. Article 18 of the 1968
SIOC and SIFN stipulated that where an invested enterprise was organised as a
company according to the Company Law, 26
 its investors may be exempt from the
restrictions concerning domicile in Chinese territory and Chinese nationality
contained in Article 98(I)(II), 128 (I)(II), 208 (V) and 216 (I)(II). The above articles
in the Company Law required that at least half of the shareholders of a company
(Article 98 and 128), and its chairman and vice chairman (Article 208), must be
ROC nationals domiciled within the territory of the ROC. At least half of the
executive directors (Article 208) and at least one of the elected supervisors (Article
216) should also be domiciled within the ROC. The exemption offered 100 per cent
ownership to overseas investors and removed an important impediment to foreign
corporate investment in Taiwan.
In addition to reforming these legal regimes during the 1960s, the
Government also revised other relevant laws to ensure consistency with the SEI,
SIOC and SIFN. Thus, most importantly, the Government not only reduced the
legal obstacles to investment but also improved co-ordination between the various
responsible agencies, and simplified procedural matters relating to investment
applications. For example, prospective investors had been required to submit 36
copies of applications and had to spend 3 months going through various
26 The Company Law was promulgated on December 26, 1929, effective from July 1, 1931.
Amended on April 12, 1946, July 19, 1966, March 25, 1968, September 11, 1969, September
4, 1970, May 9, 1980, December 7, 1989, and November 10, 1990.
bureaucratic procedures (Hsing, 1971: 221). Time was lost because there was no
independent government agent in charge of investment applications. All
applications had to be approved by different agents, such as the Ministry of Finance
(MOF), Ministry of Communications, etc. In order to simplify the administrative
procedure, the Investment Commission, under the MOEA, was established in 1968
to screen and handle all investments made by foreign nationals and overseas
Chinese (Wu, 1993: 31). After administrative simplification, investors only had to
file 3 copies of applications, and the time required for final government decisions
on investment applications was reduced to less than a month (ilsing, 1971: 221).
Even with what were, for the 1 960s, relatively pioneering liberal foreign
investment codes and simplified application procedures, Taiwan clearly had an
uphill struggle in trying to attract foreign capital (Long, 1991: 84). Taiwan could
offer no outstanding natural resources base, no sizeable domestic market, no long-
term guarantee of political stability. What Taiwan did have by that time was a
capable, educated and cheap workforce, a relatively developed infrastructure, and a
US aid-sponsored investment marketing strategy of some sophistication. 27
 Even so,
foreign investor response was slow. 28
 To make Taiwan more attractive to foreign
27 Once more, the US provided important help to the ROC Government regarding how to attract
FDI. AID addressed these concerns prior to the end of the AID mission. It publicised Taiwan
as an invesment site, and the US government utilised serveral programmes to facilitate and
protect the flow of private capital to Taiwan and other LDCs. These included the AID
Investment Guarantee Programme, Cooley Fund, China Trade Act, and Sino-American
Industrial Guarantee Agreement. For more information about these programmes, see Schreiber
(1970).
28 Although tax incentives undoubtedly helped to create a more favourable investment environment
in Taiwan, other factors, particularly political stability, were also important to foreign
investors. In fact, as was made clear by the survey conducted by the Tax Reform Commission
in 1968, the importance of all tax concessions taken together for the encouragement of foreign
investment (both by Overseas Chinese and foreign nationals) compares rather unfavourably
with such considerations as political stability (cited by 1,201 respondents), low wage rates
(849), an attractive domestic market (701), well-educated and dependable labourers (625), low
cost energy fuel (577), contrast the assurance of a five-year tax holiday (551), and other tax
incentives (202) (Executive Yuan, Tax Reform Commission, 1970: 100). Given the fact that
tax savings iii Taiwan were often partially negated by increases in tax paid to the foreign
investor's own country and that tax exemption occurred during the initial period of operation,
when profits tend to be slow, it is not surprising that foreign investors attached relatively little
importance to tax incentives (1-Ising, 1971: 220; Ho, 1978: 239).
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investors, a further investment promotion scheme was launched and the Statute for
the Establishment and Management of Export Processing Zones was enacted in
1965. In 1966 the first export processing zone was established in the southern port
city of Kaohsiung. This offered complete duty exemption and other tax incentives
for export businesses set up in the Zone (Long, 1991: 84).
6.3 Export Processing Zones
Export Processing Zones (EPZs) were another important step taken by the
Government to solicit FDI and further integrate Taiwan's economy with the global
one. The Government established EPZs in Kaohsiung (KEPZ) in 1966, Nantze
(NEPZ) in 1969 and Taichung (TEPZ) in 1971 (Lim and Fong, 1991: 65; San,
1989; Gold, 1990: 86). it is useful to consider EPZs in some details, since the
establishment of EPZs and bonded factories in the 1 960s attracted considerable
quantities of FDI into Taiwan, helped to maintain a relatively strong international
position for Taiwan's exports, and has subsequently been praised by most
economists.
The EPZs were, and still are, located in the port cities, with more mobile
bonded factories spread throughout the island29
 (Ho, 1978: 197). They were created
by the Government in order to serve the four following purposes: (1) attracting
industrial investment from overseas Chinese and foreign nationals, (2) expanding
the export trade, (3) creating job opportunities, and (4) introducing up-to-date
technology (KEPZ, 1968). One advantage to investors is the availablility of
specially-designed and largely self-contained industrial estates with factories and
29 It is interesting to note that the Japanese seemed to have a preference for EPZ investments, the
United States for bonded factories. In 1980, for example, more than 60 per cent of total US
FDI exports emanated from bonded factories, compared to 25 per cent for the Japanese. With
respect to EPZ exports, the figures were reversed; 5 per cent for the US and 31 per cent for the
Japanese (Ranis and Schive, 1985: 97).
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utilities installed, local labour easily available, and nearby access to ports and
airports (Woronoff, 1992: 78). Another attraction is the availability of various fiscal
and investment incentives (Ranis and Schive, 1985: 94). One of these incentives is
efficiency. Official transactions, from investment application to foreign exchange
settlement, are handled by one centralised agency, the Export Processing Zone
Administration Bureau, which enjoys decision-making power beyond the red tape
of the ministries (Gold: 1990: 80).
Firms in EPZs enjoy all privileges and tax incentives provided to export
producers in Taiwan. In addition to giving investors the advantages of
nonunionised, cheap labour, and the incentives already contained in the ordinary
foreign investment statutes, locating in an EPZ entitles an investor to (1) exemption
from import duties and related levies, commodity tax and business tax; (2) freedom
from quantitative control of exports and imports; (3) virtually complete freedom
from exchange control where the foreign exchange needed to procure equipment
and new materials was self-provided; (4) free remission of business profits and
capital; and (5) provision of standard factory buildings by the EPZ administration
for immediate occupation with a 70 per cent loan to be paid back on a 10-year
instalment basis (Huang, 1986: 207; KEPZ, 1968; Hsing, 1971: 215). EPZs thus
facilitate the routine importing of raw materials, the adding of value (mainly in the
form of unskilled labour), and the re-export of the more fully processed or finished
goods, very often taking advantage of U.S. tariff code provisions 806 and 807°
(Yoffie, 1993: 201). The regime also facilitates the Governmen's desired economic
shift to a new mode of export-oriented manufacturing production, based in
particular on imported raw materials (Ranis and Schive, 1985: 94).
30 Items 806.30 and 807.00 of the US Tariff Schedules (as amended in 1963) allowed the duty-free
entry of US components sent abroad for assembly or re-processing, then re-exported back to
the United States; only the value added by foreign labour was subject to tariffs (19 U.S.C. s
1202). These items were replaced by Subheadings 9802.00.60 or 9802.00.80 of the
Harmonised Tariff Schedule of the United States in 1988 (Pub. L 100-418, Title 1, s 1204(a)
August 23, 1988, 102 Stat. 148).
Because customs duties, commodity tax, and sales tax are not levied at all,
the investors bypass the bureaucratic procedures involved with tax rebates.
However, only firms in approved industries3 ' and those willing to meet certain
other conditions are allowed to operate in EPZs. 32 For example, the industries
permitted to operate in KEPZ are limited to those which are not competing with
export industries which have been developed domestically, nor having to face a
saturated world market, and whose products contain services amounting to no less
than 20 per cent of their total value (Hsing, 1971: 232; KEPZ, 1968).
Notwithstanding a slow start, the EPZs have become a major force in the
economy (Wang, 1980: 7-28). With as many as 80,000 workers and more than US$
2 billion of exports annually, these zones were and remain a great boon to the
economy (Woronoff, 1992: 79). The Investment Commission of the MOEA
approved 29 applicants in 1961, 103 in 1966, 212 in 1967, 321 in 1968, and 201 in
1969 (TSDB, 1997: 242). At the end of 1973, 290 factories were located in the
three zones, of which 222 were in operation (EPZ Concentrates, 1980, vol. 5, no. 7-
8: 59). The combined investment of these firms exceeded US$ 148 million (FCW,
1974: 1). Local capital, singly or in partnership with foreigners, has also invested
actively in EPZs (Gold, 1990: 80). By the end of 1984, aggregate committed
investment in the three zones came to US$ 417.5 million, and the EPZs enjoyed a
surplus of nearly US$ 1 billion in foreign trade (Huang, 1986: 208-209; Tuan,
1992: 126-127). Exports from the zones increased from US$ 8 million in 1967 to
US$ 405 million, or about 9 per cent of Taiwan's total exports in 1973 (Ho, 1978:
197-198). FDI in the EPZs grew substantially between the mid-1960s and 1980
(Schive, 1994: 416-417). Although FDI in the EPZs is in the vicinity of 20 to 25
31 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, precision, labour-using, and relatively high value-added
industries (e.g., precision machinery, electronics, optical equipment, and plastic products) were
given priority for admission to the zones (Ho, 1978: 197).
32 For details of the regulations, see EPZ Laws and Regulations (1965), KEPZ Answers (1970),
NEPZ Answers (1971).
per cent of total arrived FDI, more than 80 per cent of the capital in EPZs is from
overseas (EPZ Essential Statistics). These statistics show that EPZs achieve the first
three purposes. The only thing that EPZs did not do adequately is to upgrade skills,
since most of the output was of simple, labour-intensive products. Consequently, in
1980, a novel version was unveiled at Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park (see
Chapter 7.3 below), which attracted high-tech industries due to the availability of
trained technicians and engineers and the proximity of technical schools and
institutes (Woronoff, 1992: 79).
6.4 FDI during the Primary Export-Substitution Phase
In a relatively small country like Taiwan one would expect FDI to become
significant oniy in the course of the primary export-substitution phase of the 1 960s.
As table 5.2 indicates, this was proved to be the case. In the primary import-
substitution phase, FDI tends to be motivated by a desire for access to the domestic
markets of large countries. The function of FDI during a primary export-
substitution phase becomes increasingly important: FDI can not only provide
information and access international markets, but it can also supply the foreign
technology needed to help the industrial sector to achieve and maintain a
competitive position in international markets (Ranis and S chive, 1985: 92).
In the initial export-substitution period in Taiwan, FDI inflow was mostly of
the 'sourcing' kind, focused on taking advantage of the large volume of cheap
labour being released by agriculture. FDI provided an important augmentation of
the domestic savings fund, as well as additional management, technology, and
entrepreneurial capacity, essentially as add-ons to the domestic industrial structure
(Chan and Clark, 1992: 85; Ranis and Schive, 1985: 93). Most of the FDI in this
period was in labour-intensive, export-oriented light industries such as textiles, and
in electronic assembly processes based on value-added concepts. This type of
industry operated under free trade conditions in Export Processing Zones (EPZs)
and bonded factories, without requiring the dismantling of protection for locally
owned import-substituting industries (Lim and Fong, 1991: 64).
Taiwan was a battleground for intense international competition between
US and Japanese industry. In 1964 the US firm, General Instruments, became the
first major company to establish a bonded factory in Taiwan (Long, 1991: 84). Its
immediate success demonstrated the potential of offshore assembly in Taiwan to
other US firms.33 As US firms gained competitive advantages through a low-cost
assembly operation in Taiwan,34 their international competitors felt compelled to
follow suit (Wornoff, 1992: 72). Japanese firms then began to invest in Taiwan, in
order to lower labour costs and to re-capture US market share, spurred also by the
fact that US import quotas had been placed on direct Japanese imports. 35 Taiwan
thus "became vital to the global production structures of corporations from two
different core economies" (Gold, 1990: 79).
American investors on Taiwan were generally large MNEs, which set up
wholly-owned subsidiaries to cut costs on goods targeted at the US market. The
Seven more US firms invested in Taiwan in 1964, with a further seventeen in 1965 (TSDB, 1997:
244). They set up bonded export factories throughout the island as well as plants in EPZs
(Gold, 1990: 83).
Many US firms relocated their assembly operations to Taiwan and other third world countries to
reduce production costs and offset the flood of cheap Japanese imports, particularly in
electronics, to the US market (Bello and Rosenfeld, 1990: 245). There were two main
incentives: cheap labour, and items 806.30 and 807.00 of the US tariff code (see chapter 6.3).
By the late 1960s, "roughly half of US imports came in under tariff item 807, most of them
from the factories of US firms in Mexico and Taiwan" (Grunwald and Flamm, 1985: 69-70;
Oman, 1989: chapter 5).
As Americans imposed quotas on Japanese imports, the Japanese began to assemble parts in
Taiwan for shipment to the United States, at least until Taiwan fell under similar restrictions
(Yoffie, 1983: 113-116; Gold, 1990: 80). Apart from the reasons mentioned in the text, the
Jpanaese also invested abroad because of domestic problems which occurred in the early
1970s. Labour shortages, high wages, lack of land and pollution led the Ministry of
International Trade and Investment (MIT!) to urge certain enterprises to invest abroad. Labour-
intensive, technologically simple smaller firms migrated, so that Japan itself could concentrate
on high technology, i.e., capital- and knowledge-intensive, high quality, high value-added
goods (Johnson, 1982 chapter 8; Ozawa, 1979; Gold, l988a: 196).
K-,-.
MNEs were willing to obtain parts locally rather than import them, if they met
specifications. By contrast, Japanese investors tended to comprise small and
medium-sized companies. To the extent that they invested, the big firms, often
through joint ventures and licensing agreements, sought to penetrate Taiwan's
domestic market in addition to that of the US and other countries (Gold, 1990: 80).
The smaller Japanese firms also frequently took local partners. But, whether large
or small, Japanese companies were loath to purchase locally made goods and
continued to import parts from Japan. 36 Taiwan thus became a "repository for
industrial sectors [products] no longer viable for the US or Japan" (Gold, 1990: 81).
It entered the emerging international division of labour at the bottom end of the
product life cycle.37
Apart from American and Japanese investment, overseas Chinese, primarily
from Hong Kong and Southeast Asia, comprised the third major category of foreign
investor in Taiwan38 (Schive, 1991: 417-419). Coming from countries less
36 In Japan's view, their joint ventures, in which they commonly held a minority share, functioned as
captive markets for Japanese-made parts which were then assembled into goods for sale under
Japanese brand names within Taiwan's tariff walls. Joint-venture contracts stipulated the
purchase of Japanese parts and restricted the markets for finished goods. Japanese found
numerous means to evade local-content requirements. The government took action on many
complaints by local industrialists on tariffs and taxes, but it, fundamentally, failed to redress
the local-content problem in anything more than a sporadic and ad hoc fashion.(Gold, 1990:
83).
The product life cycle is a concept popularised in the US through the work of Raymond (1971). It
envisages that products go through stages of origin, development, and decline, each of which
has different requirements of technology, investment, skilled labour, etc. Japan's rapid postwar
development has been characterised by careful analysis of the product life cycle by Japan's
economists, who break the production process into stages and determine where production of
which products is most cost-effective. As is noted above, in the mid-l970s, MITI decided that
Japan could no longer make certain goods competitively, and encouraged and assisted
Japanese manufacturers to shift production of those items offshore - first to Taiwan and South
Korea - and to concentrate instead on developing new products. That is, Japan would stay at
the origin stage of the product life cycle and let newly industrialising countries such as Taiwan
and Korea take over when Japan lost competitiveness. This concept is also at the root of
popular discussions of a new international division of labour based on a nation's comparative
advantage at producing particular goods at different stages of the cycle. For details, see Frobel,
Heinrichs, and Kreye (1980); Ruggie (1983); Kurth (1979: 1-34).
38 In the 1960s, overseas Chinese investment in Taiwan came mainly from Hong Kong (40.8%), the
Philippines (31.8%), Malaysia (12.2%), Japan (7.6%), US (3.4%) and Thailand (2.9%)
(MOEA, Statistics on Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investment, 1996).
developed than Taiwan, they invested in textiles, competed with the exports of
Taiwan's local capitalists, and in other import-substituting light industries, which
transfer little technology (Wu, 1993: 10). Their main contribution was political -
"demonstrating with their capital the conviction that the ROC was the legitimate
government of China" (Gold, 1983: 267-278). When Taiwan began to market itself
overseas in order to boost exports, overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia provided the
network that Taiwan first turned to. This alerted many to Taiwan's comparative
advantages, particularly its privileged relationship with the US, and continued flow
of aid-financed imports (Long, 1991: 85).
The results of Taiwan's strategy to attract FDI were impressive. As
mentioned in Chapter 5.2.3, not only did the number of cases of approved foreign
investment increase, but also the total annual amount of foreign investment jumped
from US$ 15 million in 1960 to US$ 162 million in 1971 (Ni, 1987: 260; TSDB,
1997: 242). FDI grew rapidly during Taiwan's transformation period. In the years
1965-1970 alone, the total amount of FDI inflow exceeded that for the 1952-1964
period by fivefold (Investment Commission, 1996: 5; Myres, 1990: 49). Between
1961 and 1972, there were in total 1,533 approved investment cases amounting to
US$ 815 millions. Of these, 57 per cent by number (but only 27 per cent by value)
were by overseas Chinese. 178 investments, making up 37 per cent of the total
value, were by US investors. Japanese investors made 419 separate investments,
accounting for 13 per cent of the total value (TSDB, 1997: 242-244). Among
foreign investors, American were clearly dominant in terms of investment value.
FDI was attracted to Taiwan not only by the mixture of a liberal investment
climate with an authoritarian political framework 39 - which helped ensure a docile
While the government adopted a more open policy towards industrialisation and investment, and
the country as a whole benefited from economic growth, there was no comparable
simultaneous political relaxation, and political development lagged behind. This was another
distinguishing characteristic of Taiwan's development: the bifurcation of the economy from
the polity. Under the umbrella of 1934 Martial Law, the Government employed repressive
measures against any 'rebellion'. Mendel (1970: 112-121) has described several political cases,
labour force - but also by a number of favourable international developments in the
mid-i 960s, which occurred as the relaxation of cold war tensions facilitated a
general expansion of world trade.
First, the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) in mainland China finished off
any hopes of a reconciliation between Peking and Washington (Klein, 1992: 260).
It also slammed shut the economic door to mainland China, which sealed itself off
in ten years of economic isolation. It also strengthened Taiwan's support abroad
(Gold, 1990: 86).
Secondly, the escalating Vietnam War (1964-1972) further poisoned
relations between the US and mainland China, firmed up America's commitment to
contain communism, and forced the US to take a more active interest in the
region.4° Like Thailand and Singapore, Taiwan profited from US investment in
military support (Long, 1991: 85). Just as the Korean War provided a much needed
stimulus to the moribund Japanese economy of the early 1950s, Taiwan, as well as
South Korea, eagerly seized the business opportunities provided by massive US
spending related to the Vietnam War (Chan and Clark, 1992: 100). Taiwan's
economy was boosted by US military purchases of agriculatural and industrial
commodities,4 ' designation of Taiwan as a destination for rest and recreation, and
by contract work for and in Vietnam (Bello and Rosenfeld, 1990: 178).
Thirdly, Taiwan's aggressive and well thought-out marketing strategy
towards foreign investors came at a time when many potential competitors were
adopting less friendly stances. The tide of economic nationalism was running
such as P'eng Ming-min case, from the 1960s. See also Kerr (1965: 446-448); Jacobs (1971:
143-149); Peng (1972); Ong (1979: 183-185); and Shih (1980: 1126-1142). For the
Government's position, see China Yearbook (1961-1962: 16-18).
40 An exemplary analysis of the interaction of the cold war and ecomonics in Northeast Asia is in
Cumings (1984).
41 Because the US did not classif' Taiwan as one of the 19 financially strong nations, South Vietnam
was allowed to procure US-aid-financed imports from Taiwan (Ho, 1978: 198).
especially high in some Latin American countries, which in terms of labour cost
alone should have been well-placed to attract large amounts of export-oriented
overseas investment (Long, 1991: 85). As countries began to reconsider the place of
MNEs in their economies, devising strategies to regulate them, Taiwan appeared on
the scene - its officials aggressively offering allowances of 100 per cent ownership,
guarantees against nationalisation, tax holidays, low wages, and the prospect of no
42
strikes (Gold, 1990: 87).
Finally, perhaps the centrepiece of Taiwan's new investment environment,
created by the post-1958 reforms, was its comparative regional advantage in
offering very cheap, abundant, disciplined, and educated labour. For example, in
1972, skilled labour in Taiwan earned an average US$ 72 per month, which was
only 70 per cent that of South Korea, 57 per cent that of Hong Kong, 38 per cent
that of Singapore, and only 26 per cent that of Japan. For unskilled labour, the
respective rates were US$ 45, US$ 60, US$ 68, US$ 82, and US$ 120 (Arthur D.
Little, 1 973b: 10-11). At the same time, Taiwan's labour effeciency was ranked just
below that of Japan and the United States (Arthur D. Little, 1973a: 55).
The policy changes of the early 1 960s stimulated local entrepreneurs into
exporting. They entered growth fields such as electronics, aggressively seeking
Japanese or US partners (Gold, 1988a: 185). The large-scale assembly and
manufacturing enterprises set up by US and Japanese investors also encouraged the
development of small-scale local operations to supply them. 43 Such Taiwanese
42 Before the 1934 Martial Law (see chapter 4) was annulled in 1986, strikes were not allowed in
Taiwan.
u There were an estimated 260,000 business enterprises in Taiwan in 1988, of which 98 per cent
were considered small business (McGregor, 1989: 2; Lee, 1989: 26). These formed the
backbone of Taiwan's trading economy, accounting for 65 per cent of exports (Chin, 1988:
61). Small- and medium-scale export-oriented manufacturing entities were a predominant
feature (having paid-up capital not exceeding NT$ 20 million, assets valued at less than NT$
60 million, or less than 300 employees: CEPD, 1980: 14) of Taiwan's economy. In part this
can be attributed to the congruence of Chinese cultural traditions: everyone with a modicum of
capital wanted to be chairman of his own company. It was also in part a consequence of the
type of investment sought by the Government - MNEs would generate a market for a host of
companies as Tatung and Sampo emerged in the 1960s based on various forms of
cooperation with foreign interests (Hsin-ching Publishing Co, 1982; Lai, 1983).
During this period, the growth of industrial exports in the 1 960s averaged
36 per cent a year. Particularly strong growth was registered in three major export
categories: textiles, leather, and wood products (Ho, 1978: 200). The composition
and destination of Taiwan's exports also changed dramatically over that period. As
a percentage of total exports, industrial products rose from 32 per cent in 1960 to 79
(83) per cent in 1970 (1972) (TSDB, 1997: 192). Textile products became the most
important export, and increasing their share of total exports from 14 per cent in
1960 to 32 per cent in 1970. By the end of the decade sugar contributed only 3 per
cent of the total exports and rice exports were almost negligible44
 (Chou, 1973: 95).
The composition of exports shifted from a primary agricultural to non-agricultural
origin, and the increased diversification in export suggests that not only had Taiwan
acquired the valuable capacity of export substitution, but also that the export-led
policy was leading Taiwan to industrialisation (Galenson, 1979). At the same time,
exports to the US grew as a proportion of the total from 12 to 38 per cent, but
exports to Japan dropped from 38 per cent in 1960 to a mere 15 per cent in 1970
(Kuo and Fei, 1985: 54-84; Scott, 1979: 308-383). Conversely, 55.6 per cent of
imports came from Japan in 1974, and 29.5 per cent from the US (CEPD, 1980b:
small local suppliers and assembly operations (Long, 1991: 87). This structure of production
allowed businessmen to respond very quickly to market demand, and reduced problems of
excess capacity, thus promoting internal competitiveness and external flexibility. The strong
role of small business, in addition, helped promote the geographic dispersion of industry in
Taiwan that in turn facilitated socioeconomic equality by enabling underemployed agricultural
workers to seek part-time factory work. For more information about small businesses in
Taiwan and their contribution to Taiwan's economic development, see Ho (1980); Fei (1986:
109-124); Greenhalgh (1988: 224-245); Hsiao (1988a: 12-23); Lam, (1988; 1990: 28-34); Li
(1986: 77-96); Sutter (1988).
1965 was the last year in which agricultural goods would earn more than industrial exports, and
by the late 1980s industrial exports would rise to roughly 95 per cent of Taiwan's exports
(TSDB, 1997: 213).
24). This reveals an overconcentration of markets and suppliers 45
 and the central
role of foreign-owned enterprises (Gold, 1990: 86).
The strong export performance in the 1 960s and early 1 970s also brought
about a significant improvement in Taiwan's balance of payments. Although
Taiwan's trade with Japan was consistently in deficit throughout the post-war years,
trade with the US shifted from a deficit to a surplus in 1968 and has remained so
ever since (Hartland-Thunberg, 1990: 116). The shift in the US position reflected
the ending of US aid and Taiwan's transformation from a debtor to a net creditor
internationally (MOEA, 1988). Thus, despite the cessation of US economic aid in
1965, Taiwan's improved trade position, plus the influx of foreign investment
attracted by the new economic environment, enabled it noticeably to strengthen its
international reserves in the following years nonetheless46
 (CBC, 1975: 9-12; I-Jo,
1978: 200).
It is worth mentioning that Taiwan's internal investment record was
extremely strong in this period, another important reason for Taiwan's rapid
industrial transformation. Savings as a proportion of GNP, which had averaged
about 9 per cent in the 1950s, skyrocketed from 12 per cent in 1962 to 35 per cent
in 1973 - one of the highest in the world (Huang, 1989: 93-12 1). This permitted the
investment rate of GNP to rise to an average 25 per cent in the second half of
1960s, despite the termination of US aid in 1965 which had financed over 40 per
cent of Taiwan's investment (Myres, 1984: 500-528). These increased savings were
augmented by Taiwan's successful measures to stimulate and manage foreign
investment. FDI, which accounted for less than 1 per cent of total investment
Apart from the US and Japan, Taiwan's trade was spread over a large number of trading partners,
with no one country ever achieving a 10 per cent share (Hartland-Thunberg, 1990: 116; TSDB:
1997: 248).
46	 .	 .	 .	 ,	 .	 .Foreign asset holdings of Taiwan s banking system increased from NT$ 17 billion in 1968 to NT$
36 billion in 1971 and NT$ 75 billion in 1974 (CBC, 1975: 9-12).
during the 195 Os, had reached 9 per cent at the beginning of the 1 970s (Haggard
and Cheng, 1987: 84-135).
Unlike the experience of many other developing countries, where foreign
capital simply displaces domestic businessmen, MNEs in Taiwan are generally
credited with a key role in stimulating the export drive (Gold, 1 988a: 184). This
was because the Goverment deliberately harnessed MNEs to the island's
developmental objectives (Chan and Clark, 1992: 85-86). While granting wide
investment scope to local and foreign investors, reducing red tape and liberalising
trade, the Government nonetheless ensured that it retained a determinant role in the
economy. It maintained ownership of key upstream productive enterprises as well
as of the banking sector (Huang, 1989: 93-121). The state channelled FDI into
priority sectors such as electronics and away from others such as textiles to prevent
denationalisation. At the same time, it maintained state monopolies in heavy
industry, which are often dominated by foreigners in developing countries.
Ensuring that most FDI went into export industries also kept the domestic market
largely off-limits (Schive, 1990).
Although encouraging trade, the Government still maintained a long list of
prohibited and controlled imports. This "created a kind of dual economy in which
exports, but only exports, could be manufactured under virtually free trade
conditions" (Little, 1979: 475). Taiwan did not develop a laissez-faire, free market
economy; the Government retained multiple controls and only permitted what
seemed like free-market activities within strict bounds (Gold, 1990: 87).
Because the dramatic increase in Taiwan's total industrial output and export
boom in the 1 96Os was due to a combination of diverse internal and international
factors, the quantitative contribution of FDI to all this, while substantial, was by no
means overwhelming. 47 The major contribution of FDI has been in the qualitative
47	 .	 .	 .	 .Contribution of FDI to capital formation in the 1960s was only 5.21 per cent (CEPD, 1983).
domain. Its significance was in the advancement of technology, job creation, and
the expansion of foreign markets, rather than as a financial source for imports. This
is especially because trade deficits were greatly reduced after 1964, due to a rapid
increase in exports (Kuo and Fei, 1985: 55). Subsequently, the importance of FDI
to Taiwan's economic development came to be in the context of quality.
Finally, Taiwan's withdrawal from the United Nations (UN) in 1971 had
affected FDI inflow into Taiwan (Ungar, 1979: 1O5121).48 Taiwan's continued
future as a de facto independent entity looked doubtful. 49 Although the US-ROC
Mutual Defence Treaty provided the security and stability essential to attract
investment, local businessmen nonetheless began to move capital and assets abroad
and emigration increased. Foreign trade and investment dipped. Once again, one
may observe the importance of political stability as a consideration affecting
48 Communist China emerged from its self-imposed isloation and made tentative forays into the
international arena at the beginning of 1970s. Western countries responded by trying to
establish diplomatic relations with PRC, which necessitated breaking relations with Taipei. The
governing rule, agreed upon by the KMT and CCP, is that there is only one China; Taiwan is
an inalienable province. As two parties claim to run the legitmate government of all China,
foreign countries can only have full diplomatic relationships with one; the other is a 'bandit
regime' (Gold, 1988a: 186; 1990: 94; Hartland-Thunberg, 1990: 114; Ching, 1979: 122-146).
"Restoration of the lawful right of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations" is
Agenda item 93 of the Twenty-Sixth Session of the U.N. General Assembly (GR official
records, 1971, 26th Sess., Annex). The agenda had been constantly discussed from the 1966th
to 1977th Plenary Meeting (GR official records, 1971, 26th Sess., Verbatim Records of
Meeting, vol. 2, AIPV.1963- 1996). By a vote of 76 to 35, with 17 abstentions, the General
Assembly adopted the draft resolution AIL.630 and Add. 1 and 2. In the face of an
international political environment increasingly detrimental to the KMT, the ROC withdrew
from the United Nations just before a vote by the General Assembly to give the China seat to
the PRC (United Nations, General Assembly Official Records, 26 Session, 1976th Plenary
Meeting, 25 October 1971, pp. 18, 33-35). As a result of Resolution 2758 (XXVI) Taiwan was
no longer recognised as the legitimate government of China and all the organisations related to
it on 25 October 1971. See GA official records, 1971, 26th Sess., supplement No. 29 (A/8429);
UN. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General (U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.E/l2, 1994: 3).
27 years after its withdrawal from the UN, the de jure status of Taiwan is still problematic. Its
complexity is due not only to ambiguities in international law, but also to conflicts in the
interests of international Powers. Even more importantly, the problem is rooted in the baggage
of Chinese history and ideology. There has been enormous research, nationally and
internationally, on this topic, but the positions of the KMT and CCP seem to be entrenched.
investment decisions (see Chapter 6.2.2 above), evidenced by the fall in amounts of
approved FDI from 163 million in 1971 to 127 million in 1972 (see table 5.1).
6.5 Conclusion
By turning to exports and allowing market forces to play a greater role in
the allocation of resources, Taiwan was able to develop its economy more in tune
with its comparative advantage, i.e. along a labour-intensive growth path.
Consequently, unlike many other LDCs, Taiwan enjoyed fast growth in both output
and employment. No longer constrained by its limited domestic market, Taiwan's
manufacturing production expanded rapidly and its industries operated at closer to
full capacity. Industrial growth in the 1960s was not only more rapid, it was also
more effectient.
Supplementing the favourable consequences of the international political
and economic events of the 1960s, the Government's open FDI policy and its
financial and economic reforms helped to create a favourable investment
environment for investors and enhanced Taiwan's exports. Some have suggested
that Taiwan's strong export performance in the primary export-substitution phase
was merely the product of a "specific historical period" (Bello and Rosenfeld, 1990:
178). This is probably partially true. However, had the Government not had a
positive attitude towards FDI, the economic development of Taiwan would not
have achieved such remarkably rapid growth. If Taiwan's government is to be
faulted for anything, it is for the caution that characterised its economic reforms.
Had it acted with greater speed, the impact of economic reform and decontrol
would have been felt substantially sooner, and had it dismantled the controls and
limited the distortions brought about by protectionism more effectively, the results
of economic reform could have been achieved more efficiently. In turn, if the
economic reform had been achieved more efficiently, a more favourable
environment would have been provided for foreign investors; and more FDI would
have come to Taiwan. Nonetheless, the caution shown is understandable, since at
the time the reforms were implemented in the late 1 950s the new policy package
was untested in similar environments overseas, and not all fashionable. In that
context the reforms, indeed, were bold.
Chapter 7
Law, Policy and FDI during the Secondary Import and
Export Substitution Phase, 1973-1983
Because of the rapid expansion of export industries during the 1 960s and the
continued high growth of the economy, Taiwan's economy had reached a
productivity ceiling by the early 1970s and 'was again confronted 'with an apparent
dead-end in the road which it had chosen to continued rapid growth. The
vulnerabilities inherent in the export-substitution strategy all seemed to appear
simultaneously: because of the rapid growth of labour-intensive export industries,
the demand for labour rose at a high rate, at a time when there was already a
shortage of primary-level labour (Sun and Lee, 1985: 61-62); with full employment
and a rising standard of living, wages and other costs rose' (Gold, 1990: 94);
manufacturing industry had grown too fast for Taiwan's infrastructure, such as
railroads, highways, harbours, most of which dated from the Japanese era, to
support it (Long, 1991: 88-89; Myres, 1990: 51); international trends towards
protectionism resulted in Taiwan's trading partners raising protectionist quotas
against its exports, especially textiles, footwear, and television sets (Balassa, 1981:
109-126; Yoffie, 1983; Aggarwal and Haggard, 1983: 249-312); and other
developing countries, such as Thailand and Pakistan, with even lower labour costs
and more abundant natural resources began to enter the market, while Taiwan's
technological edge over its competitors was still marginal (Gold, 1 988a: 186).
Compounding Taiwan's economic impasse, the international outlook was
further clouded. With the emergence of the PRC from its self-imposed isolation in
the early 1 970s and the co-incidence of geopolitical strategies in Washington and
For example, the rapid growth of labour-intensive industries stimulated real wage increases of
over 5 per cent a year during the export-substitution period (Greenhalgh, 1988b: 67-100).
Peking, the Nixon administration extended official recognition to the PRC in order
to play a 'China card' against the Soviet Union 2 (Klein, 1992: 260). Following the
US's lead, many countries switched their diplomatic recognition from the ROC to
the PRC. 3 The ROC on Taiwan became increasingly isolated diplomatically. Its
dependence on cheap exports to Western countries began to appear politically as
well as economically vulnerable.
At this juncture, unless the Government were able to formulate an effective
strategy for dealing with these internal and external threats, critical bottlenecks
could well impede Taiwan's further economic development. Faced with the need
for change, the Government in 1972 adopted a Sixth Four Year Plan, which marked
a new direction in policy (Gold, 1990: 94). The export orientation would remain,
but Taiwan would develop a new tier of import-substitution industries in areas like
petrochemicals, electrical machinery, advanced electronics, precision machine
tools, and computer terminals and peripherals. This came to represent the
Government's Secondary Import and Export Substitution economic policy, lasting
from 1973 to 1983: it involved the production of intermediate inputs as well as final
2 The US sought to confine the Soviet expansionism by establishing diplomatic relationships
with the PRC and then alienating the PRC from the USSR. US President Richard Nixon visited
Peking and issued the Shanghai Communiqué with Chou En-lai in February 1972 (Cooper,
1995: 22). The US and the PRC established fonnal diplomatic relations in January 1979;
Taiwan has had no diplomatic relationship with the US since then. The 1954 US-ROC Mutual
Defence Treaty expired on January 1, 1980. Although the Taiwan Relations Act, passed by
Congress in March 1979 and signed by President Jimmy Carter on April 10, has since served
as the basis for relations between the peoples of the US and Taiwan, the loss of US diplomatic
recognition and the ending of the mutual security treaty represented the cutting of an umbilical
cord after three decades of support and protection from the US (Bush, 1992: 349; Hartland-
Thunberg, 1990: 114-115; Gold, 1990: 99).
Towards the end of the 1960s, the ROC was recognised by more than 70 nations as the 'sole
legal government of China'. In addition, it held membership in 39 important international
government organisations (IGOs), including the UN and most of its affiliated agencies.
However, in the two years between 1971 and 1973, 37 countries switched their diplomatic
recognition from Taipei to Peking (Kau, 1992: 237-238; Thorbecke, 1979: 204-205; Rowan,
1979: 75). Although, after considerable efforts, the ROC managed to win diplomatic
recognition from some small new nations, the total number of countries that maintain official
ties with ROC is now only 30 (of which none are countries of importance), and Taiwan is able
to keep membership in only 15 IGOs (of which only the Asian Development Bank is
considered of some importance) (CDN, May 7, 1997).
assembly, and repositioning the country's industry to emphasise more
technologically sophisticated and capital-intensive manufacturing (World Business
Weekly, May 19, 1980: 5; Lim and Fong, 1991: 64).
7.1 Government Economic Policy
All of these inherent structural problems in Taiwan's internal economic
organisation and its international standing came to a head with the first oil crisis of
1973-1974 and the serious recession in the West in 1974-1975 (Long, 1991: 89).
The world economy entered an era of structural transformation 4 and was buffeted
on all sides by adverse conditions such as the devaluation of the US dollar and a
shortage of food production (Hsieh, 1992: 17; Sun and Lee, 1985: 62). The
phenomenon of stagflation (inflation combined with zero growth) in the developed
world effectively blocked Taiwan's economic growth in two ways: it attacked the
markets for Taiwan's export products, and it made imports much more expensive
(Long, 1991: 90). Furthermore, Taiwan's fixed foreign-exchange system
exaggerated economic fluctuations (Schive, 1989: 13-27). Real exports, which had
grown by 30 per cent a year during 1970-1973, actually fell by 6 per cent a year in
1974-1975 (TSDB, 1997: 189). In 1974, wholesale prices went up 40.6 per cent and
consumer prices 47.5 per cent, but fell back to minus 5.1 per cent and 5.2 per cent
increases respectively in 1975, and subsequently decreased further until the second
oil crisis of 1979-1980 (TSDB, 1997: 165). Savings also fell by 9 per cent a year in
1974-5 (TSDB, 1997: 56), a situation that was exacerbated by a precipitous decline
in FDI from 8 per cent to 2.5 per cent of total investment between 1973 and 1975
(Chan and Clark, 1992: 86).
'	 In particular, in terms of a shift of global wealth, the purchasing power in the OECD countries
was transferred to the oil-exporting countries during this period (Long, 1991: 90).
Only at this stage did the Government begin pushing harder for secondary
import and export substitution, and deliberately accumulating foreign reserves and
know-how in order to enhance the stability and self-sufficiency of the
manufacturing cycle. This push was symbolised by the 1973 'Nine Major
Construction Projects' (increased to Ten in 1974 and completed in 1979) in
infrastructure (highway and airport construction, railroad expansion and
electrification, nuclear power plants, port modernisation) and industry
(petrochemicals, steel, shipbuilding) (Woronoff, 1992: 69; Yeh, 1979: 8-23; China
Yearbook 1980: 21 1-219). The Government retained control over the former but
sought investment by private local and foreign investors in the latter. 5 The major
objective of these projects was to vertically integrate 6
 all of Taiwan's leading
export industries, and then upgrade them, increase the quality of products output,
and expand into new sectors from this base (Gold, 1 988a: 186). These construction
projects also opened up the era of petrochemical and heavy industries for Taiwan.7
Originally, the Government intended to have joint state-private enterprises undertaking the
industrial projects. But when most of the private investors backed out, China Steel Corporation
and China Shipbuilding Corporation became virtually 100 per cent government-owned
enterprises (Djang, 1977: 92-93). China Steel was designed to supply domestic customers, but
began exporting as well (FCJ, July 29, 1984: 4). Although it has not consistently been efficient
in international terms (sometimes domestic prices have been higher than those available on
international spot market), it still became one of the world's most profitable steel companies
(FEER, November 26, 1982: 75). The same result happened to China Shipbuilding. Despite the
chronic global oversupply of shipbuilding in the late 1970s, Taiwan's shipbuilding industry
was undoubtedly competitive in world terms, being kept afloat through a mixture of domestic
demand and government subsidy (Long, 1991: 92-93).
6	 The integration was 'vertical' in that it involved the addition of earlier and latter stages of
processing to existing industries.
Since the supply of raw materials and unfinished goods was mostly controlled by foreign
companies in international markets, the activities of these companies greatly affected on the
normal manufacturing and selling operations of Taiwan firms. Therefore, the Government
concentrated on developing industries which produced heavy chemical raw materials and
component parts of products. From 1973 onwards, heavy industries together constituted a
larger proportion of total manufacturing than light industries, making the transformation
toward heavy chemical industries the most important feature of the decade (I-lsieh, 1992: 18).
In 1983, heavy and chemical industries generated 57.2 per cent of Taiwan's net domestic
product. This figure indicates that while Taiwan's industrial structure was not as good as that
of the industrialised countries, it was far more advanced than that of most developing countries
(Sun and Lee, 1985: 64-65).
Both were much-needed: the petrochemical industry was targeted for major
investment on the eve of the first oil crisis, while the heavy industries which
emerged were primarily materials and parts industries, supplying traditional export
firms, and the machinery industry providing capital goods (Sun and Lee, 1985: 62).
Consequently, during the late 1970s Taiwan's reliance on imports of intermediate
products and capital equipment decreased8 (Schive, 1992: 103). These projects not
only compensated for reductions in exports and private investment and helped
Taiwan's economy ride out the first oil crisis, 9 but also constructed an environment
favourable to investment and growth (The Economist, January 3, 1981). Thus the
economy continued to grow, albeit slowly (Hsieh, 1992: 18; Kuo, 1983: 216-217).
At the same time, putting stability first, the Government responded to
inflation by raising the interest rate on one-year savings deposits from 8.75 to 15
per cent between July 1973 and January 1974, and by restricting credit'° (BUT,
TFSM, 1984: 76). This brought a tremendous cashflow into banks and helped to
curb inflationary spending (Myres, 1990: 52). The real GNP grew only 1.2 per cent
in 1974 and by 4.4 per cent in 1975. However, it had recovered to a high growth
rate of 13.5 per cent by 1976 (TSDB, 1997: 27). From then on, Taiwan managed to
8 Schive has argued that the secondary import and export substitution policy caused an overall
fall in imports, which in turn affected the trading structure of the 1980s and caused the ensuing
trade imbalances. For details, see Schive (1989: 13-27).
For example, by establishing the first nuclear power station, the Government reduced the
country's dependence on imported energy. Nuclear power accounted for more than 40 per cent
of all power generated by mid-1984 (FCJ, December 23, 1984: 1).
'° Scitovsky (1990: 139-140) has argued that the high deposit and loans rates instituted in Taiwan
came close to but did not exceed the equilibrium rate of interest, which explains why raising
interest rates raised the level of investment or capital accumulation. He has suggested that
raising interest rates is likely to have rendered investment a more efficient and more effective
engine of growth. He has also claimed that rationing credit by interest rates rather than through
bank managers and government officials is almost certain to raise the average return on the
total volume of investment, thereby further accelerating growth. See, however, Anrdt (1982)
for an interesting contrary view.
keep inflation within reasonable limits 11 while maintaining a 9.6 per cent annual
rate of real GNP growth between 1975 and 1981 (Scitovsky, 1990: 171).
In order to counter neoprotectionist quotas based on the volume of goods,
primarily textiles, the Government encouraged exporters to produce more
upmarket, higher value items which earned more for each unit sold. This was
another element in the strategy of upgrading the industrial structure (Gold, 1990:
107).
However, because of the resources required for development of industries
such as petrochemicals and base metals, as well as the large increase in living
standards, Taiwan's dependence on imported energy increased sharply during this
period.' 2
 When the second oil crisis hit in 1979-1980, Taiwan's economy again
suffered a blow from stagflation in the midst of a global recession (Sun and Lee,
1985: 62-63). The economy growth rate declined and did not recover until 1983
(TSDB, 1997: 29).
The Government continuously undertook policy adjustments and carried out
reforms in response to the disruptions caused by the oil crises during this period
(Balassa and Williamson, 1987: 58-59). In 1976 it first established a money market,
and gradually relaxed interest rate controls; the interest rates only rose in 1979-
1980 because of world-wide inflation (Myres, 1990: 35). As Taiwan became more
dependent upon foreign trade during its economic development , it became
increasingly difficult for a single fixed exchange rate to accommodate the rapid
changes in value of other foreign currencies; a situation that became more acute
From 1973 through 1983, the Government managed to keep its inflation rate down to an
average of 11.4 per cent. This was much lower than the average of more than 30 per cent
recorded by the other developing countries (The Business Guide to Taiwan, 1980: 7-8; Sun and
Lee, 1985: 64).
12 Although Taiwan's dependence on imported oil decreased after the first nuclear power station
came onstream in 1979, Taiwan remained 73 per cent dependent on oil after 1979 (AlT, 1981:
3).
after the mid-1970s. Local and foreign investors encountered very unpredictable
costs whenever the value of foreign currencies shifted rapidly. Therefore, in
February 1979, the Government changed the fixed foreign exchange rate to a
controlled-floating exchange rate system' 3
 (Sun and Lee, 1985: 63; Kuo and Fei,
1985: 80-83). This helped to minimise unexpected costs and risks for local and
foreign investors, and reduced the impact of international economic fluctuations on
the Taiwanese economy.
The Economic Planning Council (EPC) issued a Six-Year Plan for 1976 to
1981, emphasising capital and technology-intensive industries, notably steel and
petrochemicals. Domestic economic dislocations and lack of confidence pushed the
Government to the forefront as the only actor capable of bringing this plan to
fruition (Gold, 1990: 100). Late in 1977, the Government terminated the EPC and
established the Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD). It re-
centralised power, taking responsibility for macro-planning, setting priorities, co-
ordination, and evaluation (Gold, 1990: 102). Its members were, and are, cabinet
ministers backed by a young and well-trained staff (Wen, 1984: 23). The MOEA's
Industrial Development Bureau does detailed sector analysis, planning and plan-
implementation. In 1979 the CEPD mapped out a Ten-Year Economic Construction
Plan (1980-1989) that identified the machinery, information, electronics, electric
machinery, and transportation equipment industries as 'strategic' industries, which
it would therefore support with specific business and investment incentives (Sun
and Lee, 1985: 63; Gold, 1981: 119-123).
In addition, immediately after the Ten Major Construction Projects were
completed in 1979, the Government followed them by initiating a further Twelve
Major Construction Projects (increased to Fourteen in 1984), with a total cost of
13 This system was intended to allow the Central Bank to buy and sell key currencies, such as the
US dollar, in order to allow the exchange rate for the NT$ to be determined by market forces
(Sun and Lee, 1985: 67; Myres, 1990: 51).
US$ 7 billion (Long, 1991: 92-93; FCW, June 21, 1981: 1-2). The new Projects
included not only transportation and communications, electrical power, additional
nuclear power plants, agriculture, and industry, but also basic construction works in
the rural living environment, undertaken in order to further the goal of building a
modernised Taiwan (China Yearbook, 1980: 211-219; CEPD, 1980a: 35; Sun and
Lee, 1985: 63). There is no doubt that the initiative for these projects was partially
influenced by the need to get the economy moving again after the second oil crisis
(Woronoff, 1992: 69-70). Through an accelerated programme of infrastructure
investment, Taiwan kept total investment up during the second oil crisis. More
generally, its economic approach was proving successful. Even in 1980, a year
marked by world-wide stagflation and rising protectionism, Taiwan recorded a
trade surplus of about US$ 78 million (MOF, 1984). In the meantime, the inflation
rate came down dramatically, from about 21 per cent in 1981 to around 5 per cent
by 1982 (Scitovsky, 1990: 172). Also, the Real GNP growth in 1983 was 8.7 per
cent, and the trade surplus increased from US$ 3.3 billion in 1982 to about US$ 4.8
billion in 1983 (TSDB, 1997: 181). In 1979, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) reclassified the ROC as a newly
industrialising country (NIC, later NIE' 4) (OECD, 1979; OECD, 1980).
In 1983, Taiwan was ranked by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as
the 17th largest trading nation in the world, 15 with exports ranking thirteenth and
imports eighteenth (FCJ, June 10, 1984: 1). Trade was still 50 per cent concentrated
14 The concept of 'NICs', which at the time included Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore,
Brazil and Mexico, was first advanced by the OECD in 1979. Deference to the PRC's
sensitivity concerning the sovereignty status of Taiwan and Hong Kong, and continued rapid
industrial development in the four Asian NICs through the 1980s, has since led the expression
to be changed to 'newly industrialised economies' (NIEs) without reference to Brazil or
Mexico (Oman, 1994: 49).
15 The export and import (two-way trade) in 1984 accounted for 90.6 per cent of GNP and made
Taiwan's economy one of the most dependent on foreign trade in the world (Sun and Lee,
1985: 68).
on Japan and, especially, the United States.' 6 In 1983, industrial products accounted
for 93.3 per cent of Taiwan's total exports. This was in sharp contrast to the export
structure in 1952, when agricultural products made up 91.6 per cent of total exports
(TSDB, 1997: 192). The comparison illustrates the extent to which Taiwan had
transformed itself from an agricultural to an industrial country. Exports to Japan
declined from 52.6 per cent of Taiwan's total exports in 1952 to 9.9 per cent in
1983, whereas Taiwan's exports to the US rose from 3.5 per cent to 45.1 per cent
(TSDB, 1997: 201). Meanwhile, imports from the US dropped from 45.7 per cent
in 1952 to 22.9 per cent in 1983, whereas imports from Japan diminished slightly
from 31.2 per cent in 1952 to 27.5 per cent in 1983 (TSDB, 1997: 199). The
growing trade deficit with Japan and surplus with the US has caused a trade
imbalance.' 7
 To fend off protectionist moves against the Taiwanese market, the
Government sent several 'Buy American' missions to the United States (beginning
in 1978) for agricultural purchases.' 8
 At the same time, frustrated by the refusal of
Japan, its main supplier, to buy Taiwanese, the Government imposed a temporary
ban in 1982 on some 1500 consumer goods from Japan' 9 (Arnold, 1985: 194-196).
It is also worth mentioning that rapid economic growth did not enlarge the
gap between the rich and the poor in Taiwan, which is very often a consequence in
16	 Exports to these two countries accounted for 56.1 per cent of Taiwan's total overseas sales in
1952, and remained at 55 per cent even in 1983. Although imports from the US and Japan
dropped from 1952's 76.9 per cent to 1983's 50.4 per cent, they still constituted more than a
half of Taiwan's total imports (TSDB, 1997: 199).
17 In Sun and Lee's research (1985: 7 1-72), they found that there were a number of economic
factors which had contributed to the trade imbalance. First, Japanese capital goods and raw
materials were much more competitive in the Taiwan market than their US counterparts.
Secondly, the US was not only the largest market in the world, but the one which had the least
import restrictions. Thirdly, the products Taiwan sells in the US were ones which provided that
country with relative advantages and thus enjoyed wide acceptance.
18 Because of the continued growth in bilateral trade, Taiwan in 1984 was the 6th largest trading
partner of the US - the 5th largest supplier and 11th largest export market (Sun and Lee, 1985:
72-73).
'	 Not surprisingly, this fuelled a black market in highly desired Japanese consumer goods, such
as VCRs (The Economic News, June 7-13, 1982: 1)
20	 .
other countries. The ratio of the average family income of the richest 20 per cent
of families to that of the poorest 20 per cent fell rapidly during the 1950s because of
the land reform programme, and continued to decline from 5.33 in 1964 to 4.49 in
1972. In 1983 this figure had dropped to 4.3621 (Greenhalgh, 1988b: 72; Fei, Ranis
and Kuo, 1972: 55, 92-93). Per capita GNP rose from US$ 196 in 1952 to US$
3,100 in 1984 (TSDB, 1997: 32). Obviously, the distribution of incomes in Taiwan
was becoming more even and the economic growth had a role in improving living
standards as well as reducing socio-economic inequality (Chan and Clark, 1992:
80). This bears out the success of the equalisation of wealth policy of Min-sheng
Philosophy, and it is a successful example of the ability to stress both wealth and
equality that is so rarely seen in the history of the world's economic development.
7.2 Government Policy on FDI and FDI Law Reform
7.2.1 Government Policy on FDI
Secondary import and export substitution policies were targeted at more
capital-, skilled labour-, and ultimately, technology-intensive manufacturing
industries (Ranis and Schive, 1985: 93). Under this approach, the Government
planned to slough off industries that were becoming uncompetitive internationally
(such as low-end textiles, electronics, and footwear), and to direct local and foreign
investment into strategic industries such as microelectronics and capital equipment
20 In a classic article, Kuznets (1955: 1-28) has argued that income inequality follows an inverse
U-curve in developing countries, increasing as the economy grew and levelling off and then
declining only much later.
21 From a comparative perspective, what is most noteworthy about Taiwan is that the level of
inequality is exceptionally low by the standards of both developing and developed countries.
Of forty-five countries for which income distribution data were available in 1986, only two had
ratios of the top to bottom fifth of households that were lower than Taiwan's ratio of 4.5 in
1985. And in these countries, Japan and the Netherlands, that ratio was 4.4 or 4.3, only a
fraction lower than Taiwan's (World Bank, 1986: 226-227). For more detailed discussions on
income distribution in Taiwan, see Fei, Ranis, and Kuo (1979); Ke (1983); Ranis (1978: 397-
409); and Wu (1978: 67-111).
(Gold, 198 8a: 186-197). The first manifestation of its plans took shape in a new
high-technology industrial park, located in Hsinchu, which was established as a
locus for local and foreign ventures in integrated circuits, PC products,
biotechnology, and other cutting edge sectors (see Chapter 7.3 below).
As mentioned in the previous section, the Government invested heavily in
infrastructure and hoped to attract investment from local and foreign sources into
industry, especially in petrochemicals. The justification was both microeconomic
and macroeconomic. From a microeconomic point of view, some large local
investors, producers of synthetic fibres and plastics in particular, needed foreign
technical and capital participation in order to vertically integrate their operations
with the petrochemical industry. Similarly, MNEs were eager to sell their know-
how and capture a share of Taiwan's huge indirect export market to third countries
in synthetic fibres and plastics (Gold, 1 988a: 186). From a macroeconomic point of
view, development of the petrochemical industry and a move to locate domestically
as many stages of the production process as possible can reduce vulnerability to
price fluctuations in imported supplies (Gold, 1990: 101).
During the secondary import- and export-substitution period, the US and
Japan were still the two most important sources of FDI (TSDB, 1997: 244).
However, the Government would have preferred that the Japanese had concentrated
their investments on export enterprises without also seeking to gain a foothold in
the local market (Huang, 1986: 224-225). Indeed, the Government consciously
excluded Japanese investors from the petrochemical industry, because of fears that
the Japanese had already penetrated too deeply into Taiwan's economy. American
investors like Mobil, Gulf, National Distillers and Chemical Corporation, and
Union Carbide, however, were encouraged to participate in the development of the
industry (Bello and Rosenfeld, 1990:247; Gold, 1990: 101).
The Government, together with local interests and foreign investors, set up
tripartite style joint ventures in the petrochemicals industry. Because local interests
in Taiwan retained a majority or whole ownership of the investment project, these
are labelled 'new forms of investment' by investment scholars: unlike traditional
FDI, the FDI share in these ventures did not constitute ownership or control of the
enterprise22
 (Oman, 1989: 7-10). These kinds of joint ventures in Taiwan enjoyed
almost the same incentives under the FDI laws as traditional FDI, with the
exception of those incentives restricted by a minimum shareholding requirement,
such as the privilege against Government expropriation.
Aside from the petrochemical industry, beginning in 1980 the Government
also attempted to create a comparative advantage for Taiwan in automobiles.
Ideally, this would stimulate the emergence of high-quality parts suppliers (Gold,
1990: 105). But this attempt failed due to conflict among the partners (Gold, 1988a:
186). The Government had negotiated with several Japanese makers to set up a
tripartite style joint venture with China Steel and private interests (FEER, August
13, 1982: 112-113), and in 1982 a deal was penned with Toyota. After several
delays, however, the scheme was abolished in mid-1984, ostensibly due to
disagreements over the preconditions that Toyota export half of the cars within
eight years, accept a 90 per cent local-content rate, and transfer technology to local
partners (FCJ, September 16, 1984: 4; FEER, 27 September, 1984: 165).
In order to reduce its heavy trade dependence on the United States and
Japan, and to diversify the resources of FDI, the Government opened new markets
in Western Europe and liberalised imports from that region. In 1979 it abolished the
22 Oman (1984: 12) defined the term 'new forms of investment' as: "(a) joint international
business ventures in which foreign-held equity does not exceed 50 per cent; (b) various
international contractual arrangements which involve at least an element of investment from
the foreign firm's viewpoint but which may involve no equity participation by that firm
whatsoever, as is frequently the case with licensing agreements, management, service and
production-sharing contracts, and occasionally with sub-contracting and turnkey operations".
For a detailed discussion of new forms of investment in developing countries, see Oman
(1984) and Oman (1989).
ban on trade with Eastern Europe, except the Soviet Union (A WSJ, November 29,
1979: 1). It solicited FDI from European countries and encouraged local
corporations to invest abroad in order to guarantee supplies of raw materials and
open new overseas markets. The China External Trade Development Council was
established in 1970. One of its main aims in the 1 970s period was to encourage the
formation of large general trading companies to wrest control of trade with Japan
from Japanese general trading companies (sogo shosha) and American buyers
(Business Asia, November 17, 1978: 364-365; FEER, January 5, 1979: 52-53).
Taiwan-Europe trading volumes rose from US$ 2.1 billion in 1977 to US$ 5 billion
in 1980 (FEER, April 4, 1983: 40). Exports to the European economic community
(EEC) grew 30 per cent per year from 1975 to 1980 (Euromoney, May 1981: 17),
and by 1980 the EEC was Taiwan's second largest export market (AlT, 1981: 12).
By 1983, Taiwan had become the EEC's twenty-fifth largest trading partner 23 (FCJ,
December 16, 1984: 4). In the meantime, the total amount of approved FDI in
Taiwan from European countries rose almost 7 times from 36 million in 1961-1970
to 225 million in 1971-1980. It took up 10 per cent of the total amount of approved
FDI during that period (see table 5.2). One may safely conclude from these
statistics that the Government's move to diversify its trading partners met with
some success.
To promote foreign and overseas Chinese investment in Taiwan, the
Government had continued to simplify its investment procedures. In July 1982, the
MOEA set up an Industrial Development and Investment Centre (IDIC), providing
a 'one stop' service for foreign investors which eliminated the need to visit various
government agencies in order to file a single investment application (Sun and Lee,
1985: 79-80).
23 This was in spite of the fact that Taiwan was not a member of the GAIT and its exports did not
qualify for duty-free status under the Generalised System of Preferences, while those of its
main-rivals did (Gold, 1990: 110).
Since Taiwan became isolated in terms of international politics, trade and
FDI have been the primary mechanisms linking its economy and society to the rest
of the world. However, the Communists never renounced the right to use force; nor
was the threat of a blockade removed (Gold, 1990: 99). In order to win the loyalty
of overseas Chinese and to secure foreign investment, the Government tried to
improve its defence capabilities. Although Taiwan was still able to purchase
American arms after the 1979 break in diplomatic relations with the US, the
quantities available were not thought sufficient by the Government, because the US
would only sell Taiwan weapons for defensive purposes under the Taiwan
Relations Act. 24
 New sources of military goods were sought, including Israel and
South Africa (NYT, April 6, 1977: 1; FEER, March 3, 1982: 32-34). Taiwan's
defence spending exceeded half of the Government's budget in 1979 (FEER,
October 27, 1978: 19), and in 1980 rose by 25 per cent from the previous year
(AlT, 1981: 2),
7.2.2 The Reform of the FDI Laws
(A) The Revision of Statute for Encouragement of In vestment
Between 1973 and 1983, the SEI was revised nine times, the SIFN three
times, and the SIOC on four occasions. This reflected the radical change of
economic conditions during the period, and the Government's efforts in reviewing
and revising its FDI laws in order to cope with the dynamic economic
circumstances.
24 Section 3 of the Taiwan Relations Act commits the United States "to make available to Taiwan
such defence articles and defence services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defence capability" (US Department of State's News
Release, 1978; Cooper: 1995: 23-27). However, the quantity of arms the US could continue to
sell to Taiwan was specifically limited under the US-PRC Shanghai II Communiqué of August
17, 1982, with the ceiling based upon the 1980 imports figure of USS 880 million (FEER,
January 27, 1983: 28).
The major amendments of the SEI occurred in 1977 and 1980, and I will
focus on these reforms. 25
 In 1977, the Government revised the SE! to offer certain
incentives to investors. For example, an enterprise can apply to defer the
commencement of the five-year tax exemption by a period of one to four years
from the start-up of a business operation, if the enterprise belongs to the category of
capital-intensive or technology-intensive productive enterprises (Article 7), or if it
is engaged in investment in the exploration, development or processing of natural
resources in foreign countries and shipping the products back to Taiwan (Article 8).
At the same time, machinery and equipment with special devices to save energy
(Article 36) or with special devices for prevention of pollution (Article 47) may be
depreciated according to an accelerated service life of two years. The maximum
rate of business income tax (25 per cent of an enterprise's annual income) remained
unchanged in Article 15 of the 1977 SET. But, as long as the enterprise engages in
basic metal production, petrochemical, or heavy machinery industries and is
capital-intensive or technology-intensive in nature, the maximum rate was limited
to 12 per cent, revised down from 22 per cent in 1970. Also, business income tax
and stamp tax were exempted in respect of contracts for building, inspecting, or
repairing ships and aeroplanes navigating on international routes and fishing boats
operating in the high seas (Article 32). These incentives were designed to
encourage investors to invest in strategic industries, and more generally to explore
international resources, to prevent pollution, to reduce the tax burden of productive
enterprises, to help the country through the oil crises, and eventually to reorient the
nation's industrial structure toward technology-intensive industries. Meanwhile,
non-resident alien and foreign business enterprises' withholding tax increased from
15 to 20 per cent. However, if the investments were not approved in accordance
25 Other special enforcement rules promulgated by the Executive Yuan in accordance with the
SEI included (1) Categories and Criteria for Special Encouragement of Important Productive
Enterprises, in 1981; (2) The Criteria for Encouragement of Establishment or Expansion of
Industrial Mining Enterprises in 1981; and (3) Categories and Criteria of Productive
Enterprises Eligible for Encouragement, in 1982. The above rules were all annulled on
December 31, 1990.
with the SIOC and SIFN, the withholding tax was set at 35 per cent (Article 16).
This device provided a big tax-rate disparity between approved FDI and non-
approved FDI, with the intention to direct FDI toward preferred industry and to
keep FDI under the control of FDI Laws.
Because of the economic recession, the Government sought to stimulate
productive enterprise and individual investment by providing tax credits or tax
reductions. In Article 10 of the 1980 SET, the Government allowed businesses to
credit 10 to 15 per cent of the amounts invested in production equipment against
income tax. If the income tax due was less than the credit amount, businesses were
entitled to carry forward the balance to credit against income tax for up to 4 years.
The Government also revised the basis for calculation of business income tax, from
"not exceeding 25 per cent of the annual total income" to "not exceeding 25 per
cent of the annual taxable income" (Article 15). Additionally, where an individual
continuously held share certificates for three years after acquisition, up to 15 per
cent of the costs of acquisition was permitted to be deducted from his (her)
consolidated income tax (Article 20). The effectiveness of the SEI was extended
until December 31, 1990 (Article 89). Article 41 of the 1980 SEI also stipulated
that a productive enterprise may, within the limit of an amount not exceeding its
paid-up capital, retain and not distribute its earnings. This was intended as an
incentive for productive enterprises, because an ordinary enterprise is otherwise
permitted to retain and not distribute earnings only to the extent of 50 per cent of its
paid-up capital. The benefit was augmented in 1982, when strategic industries and
important productive enterprises (as designated by the Government) were allowed
to retain earnings of up to 200 per cent of their paid-up capital.
(B) The Revision of the Statute for In vestment by Foreign Nationals and of
Stat ute for Investment by Overseas Chinese
During this period, accompanying revisions to the SIFN and SIOC were
intended to provide a more favourable environment for overseas and foreign
investors. Article 12 of the 1979 SIOC, and Article 13 of the 1979 SIFN, for
example, stipulated that investors, one year after the commencement of a business
operation, could apply for repatriation of capital in any amount up to 15 per cent of
the total sum invested. Compared to the 1959 version, the revised laws shortened
the repatriation time from two years to one year from the starting date of a business.
In the meantime, the amended laws also gave better protection against govermnent
expropriation. Article 16 of the 1979 SIFN gave the same guarantee as the 1960
SIFN: an enterprise would not be subject to requisition or expropriation for a period
of 20 years after the commencement of business. Moreover, in order to qualif' for
this protection, the 1979 law required investors to continue to hold only 45 per cent
or more of the total capital; the requirement had been 51 per cent in 1960. In order
to encourage joint ventures between overseas Chinese and foreign investors, the
1983 amendment added that the above guarantee would also apply to such joint
ventures (Article 16 (II)).
Although the statutes provided various incentives to foreign investors, some
export obligations were also imposed. Due to the small size of the domestic market,
the Investment Commission requested that new foreign factories export half their
output and that high-technology joint-ventures should also have concrete plans to
export.26
 However, foreign-funded firms having overseas shareholdings of less than
20 per cent would be exempted from the minimum 50 per cent export obligation
(Wang, 1985: 113; IDIC, 1982).
26 Mandatory export levels for Japanese investors were often set higher, because of their
"notorious" reluctance to transfer advanced technology (Huang, 1986: 218).
Apart from the above amendments of FDI laws, the Government also revised the
Banking Law in 197527 to encourage local investment. The Government has
monopolised the banking system ever since it moved from the mainland. Because
the state banks preferred to fund state enterprises and large private finns, smaller
private firms were forced to borrow money from an unorganised kerb market at
exorbitant rates (Caldwell, 1976: 736; AW&J, December 4, 1979: 1). To rejuvenate
the local capital investment system, the 1975 revision broadened the scope of
banking practices. One result was the expansion of investment and trust companies,
most of which are part of business groups, such as Cathay, that were otherwise not
permitted to merge productive and financial functions. Such companies were able
to perform banking functions and to make equity investments (A WSJ, January 1,
1980: 1).
7.3 Science-Based Industrial Park
Apart from constantly revising FDI laws to attract more FDI, the
Government also sought to involve both local and foreign capital in restructuring
Taiwan's economy to increase the international competitiveness of its products. A
scheme launched in July 1979 to create a 21 0-hectare park (now 424 hectares with
another 156 hectares under development) only forty-five miles Southwest of Taipei,
in Hsinchu, for Chinese and foreign high-technology firms to concentrate talent and
resources (Li, 1980: 3; SIPA, 1996: 8). The Statute for the Establishment and
Administration of A Science-based Industrial Park (SEAASIP) was promulgated on
July 27, 1979, with Enforcement Rules promulgated on June 19, 1981.28 The
27 Promulgated on March 28, 1931 and amended on September 1, 1947, June 16, 1950,
November 11, 1968, July 4, 1975, December 29, 1977, July 21, 1978, December 5, 1979,
December 5, 1980, July 17, 1981, May 20, 1985 and July 19, 1989.
28 After its initial promulgation, SEAASIP was amended on May 20, 1981 and May 24, 1989.
Enforcement Rules were amended on July 1, 1994.
Science-based Industrial Park Administration (SIPA), under the Park Supervisory
Committee of the National Science Council, acts as the management institute. All
Park enterprises must be incorporated in accordance with ROC Company Law,
after their investment projects have been approved by the Park Supervisory
Committee (SIPA, 1994: 2).
In December 1980, the 1-isinchu Science-based Industrial Park (HSIP, also
known as the Silicon Valley of Taiwan) was established, with the main aim of
attracting high-tech investment (Bello and Rosenfeld, 1990: 247). HSIP is a
bonded, duty-free area with a computerised inventory control system, and aims to
create an environment favourable to the development of high-technology industries
so as to bring in high-calibre research scientists, while at the same time stimulating
domestic research and development (Li, 1980: 3; Chu, 1987: 115). It offers the
same incentives as do the Statutes for Encouragement of Investment, including a
five-year income tax holiday (Article 15, SEAASIP). In addition, while still
offering the advantages of Taiwan's relatively low-cost labour force, it also boasts
low-cost engineers, proximity to Taiwan's prestigious technology universities
(Tsinghua University and Chiaotung University), and the availability of the state-
run Industrial Technology and Research Institute (ITIR) and its Electronics
Research Service Organisation division (ERSO) to develop and make available
technology (Gold, 1990: 103; Long, 1991: 94). Meanwhile, for goods and services
exported by a Park enterprise, business taxes are computed at a rate of 0 per cent
and no commodity taxes are payable (Article 17, SEAASIP). In addition, a science-
based industry may obtain low-interest loans for the purchase of equipment or for
construction of factory buildings. The maximum period for repayment of such loans
is 10 years, including a grace period of one to three years (SIPA, 1994: 5). Further,
the Government is willing to take up to a 49 per cent equity share in ventures in the
park (Article 23 (II), SEAASIP), replicating the tripartite model used in
petrochemicals.
HSIP immediately solicited applications from firms to make minicomputers,
integrated circuits, and laser optics. In this way HSIP, like the EPZs described in
Chapter 6.3, began to channel new resources and technology into new product lines
that are now revolutionising all sectors of Taiwan's manufacturing (Myres, 1990:
50). As of August 1984, the park had fifty-three approved investments, forty of
which were already in operation. These included subsidiaries established by
important American firms such as Wang Laboratories and Qume (Gold, 1990: 103).
Twelve years later (in 1996), there were more than 180 high-tech companies in
operation at HSIP with combined sales of US$ 11.34 billion (FCJ, February 14,
1997). Of these companies, 36 were instituted by FDI (including 23 US investors)
and 144 were domestically owned. Aggregate investment in FISIP reached US$ 5.6
billion by 1996. Domestic sources accounted for 88 per cent of HSIP investment
capital (of which 8 per cent came from Government investment) (SIPA, 1996: 10-
11). Although FDI made up only 12 per cent of HSIP investment capital in 1995,
about 23 per cent of current and FDI inflows went to HSIP. This illustrates the
success of the Government's efforts to attract FDI in high-tech industries, such as
integrated circuits, computer and peripherals telecommunications, optoelectronics,
precision machinery and materials, and biotechnology: these are also the major
industries in HSIP (SPIA, 1996: 10). In 1996, Taiwan became the biggest notebook
computer manufacturing country in the world. 26 per cent of that output was
sourced from HSIP (CDN, March 24, 1997).
7.4 FDI during the Secondary Import and Export Substitution
Phase
As the Government slowly shifted its economic policy from export
substitution to secondary import and export substitution with the march of the
international product life cycle,29
 two distinct shifts in FDI can be observed. At
first, FDI had been directed to exploiting Taiwan's labour supply, which was
treated merely as an input into foreign-based manufacturing activities. However, as
that resource became more expensive, FDI shifted toward investing in entire
proprietary enterprises, whose Taiwan-based activities might supply both domestic
and/or export markets. First, FDI shifted from pure sourcing investments to
investments which focus on particular proprietary interests with an eye to both
domestic and export markets. Secondly, during the late 1 970s and early 1 980s,
capital inflows shifted from FDI to other sources of foreign capital, such as
portfolio investment and commercial loans (Ranis and Schive, 1985: 93). It has
been demonstrated that FDI and other long term foreign capital has gradually
replaced foreign aid (82 per cent in the 195 Os) as the main source of capital inflows
(CBC: Balance of Payments, 1983). Meanwhile, although FDI still maintained a 22
per cent share of foreign capital inflows in the 1 970s, this proportion was by then
dwarfed by the influx of portfolio and longer-term capital (78 per cent) (Ibid). "This
resulted both from the gradual achievement of economic maturity and from the
impact of the oil crisis, which led to petrol-dollar recycling by commercial banks as
an increasingly important phenomenon throughout the world" (Ranis and Schive,
1985: 94).
FDI inflow averaged about US$ 125 million per year during this period
(Klein, 1992: 268). However, the amount of arrived FDI was very unstable (see
table 5.1). FDI bounced back vigorously after the Nixon shock of 1971 and the oil
crises of 1974 and 1979 (TSDB, 1997: 242). One may presume from this that the
reluctance of foreign investors derived from the uncertainties of that decade
(including the US-PRC rapprochement and the two oil crises). In the two years after
diplomatic relations were broken off between the US and Taiwan, overall FDI
increased 125.4 per cent, spearheaded as before by American investors (AlT, 1981:
29	
see Chapter 6.4 above.
3). Passage of the Taiwan Relations Act through the US Congress in March 1979
(Lasater, 1993: 21), with its implicit American commitment to protect Taiwan, no
doubt buttressed foreign willingness to continue investing into Taiwan (Gold, 1990:
110).
As mentioned above (Chapter 7.2.1), FDI and trade became the only two
connections between Taiwan and the world after it became almost politically
isolated. Nonetheless, the PRC threatened even these connections. It warned
American companies that if they continued to do business with Taiwan, they might
be prohibited from the mainland, and it made an example of American Express by
not accepting its travellers cheques. Some companies, such as Pan Am and First
National Bank of Chicago, therefore withdrew their Taiwan operations (Gold,
1990: 98). There is no doubt that the PRC has successfully hindered a great deal of
foreign capital from going to Taiwan.
From table 5.2, it should be noted that overseas Chinese investment was
very important during this period, and indeed took up 37 per cent of total FDI by
value in Taiwan (increased from 29 per cent in the previous decade). Most of the
investment went into cement and petrochemical industries because of the need to
finance Taiwan's Ten and Twelve Major Construction Projects (Wu, 1993: 9). The
US accounted for 25 per cent of the total investment in this period. Compared with
42 per cent in the 1960s, its predominance declined markedly in a decade when the
Japanese (17 per cent) and others (21 per cent), mostly European investors (10 per
cent), began to play a larger role. (As was mentioned in Chapter 7.2.1, the
Government began to encourage capital inflows from European investors in order
to help diversif' sources of foreign capital.)
Exports by FDI-funded enterprises contributed about 22 per cent of
Taiwan's total exports in the 1970s (MOEA, 1981). In general, overseas Chinese
investors tended to be less export-oriented than others. This was probably because
overseas Chinese had invested mainly in infrastructure-related industries. US FDI,
however, appeared to be more export-oriented than that of Japanese investors, but
less than FDI from European investors (Ranis and Schive, 1985: 111). US
subsidiaries or joint ventures in Taiwan exported 65 per cent of their total
manufacturing product in 1975,° while the figure for the Japanese was only 53 per
cent, and that for European investors almost 96 per cent (Gold, 1988a: 195; Ranis
and Schive, 1985: 116). This buttressed the Government's decision to discourage
Japanese investors from investing in domestic-oriented industries and thereby
exploiting without contributing sufficiently to growth of the Taiwanese economy.
Total FDI between 1970 and 1980 rose by a factor of 700 per cent compared
to the total in the previous decade, and comprised 9 per cent of total investment
during that decade. While part of the funding went to the new EPZs, overall foreign
investment accounted for around 4 per cent of the value added in manufacturing,
around 20 per cent of exports, and 10 per cent of manufacturing employment
(MOEA, 1981; Ranis and Schive, 1985: 101). The contributions of foreign
investment were not only financial, but also extended to better technical know-how
and opportunities to import suppliers and increase exports (Kuo, 1975). From these
foreign-funded enterprises Taiwanese businesses obtained much valuable
technology, via patents, licensing, and technical assistance contracts (Myres, 1990:
55-56).
In April and May 1980, Taiwan was expelled from the World Bank and
IMF, but at the same time there was an explosion of foreign bank openings, with
the Europeans leading the charge. The thirteen foreign bank offices at the start of
°	 Sun and Lee (1985: 80-8 1) have argued that exports to the US by American-funded companies
have been a major contributing factor in Taiwan's long-term trade surplus with the US.
1980 were joined by eight new offices by year's end, five of which were
European3 ' (AlT, 1981: 10; Gold, 1990: 110-111).
7.5 Conclusion
In spite of the higher levels of skill and capital intensity required by the new
industries of the seventies, in spite of drastic shocks to the world economy from oil
price increases, global recession, protectionism, and inflation, and in spite of its
isolation from the international community, Taiwan's growth rate continued to be
exceptionally high throughout the decade (Klein, 1992: 26 1-269).
The severe political and economic challenges required increased state
intervention after a long period of continuous retrenchment. The Government
devised a flexible, multifaceted strategy to reduce Taiwan's vulnerability to the
instability of the global economy, primarily by vertically integrating and increasing
the self-sufficiency of industry and, to compensate for its diplomatic isolation, by
substituting economic ties for political ones (Gold, 1990: 100).
Taiwan's highly successful export-oriented industries underwent a gradual
transformation in the 1 970s. The textile industry continued to play an important
role, but petrochemical and heavy industries gradually increased their importance.
Partly this was a response to a deliberate policy of upgrading into more capital- and
technology-intensive industries. Partly it reflected a process of vertical integration
of existing industries through a second wave of import-substitution capital
investment (Long, 1991: 92). Undoubtedly, achieving the goal of vertical
integration and self-sufficiency in important industrial inputs has meant that the
stability of these industries has never seriously been threatened by uncertainties
' Grindlays Bank of Britian; Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas and Societe General of France
(whose parent company is 90 per cent owned by the France government); European Asian
Bank; Hollandsche Bank-Unie N. V. of the Netherlands, which is a joint venture of seven
European banks (AlT, 1981: 10).
over foreign sources of supply. In the 1980s they achieved efficiency levels
comparable with their international rivals (Long, 1991: 93).
During this period of secondary import and export substitution, FDI had a
crucial role to play in assisting the industrial sector to maintain a competitive
position in international markets despite rising labour costs. FDI was utilised in
helping Taiwan's industry to produce high value-added products and to explore
new export markets. FDI was especially welcomed in the strategic industries, and
the Government constantly amended the FDI laws to reflect this policy. The
establishment of HSIP in order to attract FDI and local investors to invest in the
production of high-tech products has also contributed a great deal to Taiwan's
ongoing development.
PART THREE
LAW, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN TAIWAN,
1984-PRESENT
One can see from the detailed discussion in Part II that for many years the
policy of the Government has been to promote FDI. Avoiding excessive economic
nationalism, in accordance with Dr. Sun' s Min-Sheng philosophy, the Government
has used legal incentives to encourage FDI projects that are conducive to the
economic development of Taiwan since 1954. This policy has also helped to shape
a closer government-business relationship in Taiwan, that first grew out of a strong
post-war economic recovery. As we have seen in Part II, the Government has been
tempted, during earlier stages of its economic development, to resort to periods of
import substitution and export substitution, along with other less market-oriented
strategies, in order to stimulate economic development in the Republic. One thing is
clear; whichever of the various models and policy techniques the government of
Taiwan has employed to attract foreign capital, technology and other factors of
production, FDI has been and remains a central element in the economic
development plan of Taiwan.
In Part III the aim is to bring the historical discussion in Part II up to date,
and to offer a description of the current legal framework for FDI in Taiwan. These
Chapters are devoted to the salient current legal issues relating to FDI in Taiwan,
including the forms of business activity, the regulatory oversight of FDI, issues
relating to entry and exit, and the treatment of FDI in Taiwan. Chapter 8 sets out the
basic economic policy underpinnings of modem Taiwan' s FDI programme, along
with policy developments since 1984 that have impacted on the nature of FDI in
Taiwan. In Chapter 9 the purpose is to assess Foreign Investment Approved (FIA)
and non-FIA investment projects in terms of how they can be structured, and to
note the merits of the various forms of business activities in Taiwan and their legal
constraints. Chapter 10 considers the question what investments are eligible for FIA
status in Taiwan? It discusses the basic requirements for admission of investments,
including the concepts of foreign direct investment and legal issues regarding
residence matters for foreign investors. Legal issues of encouragement and
protection for foreign investors will be detailed in Chapter 11. In addition, relevant
norms of international law will be examined as reference-points for the law and
practice of the ROC. Where appropriate, critical comment on the present legal
regime will be made, with suggestions for further reforms.
Chapter 8
Modern Government Policy and FDI Law Reform during
the Industrial Upgrading Phase, 1984-Present
Even though FDI has always been treated by the Government as a crucial
element in Taiwan's economic development, Taiwan's economic policies and the
need for foreign exchange have made the FDI review process complex, delicate,
time-consuming. The purpose of this chapter is to discusses the interaction between
economic policy and FDI law reforms in Taiwan during the industrial upgrading
phase. This chapter focuses mainly on how major economic policy shifts, as
manifested in recent legal reforms, have reshaped the FDI environment and
framework and the responses from FDI to the Government's modern FDI policy. It
will consider, most notably, the impact of the Government's current economic
policies - liberalisation, internationalisation, and institutionalisation - and other
regulatory developments. The advent of political democracy, another factor to have
affected Taiwan's FDI environment, will also be noted.
8.1 Modern Government Economic Policy
In the early 1 980s, the world economy suffered its longest recession since
the First World War. Almost every developed country had high inflation, high
unemployment, and low economic growth. In order to ride out the stagnation,
developed countries sought to increase exports to stimulate the growth of the
domestic economy and they set up many non-tariff barriers to protect their domestic
markets (Tuan, 1992: 293). This was especially true of the US, which had a serious
balance-of-payments imbalance in the 1 980s and therefore a strong penchant for
protectionism. It very often used the Section 301 provision of the 1974 Trade Act to
sanction its trade partners for unfair trade, in order to ensure fair and equitable
conditions for US commerce' (Schwab, 1995: 79-85; Hsing, 1995: 21). In addition,
after the two major international oil crises, developed countries could no longer
utilise cheap oil to develop their industries, and have had to change their economic
structure to develop low-energy industries, such as the micro-electronic industry, in
order to lower production costs. Meanwhile, to increase their products'
competitiveness, MNEs relocated manufacturing lines and internationalised their
production. Developing countries were enthusiastic to increase exports by fitting in
with the strategy of MNEs. (Tuan, 1992: 358). These structural changes in the
world economy have had an important influence on the economy of Taiwan.
Since 1981, when oil prices finally stabilised and then began to decline,
Taiwan's trade surpluses became increasingly and persistently large (Lau, 1990:
204). In particular, the economic recovery of the US in 1983 provided Taiwan with
an outlet for another export drive. The value of exports increased by more than 100
per cent from US$ 30 billion in 1984 to US$ 61 billion in 1988 (TSDB, 1997: 192).
In 1987, the trade surplus reached a peak of some 18 billion and Taiwan 1 s largest
bilateral trade surplus, approximately US$ 16 billion, was with the US (TSDB,
1997: 188, 194). By 1988, Taiwan had the second largest foreign reserves in the
world, of approximately US$ 79 billion (Chan and Clark, 1992: 90). The figures
were not entirely positive: they not only put upward pressure on the exchange rate
and growth of the money supply domestically2
 but also farmed protectionist
sentiments abroad and forced Taiwan to open its market (Lau, 1990: 184; Copper,
1988; Seymour, 1989: 54-63; Simon, 1986: 42-51).
1 The US Congress passed the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (OTCA) in 1988. Unveiled
in the 1988 OTCA, the US 'Special 301' trade policy allows the US, in effect, to designate
specific countries as unfair traders, and to threaten them with strong trade sanctions, such as
higher tariffs, unless they change their trading practices (Moyer, 1994: 178-205).
2 Before the law changed in 1987, private individuals and firms were not allowed to hold foreign
exchange; they had to sell it to the central Bank of China in return for New Taiwan dollars.
Because the Central Bank had to purchase the foreign exchange with New Taiwan dollars, this
led, in turn, to a very rapid growth of money supply (Lau, 1990: 204).
Taiwan's economic structure became problematic in the early 1 980s. On the
one hand, facing competition from other developing countries and pressure from
the increase of domestic labour costs, labour-intensive export industries in Taiwan
became less competitive in overseas markets. On the other hand, Taiwan did not as
yet have enough capital and technology to develop capital- and technology-
intensive industries. Thus Taiwan's economy faced a new dilemma, and the
Government had to adjust the country's economic structure and redraft its
development strategy in order to foster continued growth.
By way of response, in 1984 the Taiwanese government adopted an
economic policy of liberalisation, internationalisation and institutionalisation, with
the underlying aim of upgrading Taiwan's industry (YU, 1995: 257; Chiang, 1995:
170). This is still the ultimate target for the Government. It should be noted that the
present 'industrial upgrading' policy differs from that of the 1970s. The latter was
focused on developing Taiwan's heavy chemical industries, while the present
policy targets Taiwan's information technology and precision machinery industries
(Tuan, 1992: 136).
8.1.1 Liberalisation
(A) Import Liberalisation
Since the foreign exchange system was converted from a fixed into a
floating system in 1979, import liberalisation has been emphasised because it
supports export expansion through reducing the costs of acquiring intermediate
products, and stabilises the foreign exchange rate. As the trade surplus decreases, it
will become easier to accept foreign capital inflows and FDI - which are important,
among other things, to technical progress, structural changes, and further export
expansion (Kuo and Fei, 1985: 83).
In 1984, the Government embarked on an import liberalisation programme,
lowering tariffs and abolishing import restrictions on thousands of commodities3
(Lau, 1990: 184; Hsieh, 1992: 18). The average nominal tariff rate fell from 7.61
per cent in 1982 to 4.97 per cent in 1991 and to 4.2 per cent in 1996 (Chiang, 1995:
170-171; CDN, May 20, 1997). The Government also eliminated direct and indirect
export subsidies and essentially switched from a policy of promoting exports to a
policy of encouraging imports (Hsing, 1995: 20). Imports of consumer goods have
increased markedly. In 1988, domestic demand for the first time exceeded exports
of goods and services, and became the main driving force behind the promotion of
economic growth (I-Isieh, 1992: 19). Liberalisation of import restrictions has also
meant that local businesses can no longer hide under the umbrella of protectionism
and have had to face direct competition from MNEs. This programme has had the
twin effects of forcing local business into upgrading technology in order to survive,
and, at the same time, of providing a fair competition environment for foreign
investors in Taiwan.
(B) Currency Appreciation
The New Taiwan dollar was allowed to appreciate against the US dollar
beginning in 1985, and by 1993 it had increased by about 57 per cent 4 (Hsing,
1995: 19). This realignment of the US$INT$ rate had three main causes. First, there
was concerted international action to allow the US dollar to fall. The 'Plaza
Accord' of the 'G-7' meeting set in motion a process of rapid US dollar devaluation
against the Japanese Yen and the Deutschmark. 5
 The NT dollar had little reason to
There were no import products in the 'prohibited' category by 1990. In 1993, total import products
in the 'controlled' category were only 2.4 per cent and 97.6 per cent of import products were
straightforwardly permissible (YU, 1995: 258).
' In fact, the NT$ had continuously appreciated, from NT$ 40.40 per US dollar in 1960 to NT$ 25.4
in 1992. The current exchange is around NT$ 27.5 per dollar (FCJ, April 18, 1997).
Group of Seven (G-7) is a group of industrialised nations that constitute the Group of Five (the US,
Japan, Germany, France, the UK) plus Canada and Italy (Rosenberg, 1994: 152). In September
1985, the G-5 met at the Plaza Hotel in New York. The Group agreed that "exchange rates
follow the US dollar down, and the peg was snapped. Secondly, NT dollar
appreciation also resulted from explicit bilateral US pressure. The deemed
undervaluation of the NT dollar was blamed for the persistence of the US deficit in
bilateral trade, and Taiwan, along with its Asian 'tiger' partners, was the target of
bitter US criticism for keeping its currency at an artificially low level (Long, 1991:
104). Thirdly, as foreign exchange reserves continued to grow, the public expected
that further appreciation of the NT$ was likely. Not only was the public reluctant to
hold US dollars, but speculative money ('hot money') began to flow into Taiwan,
seeking to take advantage of potential currency appreciation (Lau, 1990: 204-205).
This put further upward pressure on the local currency.
The massive appreciation of the NT dollar from 1985 has had some
advantages for the economy: it stemmed inflation and encouraged the import boom.
Yet, in the meantime, the rapid appreciation of the NT dollar also had adverse
effects: it not only raised labour wage rates in Taiwan and placed great pressure on
production costs in the labour-intensive industries, but also made export-oriented
industries internationally less competitive. In addition, the liberalisation of
exchange rate controls has reshaped Taiwan's FDI environment. Many FDIs which
were targeted at export or labour-intensive industries have either reduced their
investments productivity or withdrawn from Taiwan and relocated to other
developing countries, such as Malaysia and Thailand. The appreciation of the New
Taiwan dollar and the rise in labour costs have diminished Taiwan's viability as an
export manufacturing base.
should better reflect fundamental economic conditions than has been the case", and that "some
further orderly appreciation of the main non-dollar currencies against the dollar is desirable".
The participants announced that G-5 governments would "stand ready to co-operate more
closely to encourage this when to do so would be helpful" (Colas, 1994: 354-355).
(C) Liberalisation of Foreign Exchange Controls
Taiwan's principal foreign exchange control statute has been the Statute for
the Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). 6 Prior to 1987, SAFE generally
required that foreign exchange earnings resulting from exports of goods and
services should be sold to the CBC or to "appointed banks" - banks authorised by
the CBC to engage in foreign exchange business (Article 7 of SAFE). This
surrender system was used by the Government to control the use of foreign
exchange and gave the CBC substantial discretion in charmelling economic
activities. Thus the Government used the right to repatriate foreign exchange as
leverage with which to channel desirable foreign investment into Taiwan. Foreign
investors whose investment projects in Taiwan were approved pursuant to a merit
review regulatory process would enjoy the right under Article 13 of the SIFN and
Article 12 of the SIOC to repatriate net earnings and capital gains in foreign
exchange. Taiwan's investment incentive laws have thus been closely related to its
foreign exchange control measures.
However, a shortage of foreign exchange - the basic premise of the SAFE -
gradually ceased to be the case after the early 1970s, and the surrender system
under the SAFE became too rigid despite such discretion. Indeed, Taiwan's
substantial trade surplus, the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, and the
expectation of the NT dollar's appreciation created huge pressure for the
Government to relax foreign exchange controls.
In June 1987, the SAFE was extensively amended. Article 26-1 of the
Statute allows the Executive YUan (the Cabinet) to liberalise the control of foreign
exchange when economic circumstances allowed. It authorises the Executive YUan
to suspend the application of core provisions of the SAFE in whole or in part when
6 Promulgated on December 24, 1970 and revised on December 20, 1978, May 14, 1986, and June
26, 1987.
the ROC experiences a long-term international trade surplus or accumulates
substantial foreign exchange reserves, or when the international economy
experiences major changes (Liu, 1986-7: 298). Subsequently, the CBC in July 1987
suspended the SAFE's core provisions and implemented eight new regulations7
under Article 26-1, while retaining the foreign exchange control framework. Of
these regulations, the most important are the Regulation for Non-Governmental
Outward Remittances (Outward Remittances) and the Regulation for Non-
Governmental Inward Remittances (Inward Remittances), because these two
regulations are designed to relax the flow and retention of foreign exchange in
Taiwan8
 (Chiang, 1994: 135). After several amendments, the former now permits
citizens and firms of the ROC to hold foreign exchange and to remit up to US$ 5
million abroad per year without government approval (Article 4). The latter,
governing the inward remittance of foreign exchange by nongovernment entities,
stipulates that remittances into Taiwan may now be made free of controls up to a
limit of US$ 5 million per person per year (Article 4). Pursuant to the liberalisation
process, all foreign exchange controls on current account transactions have been
abolished, and controls over international capital movements have been
significantly relaxed (Hsieh, 1992: 18). However, it is notable that the
Government's control of foreign exchange is focused on quotas of inward and
outward remittances per person per year, not the nature of transaction. The policy of
neglecting the nature of transactions and of neglecting the forms of a transactions
may result in some valuable economic transactions becoming impracticable. As
Those regulations are the Regulation for Central Bank of China's Supervision of Foreign Exchange
Operations of Appointed Banks, Guideline for Operation of Foreign Exchange Business by
appointed Banks, Regulation for Purchase and Sale of Foreign Exchange by Appointed Banks,
Regulation Governing Collection Business for Foreign Credit Cards, Regulation for
Establishment and Administration of Foreign Currency Exchange Counters, Regulation for
Registration of Balance of Medium-term or Long-Term Foreign Debts Incurred by Private
Enterprises, Regulation for Non-Governmental Outward Remittances, and the Regulation for
Non-Governmental Inward Remittance.
8 The latest amendment for these two laws was on 15 March, 1991.
such, the policy appears to be at variance with the IMF's policy guideline to use the
nature of a transaction to decide the legitimacy of foreign exchange controls.
The SAFE liberalisation led to an amendment of the SIFN and SIOC in
1989 and relaxation of FDI policy (see Chapter 8.2 below). As amended, the SIFN
now sets out a 'negative listing policy', by listing only those industries and
businesses in which foreign investment is prohibited or restricted (see Chapter 8.2
below). These reforms "have made the foreign investment process and review
standard more transparent and less intrusive" (Liu, 1994: 134).
(D) Other Forms of Liberalisation
At the same time, the Government gradually relaxed restrictions on trade
with communist countries. For political and ideological reasons, the ROC
government used to have a strict policy prohibiting trade with communist countries.
As the Government liberalised its trade policy, and in keeping with a more flexible
foreign policy, most countries are now allowed to trade directly with Taiwan: the
only exceptions are Cuba and the PRC, which trade with Taiwan indirectly
(Chiang, 1995: 173). In addition, in order to attract foreign investment, the
Government amended the FDI laws and simplified investment procedures to
compensate for the NT dollar's appreciation and the increase of the labour wages.
These measures led to a huge growth of capital inflows (see Chapter 8.2 below).
8.1.2 Internationalisation
The process of internationalisation has been conducted in both economic
and political spheres. One of the Government's economic strategies was and is to
take advantage of the strict quality and quantity controls of MNEs in order to
upgrade Taiwan's industry. As one of an MNEs international manufacturing sites,
Taiwan's industry would be well-placed to upgrade itself by using foreign
technology or equipment (Tuan, 1992: 135). Of course, within this economic
development strategy, it becomes imperative to attract foreign investment by MNEs
(see Chapter 8.2 below).
In order to diversify the sources of imports and the markets for exports, the
Government has encouraged businesses to explore new suppliers internationally
and to venture into new overseas markets, mainly focused on European countries.
Correspondingly, as commercial activity in Asia and along the Pacific Rim
increases and as part of its new 'flexible policy' regarding foreign affairs, Taiwan
plans to seek membership in more regional and international organisations, and this
will give it a larger voice in the international arena (Schive, 1992: 120). Taiwan
joined the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), Pacific Economic Co-
operation Council (PECC) and Atlantic Provinces Economic Council (APEC) in
1984, 1986 and 1991 respectively (Chiang, 1995: 172). By participating in the
activities of regional economic organisations, Taiwan not only enlarged its activity
space internationally but has also brought itself back on to the international stage.
In addition, Taiwan became a colloquium partner in OECD in 1989, and more
importantly, Taiwan became an observer in GATT in 1992. The next target for
Taiwan is to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In all, 26 countries have
requested individual trade negotiations with the ROC to discuss the terms of its
WTO membership application. Taiwan has now completed 20 bilateral talks for full
support of the ROC's membership in WTO (CDN, July 23, 1997), and 13 countries
have signed bilateral agreements with Taiwan (CDN, May 10, 1997).
In order to avoid the assertion of statehood, the ROC used the name of "The Separated Customs
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu" (referred to as Chinese Taipei) for its
application to join GATT. The ROC officially began an attempt to join GATT in 1987 by
forming an ad hoc committee to lay the groundwork (Commercial Times, December 27, 1987).
This committee completed a report in 1988, which included a recommendation to join GAIT
and procedural plan (FCJ, November 10, 1988; Economic Daily News, December 7, 1988).
Also, see Shaw (1991: 163); Keesing's Record of World Events (1990: 37671).
8.1.3 Institutionalisation
This policy is aimed at maintaining a good trade order. By institutionalising
Taiwan's trade measures and targets, liberalisation and internationalisation can be
implemented more smoothly.
In essence, before 1993 Taiwan's foreign trade was regulated by rules
promulgated by different Government's agencies (CEPD, 1990: 125). This was, in
fact, inconsistent with Article 107 (XI) of the Constitution, which required that
international trade policy should be promulgated and executed by the Central
Government. For institutionalisation, the Government promulgated the Foreign
Trade Act'° on February 5, 1993, the spirit of which was substantially influenced
by the US Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Economic Daily
News: February 28, 1993; China Times, February 17, 1993). The Foreign Trade Act
contains a number of features. It adopts a 'negative list' for imports and exports of
commodities - in other words, the import and export of commodities are by defauit
liberalised, except for those commodities on the control list (Article 11). Other
measures include countervailing or anti-dumping duties to be imposed on unfair
trade partners (Article 19); military procurement to be included in the export and
import statistics (Article 12); and for the MOEA to organise a trade investigation
committee for import relief if an industry is suffering from or threatened by an
import commodity which increases sharply in value or in quantity (Article 18). The
Act is an important step forward in the internationalisation and liberalisation of
trade policy, and signifies the modernisation of Taiwan's foreign trade regime.
8.1.4 Other Economic and Political Influences
The US management expert Michael E. Porter (1990) has divided a nation's
economic development into four stages - driven successively by production,
'° The Foreign Trade Act is also known as Constitution Law of Trade in Taiwan (CDN, April 26,
1993).
investment, innovation and wealth. He has argued that Taiwan is now at a critical
juncture of moving from the investment-driven stage to the innovation-driven stage,
wherein R&D is essential to further development (FCJ, April 11, 1997). With the
rising value of the NT$, many traditional industries, such as textiles and shoes,
became uncompetitive in the world market, and firms were forced to either close
down or contract drastically. Other industries, especially agriculture, became
threatened by potential imports. The necessity of industrial upgrading became
obvious, and the Government has itself funded large-scale industrial research and
development (R&D) projects." Such Government support may well be necessary
given Taiwan's particular mode of industrialisation, which relies on a large number
of diverse but relatively small firms. The advantages of this mode of
industrialisation are an equitable distribution of income, social mobility, and
flexibility. The disadvantage is that few firms are large enough and financially
strong enough to undertake long-term and high-risk investments, especially in R&D
(Lau, 1990: 185).
The CEPD began shifting the emphasis in industrial restructuring, stressing
tecimology-intensive, non-pollution, and low energy-consumption industries,
instead of heavy or capital-intensive ones. Its Ten-Year Plan for 1980-89 and Four-
Year Plan for 1982-86 reflect this priority. The CEPD devised a new incentive
package to channel capital into strategic industries such as information technology,
telecommunications, and semiconductors. It planned to let value-added, labour-
intensive industries such as textiles and footwear contract (Gold, 1990: 102). The
CEPD's goal was to continue to utilise export demand to guide production but to
nurture Taiwan's own research and development (R&D) capacity to develop new
products, raise value added, and vertically integrate the electronics sector (Gold,
1990: 103).
"In 1996 the Government spent about 1.8 per cent of GDP on R&D. The total amount spend on
R&D by the Government is expected to reach 2.5 per cent of GDP by 2000 (CDN, April 14,
1997).
In order to help Taiwan move towards a domestic demand-oriented
economy with a special focus on the high technology industries, the Government
started an 'Information Technology Development Plan' (1982-1989) and added
information industry as one of the strategic industries in 1982. Additionally, in
order to develop high-tech industry, the Government, Phillips International and
local investors combined to invest NT$ 10 billion and established the Taiwan
Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) in 1987; semiconductors also
became a designated strategic industry (Shih, 1994: 313-314).
The Government in 1993 announced that it will build Taiwan into an Asia-
Pacific Regional Operations Centre - sea transportation, air transportation,
telecommunications, finance and media, and science and technology hub (FCJ,
April 11, 1997). However, it is submitted that this economic target will probably
become no more than a slogan. For example, Taiwan will not be unique as a
transhipment hub because Hong Kong and Singapore discharge similar roles.
However, Taiwan's position in science and technology is unique, distinctive and
more advanced than most Asian economies. Information technology is one of the
target industries in Taiwan. Taiwan currently ranks No. 1 for global market share in
nine categories of information technology products (FCJ, April 18, 1997). In
addition to the information technology industry, the semiconductor industry has
become another important industry in Taiwan. It is estimated that the Taiwanese
semiconductor industry will occupy about 8 per cent of world market share in 2000
(TIER, 1996: 125). Taiwan is expected to become the top 4M DRAM (dynamic
random access memory) producing country in 1997 (CDN, April 18, 1996). If the
Taiwanese government can develop Taiwan's scientific potential and modify its
rather overambitious proposal into a simplified plan for a science and technology
hub, it will be more practical and may well improve Taiwan's competitiveness in
the world.
On the political and social fronts, there has been a considerable sea change.
On July 14, 1987, martial law, which had been in place for almost 40 years, was
lifted in Taiwan. The Emergency Decree was also formally replaced in July 1987
by the National Security Act. While the abolition of martial law had little direct
impact on Taiwan's politics, it marked a symbolic break with the past and opened
the way for many of the later reforms (for example, the legalisation on new political
parties) (Chan and Clark, 1992: 91-92; Gold, 1989: 87-108). In addition, the bans
on new political parties and newspapers were also removed. These actions indicated
significant progress toward democracy and respect for human rights in Taiwan. The
cancellation of the 1948 Temporary Provisions in 1991 ended the domination of the
national legislature (Legislative YUan) and the electoral college for the president
(National Assembly) by Mainlander senior legislators elected to their seats in the
late 1 940s - arguably the principal barrier to the full realisation of democracy in
Taiwan (Chan and Clark, 1992: 93). In the decades when the ROC Constitution
gave the power to choose the head of state to the National Assembly, the election
system was a comparatively closed one. The contenders were limited exclusively to
senior members of the ruling KMT (FCJ, March 8, 1996). In 1990, the Judicial
YUan (Taiwan's Supreme Court) ruled that all legislators elected before 1949 must
retire by the end of 1991 (Chan and Clark, 1992: 93). In 1992, a new National
Assembly was elected to revise the 1947 Constitution Law and in 1994 these
constitutional revisions required the president to be elected by the general populace
(FCJ, March 8, 1996). The March 23, 1996 presidential election, the first under the
new rules, marks a significant political liberalisation in Taiwan. The KMT's
candidate Lee Teng-hui is the ROC's first popularly-elected president (CDN, March
24, 1996).
The arrival of political democracy since the late 1 980s has had a profound
influence on Taiwan's FDI environment. Indirectly, for example, it has affected the
nature of the labour force and labour costs in Taiwan. One of the foundations of
Taiwan's economic success has been its labour force. In the past, labour supply has
proved flexible, cheap, productive and, by and large, docile. The Labour Standards
Law was passed on July 30, 1984, strengthening protection of the rights of workers.
Under martial law, strikes were effectively illegal. With the lifting of martial law in
1987, labour unions have become more active and militant in their wage and other
demands (Lau, 1990: 186). A package of more liberal labour legislation was urged.
The Labour Standards Law was revised in 1987 and sets minimum ages, hours,
annual leave and pension arrangements (Long, 1991: 103). For foreign investors,
Taiwan's traditional comparative advantage as a low-cost assembler has become a
thing of the past.
8.2 Government Policy and the Reform of the Laws on Foreign
Investment
8.2.1 Government Policy on FDI
In the 1 980s, because wage rates were rising, land was becoming more
expensive, and environmental controls were becoming stricter, Taiwan could no
longer compete in making sports shoes, handbags, plastic toys and in similar low-
tech areas where labour costs matter more than teclmology and capital. Investment
incentives had been directed to facilitate investment in the high technology
industries with the introduction of special incentives, and with the establishment of
more Science Parks. A second science-based industrial park has been constructed in
Tainan, south of Taiwan (FCJ, January 20, 1995). It is also treated as part of the
Government's plan to build Taiwan into a science-and-technology island and a
regional operations centre. Hsinchu and Tainan Science Parks host both domestic
and foreign companies engaged in high technology industries. As has been
mentioned, this initiative was geared not only to attract FDI, but also to broaden the
industrial base and upgrade domestic skills.
In order to upgrade domestic industries as well as achieve its targets of
economic development, internationalisation and liberalisation, the Government's
present FDI policy is to encourage investment in high technology industries in
order to help build Taiwan into the envisaged Asia-Pacific Regional Operations
Centre (FCJ, April 18, 1997).
8.2.2 The Reform of the FDI Laws
(A) The Revision of Statute for Encouragement of In vestment and the
Promulgation of S(a(u(e for Upgra&ng fndustries
Under the Statute for Encouragement of Investment, the Government
regularly promulgated and upgraded lists of products and services that would be
entitled to investment incentives under the SET. Lately, these lists have become
more higher-end, higher-tech, and higher-value-added oriented. Similarly, the
policy of the Government in recent years has been to foster as many capital- and
technology-intensive investment projects as possible. The SET enacted in 1960 was
amended in 1984 and 1987. The revised SET, effective December 30, 1984,
strengthened a provision requiring industries receiving benefits under the SEI to
spend a standard amount of money on R&D (Article 35). 'Public Facility
Construction and Development' was added as one of the 'productive enterprises' in
order to encourage investment in public construction (Article 4). The 1987 SEI
amendment provided added incentives for investment in venture capital investment
enterprises; e.g., 80 per cent of the income derived from such investment can be
excluded from taxable income (Article 16-3).
The SEI has now been replaced by the Statute for Upgrading Industries
(SUI), effective from January 1, 1991 to June 30, 1998.12 The SUT is designed to
12 The Enforcement Rules of SUI were promulgated on April 1, 1991, and details on the SUI's
investment tax credits in the purchase of equipment and technologies were announced on April
15.
encourage both domestic and foreign investment, and is directed toward investment
activities rather than specific industries like SE!. As in the past, the Government
considers tax incentives to be the most effective form of encouragement. Certainly
a five year tax-holiday is a very strong incentive for investors. However, when
Taiwan's economic development is approaching that of fully-developed countries,'3
fair distribution may become more important than rapid growth (New Taiwan
News, February 9, 1990). According to Government data, the total amount of tax-
exempt income exceeded NT$ 300 billion by 1990 (Commercial Times, February 2,
1990). Under the SET, on the one hand, the Government subsidised industrial
development and distorted the distribution of resources; on the other hand, it
created an unfair tax system and a distorted competition environment (Commercial
Times, January 29, 1989). The SUI, however, encourages industrial upgrading by
allowing a company to credit 5%-20% of amounts invested for specified purposes -
such as investment on equipment for automation of production or production
technology and investment on R&D - against its income tax (Article 6). While the
SUI incentives are applicable to both foreign and domestic investments, without a
five-year tax incentive, they appear to be less aftractive than were incentives under
the SET. This is evidenced by the fact that approved FDT dropped from US$ 2,418
million in 1989 to US$ 1,213 million in 1993 (see table 5.1). Consequently, the SUI
was amended on January 27, 1995. In particular, to encourage the incorporation or
expansion of 'important technology-based enterprises', Article 8-1 of the 1995 SUI
stipulates that such enterprises can enjoy a five-year income tax holiday.'4
13 IMP has reclassified Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Israel as industrialised
countries in its 1997 World Economic Outlook. They are termed 'advanced economic entities'
in the report (CDN, May 24, 1997).
14 The scope of application of the terms 'important technology-based enterprise', 'important
invested enterprise' and 'venture capital investment enterprise' is prescribed by the Executive
Yuan and subject to review once every two years (Article 8 (II) of 1995 SUI).
(B) The Revision of the Statute for In vestment by Foreign Nationals and of
Statute for In vestment by Overseas Chinese
The Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals and Statute for Investment
by Overseas Chinese were each revised twice in 1986 and 1989. Those amendments
reflected shifts in Government FDI policy. For example, Article 13 of the 1986
SIFN allowed investors to remit the whole amount of invested capital after one year
of investment. (Investors could only remit 15 per cent of the invested capital before
the 1986 amendment.) Also, foreign company allow to set up a manufacturing
branch in Taiwan and to forsake privileges and benefits under the SIFN (Article 6
of the SIFN). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, in May 1988 the Government
announced a 'negative listing policy' for FDI applications. The Government had
until then only allowed foreign shareholdings in approved industries, an approach
known as 'Positive Listing'; under which the permissible industries were
exceptions rather than the general rule, and most industries were allowed no room
for foreign shareholdings under the SIFN or SIOC. Gradually, the Government
broadened the range of permissible industries, and the Positive List was replaced by
the 'Negative List' in 1989, a liberalisation in the sense that, except for industries
on that list, all industries were deemed open to FDI.'5
The Negative List was revised on July 11, 1990. The List contained 54
prohibited industries and 55 restricted industries for investment by foreign nationals
15 The industry classifications and categories in the negative list are not exhaustive. The 1989
amendments which incorporated the negative list also prescribed a general prohibition against
FDI from being made in the following categories of activity: (a) those against the public safety
and security; (b) those against good morals; (c) those having a high rate of pollution; and (d)
those having monopoly privilege or protection from investment by investors by laws (Article 5
(I) of SIFN and SIOC). The SIFN and SIOC, as amended, also requires that FDI in any of the
following industries be approved in advance by the agencies having primary jurisdiction over
such industries and that approval shall be made in accordance with the regulations adopted by
the primary jurisdiction agencies: (a) public utility; (b) financial and insurance; (c) news media
and publication; and (d) industries in which FDI is restricted by law or regulations (Article 5
(II) of SLFN and SIOC).
and 43 and 44 for overseas Chinese.' 6
 The List was further amended on July 24,
1996, and both prohibited and restricted industries for foreign nationals and
overseas Chinese investment have been considerably reduced. Liberalisation of FDI
policy, thus, has continued.
8.3 FDI during the Industrial Upgrading Phase
Because of appreciation of the local currency, higher labour costs and land
prices, and increasing pressure to consider environmental issues, levels of approved
FDI dropped sharply between 1989 and 1993 (see Table 5.1). The Government's
strategy of upgrading Taiwan's industrial structure away from the no-longer viable
labour-intensive, low-technology industries conflicts with the objectives of the
MNEs that originally went to Taiwan for just those things (Gold, 1988a: 199). The
appreciation of the NT dollar and the rise in labour costs owing to labour's new
militance effectively ended Taiwan's viability as an export manufacturing base.
Thus, during this period, many Japanese and US investors who had come to Taiwan
to take advantage of cheap labour either left or were planning to leave. Nonetheless,
this did not lead to a net decrease in foreign investment inflows. Rather, many of
the new investments, e.g., by foreign banking operations, were geared not at
producing exports to the US but at penetrating the local economy to take advantage
of Taiwan's new prosperity. These were precisely the investments that were
perceived as threatening the interests of the local enterprise blocs that had
traditionally controlled the domestic market (Bello and Rosenfeld, 1990: 248).
Because Taiwan has a good international balance of payments position,
MINEs do not derive leverage from their ability to bring in capital to Taiwan. Thus,
MNEs' bargaining position depends more on their control of the technology that
16 See Tsung-t'ungfu-kuan-pao (1990).
Taiwan needs to upgrade its industry, and on their access to the markets that can
absorb Taiwan's output. But the strongest element in their package is that they
contribute another tie between Taiwan and other entities with legitimacy in
international affairs. Many MNE offices have taken the place of embassies in
Taiwan.
Since 1984, Japan has been the largest foreign investor, accounting for US$
5,533 million of approved investment between 1984 and 1996, while the amount of
approved US investment during this period totalled US$ 5,157 million. European
investment reached US$ 2,545 million for the same period, while Overseas Chinese
accumulated US$ 1,961 million (TSDB, 1997: 242-244). The above four categories
of foreign investors generally have a different sectoral focus for their investment
strategies in Taiwan.
Since 1984, overseas Chinese have been responsible for about 10 per cent
value of total foreign investment in Taiwan, with private foreign nationals
representing the rest (see table 5.2). Incoming investment during this period has
been concentrated mostly in five sectors: electronics and electrical appliances,
chemicals, service, transportation, and finances and insurance (FCJ, December 15,
1995).
The size of Overseas Chinese investments in Taiwan is generally small
(averaging US$ 3.1 million per investment between 1991 and 1995, for example)
and nearly three-quarters of these investments are joint ventures. Overseas Chinese
investments are concentrated in the light industrial, service and speculative sectors
(such as construction and real estate), where Taiwan's local investors are active.
Coming in many cases from countries less developed than Taiwan, they contribute
little in the way of advanced technology, either in the goods they make or in
manufacturing techniques (Gold, 1988a: 198). According to Government
information, overseas Chinese investment from Hong Kong in particular has
increased during the 1990s (CDN, March 23, 1997). Most capital has come from
Hong Kong Chinese who sought political insurance against Hong Kong's 1997
return to Chinese sovereignty.'7
From Table 5.2 one can see the relatively large size of individual US
investments. Between 1991 and 1995, for example, US cases represented 16 per
cent of the total but 28 per cent of the capital. The average American investment
was US$ 8.44 million. Most of the investment is in the form of wholly owned
subsidiaries with initial capital supplied by the parent firm (Gold, 1 988a: 195).
Starting in the 1 980s, American fast-food companies began operating in Taiwan.
Some, such as MacDonalds, were extremely successful. Other service-sector
industries, such as insurance and transport, entered the market in the mid-1980s. Of
significance also is that the Government's strategy of upgrading industry is having
some success in getting Americans to buy locally and to invest in high-technology
upstream operations (Gold, 1988a: 199). For example, the world's leading seller of
personal computers, Compaq of the United States, currently has plans to inject US$
5 billion annually into Taiwan for setting up a product research and development
centre. The establishment of Compaq's R&D centre is expected to upgrade the
technology and quality control of PC products manufactured in Taiwan, and to
reduce production cost and time (FCJ, March 14, 1997).
The Japanese investors in Taiwan are much more diverse than their
American counterparts. At one extreme are large companies such as SONY, Sharp,
Matsushita, and Hitachi. But the majority are small and medium-size enterprises
that operate as subcontractors and suppliers to the giants in Japan (Gold, 1 988a:
196). Although Japanese investments accounted for 32 per cent of the total
approved cases between 1991 and 1995, they presented only 24 per cent of the total
17 Those Hong Kong citizens did not apply an Overseas Chinese Identification Cards before Hong
Kong reverts to Chinese rule (July 1, 1997) are no longer posses overseas Chinese status in the
ROC (July 1, 1997, The China News).
capital. The average investment was US$ 3.5 million (see table 5.2). Nonetheless,
this represents a rapid increase in size over time, as the upward valuation of the yen,
combined with Japan's industrial restructuring, pushed a number of larger firms to
Taiwan. Most Japanese investments in Taiwan are joint ventures with local
entrepreneurs, where product development is almost always done in Japan (see
previous Chapter 6.4 about MITI's strategy). Even in these joint ventures with local
investors that involve technology licensing, the Japanese tend to keep the key
elements secret. Electronics and pharmaceuticals are frequently-cited examples of
this practice (Gold, 1988a: 197). Despite the lack of technological benefit, however,
in order to reduce Taiwan's huge trade deficit with Japan the Government has
aggressively encouraged investment from Japan in recent years. Its efforts appear to
be paying off. In 1995, Japanese entrepreneurs poured US$ 569 million into new
projects in Taiwan, the highest Japanese investment figure since 1991 (TSDB,
1997: 244).
In order to diversify the origins of FDI, the Government welcomes FDI
from countries other than the US and Japan, especially targeting FDI from
European countries. The Government utilises various exhibitions and
advertisements in European countries to attract keen investors. Approved
investment in Taiwan from European countries has significantly increased, from
US$ 20 million in 1983 to US$ 334 million in 1995 (TSDB, 1997: 244). From 1991
to 1996, European investors represented 13 per cent of total approved FDI in
Taiwan. The average investment amount is about US$ 5.46 million, which is
smaller than the average US investment (LJS$ 8.44 million) but larger than the
equivalent Japanese (US$ 3.5 million) and overseas Chinese (US$ 3.1 million)
investment (see table 5.2). European investors tend to be the most export-oriented
investors among all FDI in Taiwan. More than 95 per cent of their manufacturing
products are exported (CDN, May 29, 1997).
Apart from the US, Japan, and European countries, investment from other
countries has also increased during this industrial upgrading phase (see table 5.2).
This result reflects one of the key elements of Government FDI policy and
economic policy - diversification and internationalisation.
The composition of FDI, in terms of both geographic origin of investors and
sectoral distribution, reveals the success of Taiwan's FDI policy. Taiwan now hosts
a wide variety of American, European, Japanese, and other foreign-invested
companies of varying sizes and in different industries, covering a wide spectrum of
the country's economy (Liu, 1994: 131). Several trends are discernible in the recent
wave of FDI into Taiwan. First, the foregoing concentration of FDI dovetails with
the focus of Taiwan's current economic policy: capital- and technology- intensive
investment. This trend is expected to continue because of the strong commitment
by the Government to upgrade its industries. Secondly, the representation of FDI in
Taiwan's service industry has increased. There is still much room for growth in this
industry, especially in the area of financial and insurance services. Thirdly, the
likely growth industries in Taiwan in the 1 990s are health, environmental
protection, and leisure-related industries. Finally, one expects benefits to accrue
from a greater linkage between foreign and domestic investment in jointly-funded
activities. At the same time, there will be more strategic alliances across national
borders.
Taiwan has the best investment climate among 35 newly-emerging
economies around the world, according to the latest survey by the World Paper
(FCJ, March 7, 1997). In addition, on the latest survey by Business Environment
Risk Intelligence (BEIR), Taiwan ranks third, behind Switzerland and Japan, for
"Profit Opportunity Recommendation" among the other 50 countries (BIER, 1996;
CDN, May 20, 1997). By liberalising FDI laws and improving the investment
environment, Taiwan has made itself a popular place for foreign investors. FDI in
Taiwan is expected to grow by 11 per cent in 1997. Private investors are becoming
more willing to invest in Taiwan because of new government initiatives, including
the crackdown on underworld interference in major construction projects. Another
incentive has been the opening up of telecommunication and power-generation
services to private participation. Foreign capital will also be permitted to invest in
local property in 1997 (FCJ, March 28, 1997).
8.4 Conclusion
At present, upgrading Taiwan's industry, building a more internationalised
and liberalised investment environment in Taiwan, and making Taiwan into a Asia-
Pacific regional operational centre are still goals for the Taiwanese people. In order
to advance these goals, Taiwan is using tax incentives on specific investments plus
the new Tainan science and industry park, which combines the economic benefits
of an EPZ with ultramodern R&D facilities. It is also willing to invest as a partner
where needed. In addition, the Government has shown preparedness to streamline
administrative approvals, relax regulations, improve infrastructure, and increase
efficiency in the legislative system because Taiwan must convince foreign investors
in high-technology industries that Taiwan has something to offer them that they
cannot get domestically or in other countries. For example, Taiwan PC makers
currently rank No. 1 in the world in the production of motherboards. Taiwan is also
a leading global supplier of semiconductors. These two facts alone make Taiwan a
very attractive investment site for foreign computer companies.
The Government is constrained in upgrading industries, however, by the
reality that it cannot push MNEs too far. It cannot be too 'nationalistic' because it is
not a nation in the eyes of most of the world. Moreover, as the KMT retrenches
from its unchallenged dominance over society, replacing martial law and a one-
party system with more pluralistic electoral politics, its ability to mobilise society
and ensure a stable investment climate will be compromised.
Chapter 9
Foreign Direct Investment and Forms of Business Activity
in the ROC
It is accepted that a state may impose conditions upon the entry of an alien,
and this principle includes conditions imposed upon foreign investors. It is also
generally accepted that a state may institute measures to keep out foreign
investment that is considered harmful to its interests (Sornarajah, 1994: 100-103).
The sovereign right of the host state to regulate the admission of private foreign
investment, including the right to exclude certain types of investments from its
territory, is recognised by the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign
Direct Investment (the 1992 Guidelines) (Shihata, 1993: 73-77). Section 3 of
Guideline II reads:
"Each State maintains the right to make regulations to govern the admission of private foreign
investment. In the formulation and application of such regulations, States will note that experience
suggests that certain performance requirements introduced as conditions of admission are often
counterproductive and that open admission, possibly subject to a restricted list of investments
(which are either prohibited or require screening and licensing), is a more effective approach." (31
I.L.M [1992] 1381)
Taiwan follows this approach. As a general principle, any foreign national
and overseas Chinese may establish a company under the laws of the ROC provided
the investor does not engage in those activities from which foreign nationals and
overseas Chinese are excluded, such as fisheries and electric light and power supply
(see Negative List).' Although a foreign investor can, without getting prior
governmental approval, establish a company within the laws of the ROC, the
Article 12 of the Law Governing the Application of the General Principles of the Civil Code
(promulgated on September 24, 1929; amended on January 4, 1981) provides "Within the
limits prescribed by law and ordinances, a recognised foreign juridical person has the same
capacity of enjoying rights as a Chinese juridical person. A foreign juridical person mentioned
in the foregoing paragraph is under the same obligations as a Chinese juridical person."
corporation must then operate as a local company would. The investor will not be
able to take advantage of the rights and privileges accorded a foreign investor under
the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals and Statute for Investment by
Overseas Chinese, such as the right to repatriate earnings and capital.
This chapter has two aims. First, it provides a general overview of the ways
in which Foreign Investment Approval (FIA) and non-FIA investments can be
structured in Taiwan and their ramifications. Second, it analyses the four different
forms of business activity most frequently adopted by foreign investors and the
legal issues involved in their creation. Between them, the laws regulating FIA and
non-FIA investments embody the practical upshot of the Government's policy of
encouraging FDI while controlling it through regulation. In a sense, it is the bridge
between policy and the current legal framework (surveyed in Chapter 10 and 11)
which is the subject of this chapter.
9.1 Foreign Investment Approved and Non-Foreign Investment
Approved Foreign Direct Investment
Broadly, there are two ways of structuring a foreign investment project in
Taiwan: as Foreign Investment Approved (FIA) investment and as non-FIA
investment. In other words, there is an 'FIA track' as well as a 'non-FIA track' for
foreign investment in Taiwan. In order to assess the merits of these alternatives, the
respective legal structures must first be examined. The discussion of FIA and non-
FIA investment in this section will be used to serve this aim.
9.1.1 Foreign Investment Approved Investment
A FIA investment in Taiwan will be eligible for certain incentives and
benefits set forth in statutes aimed at encouraging foreign investment. The most
relevant statutes are the SIFN and SIOC, which set forth guidelines regulating the
various aspects of investment made by foreign nationals and overseas Chinese in
the ROC.
In order to enjoy privileges and benefits under the FDI laws, foreign
investors intending to make a direct investment in Taiwan, whether in the start-up
or expansion phase, must submit an application which consists of the investment
plan and other relevant documents to the Investment Commission of the Ministry of
Economic Affairs (MOEA) (Article 8 of SIFN and Article 7 of SIOC). The
Investment Commission then approves or disapproves the investment plan, with the
former in a few rare cases accompanied by certain conditions and restrictions. This
kind of company is generally called an FIA company. The FIA route is often the
best means to structure a foreign investment project in Taiwan simply because the
Government offers many incentives to FIA companies. Indeed, in approving a
foreign investor's application under the investment statutes, the government is
actually granting certain concessions of its rights, authority, and privileges, which
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 11 below.
FIA companies in Taiwan can be established in the form of either a branch
office or a subsidiary company of the foreign company, generally to engage in
manufacturing industries. Certain service industries now also qualify for FIA, but
may only be organised in subsidiary form. Foreign investors are permitted to hold
100 per cent of the shares in FIA subsidiary companies (Article 18 of SIFN and
SIOC).
Article 2 of the ROC Company Law provides for four types of business
organisations: unlimited company (similar to the English equivalent), limited
company (corresponds to an English private company limited by shares), unlimited
company with limited liability shareholders, and company limited by shares
(corresponds to an English public company limited by shares). In order to be a
recognised form of business organisation, a business other than a sole
proprietorship or partnership must be organised in accordance with the ROC
Company Law (Article 1)2 Before 1986, most FIA investments used the form of a
subsidiary, normally a company limited by shares incorporated under Article 98 of
the Company Law. This was for two reasons. First, only companies limited by
shares are eligible for tax benefits under the SE! (Article 3 of SE!). Secondly, the
Government did not allow branch offices of a foreign company to engage in
manufacturing industry. This was in part because the non-F!A investor might
otherwise invest in those industries which could compete with local enterprises,3
but also because the foreign company would own a 100 per cent share of the
branch, leaving no room for local Taiwanese to participate (Kuo, 1989: 446-447).
However, after the SIFN was amended in 1986, it is also possible to
establish an 'F!A branch', which is duly recognised as conducting business in
Taiwan, provided the FIA branch engages in productive or manufacturing
operations (Article 6 of S!FN). Compared with setting up an FIA manufacturing
subsidiary, an F!A manufacturing branch can offer foreign investors more
flexibility to take advantage of favourable tax rules in their home country (Liu,
1994: 137). So far, the SIFN contemplates only these two forms of FDI.
9.1.2 Non-Foreign Investment Approved Investment
Non-FIA enterprises may also do business in Taiwan but will not be able to
enjoy the special benefits discussed above. In principle, the Government requires
validation of a foreign investment only if the investor wishes to have the rights and
2 This is not to say that individuals may not get together to do business, but rather that if they wish to
be accorded the advantages of doing business in a formal organisation, they must organise
under the Company Law (Wang, 1985: 516).
A proposed FIA investment of this sort could be controlled by the FIA approved mechanism.
Digital Equipment Corp. was the first company to 'convert' its FIA manufacturing subsidiary in
Taiwan into an FIA manufacturing branch (Liu, 1994: 180).
privileges provided in the SIFN and SIOC. These rights and privileges include the
right to repatriate capital and earnings in foreign currency (Article 12 of the SIFN
and Article 13 of the SIFN). However, if a foreign investor does not deem it
necessary to enjoy such rights, no special government validation is required. A
foreign investor must, of course, still comply with government regulations and
relevant laws, as must any local investor.
In many developing countries, such as Spain and Sudan, 5 foreign investors
must obtain a licence (an approval) from a competent authority before taking any
step in setting up the investment. This authorisation is because, on the one hand, the
government wants to protect some monopoly industries and, on the other, the
government hopes to channel the FDI into its preferred industries. The question
may then arise: why does the ROC government allow foreign investors to make
investments without specific approval? It appears that non-PTA investments were
the result of foreign investment laws and regulations being formulated at a time
when Taiwan was experiencing a shortage of foreign exchange in the 195 Os. Given
this framework and the administrative policy governing FDI, a project not deemed
useful to Taiwan at the time (e.g. a trading business) would not receive the FIA or
similar CBC approval under the Statute for the Administration of Foreign Exchange
(SAFE). In order to get as much foreign exchange as possible and not to deter
foreign investors from proceeding with their investment in Taiwan, the Government
therefore also allowed foreign investors to set up a non-FIA company.
In fact, before the SIFN and SIOC were amended in 1989, some foreign
nationals or overseas Chinese did choose not to proceed with the FIA review,
because their projects would not be able to qualify for investment under the positive
listing policy of the SIFN and SIOC. Although lacking approval, the investors
could still organise either a subsidiary or a branch. But they were not able to
See Garcés (1976) and El Sheikh (1984).
repatriate the 'blocked profits' of these non-FIA subsidiaries and non-FIA
branches.6
The right to repatriate earnings and capital is especially significant to a
foreign investor. Before the control of foreign exchange was lifted in 1987, without
the privilege of remitting out foreign currency, the profit of the company would
have to stay in the ROC. In addition, if the foreign capital stays within the country
for more than 6 months, it will not be permitted to be repatriated. 7 As a result, many
foreign investors who did not obtain the privileges afforded by the SIFN or SIOC
were either reluctant to invest or tried to incorporate non-FIA business entities
'thinly', so that operations could be maintained at the necessary level without
earning sizeable profits that could not be repatriated from Taiwan.
The Outward Regulations, adopted in 1987 as part of the foreign exchange
liberalisation (see Chapter 8 above), have largely alleviated this problem. The
annual quota of outward remittances is US$ 5 million per person under the Outward
Regulations (Article 4). Because the remittance quota is granted by a regulatory
measure rather than by a statutory authorisation like the SIFN, it is more
6 However, Taiwan has had a foreign exchange black market, which is believed to be quite sizeable.
This has shrunk since the foreign exchange liberalisation in mid-1987.
Article 6 of the Regulations Governing the Limitation on the Amount of Gold, Silver, Foreign
Currency and New Taiwan Dollars Carried by Inbound and Outbound Passengers
(promulgated on February 28, 1955; as last amended on September 15, 1980):
"1. Passengers entering Taiwan must declare to Customs the amount of gold, silver, and
foreign currency they are carrying. The foreign currency may be converted into New Taiwan
dollars in accordance with the prevailing rates. However, the gold and silver are not
convertible and may be stored with the Customs Authority by the passenger. The passenger
then is permitted to bring those declared and stored gold and silver with him when he departs.
As to the foreign currency, only the difference of the amount declared and the amount
converted into New Taiwan dollars is permitted to be carried out.
2. When the above-mentioned passenger departs after remaining in this country for over six
months he is still allowed to carry the stored gold and silver with him. But the amount of
foreign currency permitted to be carried out shall be limited in accordance with the restrictions
applying to ordinary passengers". In other words, they allow to carry out only US$ 5,000 and
NT$ 40,000 when departing (DGC, 1994).
susceptible to a change in the administration of foreign exchange policies. 8 It
should be noted, however, that many foreign investors believe that the risk of an
adverse change in the Outward Regulations is not significant enough to preclude
the setting up of a non-FIA subsidiary or a non-FIA branch in Taiwan.
Inward remittances present few difficulties for non-FIA investors. They
need only to comply with the requirements of the Inward Regulations, and the US$
5 million annual quota for inward transfers under Article 4 of the Inward
Regulations is usually adequate for a foreign investor to fund the initial capital
needs of its non-FIA entity in Taiwan (Liu, 1994: 137).
(A) Limitations on Non-Foreign In vestment Approved In vestments
Apart from the fact that non-FIA investments cannot enjoy the benefits and
protection of the SIFN and of the SIOC, there currently remain certain other
limitations for such investment.
First, a non-FIA company is setup according to the ROC Company Law.
The investment is carried out with New Taiwan Dollars and is subject to
restrictions regarding local residence, nationality, and investment amount as
stipulated in the Company Law. 9 For example, foreign investors cannot contribute
more than 50 per cent of the total amount of capital of a non-FIA company;'° while
for the FIA investment, the investors may invest between 0.01 per cent and 100 per
In fact, article 26-1 (II) of the SAFE requires that any retraction from liberalisation measures has to
be approved by the Legislative Yuan in advance.
See Article 98 (I), 108 (II), 128 (I), 208 (V), and 2 16(I) of the Company Law. See also Chapter
7.2.2(B) above.
'°Article 98 of the Company Law.
cent of the total capital of the company. In addition, the non-FIA investors cannot
be the 'responsible persons" of the company.
Secondly, non-FIA investors cannot enjoy the privileges of multi-entry
visitor visas or multi-entry resident visas under the Key Points for Screening
Applications for issuance of Multi-Entry Resident and Visitor Visas to Foreign
Nationals. 12
Thirdly, non-FIA investors cannot enjoy certain legal incentives which are
used to encourage FIA investors to continue to hold 45 per cent or more of the total
capital of the company, such as (1) a guarantee to investors that the company will
not be subject to requisition or expropriation for a period of 20 years from the
commencement of business; (2) possible exemption from the rules in Article 156
(IV) of the Company Law requiring issuance of stock certificates to the public; and
(3) waiver of the rules in Article 267 of the Company Law that investors should set
aside a certain percentage of new shares to be issued for purchase by the employees
of the invested company.
Fourthly, FIA investors and FIA companies' withholding tax is only 20 per
cent (Article 11 of the SUI). However, if the investment does not get Government's
approval, withholding tax is set at 35 per cent (see Chapter 7.2.2 (A)).
Fifthly, overseas Chinese investors investing in FIA projects will qualify for
privileges under Regulations Governing the Levy of Inheritance Tax on the Amount
Article 8 of the Company Law defines the meaning of 'responsible persons' as follows: "...
shareholders conducting the business or representing the company in case of an unlimited
company or unlimited company with limited liability shareholders; directors of the company in
case of a limited company or a company limited by shares. The managerial officer or liquidator
of a company, the promoters, supervisor, inspector, reconstructor or reconstruction supervisor
of a company limited by shares acting within the scope of their duties, are also responsible
persons of a company."
12 Promulgated on April 12, 1984 by the Executive YUan under its administration decree No. Tai
(73) Wai 5496; it was amended on June 16, 1988, administration decree No. Tai (77) Wai
15831.
of Approved Investment by Overseas Chinese, 13 under which half of the approved
investment will be exempt from inheritance tax (Article 2). A non-FIA project will
not receive such benefits.
9.2 Forms of Business Activity
The term "activity" is used here, instead of "organisation", because the
former is more inclusive. In particular, it allows the inclusion "activities" of foreign
companies which cannot be classified as "foreign investment".
Once an investor determines the method he will use to invest in the ROC, he
must determine the form that the investment will take.
An individual foreign national or overseas Chinese can invest in Taiwan by
purchasing shares in a ROC company or by establishing a ROC company with
other investors (Wang, 1985: 513). A foreign corporate investor can, of course, also
invest in Taiwan in either of these ways. However, if the corporation wishes to be
actively represented in the ROC, establishing a company is not the only available
method of representation. There are various forms of business activities in which a
foreign company may consider operating in Taiwan, depending on the nature and
range of its business involvement. The forms of business activity most frequently
adopted by foreign investors are appointing an agent or a distributor, representative
or liaison office, branch, or subsidiary. What follows is an assessment of the
various forms and the legal problems they may involve.
13 Promulgated on November 29, 1979 by the Executive Yuan under its administration decree No.
Tai (68) Ts'ai 11992.
9.2.1 Appointing An Agent or A Distributor
A foreign company may appoint an individual or a company in the ROC as
its agent or distributor to conduct business on its behalf. A local company or a
recognised branch office of a foreign company is entitled to act as agent or
distributor on behalf of a foreign company. Article 558 (II) of the Civil Code
stipulates that a business agent cannot subscribe to negotiable instruments or
borrow fungible things or file an action in court, unless he has been given written
authority to do so. In addition, according to Article 10 (II) of the Income Tax
Law 14, a business agent should fulfil any of the following requirements:
"1. Where the agent, in addition to representing its principal in the purchase of goods, is authorised
to regularly represent the principal in making business arrangements and in signing contracts;
2. Where the agent regularly keeps in store goods of its principal and delivers the same, for its
principal, to others; or
3. Where the agent regularly accepts, for its principal, oràer for goods.
The relationship between the foreign company and the agent or the
distributor is only a contractual, fiduciary relationship. As such, it is governed by
the relatively settled principles of law which apply to such relationships. From the
perspective of corporate law, it is certainly the simplest form of business activity.
9.2.2 Representative or Liaison Office
Foreign investors may wish only to establish a presence without
maintaining a significant profit-seeking operation in Taiwan. For investors merely
desiring some market presence, the option to set up a representative or liaison office
by appointing a person to act as its representative may be more suitable than setting
up a branch or a subsidiary, because it requires much less cost and effort than those
other methods.
14 The Income Tax Law was effective on February 17, 1943. During the past fifty-four years, it has
been amended on twenty-nine occasions. The last amendment was made on January 27, 1995.
In general, there are two types of such offices: a representative office, which
is set up according to Article 386 of the Company Law (so called '386 office'),'5
and a liaison office which is set up simply by appointing a representative and filing
the appointment letter with the local tax office for recording and tax registration
purposes. Basically, a representative office and a liaison office are the same in
terms of the scope of business activities allowed in the ROC. The difference is that
a representative office is a form of organisation under the Company Law and a
liaison office is not. Thus, a foreign investor wishing to set up a representative
office must file an application with the central authority (i.e. Commerce
Department of the MOEA). In contrast, if the foreign investor prefers to set up a
liaison office, the investor only needs to file a business registration with the local
tax collection authority for tax purposes.
The representative office of a foreign company cannot conduct profit-
seeking business. It is permitted only to deal with legal matters as authorised by its
parent company (ICID, 1996: 17). The representative office may engage in legal
acts under the company name in Taiwan,' 6
 such as signing contracts, negotiating
prices, and bidding, and it may conduct other activities such as market surveys and
product inspection. Such an office is ideal for a company which conducts only
purchasing activities in the ROC. All matters in relation to the purchasing, such as
locating suppliers, inspecting merchandise, and arranging shipping schedules can be
handled by this office. Registration of the office requires only that there be a
resident representative, either a domiciled national or a resident alien (Article 386
of the Company Law). The foreign company should file an application for
Article 386 of the Company Law: "A foreign company which, having no intention to set up a
branch office to transact business within the territory of the ROC has not applied for
recognition in the ROC, but designate a representative for the performance of juridical acts
relating to its business in the territory of the ROC, shall file a report for record with the central
authority setting forth the following particulars: ...".
16 The name of a foreign company must be translated into Chinese and also must indicate its
nationality (Article 370 of the Company Law).
designation of the representative for record.' 7
 Unlike a liaison office, running the
representative office of a foreign company enables its representative to apply for a
resident visa and alien resident certificate. (Note, however, that the enactment of the
Employment Services Law in l992' has made it more difficult for foreign
employees heading such offices to obtain resident status in Taiwan.'9)
There are no capital contribution requirements for setting up a
representative office. Because such an office does not engage in any profit-seeking
business, the foreign company will not be subject to taxation in Taiwan. The office
is also not liable for any tax on reimbursements of cost received from its head
office, except that the office is required to withhold income tax on, for example,
salaries to employees and rental payments to the landlord for office location. In
addition, the representative office cannot use Government-issued unified invoices,
because no profit-seeking business should be involved.
Like representative offices, a liaison office cannot sell goods or provide
services in Taiwan. It can only act on behalf of its parent company for purchasing,
inspecting merchandise, and liaison. All business and legal relationships of such an
office must be conducted in the nanie of the individual acting as liaison person. A
liaison office must file a business registration with the local tax collection authority,
but may be exempted from business registration with other government authorities.
The liaison office is also non-taxable. However, if the liaison office has income
from non-profit-seeking business, such income is subject to the business income tax
' Article 386 (IV) of the Company Law.
18 The Employment Services Law was enacted on May 8, 1992, and the Profession Introduction Law
was repealed on the same day.
19 Under the Employment Service Law, no foreign national is allowed to work in Taiwan unless
he/she obtains a work permit applied for by the employer. Also, Article 43 of the same law has
a positive list stating those kinds of work that foreign nationals are allowed to engage in.
in accordance with the Business Tax Law. 2° Whether a representative or a liaison
office, the office is subject to the tax authority's verification of the proper
establishment of accounting records and the receipt of inward remittances from the
home office in order to fund its operation.
In recent years some Government agencies have requested the MOEA not to
grant pennission for foreign companies to set up a 386 office in Taiwan (Liu, 1994:
139-140). This is because that there have been a number of foreign companies
apparently setting up representative offices in Taiwan which secretly engage in
profit-seeking business. The illegal phenomenon may be blamed partially on an
ambiguous provision in Article 386 of the Company Law. Article 386 (I) states that
a representative office of a foreign company in Taiwan is available for a foreign
company "having no intention to ... transact business" in Taiwan. The question is,
what exactly does the term "transact business" signif'? Is contracting or bidding
part of a business transaction? The law does not give a clear answer, and therefore a
foreign companies would normally choose not to set up a branch or subsidiary in
•	 ,,21Taiwan unless it is absolutely necessary. They prefer, instead, to rely on the
ambiguity inherent in Article 386 of the Company Law and to establish
representative or liaison offices.
9.2.3 Branch
A branch office, compared to a subsidiary, is the less complicated business
form to create as it is not a ROC company; it is merely an extension of the foreign
company. Therefore, a branch office need not comply with many of the regulations
governing ROC companies. Instead, it needs only to comply with Chapter 7 of the
Company Law, the section of the Law dealing with foreign companies.
20 The Business Tax Law was effective on June 13, 1931, and has been amended for sixteen times
till now. The last amendment was on July 30, 1993.
21 Interview with Cheng-li Huang, associate professor in Tamkang University, on July 28, 1996.
According to Article 371, a foreign company that wishes to set up a branch
office in Taiwan must first be authorised to do business as a corporation in its own
country. Then the company must undergo the recognition process with the
Conimercial Division of the MOEA in order to obtain a certificate of recognition.22
It must then register with the local Government Bureau of Construction of local
government for issuance of a licence to do business in Taiwan (IDIC, 1996: 19). A
foreign company which obtains a certificate of registration will have the same
rights and obligations as a domestic company, and will be subject to the authority
of the ROC government in the same manner as is a domestic company (Article
375). Finally, there is a modest capital contribution requirement in establishing a
branch office. The foreign company must establish an appropriate fund for the
exclusive use of this branch as its 'operating capital', which is similar to the paid-in
capital of a company limited by shares. The amount of this fund will depend on the
business of the foreign company (Article 372).23 As such, the branch will have to
set up its own accounting and book-keeping system and will be liable for all taxes
applicable to local profit-seeking enterprises (Article 41 of the Income Tax Law).
The Law does not regulate the nationality of the branch's responsible persons but
states that the representative of the branch "should be within the territory of the
ROC" (Article 372 (II)). The branch manager can therefore be either a domiciled
national or a resident alien.
A branch office of a foreign company in the ROC can conduct the full range
of business activities. Under ROC law, the Taiwan branch of a foreign company is
not a separate legal entity (except for the purposes of the Income Tax Law) but an
22 For the nature and effect of the recognition of foreign companies, see Liu (1974: 282-284). It
must be added that the ROC Company Law adopts the principle of reciprocity, and recognition
may be denied to a foreign company if the country to which it belongs denies recognition to
ROC companies (Article 373 (II) of the Company Law).
23 If the foreign company is of the same nature as a 'company limited by shares' (discussed infra),
the business capital requirement is NT$ 1 million.
integral part of its parent company. This is the major disadvantage of the branch
office. If its liabilities exceed its appropriated funds, the parent company is liable
for the deficit. In other words, the parent company is jointly liable for all
obligations and losses of the branch incurred in Taiwan and would be subject to the
jurisdiction of the ROC authorities in litigation and non-litigation matters. Indeed,
the branch manager of a foreign company in Taiwan often serves as the agent for
service of process against the parent company for both litigious and non-litigious
matters in Taiwan (Article 372).
This form of business organisation has been used most commonly in the
banking and insurance industries, futures and securities trading, general trading, and
trade-related services (Liu, 1994: 139). However, investments in those industries
will not be able to get FIA approval. Furthermore, unless approved by the
Investment Commission of MOEA, according to Article 6 of the SIFN, a branch
company is not allowed to undertake any production or manufacturing. In practice,
this leads to some simplification: the foreign investors do not need to proceed with
the investment review process under 'the SIFN if they do not wish to set up a
manufacturing or production branch. However, in certain regulated industries such
as banking and insurance, because they fall into the categories of restricted
industries in the Negative List, separate approval by the relevant agencies such as
the Ministry of Finance must still be obtained in advance.
9.2.4 Subsidiary
A subsidiary, regardless of its dependent status with respect to management
of its business affairs, is nevertheless a legally independent entity (Article 1 of the
Company Law).24
 It is capable of dealing with third parties, and can be a
24 See also Wei Tseng Enterprise Inc. v. Taipei Tax Collection Office Case, Administrative Court
decision with reference number of 68-P'an-tzu-64, dated February 20, 1979, from Gazette of
Presidential Office No. 3516, p. 9-10.
contractual debtor. 25
 A subsidiary is responsible for tortious acts committed by its
employees, and can be a tortious debtor (Article 23 of the Company Law).
Although a foreign investor may invest in any form of business enterprise,
in most cases a foreign investor will want to participate in an organisation which is
a separate legal entity. This separation of capacities has some advantages. For
example, the life of the juridical entity is perpetual, unless specifically limited by its
articles of incorporation. 26
 This accords an element of continuity to the investment
(Wang, 1985: 522). In addition, a juridical entity has legal capacities; it may hold
property in its own name, sue and be sued, and become a party to a contract
(Articles 25, 26 of the Civil Code). Furthermore, because a subsidiary has the
character of an independent legal entity, the debts, obligations, and losses of a
subsidiary will not normally be actionable against its parent company. 27 This
insulation against losses make the subsidiary form a particularly useful vehicle for
speculative ventures.
(A) A Wholly-Owned Subsidiary
The best means for a foreign investor to assure control over its overseas
operation is, of course, to own it. However, because of restrictions in the ROC
Company Law, it is not possible for foreign nationals or overseas Chinese to form a
wholly-owned subsidiary in Taiwan, unless the investment is an FIA project.
25 For detail, see Supreme Court decision, reference no. 59 T'ai-sung-tzu 4355, dated December 18,
1970 in Compilation of Republic of China Cases (1973, vol. 12: 515).
26 There exists no provision which limit the life of a company. Therefore, it is assumed that unless
otherwise provided for in the articles of incorporation, the life is perpetual.
27	 .See China Credit Information Service v. Taipei Bureau of National Taxation Case (1973).
Administrative court decision with reference number of 62-P'an-tzu-252, dated June 19, 1973,
from Compilation of Republic of China Cases on Tax and Customs Cases (1975: 710). The
Court stated that a parent company is not liable for the debts owed by its wholly-owned
subsidiary.
Articles 98 (I) and 128 (I) of the Company Law stipulate that one-half of the
shareholders in a limited company and founders of a company limited by shares
should be domiciled in the ROC. 28 Compared to a company limited by shares, the
limitations for establishing a limited company are even stricter in terms of Chinese
nationality and the amount of the investment required. For example, one-half of the
shareholders must be of Chinese Nationality and the total amount of their
contribution must exceed 50 per cent of the total amount of capital of the company
(Article 98). Furthermore, the director who represents the limited company
externally must be of Chinese nationality and should be domiciled in the ROC
(Article 108 (II)). However, there are also further limitations upon a company
limited by shares. For example, the Chairman of the Board of Directors and the
Vice Chairman must have Chinese nationality and, be domiciled within the territory
of the ROC, and more than one-half of the managing directors and at least one of
the 'supervisors' 29 of a company must have be domiciled within the territory of the
ROC (Article 208 (V) and Article 216 (I)).
In order to encourage FDI in preferred industries, all the above restrictions
concerning domicile in ROC territory, Chinese nationality, and the amount of the
investment may be waived if the investment project is approved by the Government
(Article 18 of the SIFN and SIOC). In other words, through the FIA route it is
possible for foreign nationals and overseas Chinese to form a wholly-owned
subsidiary in Taiwan, where the investors can also be the responsible persons of the
company.
28 Under the ROC Company Law, a limited company shall have at least five and no more than
twenty-one shareholders whereas a company limited by shares shall have at least seven
promoters.
29 The 'supervisors' of a company must be elected at a meeting of shareholders from among the
shareholders (Article 216 of the Company Law). The supervisors may at any time investigate
the business and financial condition of the company, examine books, records and documents
and request the Board of directors to make reports (Article 218 of the Company Law).
(B) A Joint Venture Company
The Government has shown a preference for investments which combine
foreign and local capital when granting approval of foreign investment applications
(CDN, 30 December, 1995). It believes that certain local industries should be
protected from the competition of foreign capital, management, and technical
know-how, and should be either totally or, if not, at least partially owned by local
investors (Hsu, Li, and Wang, 1985: 557). Of course, which industries are felt to
deserve such protection changes from time to time, according to circumstances.
However, over-emphasised protectionism in any country's FDI policy can not only
deter the inflow of FDI but can also become an impediment to industrial upgrading.
The Government's policy has, of course, affected foreign investors. Many
foreign investors in Taiwan have chosen to invest jointly with local capital and it
appears that over 75 per cent of FIA investment in recent years has involved joint
ventures (MOEA, Statistics, 1 996).°
(i) What Constitutes a Joint Venture?
In order to examine the legal status of a company which involves local and
foreign capital, we first have to discuss what constitutes a joint venture.
Unfortunately, there is neither a provision in ROC law nor a court decision that has
attempted to define the term 'joint venture' (Hsu, Li and Wang, 1985: 561). Legal
30 Historically, FDI in developing countries has generally been in the form of wholly-owned
subsidiaries. In later years, however, there has been a tendency for foreign investors to share
ownership with local investors (Harrigan, 1985). Apart from the reason that developing
countries may pass legislation either prohibiting total foreign ownership or making incentives
conditional upon a certain degree of local ownership, the most important factor has been that
many foreign investors have become increasingly aware of the positive advantages they can
derive from sharing ownership with local partners, whether private or governmental. Among
these benefits are tangible contributions, such as land, capital, trained personnel, a knowledge
of the local language, and familiarity with local markets, suppliers, and conditions of doing
business. Some intangible benefits include the goodwill engendered with employees,
customers and the Government, and the decreased likelihood of nationalisation or
discriminatory legislation (UNIDO, 1971: 1; Beamish, 1988: 1; OECD, 1992: 8-9)
scholars3 ' and international organisations, such as the OECD 32
 and the European
Commission of the EU33 have made efforts to define the term. However, it is
difficult to give a universally acceptable definition of this term because the concept
of joint venture covers a large variety of situations, owing both to the diversity of
actors and possible legal forms and to the fields, types of activity and objectives
that are aimed at (OECD, 1986: 11; Way, 1994: 3; Ashurst, 1991: 1).
In determining the existence of a joint venture under ROC law, the
following criteria are of vital importance:
(1) A joint venture agreement. Such an agreement constitutes a partnership among
the joint venturers, and is a "voluntary contractual arrangement that goes beyond
31 For example, many lawyers (Faull, 1984: 358; Claydon, 1986: 151; Bellamy, Child and Rose,
1993: 193-194) have adopted the proposal of Brodley (1982: 1523-1526) and have defined
joint venture as, "an integration of operations between two or more separate firms in which the
following conditions are present: (i) The joint venture is under the joint control of the parent
firms, which are not under related control; (ii) Each parent makes a substantial contribution to
the joint venture; (iii) The joint venture exists as a business entity separate from its parents; (iv)
The joint venture creates significant new enterprise capability in terms of new productive
capacity, new technology, a new product or entity..."
32 The OECD (1986: 11) gave the term joint venture a functional definition as involving: "the
operations of two or more firms [which] are partially, but not fully, functionally integrated in
order to carry out activities in one or more of the following areas: (i) Buying or selling
operations; (ii) Natural resource exploration, development and/or production operations; (iii)
Research and development operations; (iv) Engineering and construction operations".
In 1990, the European Commission of the EU defined 'joint ventures' as "undertakings that are
jointly controlled by several other undertakings, the parent companies" (Commission Notice on
Concentrative and Co-operative Operations, 1990: para. 7). Implicit in this definition are two
issues: first, whether the relevant organisation or activity constitutes an undertaking and,
secondly, whether the parties jointly control the undertaking (Fine, 1994: 287). The
Commission has stressed that the legal form of the joint venture is irrelevant (Comm'n, Sixth
Report on Competition Policy, 1977, point 54) and the definition does not require that it be
intended and able to operate on a long-term basis (Commission Notice on Co-operative Joint
Ventures, 1993: para. 10). Furthermore, the Commission has stated that "control means the
possibility of exercising directly or indirectly, a decisive influence on the activities of the joint
venture" (Commission Notice on Concentrative and Co-operative Operations, 1990: para. 9)
and joint control would fail to exist only where "one of the parent companies can decide alone
on the joint venture's commercial activities" (Commission Notice on Concentrative and Co-
operations, 1990: para. 12). In 1974, the Commission defined a joint venture as "an enterprise
subject to joint control by two or more undertakings which are economically independent of
each other" (Comm'n, Fourth Report on Competition Policy, 1975: point 73; Comm'n,
Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy, 1984: point 53).
being a mere contract" (Bean, 1995: 6), since the joint venture agreement also
serves as a prerequisite for forming a joint venture corporation. More than a mere
accord, the joint venture agreement is "a form and method of business organisation
and of doing business" (Taubman, 1956: 643).
(2) Dual interest. In a joint venture arrangement, there should be a clear
understanding concerning the existence of joint interest, as well as the sharing of
profits and losses.
(3) Degree of control. There should also be a specific arrangement as to what
degree of control each joint venturer will possess.
(4) Fiduciary duty: A fiduciary relationship34 exists between joint venturers, who
owe each other a duty of loyalty.
As a result, one can say that a joint venture also exists as a partnership
relationship during the period before the incorporation of the joint venture
enterprise.
Although it is established that a joint venture always commences pursuant
to the conclusion of a joint venture agreement, it has frequently been questioned
whether the agreement that gives the joint venture its existence automatically
terminates when the enterprise is incorporated. For example, it is unclear whether
the joint venture agreement terminates when the incorporation was for the purpose
of carrying out the joint venture, if the rights of the third parties were not affected
thereby, and the act of forming the corporation has been undertaken in conformity
with the contractual agreements of the parties to the undertakings.
"The recognition of fiduciary relationships and duties.., is problematic and controversial because
there is no agreed basis by which fiduciary relationships and duties may be recognised. Nor is
there an all-embracing definition of a fiduciary relationship" (Bean, 1995: 24). One might say
that a fiduciary relationship is a relationship in which fiduciary duties exist.
The ROC statutes do not give a clear answer. Article 667 (I) of the Book of
Obligations of the ROC Civil Code states that the "partnership is a contract
whereby two or more persons agree to put contributions in common for a collective
enterprise". The question then is can a "partnership", as defined by the Civil Code,
co-exist with one of the entities provided in the Company Law? As there is no
restriction in ROC law prohibiting shareholders or directors from continuing or
reaching an agreement among themselves, it seems reasonable to assume that if the
parties to the agreement intended that the original contract would continue after
incorporation, there should be no reason why the corporate form and the joint
venture agreement cannot co-exist.
The above view fits well with the reality of business practice. The
establishment and registration of a company often involves various types of
contractual relationships among the promoters, shareholders, and directors; such
contractual relationships cannot be terminated simply because the joint venture has
entered a new phase, namely, the incorporation of a joint venture company. Instead,
the situation should be viewed as one where, before incorporation, all juridical acts
are conducted in the name of a partnership; all partners bear inter se obligations as
joint and several obligators. Then, once the joint venture company is incorporated,
the joint venture agreement may still be in effect, even though all juridical acts are
concluded in the name of the company. If the company is of limited liability,
liability will then be limited to the assets of the company.
(ii) Corporate Structure of Joint Ventures
As stated above, the term 'joint venture' has been used quite loosely. The
mere existence of a joint venture agreement and of share participation, regardless of
the percentage of shares, would be considered a joint venture in most cases. Any
one of the four different forms of companies under the ROC Company Law may be
chosen for a joint venture operation; there is no law restricting joint ventures
involving foreign investors. For the investor who wishes to obtain the privileges
afforded by the SIFN or SIOC, such as repatriation of earnings and capital, these
Statutes do not limit the forms of business organisations that can take advantage of
the provisions.
Nevertheless, as most investors are anxious not to expose themselves to
unnecessary liability, normally the only reasonable investment choices are the
limited company and the company limited by shares. 35 From the viewpoint of the
Company Law, the most satisfactory form of organisation for a joint venture is
probably the 'limited company'. This is because (1) the liability of shareholders is
limited to the extent of the capital each contributes (Article 98); (2) shareholders
who do not conduct business may, from time to time, exercise a power of control
(Article 109); (3) a shareholder may not, without the agreement of a majority of the
other shareholders, transfer all or a part of his shareholding in the company to
another person (Article 111); and (4) as a further measure to maintain the closed
nature of the enterprise and to preserve management interest, the directors may not
transfer any part of their capital contribution to a third party without the unanimous
consent of all the other shareholders (Article 111).
Such an internal corporate arrangement greatly simplifies the complicated
nature of a joint venture and, under normal circumstances, would be a satisfactory
vehicle for a joint venture company. In practice, it is also easier for a joint venture
company with relatively few venturers and a small amount of capital to form a
limited company in Taiwan. Article 98 of the Company Law states that a limited
company must have at least five but no more than twenty-one shareholders,
Before the SE! expired in December 1990, a limited company could not take advantage of the
privileges and benefits provided by the SE!; only a "company limited by shares" was
recognised as a "productive enterprise" entitled to the Statute's preferential treatment (Article 3
of SE!). As a result , many foreign investors chose to use a company limited by shares as the
vehicle for their Taiwan operations. After the Government's 1990 FDI law reform (SE!
repealed in 1990), no such restrictions exist under the SUI.
whereas a company limited by shares must have at least seven founders (Article
128). In addition, the minimum total capital of a limited company is NT$ 500,000,
while it is NT$ 1 million for a company limited by shares.36
Compared to a limited company, establishing a company limited by shares
involves more complex legal constraints. For example, when the capital of the latter
has reached or exceeded a specific amount fixed by the central authority, its share
certificates must be issued in public (Article 156 (IV)). In addition, it is a form of
business organisation which incorporates all the features of limited liability and
centralised management, as well as with the added possibility of public solicitation
of shares to raise additional capital (Article 2 and 133) - with all the securities
regulation that doing so involves. Some quite particular rules also apply, and are
often relevant to FDI ventures. For example, a foreign or local investor who wishes
to use patent rights or technical know-how as a contribution to capital must be a
promoter (Article 131 and 156 (V)). Patent rights are limited to 20 per cent of the
total capital, whereas technical know-how is limited to 15 per cent. 37 Article 156
(V) of the Company Law also states that contributions made by shareholders must
be in cash, but that promoters may make payment for shares in assets which are
required for the business of the company (Article 131 and 156).
(iii) An Ordinary Local Company
If a foreign national or overseas Chinese fails to qualify for investment
under the SIFN or SIOC he may still organise an ordinary local company jointly
with local nationals, but will not be able to hold a majority share in it. The company
will be treated as a 'normal' local company; thus the restrictions in Articles 98, 108,
36 For details, see Article 2 of The Standard Regarding the Minimum Total Capital For a Limited
Company or a Company Limited By Shares, promulgated on October 15, 1980 and then
revised on June 29, 1988.
See Article 6 of the Regulations Governing the Use of Patent Rights and Technical Know-How As
Equity Investment. It was promulgated on June 3, 1968.
128, 208, and 216 of the ROC Company Law regarding local residence, nationality,
and maximum investment amount of the company capital will bind the investors. In
practice, there are some joint venture companies operating in Taiwan that have
never applied for the privileges conferred under the SIFN or SIOC. Such companies
operate as any local company would, with no privileges.
(iv) An Foreign Investment Approved Company
A subsidiary of a foreign company setting up in the ROC is considered an
independent juridical person, and must apply to the Investment Commission of
Ministry of Economic Affairs in accordance with the SIFN and the Company Law.
As long as the foreign national or overseas Chinese investor establishes new
enterprises under the SIFN or SIOC and obtains approval from the Investment
Commission, those investors are eligible to enjoy a number of benefits mentioned
in Chapter 9.1 .1 earlier. For example, they may be exempt from the restrictions
concerning domicile in the ROC territory, ROC nationality, and amount of
investment contained jn Articles 98(I), 108(11), 128(I), 208(V) and 216(I) of the
Company Law, regardless of the form of the company used.
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Chapter 10
Prerequisites for the Admission of Foreign Investments in
the ROC'
For FDI to be admitted into Taiwan under the present ROC laws, there are
certain substantive and procedural requirements which have to be satisfied initially.
Once these requirements have been met, an investor will be entitled to claim those
measures of protection which will be discussed in the next chapter, and may also
benefit from certain incentives. In the previous chapter, we discussed the
requirements for FIA investment and the limitations on non-FIA investment in
Taiwan and analysed the forms of business organisation which operate those
investment activities. This chapter will focus on the initial question of the definition
of the term 'foreign direct investment', both under the ROC
	 stment 1a's an
bilateral treaties. In addition, legal issues regarding entry visa, resident and work
permits are important as they fall into the category of prerequisites for the
admission of investments and will therefore be discussed in this chapter. In the
course of the chapter, aspects of present ROC laws regarding the admission of
investments will be criticised, and some suggestions for possible legal reforms will
be made.
To translate the relevant legal texts from Chinese to English is not an easy task. Although many
administrative authorities have English translations of the laws and/or regulations for which
they are responsible, no official and authoritative translation of the laws of the ROC has been
available, as mentioned in a meeting of the Judicial Yuan held in April 1991. In this research,
all the translations of Constitution Law and the Nationality Law texts are based on the Major
Statutes of the Republic of China, (1990 and 1992) Vol. 1-2, published by the Judicial Yuan.
The translation of Civil Law texts is based on the Major Laws of the Republic of China on
Taiwan, (1991) published by the Magnificent Publishing Co.
10.1 The Concept of Foreign Direct Investment
As defined in Chapter 1, this research is concerned only with foreign private
direct investment. Such investments normally involve three parties: the capital-
importing country, the foreign investors, and the capital-exporting countries (of
which the foreign investors are usually nationals). As a result, the legal problems of
FDI are more complicated than that of foreign public investment because the latter
transaction involves only two parties: the capital-importing and capital-exporting
countries or institutions. In addition, FDI involves the "movement of persons and
property from one state to another and such movements have potential for conflict
between the two states" (Sonarajah, 1994: 7-8). Because of the complex nature of
FDI, it is helpful to consider the definitions of FDI formulated by scholars before
clarifying the definition of FDI both in the context of international instruments and
under the ROC laws.
Although many investment lawyers have attempted to define FDI, there is
no internationally-accepted definition -of the term. However, it appears that many
scholars have stressed the importance of 'control' in their FDI definitions. Graham
and Krugman (1995), for example, have claimed that "foreign direct investment is
formally defined as ownership of assets by foreign residents for purpose of
controlling the use of those assets." Sonarajah (1994: 4), has also argued that FDI
"involves the transfer of tangible or intangible assets from one country into another
for the purpose of use in that country to generate wealth under the total or partial
control of the owner of the assets." Oman (1995: 73) emphasised that FDI "is
defined as investment by non-residents who ... have an effective voice in the
management of the enterprise in which they are investing".
The emphasis on control, taking the form of influence upon management of
the investment, is also found in definitions of the term offered by international
organisations, such as the OECD and the World Bank. For example, the OECD
(1996b: 7-8) has stated that:
"FDI reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a resident entity in one economy
('direct investor') in an entity resident in an economy other than that of the investor ('direct
investment enterprise'). The lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship
between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of influence on the
management of the enterprise. Direct investment involves both the initial transaction between
the two entities and all subsequent capital transactions between them and among affiliated
enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated."2
The World Bank (1996: xvi) has defined FDI in a comparable manner.3
Unfortunately, no corresponding definition of FDI can be found in the ROC
laws. Even the SIFN and SIOC, two major laws governing the investments made
respectively by foreign nationals and overseas Chinese, only regulate the methods
of FDI and fail to define the term. Although the term 'FDI' has been defined earlier
in Chapter 1 as "the phenomenon of non-governmental long-term assets
movement" and "the word 'direct' not only means the foreigner invests in a
business in the host country but also that he controls that business", these
definitions serve only the purposes of the context in which they appear in this
thesis, and are by no means general in application.
It is worth remarking that the term 'ch 'iao-wai chih-chieh-t 'ou-tzu' in the
ROC means not only investments made directly by foreign nationals but also by
overseas Chinese. 4
 Therefore, there are three components even in the concept of
2 The OECD Benchmark Definition states that it "is fully consistent with the IMF Balance of
Payments Manual (1993)" (OECD, 1996b: 3).
The World Bank (1996: xvi) has defined FDI as "investment that is made to acquire a lasting
management interest (usually 10 per cent of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in a
country other than that of the investor (defined according to residency), the investor's purpose
being an effective voice in the management of the enterprise. It is the sum of equity capital
reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the
balance of payments."
' The ROC is not the only example of this phenomenon in the world. Spaniards or Nicaraguans who
habitually and permanently reside abroad are also considered as 'foreigners' for the purposes
of Spanish and Nicaraguan investment legislation. For details of the Spanish investment laws,
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foreign investment in Taiwan, namely, the 'foreign nationals', the 'overseas
Chinese', and the 'investment'. Many legal questions follow. What is the definition
of foreign nationals? Can a ROC citizen with a dual nationality also enjoy the
privileges in the SIFN? What are the criteria applied by the ROC legislation in
determining whether juridical persons such as companies are nationals or
foreigners? How does the ROC law distinguish between private juridical persons
and public juridical persons? What is the definition of overseas Chinese? Can
overseas juridical Chinese qualify under the SIOC? What is the definition of
investment under the ROC law? This section is aimed at answering the above
questions.
10.1.1 Foreign Nationals
The SIFN states that it governs matters relating to investments by foreign
nationals (Article 1). However, it does not define foreign nationals and only
stipulates that 'foreign nationals' include foreign natural and juridical persons
(Article 2 (I)). One can therefore assume that investments are defined as foreign in
Taiwan according to the nationality of investors rather than according to the foreign
origin of capital brought in by such investors.
(A) Foreign Natural Persons
It is an accepted view, under customary international law, that it is for each
state to decide who has its nationality. 5
 Whether it decides the problem of
see Spanish Decree Liberalisation Procedures for Foreign Majority Ownership of Certain
Investments, Decree-Law No. 701/1963, 18 April 1963 (Graces, 1976: 15- 22; 2 I.L.M, 1963:
676-677); for details of Nicaragua's investment laws, see Article 1, Decree No. 10, 1935 (Don,
1979: 17).
Manley 0. Hudson (UN YB.J.L.C., 1952: ii.3- 7) expressed his view as a Special Rapporteur in
the International Law Commission that "In principle, questions of nationality fall within the
domestic jurisdiction of each state". Cf United States v. Wong Kim Ark 169 U.s. 649 (1898);
Whiteman (1967, vol. 8: 121). There is much literature on the concept of nationality in
international law, for example Oppenhem (1996: 869); Shearer (1994: 307); Shaw (1991:
nationality in accordance with its constitution or other municipal laws is of no
concern to international law. This principal was confirmed by the Permanent Court
of International Justice (PCIJ) in its Advisory Opinion in the Nationality Decrees in
Tunis and Morocco Case (1923).6 The Court stated:
"Thus, in the present state of international law, questions of nationality are ..., in principle,
within the reserved domain [of a State's domestic jurisdiction]".
The ROC has followed this practice in the investment agreements it has
concluded with other countries. The Agreement between the Government of the
Republic of China and the Government of Republic of Panama for Treatment and
Protection of Investments (cited hereinafter as the ROC-Panama Investment
Protection Agreement), 1992, defined the term 'nationals' in Article 1 as:
"natural persons who, according to the respective legislation of each contracting party, have
nationality or citizenship of that country."
404); Brownlie (1996: 381); Parry (1957: 4); MacDougal (1974: 981); Amerasinghe (1977:
246).
6 P.C.I.J. Series B, No. 4, 1923: 24; W.C.R. (1969: 145-162); [1923- 1924] 2 Annual Digest, case
203, pp. 349- 355. However, although conferment of nationality is decided by the state in
accordance with its municipal law, the state's right of granting nationality is not unlimited.
Article I of the 1930 Hague Convention on the Conflict of Nationality Laws provided: "it is
for each state to determine under its own law who are its nationals. The law shall be recognised
by other states in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom
and the principles of law generally recognised with regard to nationality". In addition, the
determination made by each state regarding nationality is not always to be accepted
internationally. In the Nottebohm Case (Second Phase) the International Court of Justice
stated: "A State cannot claim that the rules [pertaining to the acquisition of nationality] which
it has thus laid down are entitled to recognition by another State unless it has acted in
conformity with this general aim of making the legal bond of nationality accord with the
individual's genuine connection with the State which assumes the defence of its citizens by
means of protection as against other State." (J.CJ. Reports, 1955: 23) The Court then defined
nationality as: "a legal bond as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of
existence and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties"(I.C.J.
Reports, 1955: 4, 23). It is important to note that the International Court of Justice did not
exclude the possibility that international law may limit a state's freedom on granting its own
nationality according to its own laws, but it was not necessary to decide the point in that
particular case (I.C.J. Reports, 1955: 20). For discussion about this case, see Jones (1956: 230-
244) ; Kunz (1960: 324- 347); Weis (1979: 176-181).
This agreement was signed on March 26, 1992 and came into effect on July 14, 1992. (TRFS,
1994: vol. 9, 207-2 16)
The same definition had been adopted in the Agreement between the Government
of Republic of China and the Government of Nicaragua for Guarantee of
Investments (cited hereinafter as the ROC-Nicaragua Investment Guarantee
Agreement), 1992.8
In Taiwan, investments made by foreign nationals are deemed to be foreign
investments whether the investor resides abroad or in Taiwan. However, unlike
many other countries, such as the United States, 9 and Kenya," there is
no comprehensive statutory definition for the terms 'foreign national' or 'alien'
under the ROC laws. Thus, we can only infer the meaning of those terms by an
indirect method. Article 3 of the ROC Constitution defines the citizens of the ROC
as those who possess the nationality of the ROC. Presumably therefore, a non-
citizen of the ROC shall be a person who has not acquired ROC nationality in
accordance with the ROC nationality laws.
The question to decide now is whether or not the meaning of 'non-citizens
of the ROC' is identical to the meaning of 'foreign nationals'. The distinction
between citizens and nationals (or subjects) still exists in many countries, including
the United States' 2
 and the United Kingdom.' 3 In those countries, every citizen is a
8 This agreement was signed on July 29, 1992 and came into effect on January 8, 1993. (TRFS,
1994: vol. 9, 183-193)
Section 1101 of the U.S. Code, 1988 and Part 215.1, 8 CFR, 1993: "The term 'alien' means any
person who is not a citizen or national of the United States" (Zagaris, 1980: 1; KPMG, 1991:
109).
'° Section 2 (e) and (f), Republic Act No. 5186, 1967.
' Article 2 (1), Foreign Investment Protection Act, No. 35, 1964: "foreign national' means a person
who is not a citizen of Kenya".
12 United States Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952. 8 Public Law 414--82nd Congress, 2nd
Session, 66, Stat 163; section 308 is entitled "Nationals but not citizens of the United States at
birth". That the term 'American national' has a wider meaning than 'United States citizen' was
recognised in Administrative Decision No. V (Nationality of Claims) of the Mixed Claims
Commission of the case United States v. Germany (1924), [1923-1924] 2 Annual Digest, case
national (or subject), but not every national (or subject) is necessarily a citizen of
the State. If this is also the case in Taiwan, then a non-citizen may claim rights and
advantages under the SIFN as a national of the ROC.
ROC possesses a civil law system, and the underlying principles of its laws
are therefore analogous with Continental European legal systems.' 4 In such States,
nationality is "a membership of the State" (Salmond, 1901: 272), which "in itself is
conceived of as a personal association or corporation of member-individuals"
(Weis, 1974: 4). For common-law States with a feudal conception of nationality,
including the United Kingdom, the status of 'subject' is the quality of the
individual's being subject to the Sovereign,' 5
 and nationality is a territorially-
determined relationship between subject and Sovereign (Weis, 1974: 4; Blackstone,
1859, vol. 1: 336-375; Koessler, 1946: 58-76; Van Pittius, 1930: 12-17; Stanbrook,
100, pp. 185- 189; Whiteman (1963, vol. 1: 5). See also on the distinction between nationality
and citizenship, UN Juridical Y.B. (1980: 189-191).
' There are about 50,000 people, according to the 1980 White Paper (Cmnd. 7987: 30), belonging
to the category of 'British subjects without citizenship'. The status of British subject without
citizenship remains one of the loose ends in British nationality law which has not been tied up
by the 1981 Act. For details, see Grant and Martin (1982: 27), Halsburv's Law of England
(1992: 64-66), Stanbrook (1982: 85- 86).
14 Modern Chinese law is the result ofjudicial reform which started at the beginning of the twentieth
century when Western legal thought and institutions were imported into China. Basic laws,
such as the Civil Code and Company Law, were codified in the l920s and early 1930s, and in
general followed the continental European system, particularly German and Swiss law.
Therefore, as far as its basic concepts, principles, and institutions are concerned modem
Chinese law and the modem Chinese legal system are similar to other legal systems influenced
by the reception of Roman law (Ma, 1985: 2-17).
' As early as in Calvin's Case (1608) (7 Co Rep 1; [1603-1627] 2 S.T 559-696), Lord Coke stated
that "Whosoever are born under one natural ligeance and obedience, due by the law of nature
to one sovereign, are natural-born subjects" (p. 24b) and "... actual obedience to the Sovereign
at the time of the birth; ..." (p. 27a). See also Isaacson v. Durant (1886), [1886] 17 Q.B.D. 54-
66; [1886] 55 L.JR. 331-339; [1886] 54 L.TR. 684-688. For more information about the
relationship between the subject and Sovereign at common law system, see Van Pittius (1930:
14). Also cf paragraph (1) section 4 of British Nationality Act 1981 (Statutes in Force, 87.
Nationality; !-lalsburv Statutes, 1994: 127-196) and Halsburv's Law of England (1992: 3-7).
1982: 85-88). However, probably the best view under international law is, offered
by Oppenheim (1992: 856):
"In general, it matters not, as far as the international law is concerned, that a state's internal
laws may distinguish between different kinds of nationals - for instance, those who enjoy full
political rights, and are on that account named citizens, and those who are less favoured, and
are on that account not named citizens."
Because the ROC adopts the idea that nationality means membership of the
State, it uses the term 'citizen' as a synonym for national and does not use the term
'subject'; the term 'citizenship' is used as a synonym for 'nationality'.' 6
 We can
therefore conclude that the meaning of 'non-citizens' is identical to that of 'foreign
nationals' in Taiwan. If a ROC citizen has a dual nationality, it is clear that he is not
qualified to any benefits under the SIFN, since he is a citizen and by implication not
a foreign national for the purpose of ROC law.
It is also interesting to note that the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
	 (hereinafter
referred to as the ICSID Convention), which came into force on 14 October 1966,
uses the concepts of 'national' and 'foreign investment' without giving further
definitions.' 8 However, Article 25(2)(a) of the Convention prohibits an investor
16 The terms of 'nationality' and 'citizenship', conceptually and linguistically, emphasise actually
two different aspect of the same notion - state membership. 'Nationality' stresses the
international, 'citizenship' the national, municipal, aspect. (Weis, 1979: 4- 5). In other words,
"Nationality is the delimitation of personal jurisdiction, while citizenship refers to the legal
relationship of the citizen to the State" (Gargas, 1928: 6). However, Weis (1974: 4) and
Salmond (1901: 270- 282) have referred to the derivation of the term 'citizenship' from the
Latin civis--civitas and have claimed that as long as States apply a Roman law conception of
nationality, citizenship may be used as a synonym for nationality.
' 575 U.N.T.S. 159; 4 I.L.M (1965: 532); U.K.T.S. (1967: No. 25) or Cmnd. 3255; 17 United
States Treaty Series 1270; Treaties and Other International Acts Series, p. 6090; Centre
document ICSID/2; 60 AJ.I.L. (1966: 892); Investment Laws of the World, vol. 1.
See Article 25(II)(a) of the ICSID Convention. Lack of definition of the crucial terms is not
always considered a drawback. For example, Shihata (1988: 139) has stated that because the
ICSID Convention does not include any defmition of the term 'investment' it is, to that extent,
more flexible than the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA Convention), 1985.
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with dual nationality from making use of the jurisdiction of the Centre established
by the convention if he holds the nationality of the State which is also a party to the
investment dispute.19
(B) Foreign Juridical Persons
Juridical persons present rather more difficulties for FDI classification than
national ones. For the purposes of diplomatic protection and international claims, it
is important to discuss the traditional rules for attributing the nationality of a
corporation to a state, and to examine (i) the criteria applied by the ROC legislation
in determining whether juridical persons are nationals or foreigners; and (ii) if it is a
foreign corporation, how the ROC determines its nationality.
The problem of the nationality of companies is an extremely complex one,
20
and this complexity has given rise to a considerable body of legal literature. In the
present research, we are not concerned with the question whether juridical persons
should be regarded as subject to the rights and obligations conferred by possessing
the nationality of a state. 2 ' Rather, given that most internal legislative systems,
including the ROC, distinguish between national and foreign companies, it is of
great practical interest to consider what different criteria can be applied in
19 Article 25 (2) (a) of the Convention has stipulated that 'national of another Contracting State'
means: "any natural person who had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State
party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to
conciliation or arbitration as well as on the date on which the request was registered ..., but
does not include any person who on either date also had the nationality of the Contracting State
party to the dispute."
20 The International Court of Justice stated in the Barcelona Traction case: "In allocating corporate
entities to States for purposes of diplomatic protection, international law is based, but only to a
limited extent, on an analogy with the rules governing the nationality of individuals" (I.C..J.
Reports, 1970: 42). See generally Seidl-Hohenveldern (1987: Chapter 2).
21 Article 26 of the ROC Civil Law: "A juridical person shall have the ability to enjoy, within the
limits prescribed by law, all rights and obligations, except those that are peculiar to a natural
person".
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attributing a specific nationality to a company; and, more particularly, what criteria
ROC law has adopted to resolve this issue.
In general, there are a number of possible tests to determine the nationality
of juridical persons: the decision of the contracting parties; the law of the place of
incorporation;22
 the law of the location of the seat of control of a company (siege
social);23
 the nationality of the partners;24
 the nationality of the person who has
effective control of the company (siege control);25 the place of issue of the shares
22 The US and Commonwealth countries, generally, adopt the incorporation test. This test was
applied by the International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Case (Preliminary
Objection), where the Court expressly noted that the company was incorporated under the laws
of the United Kingdom and then referred to it as "this British company" (LC.J. Reports, 1952:
102). Also, Article 1 and 2 of the Hague Convention 1956 concerning the Recognition of the
Legal Personality of Foreign Corporations, Partnerships and Foundations states that the
possession of legal personality is determined by the law of the state under which the entity was
established or by the law of the place where the entity has its real seat (siege reel). The same
test was later applied by the International Court of Justice in the Barcelona Traction, Light and
Power Co. Case. The Court held: "The traditional rule attributes the right of diplomatic
protection of a corporate entity to the State under the laws of which it is incorporated and in
whose territory it has its registered office" (J.C.J. Reports, 1970: 42).
23 Generally speaking, in civil law systems, the law of the location of the seat of control of a
company determines its nationality. This test was acknowledged by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the Wimbledon Case, 1923 (P.C.IJ. Reports, Series A, No. 1), where
the only relevant feature of the company that France was protecting was the location of its seat
of control which, being in Paris, established the company's nationality as French according to
French law. Cf Section 1(d) of the Investment Code of Zaire which defines a resident juridical
person as "any corporate body whose registered office or main establishment is in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo" (O'Connell, 1970: 1041). Also, cf the Indonesian Foreign
Investment Law of 1967 provides "An enterprise ..., which is operated wholly or for the most
part in Indonesia as an independent business unit, must be a legal entity according to
Indonesian law and have its domicile in Indonesia" (Investment Laws of the World, vol. 3).
24 For example, in English law, a partnership is not a separate legal entity; the partnership will fall to
be protected according to the national interests of the partners (Oppenheim, 1996: 520). But in
French law, partnership is an independent entity and has its own personality (Su, 1985: 185).
25 This test was applied during the two World Wars by the British and American courts to decide the
enemy character of companies (Mann, 1962: 471; Domke, 1950: 52). In other words, if a
company is controlled by enemy nationals, it has enemy character even if it is not incorporated
in a non-enemy state. Occasionally, the notion of control has been resorted to for the purpose
of justifying protection of the alien shareholders of a company which is incorporated in the
respondent State and has its 'siege control' or its domicile there (O'Connell, 1970: 1042). See
the I'm Alone Case (1933, 1935) (3 R.I.A.A. 1609; 29 A.J.I.L. 1935: 326). In this case, the
Commissioners did not deny Canada's capacity to present the claim. However, it declined to
award damages to Canada for an unlawful act committed by the US against property of a
Canadian company (the I'm Alone was a British ship registered in Canada) in which all the
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representing the company's capital; the nationality of the substantial economic
interest owner;26 the nationality of the ratifying authority; the situation of the centre
of operation;27
 and the location of its registered office (Graces, 1976: 23;
O'Connell, 1970: 1040-1043; El Sheikh, 1984: 16-19; Brownlie, 1996: 421-424).
In deciding which company acquires its nationality, domestic laws or treaties may
apply one of these tests, or may combine two or even three of them together.28
With regard to this question, the ROC legislative system reveals a certain
degree of confusion, since the various provisions that refer to the nationality of
juridical persons are not absolutely consistent with one another. For clarity, I will
examine the criteria which the ROC laws have applied to decide the identity of
shareholders were Canadian, since the company held its property in trust for the benefit of
certain US nationals. The Commissioners provided: "the I'm Alone, although a British ship of
Canadian registry, was defacto owned, controlled, and at the critical times, managed, and her
movements directed and her cargo dealt with and disposed of, by a group of persons acting in
concert who were entirely, or nearly so, citizens of the United States, and who employed her
for the purposes mentioned." "The Commissioners consider that, in view of the facts, no
compensation ought to be paid in respect of the loss of the ship or the cargo."
26 This test was adopted in Article 3 of the Convention establishing the UK-Mexican Claims
Commission (11 U.K.T.S., 1928), covering claims against Mexico for damage suffered by
"any partnership, company or association in which British subjects or persons under British
protection have or have had an interest exceeding 50 per cent of the total capital"; and the US-
Peru Claims Settlement Agreement 1974 (68 A.J.I.L., 1974: 583), which covered claims of
companies organised under the US law and owned by US citizens 50 per cent or more of the
outstanding stock or property interest; also the US-Bulgarian Claims Agreement, 1963; 58
A.J.I.L. (1964: 686); see also Article 9 (c) of the Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign
Property 1967, adopted within the framework of the OECD (7 I.L.M, 1968: 117). More
recently, this test was applied by the International Court of Justice in the Elettronica Sicula
case 1989, where a state (the US) whose nationals held a substantial interest in a foreign
(Italian) company presented a claim for damage suffered by the company itself. (I.C.J.
Reports, 1989: 15).
27 This test is claimed by a French lawyer, Lyon Caen. For discussion, see Wolff (1950: 289-299);
Rabel (1958, vol. 2: 33-68); Ma (1986: 162-165).
28 For example, Article 63 of the Lomé Convention of 1975, concluded among the European
community and the African-Caribbean-Pacific countries (A.C.P.), defines for its own purposes
that the nationality of a company or a firm of a Member State or of an A.C.P. State is
determined by blending together the tests of 'siege social' and place of registration
(incorporation), and it is not enough for the company or firm to acquire the nationality of a
member or A.C.P. State by only having its registrated office there (The Courier no. 31).
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Chinese juridical persons, and then that of the foreign juridical persons. After
discussing the state practice, the application of bilateral treaties will also be
addressed.
Articles 25, 29, 30, 48(11), and 61(11) of the ROC Civil Law 29 give official
sanction to the double criteria of incorporation and siege social tests by indicating
two requirements that must be fulfilled by a juridical person in order to be validly
constituted under domestic law: incorporation in accordance with the law of the
ROC, and having its principal office within the national territory. If a company
meets these tests, it is treated by the Civil Law as having Chinese nationality. We
can conclude therefore that ROC law uses the incorporation and siege social tests in
order to distinguish national from foreign juridical persons.
However, Article 2 of the Law Governing the App caicsn cfLzws s Csc
Matters Involving Foreign Elements provides:30 "With respect to a foreign juridical
person who comes into existence under the authorisation of the Republic of China,
the lex domicilii of such juridical person shall apply as the law of his country".
29	 Article 25: "No juridical person may be formed unless it is incorporated in accordance with the
Civil Law or other regulations".
Article 29: "The domicile of a juridical person is the location of its principal administrative
office."
Article 30: "No juridical person may be formed until it has completed registration with the
competent authority."
Article 48 (II) of the Civil Law: "The application for the registration of an association shall be
submitted by the directors to the competent authorities for the places where its principal and
branch offices are located. A copy of its constitution shall be annexed to the petition for
registration."
Article 61(11) of the Civil Law: "The foundation shall be registered by the directors with the
competent authorities for the principal office and branch offices. A copy of the act of
endowment or the will must be annexed to the application for registration."
° The Law Governing the Application of Laws to Civil Matters Involving Foreign Elements was
promulgated and enforced on June 6, 1953.
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Thus it appears that the law adopts only the siege social test to decide the particular
nationality of foreign juridical persons. While this appears similar to the Chinese
nationality test, it is not quite the same. And there is further possible conflict among
the other relevant ROC laws regarding this question.
Article 2 (II) of the SIFN states that the nationality of a foreign juridical
person shall be "determined by the law under which such a foreign juridical person
is incorporated". Article 4 of the Company Law describes the term 'foreign
company' as "a company, for the purpose of profit making, organised, incorporated
and registered in accordance with the laws of a foreign country, and authorised by
the Chinese Government to transact business within the territory of the Republic of
China".3 ' It is obvious that the regulations here adopt the incorporation test: the
nationality of a juridical person is determined according to the law of the country in
which it is incorporated.
From the above discussion, it is clear that there is lack of legal consistency
among the ROC regulations regarding how to determine the nationality of juridical
persons. It is difficult to conclude which criteria the ROC laws adopt: Although the
general Civil Law suggests the twofold test of incorporation and siege social to
determine the nationality of foreign juridical persons, the SIFN and the Law
Governing the Application of Laws to Civil Matters Involving Foreign Elements
are statutes which are both more specific in their application to Company Law, and
more recent in their enactment. This, in accordance with the general principles of
lex specialis derogat legi generali and lex posterior derogat priori, suggests that
the incorporation test may be preferred to determine the nationality of juridical
31 Article 4 of the Company Law: "For the purposes of this Law, the term 'foreign company' used
herein shall denote a company duly organised under the laws of a foreign country for the
purpose of seeking profit, and duly recognised by the Government of the ROC to transact
business within the territory of the ROC."
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persons. In short, this is a question which worth more attention for scholars and
needs to be clarified by the legislators.32
In practice, the particular nationality of the foreign investor rarely presents
problems for the government agencies when reviewing an investment application
(Liu, 1994: 140). Then, one may ask, why it is important to clarify the legal criteria
for determining the nationality ofjuridical persons? There are at least two reasons.
First, traditionally, investment made by Hong Kong individuals and
corporations has received more scrutiny and therefore requires more time for
completion of the FIA review.33
 This is because the ROC government is concerned
about possible infiltration by mainland China and about security risks arising from
such investments. 34
 If the ROC uses the incorporation or siege social tests, it cannot
thereby solve this problem, since these tests will not necessarily reveal the
nationality of the controlling individuals or major investors.
Secondly, it is not clear whether a foreign juridical person needs to have a
principal office abroad under the ROC laws. There is no express provision to this
effect in the ROC Company Law, 1990, nor in the SIFN, 1989. The difficulty with
32 A point that has been made by a number of Taiwanese lawyers. See Tsen-chen (1984: 2- 6); Mei
(1990: 174- 181); Lu (1988: 119- 123); Ma (1986: 161- 165); Ke (1987: 717-718).
Since July 1, 1997, those Hong Kong citizens who do not have Overseas Chinese Identification
Cards no longer possess overseas Chinese status in Taiwan, which confers the right to work,
buy real estate, and hold full civil rights in Taiwan (July 1, 1997, The China News).
Like Korea, China is one of the so called 'divided countries'. The special political situation is
reflected in the ROC investment laws. The Nationalist Chinese Government in Taiwan
changed its requirements relating to foreign investors in order to cope with the diplomatic
upheaval which was caused by the Peking Government's taking over of the 'China seat' at the
United Nations in 1971. In order to adjust itself to the new and unfavourable diplomatic reality,
the Nationalist Government in Taiwan permits investments made by nationals from 'friendly
countries', in addition to these coming from countries which still have diplomatic ties with it.
The term 'friendly countries' refers to the non-communist countries with no diplomatic
relations with the Nationalist government, whereas 'unfriendly countries' refers to the
Communist countries, such as Cuba. Thus, "whether or not there is a diplomatic relationship is
no longer of any importance" (Don, 1979: 19).
this is that Taiwan's municipal law apparently permits incorporation by a person
who has none of the links with his 'home' state which are required to support
diplomatic protection of individuals. 35 For example, a company may incorporate in
some country, such as the British Virgin Islands, whose law is favourable to its
purposes (usually for tax reasons). Apart from paying taxes and filing an annual
return, the company may have no further connection with its country of registration.
This company then could invest in the ROC as a foreign juridical person and thus
enjoy tax preferences. Although the foreign company must have an 'operation of
business' in the country of incorporation in order to be recognised by the ROC
government,36 it is in practice very difficult for the government authority to know if
the foreign company does operate a business in the country in which it is
incorporated. In fact, there has been considerable regulatory concern about
investment made by corporations incorporated in tax-haven countries since the
liberalisation of foreign exchange in 1987. The Government is wary of possible tax
evasion and of money laundering or other criminal activities by Taiwan citizens and
residents remitting money out of Taiwan, under the Outward Regulations, and
setting up such corporations for reinvestment in Taiwan. It is to be hoped that this
deficiency will be reminded in the next law reform.
By contrast, the test of 'substantial interest' has been adopted by the ROC
for the purposes of investment treaties. Article 1 of the ROC-Nicaragua Investment
Guarantee Agreement defines the term 'companies' as "companies or juridical
persons which are incorporated in the contracting states, in which nationals of either
contracting party own more than 50 per cent of shares of the company". In terms of
bilateral treaties, variations amongst treaties concluded by the ROC tend to reflect
See Nottebohm Case, J.CJ. Reports (1955: 4); U.N. STILEG/SER.F/1 (1992: 29, 32).
36 Article 371 of the Company Law.
differences in the law of the other contracting State. In order to conform with
Nicaraguan notions of the nationality test for juridical persons, the ROC-Nicaragua
Agreement adopts the 'incorporation' and 'substantial interest' test.
Article 1 (c) of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of
China and the Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho for Promotion and
Protection of Investments (cited hereinafter as the ROC-Lesotho Investment
Protection Agreement)37 provided that:
"companies" means
(I) in respect of Lesotho corporations, firms or associations incorporated or constituted under the
law in force in the territory.
(ii) in respect of the Republic of China, corporate juridical persons organised and incorporated in
accordance with the Company Law of the Republic of China for the purpose of profit making.
The parties to a treaty may well use identical tests for determining the nationality of
a juridical person; yet the underlying rule is that nationality is determined by the
municipal law of each state. This rule has also been adopted in the Agreement
between the Taipei Economic and Trade Office and the Indonesian Chamber of
Commerce to Taipei for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 38 (cited
hereinafter as the Taipei-Indonesia Investment Protection Agreement).
To compound the difficulties, for questions of diplomatic protection, it
should also be mentioned that the ROC has not established any legislative standard
whatsoever for distinguishing between juridical persons of a private nature and
those of a public nature. This question may in principle be approached in two ways:
Signed on December 1, 1982 (TRFS, 1986, vol. 7: 133-139). However, the ROC and the
Kingdom of Lesotho terminated diplomatic relations on May 14, 1983; all of the treaties,
agreements and exchange of notes between the two countries have been suspended from
operation unless otherwise agreed upon by the Parties.
38 Signed on December 19, 1990 and entered into force on the same day (TRFS, 1993, vol. 8: 263-
267). (Indonesia does not have diplomatic relationship with the ROC.)
either by recourse to the legislation of the country of origin of the juridical person
whose public or private nature it is desired to determine, or by establishing some
internal qualificatory criteria (qualification according to the lexfori) that may serve
as standards for settling the question and be applied in a general way to all foreign
juridical persons, whatever their country of origin.
Given that the ROC does not have diplomatic relationships with most
countries in the world, the first approach may be the more practical. Enforcement of
its own views regarding a foreign juridical person's public or private personality
would seem unnecessarily difficult in a country which is not generally recognised
as having sovereign status.
10.1.2 Overseas Chinese
Surprisingly, there is no definition of the term 'overseas Chinese' under the
SIOC, the most important law to regulate the investments made by overseas
Chinese. The only provision defining the term 'overseas Chinese' occurs in the
Statute for Technical Co-operation (STC). Under Article 2 of the STC, overseas
Chinese "refers to nationals of the Republic of China residing outside of the
territory of the Republic". In other words, overseas Chinese are merely those who
have ROC nationality but are living overseas. However, in practice, the authorities
adopt a much broader definition of the term 'overseas Chinese', to include: (1)
nationals living overseas who hold a valid ROC passport; and (2) ethnic Chinese
holding a foreign passport (Kuo, 1989: 67). In order to enjoy the privileges
available under the SIOC, overseas Chinese have to apply for Overseas Chinese
Identification Cards which confer the right to work, buy real estate, and hold full
civil rights in Taiwan.
Generally speaking, both foreign and overseas Chinese investors must
comply with the same domestic investment legislation (Don, 1979: 17). However,
the ROC investment laws specifically governing foreign investment draw a
distinction between overseas Chinese investors and their non-Chinese
counterparts.39 An obvious question is whether this is racial discrimination. For this
question, we first have to examine how nationality can be acquired under the ROC
law. In principal, the acquisition of ROC nationality is governed by the test of
descent from a national (jus sanguinis)4° and, in exceptional cases, by the test of
birth within the state territory (jus soli).4 ' Furthermore, Article 11 of the Nationality
Law42
 contemplates that any person who intends to renounce his ROC nationality
may only do so by obtaining permission from the Ministry of the Interior. 43 In other
words, a Chinese who is born abroad having a Chinese father remains Chinese until
he has gone through this administrative formality. Therefore, most overseas
Chinese have dual nationality. Under general principles of international law, a dual
Article 1 of the SIOC: "Matters relating to the encouragement, protection, and administration of
domestic investments by overseas Chinese shall be governed by this Statute." Also cf Article 2
of the STC.
40 Article 1(I) (1)-(3) of the ROC Nationality Law stipulates that the following persons are of the
nationality of the Republic of China: (1) Any person whose father was, at the time of that
person's birth, a Chinese national; (Since the Nationality Law was enacted in 1929, before the
Chinese civil war, there is no recognition of the distinction between the ROC and the PRC.) (2)
Any person born after the death of that person's father who was, at the time of his death, a
Chinese national; (3) Any person whose father is unknown or stateless but whose mother is a
Chinese national.
' Article 1(I) (4) of the ROC Nationality Law: "The following persons are of the nationality of the
Republic of China: ...; (4) Any person born in Chinese territory whose parents are both
unknown or stateless."
42 The ROC Nationality Law was promulgated and effective as of February 5, 1929.
" Apart from obtaining permission to this effect from the Ministry of Interior, any person who
intends to give up his ROC nationality has to be at the age of twenty years or more and must
have disposing capacity under Chinese law. See article 11 of the ROC Nationality Law.
national (of a foreign country and the host state) is considered a national of the host
state, unless the host state decides to afford the national different treatment.44
By separating the overseas Chinese investors from foreign investors, it is
clear that the ROC investment laws do not formally regard the former as foreign
investors in the full sense, although in fact there is no very substantial difference
between the content of the enactment governing the overseas Chinese investors and
that regulating foreign nationals. Why does the law separate overseas Chinese
investment from foreign investment? The ROC laws are influenced a great deal by
traditional Chinese culture. One's 'roots' are rarely forgotten by the Chinese
people. As long as one of a person's ancestors was Chinese, Chinese people would
assume that the person has 'Chinese blood', and would think of him differently
from foreigners, no matter what nationality he has or how long he has been abroad.
Given the tradition of Chinese nationalism, it is not difficult to understand why the
ROC government symbolically does not treat foreigners and overseas Chinese on
an equal footing when enacting the investment laws. Because overseas Chinese are
regarded as Chinese in the ROC, regardless of what nationality they have, it is clear
that the discriminatory treatment between overseas Chinese and foreign nationals is
based on racial grounds. 45
 A basic rule of international law prohibits racial
discrimination. However, Brownlie (1989: 9) has argued that "the fact that the
primary criterion involves a reference to race does not make the rule discriminatory
For example, Poland and Vietnam both have special investment codes dealing with investments
made by expatriates (nationals of the host state residing abroad) either alone or jointly with
host country residents. See Mahmassani (1988: 286) and Shihata (1993: 69).
' Discrimination based upon racial grounds may, in certain circumstances, violate erga omnes
obligations (i.e. obligations binding on all states that also have the status of peremptory norms
[jus cogens]). In the Barcelona Traction Case (Second Phase). The Court said "such
obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts
of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights
of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination" I.C..J. Report
(1970: 3).
in law, provided the reference to race has an objective basis and a reasonable
cause".46
 Sornarajah (1994: 103) has also claimed that "except in the case it is
clearly directed at [i.e. against] an ethnic group, 47
 there cannot be any international
wrong committed by discriminating between investors or types of investments". He
has also stated that "there cannot be a blanket rule of such a nature. Much will
depend on the exact circumstances of each state's situation." (1994: 136) Given that
the there is little significant difference in practical legal content between the SIFN
and SIOC, and given that the symbolical difference between these two laws is
derived from traditional Chinese nationalism and culture, it is unlikely that the rule
against racial discrimination is violated by the ROC laws.
However, because the ROC government has adopted such a broad definition
of 'overseas Chinese', some local opportunists have taken advantage of this
definition and there have been many cases of 'false overseas Chinese local
investment'. In order to clarify the meaning of 'overseas Chinese', it is submitted
that there should be a clear definition of the term 'overseas Chinese' under the
SIOC. This would necessitate amending the existing legislation.
Many overseas Chinese investors have their own companies in the countries
in which they live, and in many cases, some of companies owned by overseas
Chinese are MNEs. Can those investors make investments in Taiwan using an
'overseas Chinese company' as investor? In other words, does the term 'overseas
Chinese' under the ROC investment laws include 'overseas juridical Chinese'? The
46 This formulation has been critised by some jurists, who suggest it can be used to "cloak racial
discrimination" (Sornarajah, 1994: 104).
' For example, certain measures taken recently by Australia may be directed against Japanese
buying real estate in Australia. This could raise a question whether it amounts to discriminatory
treatment of foreign nationals on racial grounds. For more on the rules regarding ownership of
land by aliens, see the Sramek Case, [1984] YBECHR 294 and Land Sale to Alien Case (1),
[1973] 77 I.L.R. 433.
STC indicates that an overseas Chinese has to have Chinese nationality. We have
seen that under the ROC Company Law if the company is incorporated in countries
other than the ROC, it is treated as a foreign juridical person. In addition, there is
also the political consideration that the Government must avoid permitting
Taiwan's economy to be influenced by mainland China. Unfortunately, it is
difficult to identif' whether a foreign company has mainland shareholders. For
these reasons, if an investment is made under the name of an overseas juridical
Chinese, the competent ROC authority will treat it simply as a foreign judicial
person (Kuo, 1989: 71). The term 'overseas Chinese' therefore only refers only to
overseas natural Chinese person; it does not include overseas juridical Chinese
person. It must be said that this conservative attitude is not consistent with the
current liberalisation of investment policy and, by contrast, it will only make
foreign Chinese-controlled or -owned MNEs reluctant to invest in Taiwan.
10.1.3 Investment
The ROC investment laws have also failed to provide a positive definition
of investment. Articles 3 and 4 of the SIFN and SIOC only define kinds and types
of investment.
(A) Kinds of Capital In vestment
Article 3 of the SIFN is identical to Article 3 of SIOC. In it, the following
are listed as assets that may be used in payment constituting foreign investments:
a) Cash in the form of foreign exchange, which is remitted or brought in;
b) Machinery and equipment or raw materials imported for own use against self-provided foreign
exchange;
c) Technical know-how or patent rights; and
d) Investment principal, capital gains, net profits, interest or any other income generated as a result
of transfer of investment, reduction of capital or dissolution/liquidation approved by the
government.
In accordance with this article, there are three different types of capital
contribution: (i) cash investment, (ii) material investment, and (iii) technical know-
how or patent rights investment. No matter what kind of capital contribution is
made, the investor becomes the shareholder of the company in which he invested.
This kind of investment is known as 'equity investment', as opposed to 'loan
investment'. Foreign investors can also make their capital investment in the form of
a loan (Article 4 (I)(2)); however, as mentioned in Chapter 1, this research deals
only with 'direct' investment, and the 'indirect' investment (such as by loan) will
not be considered here.
(i) Cash In vestment
Cash investment comprises foreign currency funds remitted or carried into
Taiwan by foreign investors. It is recognised by the Government as a proper source
to fund an FIA investment only if the funds are remitted or carried into Taiwan
following the issuance of the FIA approval (Liu, 1994: 141). The cash investment
may be reserved and deposited in its original form until such time as it is needed for
investment purposes (Huang, 1988: 98). If, as is usual, the funds are remitted by
telegraphic transfer, accompanying documentation must state that such funds
represent investment approved by the IC with reference to the number of the IC
meeting when approval was obtained, and the amount of foreign currency to be
retained, if any. If the cash is to be brought in by an individual, the cash must be
registered with the customs office at the port of entry (Kuo, 1989: 136).
Where a foreign investor has made an FIA investment in Taiwan he can
make another investment using the investment proceeds from the first project
provided the new project itself obtains an FIA approval. Thus an FIA foreign
investor receiving net profits (such as dividends and shareholders' bonuses),
interest (such as interest from a 'loan investment' in Taiwan), or other proceeds in
Taiwan may reinvest such earnings within Taiwan to constitute a further foreign
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capital investment under Article 3. This further FIA project may involve an
investment in the same subsidiary or in an entirely different company. Similarly, as
the shareholder's capital increases (via capital gains or returns on capital), such
increase can be formally capitalised after related taxes have been deducted and paid.
There are a number of comments that need to be made about cash
investment. First, it seems somewhat unreasonable that the investment laws do not
allow a foreign investor to finance his investment with local currency. As we
discussed in the preceding section, an investment has the quality of 'foreignness'
not because of the means of payment employed but from the fact that the
investment is effected by certain persons. In particular, since the liberalisation of
foreign exchange in 1987, opportunism by way of exploiting the FDI process to
obtain foreign exchange is no longer a relevant concern. It is possible for foreign
non-FIA investors to use NT$ to invest in Taiwan in FIA-prohibited or -restricted
industries. At present, in such a case, foreign investment status will not apply -
surely an odd legal situation.
Secondly, given the current FDI policy of liberalisation, one can see no
reason for the Government to restrict the kinds of permissible cash investment
made by foreign investors. It is suggested that, in principle, as long as a foreign
investor invests in Taiwan using valuable assets - of whatever type - those assets
should be regarded as investment.48
(ii) Material In vestment
A foreign national or overseas Chinese may import machinery and
equipment or raw materials for his own use as investment provided the foreign
48 Subject, of course, to administrative approval, to be exercised in control of assets which might
adversely affect the public good in some way, e.g. national security, the environment, etc.
Aexchange used in buying such goods comes from a source outside the ROC. These
items must have been paid for in foreign exchange provided by the investor. As to
whether the machinery and equipment must be new or may be used, the SIFN and
SIOC are silent.
Generally speaking, prevailing government policy bars the importation of
used machinery and equipment (see Guidelines for Screening of Used Machinery
and Equipment to be Imported Under Investment Project Proposed by Overseas
Chinese and Foreign Nationals). 49 The purpose of this regulation is to prevent
obsolete equipment from being dumped in Taiwan for the production of inferior
quality products. However, special permission to import used equipment or
machinery may be granted upon the submission of justifying reasons; it may be
considered an acceptable reason if new machinery of the same type is not available
or if the machinery is under lease on a cost-free basis.
In order to avoid the importation of outmoded machinery or equipment from
developed countries, it is suggested that this concern could be made an explicit
constraint upon the discretion to give special permission, e.g. by requiring that such
permission may only be granted 'provided the items are in accordance with up-to-
date technical development suitable for the ROC as prescribed by the Ministry of
Economic Affairs' .s
(iii) Technical Know-how or Patent Rights In vestment
It is worth noting that the kinds of investment employed in the SIFN and
SIOC include not only tangible but also intangible assets, such as technical know-
Promulgated by the Investment Commission on March 17, 1980.
° Cf Section 3 (b) of the Encouragement of Investment Act, 1980, of Sudan.
how and patent rights. 5 ' This is justified by the fact that the purpose behind the
invitation of foreign investment to the ROC is not only to solicit the capital itself
but also for the sake of expertise and technology which the ROC needs in order to
achieve its goal of industrialisation, by exploiting its relatively inexpensive 52 and
well-educated population, and to help its population to acquire the technical
knowledge required for better management of the developmental projects already
embarked upon.
A foreign investor may contribute know-how or patent rights to its
subsidiary in return for an equity interest. However, the SIFN and SIOC do not
elaborate, describe, or specify these items and contain no detailed instructions for
the Ministry of Economic Affairs. In the early years, the Ministry allowed only a
fixed sum of money, in one payment or in instalments, as compensation for
technical know-how despite the statutory provision that technical know-how could
become equity capital. (Liu, 1973: 256) Dissatisfied with this way of handling the
matter, the MOEA promulgated the Regulations Governing the Use of Patent
Rights and Technology Know-how As Equity Investment (cited hereinafter as
There is no question that the ROC laws include intangible assets in this definition. By contrast,
some other countries impose stringent requirements as to the valuation of intangible assets
contributed in exchange for shares. In addition, many governments take a more restrictive
approach than the ROC to the types of intangible assets that may qualif' as capital assets for
special investment incentives, e.g. by not pennitting certain intangible assets such as
unpatented know-how to be capitalised at all (Friedman, 1959: 746-756).
52 As of the end of 1994, the average monthly labour wage in Taiwan was US$ 1,275. The average
monthly labour wage in the manufacturing field was US$ 1,162, and in the service industry
was US$ 1,362. Although no longer competitive with some less-developed nations, the average
wage level in Taiwan remains relatively lower than the other major industrial countries.
Compared with Japan, Germany, the US, France and Korea, where the hourly wages in
manufacturing industries were US$ 22.71, 15.17, 12.06, 7.86 and 6.01 respectively, the hourly
wage in Taiwan was only US$ 5.74, slightly higher than that of Hong Kong (US$ 5.43)
(National Statistics Agency, 1995).
'Technology Investment Regulations') for its own guidance in technical know-how
or patent rights cases.53
The Technology Investment Regulations that supplement Article 3 of the
SIFN and SIOC are stringent. Under the Regulations, to qualify for equity capital
the technical know-how must be in a newly developed technology, must have an
economic value, must be indispensable for the projected enterprise and,
importantly, must not have been previously used in Taiwan (Article 3). Recognised
as patent rights will be those patents which are approved by the Government of the
ROC as a new invention, a new model, or a new design (Article 2); foreign patent
rights are excluded. In other words, the qualifying patent rights are limited to those
registered under the ROC Patent Law, 55 and foreign investors may not simply use
their foreign patents as capital contribution as if they were ROC patents. Unless the
investor holds an ROC patent, the subject matter would be treated as unpatented
know-how for the purposes of capital contribution under the SIFN and SIOC.
Patent rights or technical know-how may be capitalised as equity investment
if the technology (whether it takes the form of unpatented know-how or ROC patent
rights) has the capability to produce a new product which cannot at present be
produced or manufactured in Taiwan; or if the technology can be used for
improvement of the quality or production cost of existing products (Article 4).
The Regulations Governing the Use of Patent Rights and Technical Know-how as Equity
Investment was approved by the Executive YUan on May 9, 1968 and promulgated by the
Ministry of Economic Affairs on June 3, 1968.
See also Article 1, 95 and 111 of the Patent Law for definitions of 'new invention', 'new model'
and 'new design', respectively.
The Patent Law was promulgated on May 29, 1944, and amended on January 22, 1959, May 12,
1960, April 16, 1979, December 24, 1986, and January 21, 1994.
The maximum proportion of equity investment made by capitalising patent
rights or technical know-how is also regulated by Article 6 of the Technology
Investment Regulations. Technical know-how may only represent up to fifteen per
cent of total paid-in capital; technical know-how in the form of patent rights may
account for up to twenty per cent. Other than in the case of patented know-how, a
matching cash investment or other form of investment must also be made, equalling
or exceeding the value of the technical know-how invested. Therefore, a foreign
investor cannot eliminate the need to fund the operation by contributing know-how.
By contrast, a foreign investor contributing ROC patents is not subject to this
matching requirement.
The shares issued in return for the know-how contribution may not be
transferred until two years after the completion of the approved investment.
Similarly, shares issued corresponding to patent rights may not be transferred
during the effective period of the patent rights. Once contributed, such patent rights
and technical know-how may not be transferred or reinvested in any other
enterprise in Taiwan. 56
 It is worth noting that, compared with technical know-how,
the patent rights contribution is subject to a potentially longer period during which
transfer may not be allowed. Taiwan grants patent rights for new inventions, new
utility models, and new designs for fifteen, ten, and five years, respectively.57
Therefore, the restrictive transfer period for technology shares issued for know-how
could be considerable (Liu, 1994: 144). Furthermore, although no tax is imposed on
the investment of know-how or patent rights, the full amount of the proceeds from
the sale of such shares will be considered a capital gain for tax purposes (Huang,
1988: 99).
56 Article 8 of the Technology Investment Regulations.
Article 6, 99 and 114 of the Patent Law.
Another important feature of investment by way of patent rights and other
technology is that evidence substantiating the declared worth of technology must be
approved by the Investment Commission. 58 The valuation process may be lengthy
and involve supplementary filings and some 'bargaining' with the regulators. 59 The
practical implication of this is to make technology a kind of foreign investment
which cannot be carried out freely, even when the percentage limits established for
foreign participation are respected. The reason for this very conservative attitude on
the part of the legislature is not clear.
In light of the foregoing discussion, one can see why foreign investors are
typically unwilling to contribute know-how or patent rights in order to reduce their
capital outlay. In addition to this obvious drawback, a further defect of the current
laws is that they decrease the opportunity for upgrading Taiwan's industries by
recognising only technical know-how and patent rights for the purposes of
entitlement to the privileges and benefits provided by the SIFN and SIOC.6°
Intellectual property rights include, but should not be limited to, know-how and
patent rights. Trade marks and copyrights, for instance, are also important
intellectual property rights. In order to show that the ROC respects intellectual
property rights, and in order facilitate continued upgrading of Taiwan's industries,
it is suggested that the present laws should be amended and the variety of
permissible of investment should be broadened, especially regarding intellectual
58 A detailed description of the technology, including its function, capability, production, economic
value, the basis of the pricing recognition requested by the foreign investor, contribution and
restrictive transfer undertakings, and other related documents, will have to be submitted for
close scrutiny. See Article 5 of the Technology Investment Regulations.
Frequently, the government estimates the value of the intangible assets at a much lower level than
its real potential (Hsu, Li, and Wang, 1985: 576).
60 Article 131(111) of the Company Law implies that trademark rights may be capitalised. It states:
"the payment for shares as mentioned in the first paragraph may be made in assets required in
the business of the company".
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property rights. Additionally, the rather cumbersome constraints on investment of
technology seem an unnecessary deterrent to prospective investors.
(B) Forms of Capital Investment
Article 4 of the SIFN and the SIOC contemplate several forms of foreign
investment admissible in Taiwan. First, foreign investors may set up essentially
wholly-owned subsidiaries in Taiwan. However, as analysed in Chapter 9, the
Company Law requires at least seven shareholders for a company limited by shares.
Therefore, such foreign investors would need to secure at least six foreign or
Taiwanese natural or juridical persons to each own a 'qualifying share' in order to
duly incorporate a company in Taiwan.
Secondly, foreign investors may set up joint venture enterprises with ROC
natural or juridical persons or with the ROC government. Article 27 of the ROC
Company Law permits government entities to become shareholders in, for example,
a company limited by shares. 6 ' The affirmative policy of the ROC government is
normally to permit foreign investors to set up wholly-owned subsidiaries in Taiwan,
although in some industries joint ventures are the only way for foreign investors to
make an FIA investment in Taiwan. Where a joint venture is required in order to
institute a foreign investment, the foreign investors may be required to invest as
minority shareholders. Such joint ventures are required, for example, in the areas of
investment in local securities companies that engage in underwriting, brokerage,
dealing, or a combination of such operations, and investment in automobile
manufacturing. Some of these restrictions are embodied in definitive laws or
regulations, while others are based upon administrative policies. In terms of
61 Article 27 of the Company Law: "In case the government or juridical person is a shareholder...."
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international law, such discrimination against foreign nationals is considered lawful
as long as "it is based on sound economic grounds" (Sornarajah, 1994: 102).62
Thirdly, foreign investors may make additional investment for the purpose
of expanding their original investment enterprise as a recognised FIA investment.
Such foreign investment may be, for example, another cash investment to constitute
a capital increase (Article 267 of the Company Law). Alternatively, for the same
purpose, foreign investors may capitalise their retained earnings in FIA subsidiaries
in Taiwan, thereby receiving stock dividends.63
Fourthly, in addition to making an investment in Taiwan from scratch, the
SIFN and SIOC contemplate that foreign investors may invest in an existing
Taiwanese enterprise by acquiring shares from some or all of its shareholders, or by
obtaining additional newly-issued shares from such a company. In fact, this take-
over form of foreign investment has become more popular in recent years.
Sometimes this technique is used to structure a joint venture, while other take-overs
62 In the Oscar Chinn Case (1934), the Permanent Court stated that equal treatment was required
only between entities in a like group (P.C.I.J. Series A/B, no. 64). See also Article 50 of the
Proposed Text of the Draft Code on Transantional Corporations: "States have the rights to
regulate the entry and establishment of transnational corporations including determining the
role that such corporations may play in economic and social development and prohibiting or
limiting the extent of their presence in specific sectors." (UNCTC, 1988: E/1988/39/Add 1).
Guideline II, Section 4 of the of the World Bank's Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign
Direct Investment also provide that "without prejudice to the general approach of free
admission recommended in Section 3 above, a State may, as an exception, refuse admission to
a proposed investment: (i) which is, in the considered opinion of the State, inconsistent with
clearly defined requirements of national security; or (ii) which belongs to sectors reserved by
the law of the State to its nationals on account of the State's economic development objectives
or the strict exigencies of its national interest." (31 I.L.M [1992]! 380).
63 In the past, the ROC imposed requirements for such expansion projects to be approved. For
example, in the case of a manufacturing operation, a plan improvement or expansion project
was often required (Article 13 of the SEI). This is no longer the case.
are investments designed to enable a company to become more international and,
eventually, to become a public listed company in Taiwan.64
Fifthly, ROC law also recognises foreign investment in the form of
corporate bonds issued by Taiwan companies as a form of FIA. Such investment is
becoming more popular as Taiwanese companies restructure their combination of
shareholders' equity, long-term loans, working capital loans, and even
shareholders' loans, to finance their operations. In 1989, an ROC company listed on
the Taiwan Stock Exchange floated a US$ 100 million bond in the Eurobond
market which could be converted into shares of the issuer 'when and if' this was
permitted by the ROC government (Liu, 1994: 142).65 One of the approvals
required would be an FIA. This development involves a new level of sophistication
in FIA practice, which had in the past been based upon the tacit premise that
approval has to be both investor- and project-specific.
Finally, Article 4(I)(3) also specifies that technical know-how or patent
rights can be used as capital stock and is a valid type of capital investment. In this,
however, it overlaps with the forms of investment which are specified in Article 3.
It is suggested that Article 4 should be revised to omit this duplication.
The question of whether an investor's setting up a branch in Taiwan
represents a type of investment is not resolved in Article 4 of the SIFN. Rather,
Article 6 of the SIFN states that in the case of:
"a foreign company which intends to set up a branch office in the ROC for undertaking productive
or manufacturing operations, the protection and disposition of its investment shall be governed by
the provisions of this Statute mutatis mutandis."
64 This is often called 'mezzanine financing' because of the possibility of the invested company
going public in the near future.
65 This bond is in bearer form and cannot be subscribed by Taiwan residents.
It does not seem to be necessary to have a separate article distinguishing the branch
office as a type of investment from other types of investment. And it is ironic that,
while spending so much effort in distinguishing various types of investment,
perhaps the biggest weakness of the SIFN and SIOC is that there is no clear
definition of the crucial term 'investment'. Although the kinds and types of foreign
investment are stated in laws, there is thus no law to regulate the foreign investors'
investment activities within the ROC; e.g. there is no specification of the extent and
duration of the investor's participation in its investment required for qualification as
FDI - regarded as essential elements of the standard definitions adopted by
international scholars and institutions (above, Chapter 10.1). An element of
unwelcome uncertainty has thus been allowed to creep into legal measures in
which, since their purpose is to attract foreign capital, the most outstanding features
should be the sureness and certainty of their rules. It is therefore strongly submitted
that a working definition for investment is necessary for the ROC investment laws.
By comparison, in terms of bilateral treaties, Article 1 of the ROC-Panama
Investment Protection Agreement gives an elaborate definition of the term
'investment':
The term "investment" means any kind of asset invested by investors of one country, in conformity
with the laws and regulations of the latter, including but not exclusively:
(i) movable and immovable property as well as other rights such as mortgages, liens or pledges;
(ii) shares, stock and debentures of companies or interests in the property of such companies;
(iii) claims to money or to any performance related to investment having a financial value;
(iv) intellectual property rights and goodwill;
(v) licenses and permits issued pursuant to law, including those issued for manufacture and sale of
products; and
(vi) business concessions conferred by laws or under contract related to investment including
concessions to search for, cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources.
This is a very wide definition of 'investment'. Not only does it include all types of
property, whether real or personal, but it also includes any interest or rights therein,
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tangible or intangible, in addition to rights in technology, patents and copyrights.
Paragraphs (v) and (vi) also recognise the fact that many of the rights which an
investor obtains in foreign countries are administrative law rights, based upon
permission to conduct specified activity in the foreign country. The investment will
be significantly affected if rights initially granted are later withdrawn by the
administrative agency which grants them. The protection of such acquired rights
and privileges is seen as a task of the bilateral investment treaty, which seeks to
achieve this by extending the definition of investment to include these public rights
acquired under the foreign country's law in the definition of investment. A very
similar definition was used in the ROC-Lesotho Investment Protection Agreement.
However, the Agreement between the Industrial Development and Investment
Centre in Taipei and the Economic Development Board in Singapore on the
Promotion and Protection of Investments 66
 (cited hereinafter as Taipei-Singapore
Investment Protection Agreement), 1990, seems to have adopt a narrower
definition:
"investment" means every kind of asset legally permitted by the relevant places including, but not
limited to, any:
(a) movable and immovable property;
(b) title to money or to any contract having an economic value; and
(c) intellectual property rights.
This appears to reflect a greater concern in Singapore to protect that Government's
administrative autonomy. Nevertheless, given the purpose of protecting nationals'
interests in foreign countries, it is understandable that contracting states tend
normally to adopt a wider definition of 'investment' in bilateral investment treaties
than they do in domestic investment laws.
66 Signed on April 9, 1990 and entered into force on the same date (TRFS, 1993, vol. 8: 53 1-534).
(There are no diplomatic relation between the ROC and Singapore.)
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However, it is noticeable that there is a discrepancy between the definition
of kinds of 'investment' found in the ROC investment laws and the definitions
found in ROC bilateral treaties so far concluded with some other countries. The
investment treaties categorise 'investment' into broad types of property, interest and
securities. However, ROC investment law merely describes some specific kinds of
'investment' which falls short of giving a comprehensive definition of 'investment';
this way of formulating the concept would seem to be narrower than the treaty
provisions decided above. The ROC law reflects the Government's conservative
attitude towards inflows of FDI, whereas bilateral investment treaties mirror the
fact that the contracting states are eager to protect their nationals' property in the
other contracting state through the principle of reciprocity. The outcome of all this
may be that certain terms agreed upon in the treaty will depart from the municipal
law of either party. How then can the problem be solved? In part, this depends on
the place or status of treaties in ROC municipal laws. Are they to prevail over
statutes or be inferior to them? What happens if it is discovered that a treaty
actually contradicts an earlier statute? These and several other questions will be
considered in Chapter 11.
10.2 Residence Matters Related to Foreign Direct Investment
A foreign investor (including an overseas Chinese holding a foreign
passport) planning to investigate the investment environment or to do business in
the ROC, needs to obtain an visitor's visa in order to carry out feasibility studies on
the potential of investment in the sectors he has chosen. If he then decides to make
his investment, he may need to secure resident status in the ROC for himself or for
others/his employee(s) so as to oversee such investment projects.
'In order to upgrade Taiwan's management skills, the Government prefers
foreign investors to localise their management team. Nevertheless, investors often
need to delegate managers, technicians, and other employees from their own
organisations - especially if the investment involves technical assistance, patents or
manufacturing licences. It may be advisable, or even necessary, to bring in
personnel specialising in the techniques or processes the investor seeks to
introduce, who will reside in the ROC in order to ensure a successful venture. In
such cases, the foreign investors must also obtain work permits from the competent
authorities for their foreign employees and workers.
The procedure for obtaining visas and work permits is well regulated by the
law,67
 and does not require special consideration here. However, because
immigration considerations are in practice so essential to the successful
implementation of an FDI proposal, it is appropriate here to analyse the legislation
regarding residence and foreign workers in so far as it relates to FDI in the ROC.
The validity of immigration provisions under international law is well
established. It is generally recognised that a State is under no duty, in the absence of
treaty provisions, to admit or not to admit aliens into its territory (Brownlie, 1996:
519; Brierly, 1963: 276).68 The reception of aliens is "a matter of discretion"
(Oppenheim, 1996: 897). Even if a state does allow entry to an alien, it may impose
such conditions on admission as it may deem fit, usually consistent with its national
security, foreign policy and economic policy (Somarajah, 1994: 100-101). This
67 For the procedure for obtaining visas, see the Regulations Governing Issuance of Visas on Foreign
Passports (cited hereinafter as 'Visa Regulations'). Promulgated on September 27, 1985. The
last amendment of the Visa Regulation was on June 15, 1995 by the Executive Yuan under its
administrative decree series Tai (84) Wai Tzu No. 21273. For the procedure for obtaining work
permits, see Employment Services Law.
68 Oppenheim (1996: 897) has also stated that "By customary international law no state can claim
the right for its nationals to enter into, and reside on, the territory of a foreign state".
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fundamental principle of international law has been accepted by many publicists,69
as well as in treaties,7° international conferences,7 ' and in State practice.72
However, protection of aliens may be secured by agreement with investor
states. 73 Thus States may, by investment treaty, confer on each other's nationals a
right to enter their territories. The ROC-Paraguay Guarantee Investment Treaty
emphasised the necessity of simplifying the immigration laws in order to encourage
and promote investment by nationals of either party:
Nationals of one contracting party whose investments are in the territory of the other contracting
party shall be granted a residence visa. This shall apply to the investment projects' directors,
administrators, and technicians as well as their families (Article 2 (2)).
Either contracting party shall issue multi-entry visitor visas to nationals of the other contracting
party if the nationals are the investors, directors or technicians of the investment project and if such
investment project has special economic benefits to the contracting party (Article 4).
69 Such as Oppenheim (1996: 897-900); Sornarajah (1994: 83, 103); Brownlie (1996: 5 19-521);
Schachter (1990: 314); Plender (l984);Goodwin-GiIl (1978: 23).
70 For instance, the investment treaty between the United States and Italy which provides for the
admissions of aliens by reference to "public order, morals, health or safety". See also, the
European Convention on Establishment, 1955 (529 U.N.T.S. 141); the Havana Convention of
1928, 23 AJ.I.L. [1929] Spec. Suppl., p. 234; European Convention on Human Rights (23
I.L.R. [1956] 393). In addition to the above treaties, various soft-law instruments incorporate
this principle. For example, General Assembly Resolution on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order, Res. 3201 (S VI) (1974), 13 I.L.M [1974] 715; 68 A.iI.L.,
[1974] 251; Para. 7 of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (1976): "Every State
has the right to prescribe the conditions under which multinational enterprises operate within
its national jurisdiction, subject to international law and to the international agreements to
which it has subscribed. The entities of a multinational enterprise located in various countries
are subject to the laws of these countries." (15 I.L.M [1976] 967; OECD (1994)).
71 E.g., the International Conference on 'Treatment of Foreigners', held in Paris in 1929, League of
Nations Doc. C.I.T.E. 62, 1930: 419-421
72 For example, MARK and Another v. Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands, Judicial
Division of the Council of State (99 J.L.R. [1989] 39). The Court observed that "the Dutch
authorities had issued regulations limiting the admission of aliens into the country in order to
avoid the attendant social problems that would otherwise result from such a policy. This policy
was deemed to be in the [interest of] public order".
For literature on this concept, see Borchard (1915); Dunn (1932); Brownlie (1983); Lillich (1984).
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However, if the immigration status of an investor is not covered by a bilateral
investment treaty of this sort, the general rules of international law will apply,
leaving it within the sovereign right of a State to decide whether or not to admit
aliens into its territory.
10.2.1 Entry Visas and Residence
(A) General Visa Regulations
Reciprocity is the general principle applied by the ROC Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA) in issuing visas to holders of foreign passports (Article 2 of the
Visa Regulations). 74
 There are four kinds of visas that may be granted to eligible
foreign passport holders: diplomatic visas, courtesy visas (protocol visas), resident
visas, and visitor visas (Article 4 (I) of the Visa Regulations). According to the Visa
Regulations, there are two types of visas available to visitors for investment
purposes: visitor visas and resident visas.
The Visitor visa is applicableto foreign nationals or overseas Chinese who
hold an ordinary passport or other travelling documents for transit, tour, visit, study,
business, or other reasons and plan to stay in the ROC for less than six months
(Article 12 of the Visa Regulations). The Resident visa is applicable to foreign
nationals or overseas Chinese who hold an ordinary passport or other travelling
documents and come to Taiwan to join relatives, for schooling, investment,
employment, missionary services, or other business, and plan to stay for more than
six months (Article 9 of the Visa Regulations).
As of June 1995, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is allowed to issue non-visa and landing visa
entry permit to fifteen countries' citizens, including the US, Canada, Japan, the UK, France,
Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Sweden, Spain, and Portugal (IDIC,
1996c: 53).
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Holders of visitor visas are not allowed to work in the ROC, and their
passport stamp will expressly prohibit their employment in the ROC. However, it is
unclear whether spouses of foreign diplomats may seek employment in the ROC, as
no such stamp is placed on their passports. Aside from that minor question,
however, the enactment of the Employment Services Law in 1 992 reflects a clear
trend toward exercising more control over the employment of foreign nationals.
(B) Multi-entry Visa
In an attempt to simplify the review of foreign investors applying for multi-
entry visas, the Executive Yuan (the Cabinet) amended the Key Points for
Screening Applications for Issuance of Multi-Entry Resident and Visitor Visas to
Foreign Nationals (cited hereinafter as 'Multi-entry Visa Regulations') on June 16,
1988.76 Foreign investors who have invested in Taiwan under an FIA and who need
to visit Taiwan frequently for the purpose of promoting or monitoring their business
can apply for multi-entry resident or visitor visas (Article 1 of the Multi-entry Visa
Regulations). Many of the categories of eligibility are specifically drawn up with
foreign investment in mind, and applications do not go through normal immigration
charmels. This thesis considers these categories below.
(1) Multi-entry Visitor Visa
This is appropriate for foreign nationals and overseas Chinese who intend to
make an FIA investment or engage in technical co-operation in the industries
encouraged by the ROC government and who, due to business reasons, may need to
visit the ROC frequently. The foreign investor, of the designated representative of
See Chapter 9.2.2 above and Chapter 10.2.2 below.
76 The Multi-entry Visa Regulations were promulgated on April 12, 1984 by the Executive Yuan
under its administrative decree No. Tai (73) Wai 5496, and amended on June 16, 1988 under
its administrative decree No. Tai (77) Wai 15831.
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an investing juridical person, may submit an application for the issuance of multi-
entry visitor visas for an effective period of one year (Article 3 (I) (2) and Article 4
of the Multi-entry Visa Regulations). If the approved invested enterprise has a paid-
in capital of US$ 100,000, the application must be submitted to the Investment
Commission of the MOEA, and an additional visa may be issued for one more
person with every US$ 500,000 increase of the paid-in capital. Such additional
issuance is limited to four persons only (Article 3 (I) (1) of the Multi-entry Visa
Regulations). It is interesting to note that the ROC laws have a lower threshold for
overseas Chinese investors. According to the Key Points for Screening
Applications for Issuance of Multi-entry Visas to overseas Chinese Investors, 77 as
long as the paid-in capital of a FIA project reaches US$ 50,000, the investor can
apply for one multi-entry visa. 78
 In addition, with every US$ 250,000 increase of
the paid-in capital, an additional visa can be applied for, up to a maximum of 5
persons.
For a foreign bank which does not have a branch in Taiwan but has frequent
business contacts with enterprises or banks in Taiwan, officers of its head office
may apply for multi-entry visitor visas, provided the foreign bank assets rank
among the top 500 banks in the free world (Article 3 (I) (3) of the Multi-entry Visa
Regulations). Other employees of foreign financial institutions having connections
with banks in Taiwan may also apply for such visas (Article 3 (I) (4) of the Multi-
entry Visa Regulations). In addition, a foreign company whose total trade value
with Taiwan reached USS 600,000 in the year before the visa application can apply
for this type of visa for one of its representatives. For every increment of US$
600,000, another visa may be issued, up to a maximum of four such addition visas
' Promulgated on September 23, 1987.
Overseas Chinese should apply to National Police Administration of Ministry of Interiors for
issuance of such visa (Article 1).
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for employees of the foreign company (Article 3 (I) (5) of the Multi-entry Visa
Regulations). Finally, any person who can demonstrate a positive contribution to
the development or expansion of industrial or commercial business in Taiwan may
apply for the issuance of a multi-entry visitor visa (Article 3 (I) (6) of the Multi-
entry Visa Regulations).
(ii) Resident Visas
Foreign investors can apply for resident visas from MOFA after the invested
enterprises are approved. Foreigners who are the 'lawsuit proxy' or 'other business
proxies' of foreign enterprises, and who often need to stay in Taiwan, may apply
for resident visas. They must apply to the Investment Commission for certificates
of relevant status and submit relevant documents to the MOFA for issuance of
resident visas.
The Regulations Governing Entry, Exit, Residence and Stay of Foreign
Nationals79 stipulate that foreigners should report to the local police station to apply
for a Foreigners' Residence Certificate within 15 days after entering Taiwan
(Article 8).80 A foreigner holding a single entry resident visa, who finds himself
needing to exit and re-enter the country, may apply to the National Police
Administration of the Ministry of the Interior for issuance of a re-entry visa.
In order to obtain a multi-entry resident visa for one year, a foreign investor
having made an FIA investment of US$ 100,000 or more may, based upon a stated
business need, apply or have representatives of the corporate foreign investor apply
Promulgated as per Ministry of Interior directive, No. 78-Tai-Nei-Jing-66 1280, dated January 6,
1989. The last amendment was on September 7, 1996.
° Before the law was revised in 1996, Article 5 provided that "Prior to departure, foreigners should
make a report to local police station for registration if they are leaving the country for the first
time". The 1996 revision deleted this article, evidencing the Government's commitment to
reduce bureaucratic procedure.
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to the Investment Commission for the issuance of multi-entry resident visas by the
MOFA (Article 2 of the Multi-entry Visa Regulations).
There are quotas for such visa holders: a foreign investor having made an
investment of US$ 100,000 or more in Taiwan may obtain a resident visa for one
person, and for each increment of US$ 500,000 of foreign investment another
person may obtain a resident visa, so long as there are no more than four such
additional issuance (Article 2 (I) (1) of the Multi-entry Visa Regulations). Where a
branch of a foreign company has been recognised and set up in Taiwan, the
representative of the Taiwan branch may obtain a multi-entry resident visa if its
operational capital exceeds US$ 100,000. Where the amount of operational capital
reaches US$ 500,000, a manager other than the representative of the Taiwan branch
may receive a multi-entry resident visa (Article 2 (I) (2) of the Multi-entry Visa
Regulations).
The resident visa application by a foreign investor, his representative, or the
officer of the Taiwan operation, may include an application for his or her spouse
and minor children (Article 2 (I) (5) of the Multi-entry Visa Regulations).8'
However, issuance of a visa to foreign nationals is discretionary by the MOFA. For
example, since issuance of multi-entry resident visas is based upon a certain amount
of investment in Taiwan, where such amount is reduced, or if the invested
enterprise discontinues its operation in Taiwan, the Investment Commission may
request the MOFA to cancel the resident visas. The MOFA also has discretion, at
the request of the competent authorities, to cancel a visa for any of the following
82
reasons:
81 In Taiwan, majority begins with the completion of the twentieth year of age. See Article 12 of the
Civil Code.
82	 .	 .Article 14 and 15 of the Visa Regulations.
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(1) if the visa holder has a criminal record in Taiwan or abroad, or has ever been denied entry or
expelled by the ROC authorities;
(2) if the visa holder suffers from a contagious disease, mental illness or other diseases, which may
be detrimental to public health or social order;
(3) if the visa holder has made false statements or withheld important facts relating to the purpose of
entry as declared on the visa application;83
(4) if the visa holder has engaged in employment without the written consent of the competent
authorities or any other activities inconsistent with the purpose for applying for a visa; or
(5) if the visa holder has committed acts of fraud, narcotics drug trafficking, subversion or violence
in Taiwan or abroad, or has engaged in speech, deeds or activities detrimental to the national
interests or social order of the ROC.
10.2.2 Work Permit
In order to intensify its control of employment of foreign expatriates in
Taiwan, the Government enacted the Employment Services Law in 1992. The Law
provides for non-discrimination in employment, government support in
employment placement, employment enhancement, brokerage of employment of
local and foreign workers, and the regulation of foreign workers. Specifically, the
employment of foreign workers should not adversely affect job opportunities of
Taiwan residents or economic development and social stability in Tai'an çti
41). Without an employer's sponsorship and government approval, foreigners are
not allowed to engage in any work in Taiwan (Article 42).
This rule does not apply to the senior executive. In order to encourage
foreigners to invest or to do business in Taiwan, foreigners who have a FIA
investment and who hold the position of president of the investment enterprise do
not need to apply for work permits. The same exemption applies to the lawsuit
proxy and other business proxies of the branches or representative agencies of
foreign companies.
83 See Amco Asia Corpn v. Republic of Indonesia (27 I.L.M, 1988: 1281; 17 YC.A. [1992] 73). In
this case, failure to comply with capitalisation commitments given by the foreign investor were
held to justify the cancellation of the permit.
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An FIA enterprise requiring technical, management, or operations personnel
who cannot be found amongst available qualified persons in Taiwan may apply to
employ foreigners or overseas Chinese pursuant to the Rules Governing the
Approval of Employment of Foreign Nationals Performing Specialised or
Technical Work by Public or Private Enterprises, and Employment of Officers in
Enterprises Invested or Incorporated by Overseas Chinese or Foreign Nationals84
(cited hereinafter as 'FIA Employment Rules'). In order to be employed, such
persons need to meet specific criteria, e.g. that they can install or provide
instruction with respect to new machinery and equipment, or they can provide the
technical expertise needed to improve the quality of production (Article 6). They, of
course, need to provide proof that they are qualified to perform the work. 85 The
hiring quota and term of employment visa are decided by the competent authority
on a case by case basis (Article 13). However, persons employed by foreign
enterprises as managers will not be restricted by such requirements as work
experience, hiring quotas, and termination dates.
Usually, if FIA employment is for any period up to three years, the
Investment Commission will grant approval as agreed between the parties. Where
the employment arrangement contemplates three years or more, then special
approval by the Investment Commission will be required. The employment may
subsequently be extended annually (up to five years in total) under a sponsorship by
the employer who has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Government that there
84 Promulgated on January 20, 1993.
The criteria in the Article 4 of the FIA Employment Regulations include: (a) they have graduated
from a college and have engaged in such technical or operational work for two years or more;
(b) they have graduated from an advanced vocational school and have engaged in such
technical or operational work for three years or more; or (c) they have engaged in such work
for six years or more.
is a need to continue such employment (Article 49 of the Employment Services
Law).
Comparing the situations of foreign and ROC nationals, the legislation
described here is guided by egalitarian principles as regards salary and other
working conditions which, in the case of foreigners, cannot be inferior to those
legally established for ROC nationals. However, the immigration rules establish
discriminatory principles which constrain the contracting preferences of foreign
investors. For work that does not require very specific skills, a work permit can
only be granted, in effect, if there is an employment shortage, and no suitable ROC
nationals can satisf' the employer's needs. This preference in favour of ROC
nationals does not present a difficulty, of course, in the case of professions or
activities where, in the opinion of the Government, there is a recognised shortage of
manpower (Article 43).
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Chapter 11
Legal Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment in the ROC:
Encouragement and Protection
After examining, in the previous chapter, some preliminary questions about
the admission of FDI under the current ROC laws, and under the bilateral treaties
concluded by the ROC, this chapter deals with certain additional problems
concerning the legal treatment of foreign investment, once made, in Taiwan.
The right of a State to control its economic affairs is based upon the
principles of economic self-determination and permanent sovereignty over natural
resources.' The notion of permanent sovereignty has been extended to cover all
economic activities of a State2 and this notion has been claimed and exercised
consistently by European countries. 3 However, State sovereignty is subject to any
duties derived from customary or treat-y-based law, as a result of the authority of the
State to limit its own powers (Shaw, 1986: 16).
Article 5 of the Seoul Declaration of the International Law Association (1988) provides that:
"permanent sovereignty over natural resources, economic activities and wealth is a principle of
international law". See also UN General Assembly Resolution of 1962 on Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources.
2 International Law Association, Report of the Sixty Fourth Congress (1990: 59).
Many European countries have stringent reporting requirements for foreign investment. For
example, Austria and Denmark have requirements for registration (UNCTC, 1986, vol. 5: 153;
1988, vol. 6: 152).
Sornarajah (1994: 119) has claimed that the priority of international law over national law may be
explained "either on the ground that international law is a system of higher law or on the
positivist basis that there has been consent of the state to be bound by treaty and customary
principles of international law".
23
In the area of foreign investments,. 5
 it is undeniable that treaties on foreign
investment can "limit the state's sovereignty to treat the foreign investor"
(Sornarajah, 1994: 119-120) and can "offer firm guarantees to foreign investors, in
place of uncertain and contested customary norms concerning the treatment of
foreign investment" (Pogany, 1989: 40).6 This is because international agreements
are bound by the principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be observed)
and "cannot be repudiated except on certain well-defined grounds" (Pogany, 1989:
42).
The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss the domestic legal treatment
of foreign investment in Taiwan. Therefore, customary international law and certain
bilateral treaties dealing with the encouragement and protection of foreign
investment are important, as well as relevant norms of Taiwan's domestic law. It
should be stressed that certain rules of international law are binding on the ROC.
The treatment of aliens is a very controversial issue under international law.
The controversy, in general, stems from differences of approach between countries
having different economic and political interests (Shaw, 1991: 503). It is not
possible for this chapter to deal with every aspect of this difficult question. Thus,
only some of the relevant issues will be examined before the laws of the ROC is
discussed. In addition, certain bilateral investment treaties which Taiwan has
concluded will be analysed.
See also Lissitzyn (1963: 58); UNCTC Outstanding Issues in the Draft Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporation E/C.10/1985/S/2 (1985: 53); Trimble (1990: 835).
6 See also Pogany (1988: 155).
These grounds are incorporated in Articles 60-62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969).
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11.1 The Standard of Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment
under International Law and in the Law and Practice of the ROC
Before dealing with the kinds of protection furnished to foreign investment
by the laws of the ROC and under various bilateral treaties concluded by the ROC,
it is important to establish as a reference the standard of treatment required by
general international law.
11.1.1 National and International Standards of Treatment
In principle, there are two underlying approaches to the protection of
foreign investment - the 'international minimum standard' and the 'national
treatment standard'. The former is preferred by developed countries, as it provides a
minimum standard of treatment for aliens which a State cannot violate without
incurring international liability, irrespective of how the State treats its own
nationals,. The latter is favoured by many developing countries, especially Latin
American states: it provides for equality of treatment between aliens, including
foreign investors, and the nationals of the host country (Shaw, 1991: 512; Harris,
1991: 493-494; Oppenheim, 1996: 931).
Supporters of an international standard argue that international law demands
that the treatment of aliens should not fall below an objective standard (Kronfol,
1972: 16). This entails restricting every State's liberty of action by the right of other
States to be assured that a certain minimum standard of treatment of their nationals
will not be overstepped. This proposition was accepted in the Neer Case (1926),
where the General Claims Commission, set up by the United States and Mexico,
stated that:
"...the propriety of governmental acts should be put to the test of international standards
the treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency, should amount
to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental
25
action so far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would
readily recognise its insufficiency" (1926 R.I.A.A., iv. 60; 3 I.L.R. 213).
This principle has received extensive support by many tribunals, 9
 by a majority of
States at the Hague Codification Conference, 1930, and was affirmed in the
Declaration of the United Nations General Assembly in 1962 on Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources.'°
By contrast, advocates of the 'national treatment standard' argue that a
foreigner is subject to the laws of the country in which he stays 1 ' and that it would
contradict the principles of territorial jurisdiction and equality if a foreigner were
given privileges denied to nationals of that country (Brownlie, 1996: 523).
Supporters of this view do not necessarily contend that domestic law is superior to
international law (ibid, 1990: 525). Rather, they oppose the international minimum
standard rule because it is a moral standard advocated by developed countries, and
because it has often been used as an excuse for foreign intervention (Roth, 1949:
48; Shaw, 1991: 512). The national treatment principle was formulated as early as
1868, in the Calvo doctrine which sought to preclude an international standard of
treatment in regard to foreign investments in Latin America (Sornarajah, 1993: 123-
8 Shaw (1991: 513) has claimed that in this statement "a fairly high threshold is specified before the
minimum standard applies". The concept of an international standard has also been linked with
the denial of justice. See Janes Claim (1926) 4 R.I.A.A. [1926] 82; 3 I.L.R. 218; and Amco v.
Indonesia (27 J.L.M, 1988: 1281; 17 Y.C.A. [1992] 73).
See the Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia Case (1926), P.C.I.J., Series A, no. 7; 3
I.L.R., 429; Garcia and Garza Claim (1926), 4 R.I.A.A. [1926] 119; Chattin Case, 4 R.LA.A.
[1927] 282; 4 J.L.R., 248; Roberts Claim (1926), 4 R.I.A.A. [1926] 41; 3 I.L.R., 227; 3 Annual
Digest [1925-1926] no. 166; the Hopkins Claim (1926) 4 R.I.A.A. [1926] 411; 21 A.J.LL.
[1927] 161; Annual Digest [1935-1936] no. 167; and British Claims in the Spanish Zone of
Morocco (1925), 2 R.I.A.A. [1925] 617.
'° Resolution 1803 (XVII) General Assembly Resolution of 1962 on Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources, 13 I.C.L.Q. [1964] 398-449.
See Rosa Gelbtrunk v. Salvador, Foreign Relations of 1902: 877. Sir Henry Strong observed in
this award that once the alien voluntarily takes the risk of investing in a host country, he
"becomes liable to the political vicissitudes of the country in which he thus has a commercial
domicile in the same manner as the subjects or the citizens of that state are liable to the same".
124).12 Apart from a considerable body of support from publicists,' 3
 the principle of
national treatment has also been approved in some arbitral awards,' 4 by some (17)
states at the Hague Codification Conference in 1930,15 and has been incorporated in
Article 2(2)(c) of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 1974.16
Ironically, some opponents of the national treatment approach, such as the
United States, have at times changed their view when they themselves became a
recipient of massive capital investment from other countries.' 7 Thus it remains less
12 Calvo, an Argentinean jurist, claimed that aliens had only those rights and privileges as were
accorded nationals and could therefore seek enforcement of such rights only before a national
court. The doctrine had been adopted at a number of Conferences of American States
(Washington Conference, 1889; Montevideo Conference, 1933). For literature on the Calvo
doctrine, see Shea (1955); Lipstein (1945: 130); Freeman (1946: 131); Graham (1971: 289);
Adede (1986: 1003-4). Originally, there was no thought that Calvo doctrine should be
extended to foreign investment protection. The proposal was made in the context of the taking
of real property and physical assets of the foreigner. The idea of foreign investment protection
through the principles of state responsibility is a rather later development (Sornarajah, 1994:
124- 125)
13 These include Somarjah (1994: 129), and Brownlie (1996: 525-528).
" See Canevaro Case (1912), PCA, Hague Court Reports, i. 285; 6 A.ILL. [1912] 746; R.LA.A., xi.
397; Cadenhead Case (1914), 8 AJ.I.L. [1914] 663; and the Standard Oil Company Tankers
Case (1926), 8 B.YB.I.L. [1927] 156; 22 AJ.I.L. [1928] 404; R.I.A.A. ii. 781, p. 794; Annual
Digest, [1925-1926], no. 169.
See Report of Guerrero of 1926, 20 A.J.I.L. [1926] Spec. Suppi. p. 176.
16 U.N.G.A. Resolution 3281 tXXIX), 14 I.L.M [1975] 251. The Charter was adopted in the General
Assembly by 120 votes to six, with ten abstentions, and is very controversial: it favours the
view of developing countries and contrasts with Resolution 1803 (The General Assembly
Resolution of 1962 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources). The Charter's value as
a statement of custom is questionable. The arbitrator in the Texaco v. Libya Case (1977) stated
that: "Article 2 of this Charter must be analysed as a political rather than as a legal declaration"
(I.L.R. [1977] 389; 17 I.L.M [1978] 1). Yet, in the Liamco Case, the arbitrator considered that
Resolution 1803 and the 1974 Charter "if not a unanimous source of law", were both
"evidence of the recent dominant trend of international opinion concerning the sovereign right
of states over their natural resources" (20 I.L.M [1981] 53). For literature on the Charter, see
Maynard (1976: 1-22); Rozental (1976: 309); Hossain and Chowdhury (1984); Hossain
(1981); Dolzer (1981: 562-572); Bulajic (1986); Makarczyk (1988); Oppermann and
Petersmann (1987).
17 See, e.g., the arguments of the United States in the Norwegian Shipowners' Claims (1922),
R.J.A.A., i, 307. See also Article 5 of the Havana Convention of 1928, 23 AJ.I.L. [1929] Spec.
Suppl., p. 234; Article 9 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States of 1933,
28 A.iI.L. [1934] Suppl., p.75.
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than firmly settled whether modem international law actually establishes an
obligation on the host State to grant aliens more than equal treatment with its
nationals when the national standard falls below the international standard
(whatever that may be). However, it seems reasonable to conclude that more than
ordinary national treatment is required. 18 For example, Section III (2) of the World
Bank Guidelines states "Each State will extend to investments established in its
territory by nationals of any other State fair and equitable treatment according to the
standards recommended in these Guidelines". While this is not necessarily evidence
of customary law, the Guidelines may be regarded as indicative of an emerging
consensus (Shaw, 1991: 512-513). Nevertheless, it seems doubtful that there is only
one single standard: on the one hand, the minimum standard would be higher in a
developed country than in a sparsely inhabited and only partially-developed country
(Beckett, 1931: 175). On the other hand, in each case, circumstances may create
exceptions to the international minimum treatment rule (Brownlie, 1996: 526;
Nwogugu, 1965: 123).
GarcIa-Amador attempted to synthesise the pdncii?es relacing Co the
treatment of aliens with the concept of human rights.' 9 Yet his views enjoyed
18 Brierly (1963: 220) has pointed out that "if a State has a low standard of justice towards its own
nationals, an alien's position is in a sense a privileged one, for the standard of treatment to
which international law entitles him is an objective one, and he need not, even though nationals
must, submit to unjust treatment". Schwarzenberger (1948: 402; 1969: 120) has asserted that
when there is a conflict between national treatment and the minimum standard of international
law, equality of treatment is not enough. Section III 3(a) of the World Bank Guidelines states:
"With respect to the protection and security of their person, property rights and interests, and to
the granting of permits, import and export licenses and the authorisation to employ, and the
issuance of the necessary entry and stay visas to their foreign personnel, and other legal matters
relevant to the treatment of foreign investors as described in Section 1 above, such treatment
will, subject to the requirement of fair and equitable treatment mentioned above, be as
favourable as that accorded by the State to national investors in similar circumstances. In all
cases, full protection and security will be accorded to the investor's rights regarding
ownership, control and substantial benefits over his property, including intellectual property."
19 Garcia-Amador, a Special Rapporteur to the International Law Commission on the subject of state
responsibility, formulated two principles: "1. The State is under a duty to ensure to aliens the
enjoyment of the same civil rights, and to make available to them the same individual
guarantees as are enjoyed by its own nationals. These rights and guarantees shall not, however,
limited success within the International Law Commission. Nevertheless, it is
widely accepted that certain minimum standards based upon human rights
principles, such as civil and political rights, 20 have become a part of customary
international law (Shaw, 1991: 514; Brownlie, 1996: 527-528). However, whether
such human rights standards are relevant to the property of an alien in a host State
21is still uncertain. (Sornarajah, 1994: 131).
11.1.2 Standard of Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment in the ROC
Article 20 of the SIOC and SIFN provide that, "except as provided for in
this Statute", an FIA enterprise shall be legally treated as if it were an enterprise
owned and operated by nationals of the ROC. By surmounting the barriers in those
statutes, foreign investors effectively overcome the nationality barrier limiting their
rights to engage in the mining industry and to own mining fields, to engage in
shipping, and civil navigation (Article 18).
However, under the SIFN and SIOC, how and what counts as standard
'national' treatment remains subject to debate. For example, a locally owned
company would not be subject to reinvestment approval when it invests in another
in any case be less than the 'fundamental human rights' recognised and defined in
contemporary international instruments. 2. In consequence, in case of violation of civil rights,
or disregard of individual guarantees with respect to aliens, international responsibility will be
involved only if international recognised 'fundamental human rights' are affected."
(UNY.B.J.L.C., 1957, ii, 104, 112-113; Garcia-Amador, Sohn and Baxter, 1974). However,
his later works on this issue indicate a change of course; see GarcIa-Amador (1990).
20	 .	 . .	 . .See, for example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted in 1966 and
entered into force in 1976) and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedom (signed in 1950 and entered into force in 1953) (Brownlie, 1995:
276, 328; Shaw, 1991: 199, 221).
21	 .	 .	 .	 .Further on the question of discrimination, see Kronfol (1972: 60-61); Hyder (1968: 20). For other
criticism on this synthesis, see Sornarajah (1994: 130-133); Brownlie (1996: 527-528).
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company in Taiwan. However, as discussed earlier in Chapter 10.1.3, a foreign
investment approved (FIA) company is subject to this requirement, presumably to
prevent foreign investors from circumventing the negative listing provisions and
policies and the restrictions on investment in listed securities in Taiwan. Simply
having to qualify under these statutes distinguishes foreign from domestic
investors. The reinvestment requirement itself is a condition imposed on foreign
investors in an FIA company in order for them to receive the FIA status, the grant
of which is within the discretion of the ROC government. The ambiguity involved
in determining national treatment may give rise to uncertainty for foreign investors.
It is suggested that the significance of national treatment should be added to the
investment laws in order to provide a formal legal assurance for foreign investors.
Article 375 of the ROC Company Law might be used as an example:
"A foreign company, after having been given a certificate of recognition, shall have the same
rights and obligations and shall subject to the same jurisdiction of the authority as a domestic
company, unless otherwise provided by law."
A significant source of inconsistency with the assurance of national
treatment under the SIFN and SIOC is imposed precisely by the conditions a
foreign investor must satisfy in return for granting the FIA status. Such conditions
often had a significant impact on the operations of the FIA enterprise; such as local
equity requirements,22 local contents requirements (LCRs), 23
 and export
22 The requirement of local collaboration was, and still is, very common in the former communist
Eastern Europe countries, such as Hungary (Pogany, 1989: 56), communist countries in Asia,
such as China (Moser 1987; Potter, 1993:1-36; Hsieh, 1993), as well as many developing
countries, such as Malaysia (Sornarajah, 1992). In Taiwan, if the foreigner wants to set up a car
factory and to sell cars locally, the enterprise must be a joint venture with locals. However, in
this case, there is no restriction on the shareholding proportions of the joint venture (Teng,
1991). In cases where the investor wants to establish a rent-lease company, the company must
be a joint venture with a Taiwanese bank (Chan, 1990). In principle, the proportion invested by
foreign investors cannot be over 70% of the total capital of the enterprise. However, if
necessary, it can be raised up to 90% after applying (ibid).
23 For example, LCRs for production of small cars (except for exporting purposes) under the Car-
Industry Development Proposal: initially 70%, reducing to 50%. Manufacturers were required
to choose 4 items from a list of 15 items to be produced locally. The aim of this regulation was
to promote the car manufacturing technology of component parts in Taiwan (Wang, 1989).
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performance requirements (EPRs). 24 In recent years, because of trade liberalisation
and pressure from trading partners (see Chapter 8 above), these restrictions have
been substantially removed by the Government. 25
 However, where the FIA investor
comes from a country, such as Japan, with which Taiwan suffers a substantial trade
deficit, such conditions are more likely to be imposed. Japanese investors are
thought to be exploitative in Taiwan, and the Government has been considering
measures to require Japanese-invested companies in Taiwan to increase exports to
Japan in order to reduce Taiwan's trade deficit with Japan (Yue, 1990: l).26
Although "investment policies are still not free from the vagaries of trade policies"
(Liu, 1994 149), the Government should be careful not to violate the principle of
equality of treatment. Nonetheless, where the imposition of such requirements are
based on the sovereign right of the state to regulate economic activity that takes
Nevertheless, the Government has decreased the level of protection gradually. Another
example is the Enforcement Regulation of the Machinery and Electric Products Local Content
Scheme, which requires LCRs for motor-cycle production in ROC to be 90% of the whole
production input (Teng, 1991).
24 This strategy is quite common in the NIEs. (Of course, there also are instances of developed
countries imposing such conditions on foreign investors. For example, the now repealed
Foreign Investment Review Act (1972) of Canada required that applications for foreign
investment entry should indicate export targets). Apart from the export processing zones,
which are specified zones for exporting, there are no other measures in ROC which have
restrictions on exporting. In other words, the only EPRs in the ROC are for those who invest in
EPZs. According to Article 4 of the Statute for the Establishment and Administration of Export
Processing Zones, no product which is for an exporting purpose may be sold locally. However,
if the product can not be manufactured in a taxable area and must be imported from abroad, or
if any style and quality of the product cannot be manufactured in a taxable area, and it is
necessary for productive enterprise or there is any special need in a taxable area, the product
can be sold locally after approval by the trade authority-in-charge and it taxed under law. Now,
the export processing zones in ROC can be approved, case by case, where the ratio of products
to be sold in domestic market are up to fifty percent of the total amount produced (Tang,
1991). Although the United States has argued that export requirements violate standards of free
trade, under the Draft Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, export requirements
are allowed (GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W135 Rev.1 20 December 1991).
25 For details of those trade-related investment measures in Taiwan, see Ho (1992) and Liu (1990:
326-343).
26 Note that Japan's trade authorities have also proposed drawing up plans for Japanese firms
investing in the Asian NICs to re-export voluntarily to Japan (Wysocki, 1990: 1).
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place within its territory and where the Government's distinctions or requirements
are made between groups on valid economic or social grounds, it is justifiable.27
The various standards of treatment commonly employed in investment
treaties are those of reciprocity, the "open door" standard, good neighbourliness,
the identical standard, the national standard, most-favoured-nation (MFN) standard,
fair and equitable treatment, and preferential treatment (Brownlie, 1996: 524).
Aliens are generally treated according to one or more of the above standards in
investment treaties. These, many of these standards can be found in the treaties
which Taiwan has concluded with capital-importing countries. For example, Article
3 of the ROC-Nicaragua Investment Guarantee Agreement applied the standard of
national treatment:
"the Government of either Contracting Party shall not in its territory subject investments or returns
of investors from the other Contracting Party either present or future to treatment less favourable
than that which it accords to investments or returns of its own nationals, corporations or other
juridical persons or to investments or returns of nationals, corporations or other juridical persons of
any third country."
The Agreement is explicit in indicating, in Article 3(2), the areas where national
treatment is to be accorded to investments by either Party, including the
management, use, enjoyment or disposal of their investments.28
27 This also appears to be the case in Community Law. See R v. Secretary of State for Home
Department ex parte Sheikh Al Sabah (1992), 2 C.ML.R. [1992] 676. The Court rejected the
argument that equality of treatment required that non-EC nationals and EC nationals should be
treated alike in decisions relating to deportation for drug related offences. Also, Gerhardy v.
Brown (1985), 57 A.L.R. [1985] 472.
28 The authentic English text of Article 3 (2) reads as follows: "The Government of either
Contracting Party shall not in its territory subject investors of the other Contracting Party, as
regards their management, use, enjoyment or disposal of their investments, either present or
future, to treatment less favourable than that which it accords to its own nationals, corporations
or other juridical persons or to nationals, corporations or other juridical persons of any third
country".
By contrast, Article 4 of the Taipei-Singapore Investment Agreement uses MFN
treatment, but only refers to the MFN standard in general terms without indicating
its actual operation and scope:
"Neither Contracting Party shall subject investments approved in accordance with the provisions of
Article 2 to treatment less favourable than that which it accords to investments or returns of
residents and companies elsewhere other than [in] the relevant places".29
The same ambiguity can be found in Article 4 of the Taipei-Indonesia Investment
Protection Agreement but the difference is that this agreement uses both the 'fair
,30
and equitable and the MFN standards:
"Both parties shall seek and obtain the approval of their respective authorities to the effect that all
investments made by investors of any party shall enjoy fair and equitable treatment by the other
party. This treatment shall be no less favourable than that granted to investors of any third country".
Although differences between individual bilateral investment treaties "represent a
compromise between the inherently divergent interests of the contracting parties"
(Pogany, 1988: 155), it is surely preferable to introduce more detailed provisions
governing the scope and function of whatever 'standard of treatment' is adopted for
foreign investments,' instead of mentioning the standard in general terms; which
tends to confuse rather than clarify the situation.
29 The term "the relevant places" is not found in most bilateral treaties, but it is not unusual in the
bilateral treaties Taiwan has concluded with countries it does not have diplomatic relation with.
Because of Taiwan's political status, most countries are reluctant to conclude treaties with
Taiwan. Those treaties which Taiwan has concluded are with countries which need Taiwan's
investment. Even in those treaties, the terminology used in articles is carefully chose to avoid
any implication of 'statehood'. For example, in Article 1 of the Agreement Between the Taipei
Economic and Trade Office in Thailand and The Thailand Trade and Economic Office in
Taipei for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Taipei-Thailand Investment Protection
Agreement), 1996, the term "relevant place" has been defined as "the place of operation to be
designated by the respective authorities of the Contracting Parties".
30 
"Fair and equitable" treatment is a vague term and is open to different interpretations. See
IJNCTC (1988: 30-33). This phrase is used in the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on
Investment Abroad, 1959 (9 J.P.L. [1960] 116) and in the World Bank Guidelines on Foreign
Direct Investment, 1992 (31 I.L.M [1992] 1363).
Article 4(1) of the Taipei-Thailand Investment Protection Treaty 3 ' uses both
the 'fair and equitable' and MFN standards, but Article 4 (2) emphasises that MFN
should only be accorded on a reciprocal basis:
"All the provisions of this Agreement relating to the granting of treatment not less favourable than
that accorded to the investors of any third party shall be granted only on a reciprocal basis"
It is interesting to note that there is a similarity in the bilateral treaties Taiwan has
concluded with Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand. These treaties tend to avoid
using any term which may result in a protest from the PRC, and avoid any assertion
of 'statehood' for Taiwan. For example, 'national treatment' may be seen to imply
that Taiwan is a nation; therefore third-party MFN approaches are preferred in those
agreements because "most-favoured-nation" treatment means treatment "no less
favourable than that granted to investors of any third country".
Article 3 of the ROC-Panama Investment Protection Agreement, in blending
together 'fair and equitable', 'national', and 'MFN' standards in one clause,
provides that either Contracting Party must give fair and equitable treatment to
foreign investments; and that this treatment must be at least equal to that granted to
nationals or companies of either party, or equal to the treatment granted to nationals
or companies of the most-favoured-nation, if the latter is more favourable:
"Either contracting party shall protect within its territory the investments by national or companies
of the other contracting party and shall ensure fair, equitable, and non-discriminative treatment to
such investment. This treatment shall be at least equal to that granted by each contracting party to its
own nationals or companies of the most-favoured-nation, if the latter is more favourable."
The novelty of this clause is that it blends those standards in one formula, thus
giving investors the benefit of either the MFN or the national standard, whichever is
the more favourable to them in the particular situation. Such a clause, in effect,
widens the standard of treatment by reference to which the lawfulness or
The treaty was signed on April 30, 1996.
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unlawfulness of a State's measures affecting foreign investment can be ascertained.
Furthermore, applying two standards concurrently is advantageous, as the benefits
of both standards can be enjoyed cumulatively (Schwarzenberger, 1957: 200-207).
From the above discussion, it is clear that, prima facie, the ROC adopts the
national treatment approach regarding foreign investment protection. Although
various standards of treatment can be found in the bilateral treaties which the ROC
has concluded, an international minimum standard is not mentioned in any of those
treaties. Thus, in the absence of a bilateral investment treaty, it appears that an FIA
investor can only claim national treatment according to ROC investment laws;
while a non-FIA investor cannot necessarily claim even national treatment, since
there is no unilateral guarantee justifiable under domestic law
Investment treaties differ in varying degrees from the ROC's investment
laws, especially in the scope of protection and guarantees to foreign investment
which they provide. What, then, is the situation when certain terms agreed upon in
the treaty depart from the ROC's municipal law? 32 What is the status of treaties in
the law of the ROC? There is no express provision as to the exact status of treaties
within ROC domestic law. In order to consider this question, we first have to
examine how treaties can be approved under the ROC laws. Article 58 (II) of the
ROC Constitution reads:
"Prior to submission to the Legislative Yuan of any statutory or budgetary bill or any bill
concerning martial law, general amnesty, declaration of war, conclusion of peace, treaties, or other
important affairs, or concerning matters of common concern to the various ministries and
commissions, the President and heads of the various ministries and commissions of the Executive
Yuan shall present the said bill to the Executive Yuan Council for discussion and decision."
32 Questions regarding the relationship between international law and municipal law involves two
broadly opposing schools of thought: the 'dualist' and 'monist' schools. For discussion of
these two schools, see Oppenheim (1996: 53); Shaw (1991: 103). However, it is clear that for
the purposes of international law, international legal obligations priority over inconsistent
domestic law requirements. See, Brownlie (1996: 35-37).
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According to Article 63 of the ROC Constitution:
"The Legislative Yuan shall have to power to decide upon any statutory or budgetary bill or any bill
concerning martial law, general amnesty, declaration of war, conclusion of peace, treaties, and other
important affairs of the State."
Therefore, bilateral investment treaties should first be discussed by the Executive
Yuan and then concluded by the Legislative Yuan, and such treaties will eventually
have legal force like any other statutes in the ROC. The questions will then be: if a
treaty provision contradicts an earlier statute, which is to prevail? Similarly, what if
a treaty contravenes a later statute? Unfortunately, there is no explicit answer in the
laws of the ROC. Article 171 of the Constitution states that: "Laws that are in
contravention of the Constitution shall be null and void", and Article 172 provides
that: "Ordinances that are in contravention of the Constitution or laws shall be null
and void". However, the Constitution does not stipulate how to solve conflicts
between laws. Therefore, it appears that the general principle lex posterior derogat
priori should be used when there is a contradiction between a treaty and municipal
laws: the instrument later in point of time must prevail (Hackworth, 1943, vol. 5:
185; Mann, 1978: 25-27; Henkin, 1975: 185).
Because most countries were, and still are, reluctant to enter into bilateral
treaties with Taiwan, the first bilateral investment treaty Taiwan concluded was
with Singapore in 1990 - almost 30 years after Taiwan enacted the SIFN and SIOC.
As all the bilateral investment treaties concluded by Taiwan were ratified after the
two major investment laws were enacted and indeed after their last amendment in
1989, the former presumably prevail over the latter. This is clearly consistent with
the requirements of international law which, as stated above, give priority to
international legal obligations over inconsistent rules of domestic law. At the time
of writing, there is no case where a conflict is reported to have arisen, and for this
reason the present discussion is hypothetical. However, it may not always remain
so. If the Government changes its policy from welcoming FDI to excluding FDI,
later FDI laws may create more restrictions on FDI inflows. Those new restrictions
may then conflict with existing bilateral treaties, in which case the problem of
conflicts between laws will become important.
The intention of the legislature in promulgating the ROC investment laws
was to improve the investment climate by furnishing incentives and guarantees to
foreign investors (see Part II). To give this policy effective legal force, it is surely
necessary to promise foreign investors that rights acquired under previous treaties
are to be respected and protected, otherwise, foreign investors will have limited
confidence in the application and continuity of the investment laws themselves.
11.2 Expropriation of Foreign Property under International Law
and in the Laws of the ROC
The taking of foreign property is a very controversial issue in International
Law (Pogany, 1988: 161; Sornarajah, 1994: 277). The controversy extends to
various aspects including the concept of 'property', the nature of 'expropriation'
and the circumstances under which it is permissible, the way in which the loss
should be calculated, and the method of compensation. Many of the questions
raised above are still open, and have been addressed by an extensive scholarly
literature. It is not proposed to discuss that literature at any length in this thesis.
However, it may be helpful to summarise some of the relevant International Law
principles before discussing the laws of the ROC.
The taking of foreign property includes expropriation, confiscation and
nationalisation. However, because the ROC investment laws use only the term
'expropriation', I will concentrate on expropriation of foreign property under
International Law and in the laws of the ROC.
hY I
11.2.1 Expropriation of Foreign Property under International Law
Customary international law recognises that the treatment a State accords to
aliens on its territory is a matter largely within the discretion of the State.
Moreover, the discretion which a State enjoys to exercise its power is not unlimited.
The same principle is extended generally to the treatment of the property of aliens
in the territory of a State. 33 Therefore, a state's duty to protect aliens also applies to
their property (Oppenheim, 1996: 911-912). It is established that a state must
respect the property of aliens, and that the aliens have the right to the peaceful
enjoyment of their property. 34 Nevertheless, a State has the right to determine its
structure and may introduce social and economic reforms, including nationalisation
or expropriation.
Foreign investors, particularly in developing countries frequently fear the
deprivation of their property by the host state without any compensation or with
inadequate compensation (ICC, 1959: 5). Deprivation may take many forms.35
'Expropriation' or 'taking' refers to the transfer of property to the territorial state or
to a third party, as might occur with land redistribution in a land reform (Brownlie,
The term 'property' includes physical objects and certain intangible entities, such as debts and
intellectual property (Shaw, 1991: 518). 'Incorporeal property', such as contractual rights, has
also been included e.g. in the Liamco Case (1981) (20 I.L.M [1981] 1, 53; 62 I.L.R. 141, 189).
See also Article 10 (7) of the 1961 Harvard Draft Convention on the International
Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens (55 AJLL. [1961] 548).
This principle has even been recognised in some human rights treaties. Article I of Protocol No 1
to the European Convention on Human Rights, 1954: "Every natural or legal person is entitled
to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions
except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the
general principles of international law." (Brownlie, 1995: 341). Also, Article 21 of the
American Convention on Human Rights: "1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment
of his property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest society."
For discussion of what constitutes a taking see Christie (1962: 307); Weston (1975: 103); Higgins
(1982: 259); Doizer (1986: 41). In this thesis, I discuss only taking through direct means. For a
discussion of indirect taking (creeping expropriation), see Dolzer (1986: 41) and
Schwarzenberger, (1969: 18-119).
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1996: 531532) . 36
 'Confiscation' is usually described as an expropriation without
compensation (oppertheim, 1996: 916), or the "taking of property by the ruler or
the ruling coterie of the state for personal gain" (Sornarajah, 1994: 278).
'Nationalisation' is generally referred to as expropriation "with a view to public
management in the national interest", including to facilitate social or economic
reform (Harris, 1991: 524).38 'Sequestration' or 'administration' commonly means
that the administration of property is, temporarily or as a prelude to nationalisation,
taken over by the state, but that the owner still has title (Oppenheim, 1996: 916).
It is generally accepted that under International Law the expropriation of
alien property is not unlawful, provided that certain conditions are met (Shaw,
1991: 517). First, the expropriation must not be arbitrary. Secondly, the taking
should be for a public purpose. Thirdly, the expropriation should be in accordance
with the principle of non-discrimination. Fourthly, 'prompt', 'adequate', and
'effective' compensation should be paid. Although it is controversial whether a
36 Under Article 10(1) and (2) of the Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility
of States for Injuries to Aliens, 'taking of property' "includes not only taking of property as
outright taking of property, but also any such unreasonable interference with the use,
enjoyment, or disposal of property as to justify an inference that the owner thereof will not be
able to use, enjoy, or dispose of the property within a reasonable period of time after the
inception of such interference" (55 AJ.I.L. [1961] 545-584).
In the BP Case (1974), the sole arbitrator held that the fact that "no offer of compensation has
been made indicates that the taking was also confiscatory" (53 I.L.R. [1974] 329).
38 For example, the Mexican expropriations of 1917 and 1938 (Gordon, 1941; Sigmund, 1980).
These requirements were exhaustively examined in a series of cases in US courts regarding the
operation of Cuban laws enacted in 1960 expropriating US-owned property in Cuba. For
example, Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino (1962), 35 I.L.R. [1962] 2, 11, 25; Banco
National de Cuba v. Farr, Whitlock & Co. (1967), 43 1.L.R. [1967] 12. The US courts
concluded that the Cuban laws involved an expropriation in violation of international law
because of non-payment of compensation, discrimination, and unlawful reprisals. More
recently, they have been considered by the chambers of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in the
Hague. See, generally, Mapp (1993).
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taking in breach of contractual commitments is unlawful,4° where a taking is in
violation of a treaty it is normally considered unlawful.4'
(A) The Taking must not be Arbitrary
The concept of 'arbitrariness' has been considered in the Elettronica Sicula
Case (1989). The International Court of Justice stated that 'arbitrary' involves "a
wilful disregard of due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a
sense of juridical propriety" (1C.J Reports, 1989: 7377)42 In the BP Case (1974),
the sole arbitrator considered that Libya's taking violated international law "as it
was made for purely extraneous political reasons and was arbitrary and
discriminatory in character" (53 IL.R. [1974] 329).
(B)The Taking must be for a Public Purpose
According to some publicist, an expropriation may be lawful even if no
compensation is payable, when it is done for certain public purposes: e.g., an
exercise of police power, health measures, or defence measures in wartime
(Brownlie, 1996: 536-537). However, whether a public purpose should be treated as
a requirement for an otherwise lawful expropriation under International Law is still
unclear. Publicists have various opinions,43 and dicta in arbitral awards are by no
40 For Nationalisation, expropriation and breach of contract, see Paasivirta (1990: 15-19). See, also,
Pogany (1992: 1).
41 See the Chorzow Factory Case (1928). The Court stated that in respect of takings in violation of
treaties, restitution was the proper remedy for the international wrong (P.C.I..J. Reports, Series
A. No. 17).
42 The Court also noted that conduct which is unlawful in municipal law is not necessary arbitrary,
and that conduct which is arbitrary in municipal law is not necessarily arbitrary in international
law (I.CJ. Reports, 1989)
For support, see Wortley (1959: 24-25); Schwarzenberger (1960: 147); McNair (1959: 243). For
opposition, see White (1961: 150), Friedman (1953: 142), Amerasinghe (1967: 138); Metzger
(1960: 40).
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means consistent. 44 Furthermore, international instruments put forward different
views,45 although the requirement continues to be included in almost all bilateral
investment treaties. 46 It is submitted that the 'public purpose' requirement may be
used, as 'a motive behind the taking' to distinguish nationalisation from
confiscation, and in so doing to supply the exceptional circumstances which justif'
State intervention.
(C) The Taking must not be Discriminatory
Neither General Assembly Resolution 1803 nor the 1974 Declaration on
Economic Rights and Duties of States mention non-discrimination. However, this
requirement can be found in many cases decided by international courts and
tribunals. For example, in the Barcelona Traction Case (1970), the International
Court of Justice recognised that the principle against racial discrimination is a rule
ofjus cogens (LC..J Reports, 1970). The Saudi Arabia v. Aramco Case (1963) also
For example, it was said in the Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper
Silesia, that expropriation must be "for reasons of public utility, judicial liquidation and similar
measures" (P.C.IJ. Series A, no. 7, 1926: 22). But how far 'public purpose' extends is unclear.
In the BP Case (1974), the arbitrator found illegality in Libya's act of nationalisation on the
ground that the taking "clearly violates public international law as it was made for purely
extraneous political reasons and was arbitrary and discriminatory in character" (53 I.L.R.
[1974] 329). The Amoco International Finance Corp. v. Iran (1987) also supports the view
that, to be lawful, an expropriation must have a public purpose (15 Iran-US.C.T.R. 189). But
in the Liamco Case, the arbitrator dismissed the argument based on the requirement of a public
purpose and held that "it is the general opinion in international theory that the public utility
principle is not a necessary requisite for the legality of a nationalisation" (20 I.L.M [1981] 58-
59; 62 I.L.R. 194). In addition, in Libyan American Oil Co v. Government of the Libyan Arab
Republic (1977), 62 I.L.R. 131, 194, public purpose was recognised as relevant only in the
context of non-discrimination, which is accepted as a 'clear and undisputed' requisite for a
lawful nationalisation.
In Paragraph 4 of the 1962 General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources, "public utility" is mentioned as a requirement for a lawful nationalisation,
expropriation or requisitioning. The requirement of public purpose is also stated in Article 712
(1) (a) of the American Restatement on Foreign Relations Law. (The Draft Restatement of the
Foreign Law Relations of the United States dealing with State responsibility for economic
injury to aliens was proposed by the American Law Institute: American Law Institute
Restatement, The Foreign Law of the US., ss. 190, 197 (proposed official Draft, 1962)).
46 For example, Article 6 (4) of the Pakistan-US Treaty of Friendship and Commerce of 1959.
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suggests that non-discrimination is a condition of a lawful expropriation (27 1L.R.
[1963] 117). In the recent case of Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina
(965 F 2d [1992] 699; 79 A.J.IL. [1985] 1065), the US District Court (California)
decided that the taking of the property at issue had a "discriminatory motivation
based on ethnicity" and full compensation must be paid for the taking. 48 This
requirement has also been endorsed by developed countries including the United
Kingdom.49
However, a post-colonial nationalisation which is designed to end economic
domination by the nationals of the former colonial power is exempt from this
general rule. 5° In Taiwan, this exception would apply only to measures directed at
Japanese investors. Even in such a case, however, a question would arise where
dual motives of racial hatred and economic objectives together inspired taking,
especially when both motives are present in equal strength. It may be that the
appropriate response in such a case is to separate the action and the intention: to
treat the taking per se as a valid taking but "to use the taking as the basis of a
separate cause of action based on racial discrimination" (Sornarajah, 1994: 320;
Brownlie, 1979: 13).
' See also the Lia,nco Case (1981).
For discussion of this case, see Dieterich (1985: 594).
In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Case (I.CJ. Pleading, p. 81), the UK submitted that a "measure of
expropriation or nationalisation ... becomes unlawful in international law, if in effect it is
exclusively or primarily directed against foreigners as such, and it cannot be shown that, but
for the measure of expropriation or nationalisation, public interests of vital importance would
suffer". A similar statement can also be found in the UK and US protests against the Libyan
nationalisation.
50 For example, a German court accepted the existence of this exception when considering the
legality of the Indonesian nationalisation Dutch-owned property (Domke, 1955: 305). See,
generally, Sornarajah (1986).
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(ED) Compensation Rule
It is widely accepted under customary international law that, subject to the
constraint outlined above, a State can expropriate and nationalise foreign property
situated in its territory, provided that adequate, effective, and prompt compensation
is paid. The US and most capital-exporting countries support this principle, 51
 and
the formulation can be found in various draft multilateral codes 52 and in many
bilateral treaties. 53 However, capital-importing countries have argued that
'appropriate compensation' should be determined by the host State in accordance
with its municipal law and practice. 54 There is no consistent view in UN
Resolutions. 55 Nor is uniformity to be found amongst publicists 56
 or in international
arbitral awards.
51 The formula of "prompt, adequate and effective compensation" was first used by US Secretary of
State, Cordell Hull, to the Mexican government, on 21 July 1938, during the Mexican
Expropriations. He wrote: "Under every rule of law and equity, no government is entitled to
expropriate private property, for whatever purposes, without provision for prompt, adequate
and effective compensation." (Hackworth, [1940-44], vol. 3: 662; Whiteman, vol. 8: 1020).
See also Robinson (1984: 176).
52 For example, the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investment Abroad, 1959.
For instance, Article 14 of the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1963.
The best example is in the Article 2 (2) (c) of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States: in the event of expropriation, "appropriate compensation should be paid by the State
adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all
circumstances that the State considers pertinent" (U.N.G.A., Resolution 3281 (XXIX)). For the
view of capital-importing countries, see Somarajah (1994: 402-41 1); Weston (1981: 437). For
analysis of the influence of political and economic factors on the evolution of a new law of
expropriation, see Dolzer (1981: 553).
In the 1962 Permanent Sovereignty Resolution, "appropriate compensation" should be paid for
compensation "in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such measures in the
exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law". However, the 1974
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States emphasises that "appropriate compensation"
should only consider domestic laws and regulations. Resolution 3171 (XXVII) also seeks to
give each State the sole right to determine the "amount of possible compensation" (13 I.L.M
[1974] 238). Similar resolutions have been passed by other United Nations organs. For
example, UNCTAD Resolution 88 (11) states that "it is for each state to fix its compensation".
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General terms are frequently employed in national laws, bilateral investment
treaties and in other international instruments, as well as in judicial decision. For
example, the term "appropriate compensation" has been used in the UN resolutions
and can be found widely in case-law. 57 The requirement of "just compensation" has
been used in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (American Law Institute, 1987, vol. II: 196). But the crucial question has
always been: how is the adequacy, promptness, effectiveness, justness or
appropriateness of compensation to be determined, and under what guiding
principles? The question of compensation is one of the most controversial issues in
international law of foreign investment and is the subject of an extensive literature.
Resolution of the issue is beyond the scope of this thesis, and it is proposed here
just to mention some of the pertinent international law rules before discussing the
laws of the ROC.
56 The question of the standard of compensation required in cases of expropriation has involved a
complex set of conflicting viewpoints. The Hull formula is supported by many Western jurists,
such as Domke (1961: 603) and Whiteman (1963: 1085), as reflecting customary international
law. However, some writers, such as Schachter (1984: 121-130) and Doizer (1981: 561),
maintain that the Hull formula was never a rule of traditional international law and cannot, in
any case, be considered as existing international law applicable to all cases of expropriation of
alien property. Some lawyers even maintain that it is "impossible to deduce from the practice
of States a legally binding rule according to which owners of property, whether nationals or
foreigners, expropriated as a result of [important social] reforms are to be compensated"
(Friedman, 1953: 206; Bishop, 1971: 866). Other Western authors, such as Bring (1980: 99-
132) and Dolzer (1985: 218-219), have stated that the formula of "appropriate" or "effective"
compensation more closely restates emerging consensus in the field. By contrast, under a
doctrine upheld by the former Soviet Union, it was maintained that there is no obligation under
international law to compensate at all in cases of nationalisation. See Amerasinghe (1967:
143), Seidl-Hohenveldern (1958: 541).
For example, Texco Case (1978) (17 J.L.M [1978] 3, 29, 53; 53 I.L.R. 389, 489) and Aminoil
Case (1982) (21 I.L.M [1982] 976; 66 I.L.R. 519).
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(i) Promptness
In general, in order to be prompt, compensation must be paid either before
the taking or within a short time afterwards. 58 If payment is delayed, the usual
practice is to determine an appropriate rate of interest so that the investor will not
suffer further loss (Kronfol, 1972: 110). In the David Goldenberg Case, the
arbitrator indicated that compensation should be paid "as quickly as possible"
(UN.RIA.A., vol. 11: 99), while in the Norwegian Claim Case, compensation was
to be paid in "due time" (UN.R.I.A.A., vol. 11: 309). However, in reality, few
States have "been in a sufficiently strong economic and financial position to be able
to pay the agreed compensation immediately in full" (U.N.I.L.C. Doc. (1959)
AICN.4/1 19). Therefore, in many instances the payment of compensation provided
has been by instalments spread over a period of years. For example, Mexico paid
compensation to the US over nine years following Mexican nationalisation
(Foighel, 1957: 127).
(iz)Adequacy
Whether compensation is adequate depends on the value to be placed on the
property (Oppenheim, 1996: 921). In principle, in order to be adequate,
compensation should correspond fully to the value of the foreign investment
affected by the nationalisation (Fatouros, 1962: 326). But, how the actual loss
should be valued is problematic in international law, 6° and the amount of
58 For example, "prompt" has been defined in the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of
Foreign Direct Investment as "in normal circumstances if paid without delay" (Guidelines IV,
Section 8) (31 I.L.M [1992] 1383).
The draft OECD convention (1967) required the payment of full compensation for nationalisation.
60 For example, should compensation include the loss of future profits (lucrum cessans)? In Amco v.
Indonesia Case, the Tribunal held that "the damnum emergens [loss suffered] and the lucrum
cessans [expected profits] ... may be considered as a source of international law" (24 LL.M
[1985] 1022). However, in the Amoco Case (1987), a Chamber of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal
rejected the "discounted cash flow" method and stated that compensation for lost profits was
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compensation will involve further consideration on distinguishing between lawful
and unlawful expropriation. 6 ' In principle, the lawful taking involves a duty to pay
compensation only for direct losses at the moment of dispossession and the
assessment of compensation is based on the fair market value, 62 while unlawful
taking involves liability for expected profits (Shaw 1991: 522-524; Brownlie 1996:
537-539). Although "adequate" (full) compensation has been stipulated in some
bilateral treaties and by some developed countries, in practice, full (adequate)
compensation seem to be rare and in most cases compensation has been partial and
only applicable in an unlawful expropriation (15 Iran-US.C.TR. 246-252). Also in the Liamco
Case, the sole arbitrator held that the inclusion of future profits in the compensation payable
will not be justified (3 I.L.R. 138). But, in AIG v. the Islamic Republic of Iran, lost profits were
awarded in a lawful expropriation (4 Iran-US.C.TR. 96-110)
' In the Amoco v. Iran Case (1987), the Tribunal held that "a clear distinction must be made
between lawful and unlawful expropriations, since the rules applicable to the compensation to
be paid by the expropriating state differ according to the legal characterisation of the taking"
(15 Jran-US.C.T.R: 189). Also, in the James and Others Case (1986), the European Court of
Human Rights observed that "Legitimate objective of 'public interest' ... may call for less than
reimbursement of the full market value" (75 I.L.R. [1986] 397; ECHR, Series A, no. 98). In
INA Corporation v. Iran Case (1985), Judge Lagergren confined full compensation to
expropriations which are unlawful, and stated that large-scale nationalisation intended to effect
an economic restructuring may not be accompanied by full compensation (8 Iran-US.C.TR.
390). Similarly, in the Sedco Inc v. NIOC (1986), the award seeks to preserve full
compensation for small-scale, single-industry nationalisation (Iran-US.C.TR. 181). However,
no criterion has been devised for defining either a large-scale nationalisation or a small
industry by any tribunal.
62 See the Chorzow Factory Case (1928) (P.C.I.J. Reports, Series A. no. 17) and INA Corporation v.
The Islamic Republic of Iran (1986) (8 Iran-US.C.T.R. 380-390; 75 I.L.R. [1986] 602-603; 80
AJ.I.L. [1986] 181). In the INA Corporation v. Iran Case, the term "fair market value" was
defined as "the amount which a willing buyer would have paid a willing seller for the shares of
a going concern, disregarding any diminution of value due to the nationalisation itself or the
anticipation thereof, and excluding consideration of events thereafter that might have increased
or decreased the value of the shares" (8 Iran-US.C.T.R.. 380). Fair market value derives from
book value plus speculative items such as goodwill (Lillich, 1972-1987, vol. 1: 96-100). "Book
value" was defined in the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct
Investment as "the difference between the enterprise's assets and liabilities as recorded on its
financial statements or the amount at which the taken tangible assets appear on the balance
sheet of the enterprise, representing their cost after deducting accumulated depreciation in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles" (Guideline IV, Section 6).
Generally, the developing countries have rejected the market value method, and have used
book value instead (Kronfol, 1972: 101-102; Sunshine, 1981).
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a lump sum settlement is common (Katzarov, 1964: 349)63 On the other hand,
Norton (1991: 488) has claimed that "With the exception of ... Liamco [case], every
recent arbitral tribunal that has considered the issue has affirmed that customary
international law requires a state expropriating the property of a foreign national to
pay the full value of that property, measured, where possible, by the market value".
(iii) Effectiveness
Whether compensation is effective involves the question of transferability
into a usable currency. Effectiveness usually refers to the exact form of the
indemnity, and especially to the possibility of its immediate utilisation by the
recipient. 64
 This means in practice compensation must be paid in a standard
international currency. 65
 However, it is possible that payment of compensation may
be in the paying state's currency. 66
 Other forms of payment, such as raw materials
or other goods, may be also utilised (White, 1961: 2O5215).67 The requirement that
63 For example, the United States accepted less than full compensation in the Marcona
nationalisation (dispute between Peru and the US) (Gantz, 1977: 474). Also, in AIG v. Iran
Case, the compensation which was awarded (10 million) was ahnost a quarter of the claim that
was made by the foreign party (39 million) (4 Iran-US.C.T.R. [1983] 96). Often claims were
settled well below half the sum that was claimed. For example, US-Yugoslavia (1948) settled
at 42.5 %, and Britain-Poland (1948) at 33.33 % of the original claim (Kronfol, 1972).
For example, "effective" was defined in the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign
Direct Investment as "it is paid in the currency brought in by the investor where it remains
convertible, in another currency designated as freely usable by the International Monetary
Fund or in any other currency accepted by the investor" and "in normal circumstances if paid
without delay" (Guidelines IV, Section 7).
65 In the Wimbledon Case, the Permanent Court of International Justice specified that the
compensation paid by Germany "shall be effected in French Francs. This is the currency of the
applicant in which his financial operations and accounts are conducted, and it may therefore be
said that this currency gives the exact measure of the loss to be made good" (P.C.I.J., Series A,
no. 1:32).
66 See Garrow Claim (1959) (30 I.L.R. [1959] 133). Also the UK-Greece agreement (1929).
67 For example, in the Libyan Oil Case, compensation was paid in crude oil (17 LL.M [1978] 1).
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compensation which has been paid should be freely transferable or convertible is
often found in bilateral investment treaties.68
(iv) Justness
"Just compensation" sums up most of the above criteria. It was described in
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Laws of the United States as "an
amount equivalent to the value of the property taken and to be paid at the time of
taking or within a reasonable time thereafter with interest from the date of taking
and in a form economically usable by the foreign national" (American Law
Institute, 1987, vol. II: 197). The term was also used in a defeated proposed
amendment for Article 2 (2) (c) of the Charter of Economic rights and Duties of
States (14 IL.M [1975] 262-263). 69 It is sometimes used in bilateral treaties.7°
(v)Appropriateness
This is an alternative requirement which, like "just", tends to summarise
other elements. What kind of compensation should be regarded as appropriate? In
Section 4 of the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct
Investment, "appropriate compensation" is defined as "adequate, effective and
68 For instance, Article 4 of the France-China investment treaty of 1984 (24 I.L.M. [1985] 550) and
Article 8 of the Australia-China investment treaty of 1988 (28 I.L.M. [1989] 121).
69 The proposed amendment formulated the right to nationalise foreign property in the following
words: "Each State has the right ... to nationalise, expropriate or requisition foreign property
for a public purpose, provided that just compensation, in the light of all relevant circumstances,
be paid". The amendment was proposed by Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Federal Republic of West Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United
Kingdom and United States, and was defeated by an overwhelming majority, composed
principally of developing States.
70 For example, the Treaty of Amity between the United States and Iran required the prompt
payment of "just compensation" and defined such compensation as representing the "full
value" of the property taken. The tribunal in INA v. Iran read such value as involving the "fair
market value of the shares" (8 Iran-US.C.TR. 380). The term "just compensation" can also
very often be found in Dutch bilateral investment treaties and is usually followed by references
to the requirement to pay the "genuine value" of the investment (Somarajah, 1994: 362).
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prompt" and "based on the fair market value of the taken asset". In addition,
"appropriate compensation" is used in both the Resolution on Permanent
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 1962 (Resolution 1803) and in the Charter of
Economic rights and Duties of States, 1974 (Resolution 3281). The former provides
that the appropriate compensation should be made in accordance with both the
taking state's domestic law and international law. But Resolution 1803 does not
solve the problem when there is a conflict between the municipal law of the
nationalising State and the international law rules concerning the appropriateness of
compensation. Resolution 3281, however, provides that compensation for
nationalised foreign investment may be paid in accordance with domestic law.
The meaning of appropriate compensation is far from clear under
international law. The is evident from the disparities in the practice of States.
implication of this is disparity in States' practice. Politically, it could mean
anything from full compensation (including future profits) to no compensation at all
when the foreign investor had obviously earned inordinate profits from its
investment and the host country did not benefit from the investment (Sornarajah,
1994: 406).
11.2.2 Exemption from Requisition or Expropriation: ROC Municipal Laws
and Bilateral Treaties Entered into by the ROC
Usually, the assurances and guarantees against expropriation, nationalisation
and similar measures promised unilaterally by a State to foreign investors are found
in constitutional clauses, in items of legislation and in official policy statements.
The purpose of these devices is to demonstrate the intention of the government to
protect foreign investment against arbitrary measures.
Article 15 of the ROC Constitution states: "The people's right to live, to
work, and to the ownership of property shall be inviolate". According to Article 23,
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"All the freedoms and rights enumerated in the preceding Articles may not be
restricted by law, except in order to prevent infringement of the freedoms of other
persons, to avert an imminent crisis, to maintain social order, or to advance public
welfare." However, the word "people" according to Article 7, means "all nationals
of the Republic of China". This implies that the framers of the ROC Constitution,
to all intents and purposes, have confined its protection and guarantees to domestic
private property, to the exclusion to foreign property.
An FIA investor in Taiwan is guaranteed by the SIFN and the SIOC against
government requisition or expropriation of his investment for 20 years after the
commencement of the FIA enterprise's business, so long as he holds (individually
or together with other FIA investors) 45 per cent or more of the total paid-in capital
of the enterprise. 7 ' Where the collective FIA ownership does not reach 45 per cent
there is no guarantee against expropriation or requisition. However,
"(1) in case the investor's investment is less than 45 per cent of the total capital of
the enterprise in which he invests, he shall be justly compensated if the government
acquires or expropriates the invested enterprise because of national defence needs.
(2) The compensation referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be permitted for
outward remittance" (Article 15)
In other words, where expropriation occurs as a result of the need to ensure national
defence, "just compensation" shall be paid and may be repatriated.
These provisions pose several questions. First, the circumstances which may
constitute "national defence needs" are unclear. Secondly, as the FIA enterprise,
Article 16 of the SIFN: "(1) In case the investor's investment is 45 per cent or more of the total
capital of the enterprise in which he invests, such an enterprise shall not be subject to
requisition or expropriation for a period of twenty years after commencement of business as
long as the investor continues to hold 45 per cent or more of the total capital. (2) If the
investor's investment is made in conjunction with overseas Chinese investment conforming to
the Statute for Investment by Overseas Chinese, and their aggregate amount of investment is
45 per cent or more of the total capital of the enterprise involved, the provision of the
preceding paragraph shall still apply"
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rather than the FIA investor, would be the entity subject to possible requisition or
expropriation, it is not clear that the compensation can in fact be fully repatriated.
This is because it is unclear whether such compensation is tax exempt. Finally,
what constitutes 'lust compensation" may be a very subjective matter. Making the
protection of foreign investment subject to such vague terms as 'just', 'appropriate'
and 'reasonable', as discussed in the previous section, invokes questions which
remain unresolved in international law, and in an extreme case potentially provides
little or no protection at all. It is very difficult to ascertain degrees of reasonableness
and what is 'appropriate' or 'just' in every case, without specific standards and
criteria to clothe these general terms. So far as the legislation is concerned, if
expropriation occurs, compensation would fall completely within the unilateral
judgement of Taiwan. Had more specific qualifying adjectives been provided, the
above uncertainties might have been reduced. Fortunately, these issues have not as
yet been tested in Taiwan! Even during military conflicts with the PRC in the late
195 Os, no foreign property was expropriated by the ROC government for the sake
of "national defence needs". Although Taiwan has committee itself, as a matter of
affirmative foreign investment policy, not to expropriate or requisition foreign-
invested enterprises in order to protect its international reputation, legislative
assurances are still important for their symbolic meaning and in order to maintain
an overtly favourable investment environment.
Even apart from issues of compensation under municipal law, unilateral
guarantees are not usually sufficient protection for private investment because their
continuance depends upon the Government continuing to adhere to the policy
manifested in the investment laws. It is therefore important to also have guarantees
included in bilateral investment treaties. Examining the fifteen bilateral investment
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treaties which Taiwan has concluded so far, 72 requirements that expropriation must
be for a "public purpose" and compensation must be "freely transferable" are found
in all of these treaties. However, there is divergence in the standard of
compensation. For example, "compensation should be adequate, effectively
realisable, made without delay" under the Taipei-Thailand Investment Protection
Treaty. But "compensation shall be effectively realisable and shall be made without
unreasonable delay. Such compensation shall be the value immediately before the
expropriation" under the Taipei-Singapore Investment Protection Treaty. The terms
"just and effective compensation" and "market value" are found in the ROC-
Paraguay Investment Guarantee Treaty, whereas the term "real value" occurs in the
ROC-Panama Investment Protection Treaty. The formulation included in particular
treaties on such matters as compensation reflects the fact that Taiwan has
negotiated with States in widely varying economic and social situations.
11.3 Repatriation Privileges underthe ROC Investment Laws and under the
Bilateral Treaties
In order to protect their balance-of-payments position, many countries,
especially developing countries, restrict capital outflows and international financial
transactions in addition to exports and imports. 73 The purpose of foreign exchange
control is to effect more efficient utilisation of scarce exchange resources so as to
maintain internal and external economic stability (Wang, 1985: 125). Customary
international law recognises the right of control by a State over its currency as an
72 Taiwan has concluded bilateral investment treaties with Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines,
Panama, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Latvia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Argentina, Nigeria, Malawi,
Honduras, Thailand, Salvador.
For example, Sudan (El Sheikh, 1984: 48-51), India, Brazil and Argentina (Pennington, 1968:
6 12-6 14).
attribute of sovereignty. 74 In the Tabar Claim (No. 3), it was held by the United
States International Claims Commission that
"international law and the usual commercial treaties are no bar to exchange restrictions. So
long as the control measures are not discriminatory, no principle of international law is
violated" (20 I.L.R. [1953] 242).
Nevertheless, stringent foreign exchange controls which restrict the
remittance of profits and capital will hamper the flow of foreign investment to
Taiwan. Such controls not only restrict the remittance of earned profits or the
repatriation of capital, but also affect foreign enterprises by making it difficult to
employ foreign technicians and managerial personnel because of limitations
imposed on the transfer of their salaries abroad. In addition, the operation of the
foreign enterprise itself may turn out to be difficult or impossible because of
restrictions on importing equipment, machinery and spare parts. Acknowledging
this, the Government finally agreed to relax its controls in 1987 (see Chapter 8
above).75
The privilege of repatriating profits is probably the most important
entitlement for qualified FIA investors in Taiwan. The SIFN specifically permits an
FIA investor to repatriate in foreign exchange the annual income, net profits, or
interest accrued from the foreign investor's investment in the FIA enterprise. An
FIA investor may also repatriate in foreign exchange the invested capital or capital
gains one year from the commencement of the business operation of the FIA
Confirmed by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case of Serbian and Brazilian
Loans (1929) (P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 20-1, 1929: 44).
See Mann (1982: 485); Nwogugu (1965: 18); Fatouros (1962: 48); Hyde (1956: 690-692).
When the SIFN was first enacted, capital gains could not be repatriated out of Taiwan. The SIFN
was then amended to permit some forms (but not others) of capital gains to be remitted abroad.
For instance, a tracing rule had been applied so that if some capital gains were derived from a
disposition of land, then that portion of the capital gains representing the realised land
appreciation could not be repatriated. For discussion of the process of liberalisation of foreign
exchange control, see Part II of this thesis.
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enterprise (Article 12 of the SIOC and Article 13 of the SIFN). 76 It may be asked,
however, under the current economic policy of liberalisation and
internationalisation, what is the value in requiring a one year lock-up period during
which the original FIA investment capital cannot be repatriated from Taiwan? This
device certainly does not improve Taiwan's investment environment. It is therefore
submitted that the lock-up requirement should be deleted in the next investment law
reform.
As discussed earlier, the Outward Regulations provide that any ROC natural
or juridical person may remit abroad up to US$ 5 million annually, without the
need for supporting documentation to be presented to the CBC for approval.
Although foreign investors may also take advantage of a repatriation privilege
under the Outward Regulations, the latter privilege is granted only as a regulatory
measure. In other words, the accorded rights are administrative law rights and the
amount of foreign exchange which may be remitted freely can be reduced or
withdrawn by the administrative agency in accordance with Government policy.
Although some foreign investors have chosen to bypass the FIA route in setting up
their profit-seeking operation in Taiwan, most still seek to obtain the statutory
repatriation privilege under the SIFN wherever they can.
It is obvious that the purpose of bilateral investment treaties is to protect
foreign investors' interests. However, the weakness of these treaties is that the
obligations they impose on the host country are general in terms, and unjustified
interference with foreign investments can usually be excused under the reservations
made to the obligations. For example, Article 5 of the Taipei-Indonesia Investment
Protection Agreement states:
76 The privilege of repatriating the original investment under the SIFN, however, is not a simple
right. Under the Company Law a foreign shareholder should cause the Taiwan company to be
liquidated and dissolved in order to retrieve the original paid-in capital.
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"Both parties shall seek and obtain the approval of their respective authorities to the effect that
individuals or companies of either party shall have the right of free transfer of their capital and of
the returns from it, subject to the right of each party in exceptional financial or economic
circumstances to exercise equitably and in good faith powers conferred by its existing laws and
regulations when this Agreement enters into force."
The definitions of 'exceptional financial' or 'exceptional economic circumstances'
admit discretion, 77 and are capable of being manipulated by the host country as an
excuse to control the movement of foreign exchange. In order to avoid this defect,
Article 8 of the Taipei-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement provides that
investors will obtain compensation from the host country when the right of
repatriation of investment is affected (within the territory of the host country),
regardless of the reasons for which the host state suspends that right:
"1. Residents and companies of either relevant place shall be accorded free transfer on a non-
discriminatory basis, of their capital, earnings, and returns from any investments and assets in the
other relevant place.
2. In the event of the occurrence of inconvertibility in either relevant place, residents and/or
companies of the other relevant place may invoke the convertibility rights and transfer their blocked
local currencies to the account of the Contracting Party or any other account designated by the
Contracting Party or an agency or instrumentality thereof to compensate the damages resulting
therefrom. The said Contracting Party may then present those local currencies to the other
Contracting Party for remittance in the form of a convertible foreign currency as compensation."
Therefore, although it seems that the legitimacy of bona fide restrictions on
currency exchanges, when made for the public interest, cannot be challenged
internationally even if they cause loss to foreigners, 78 bilateral investment treaties,
The same clause can be found in many British treaties, e.g. the Singapore-UK Investment Treaty.
Such escape clauses are also found in US and other nations' treaties. The IMF Articles of
Agreement permit exchange restrictions in times of financial difficulties. In some British
treaties, such as the UK-Guyana Treaty, there is a requirement that the repatriation of a
percentage of the profits (usually 20 per cent) should be permitted every year in circumstances
of foreign exchange difficulties. This create an obligation to permit the repatriation of at least a
percentage of the profits and the rest when circumstances permit.
78 In the case of re Helbert Wagg & Co., it was held that English courts will not recognise a foreign
exchange law which is not bona JIde, but was passed "in reality with some object not in
accordance with the usage of nations" (1 All E.R. [1956] 129; 22 I.L.R. 481). This principle
has been impliedly recognised by the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign
Property of OECD (1962) (Publication no. 15637) (2 J.L.M [1963] 241). Note that the text and
the commentary attached to the Draft Convention were modified and adopted in 1967
(Resolution no. 23081) (7 I.L.M [1968] 117; Cmmd. 1257 (1960)).
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despite the weakness identified above, can often provide a better degree of
assurance and protection to investors than a unilateral guarantee from the host
country.
11.4 Other Privileges under the ROC Investment Laws
We have seen in this thesis that FIA status accords the foreign investor with
various rights, privileges, and entitlements within Taiwan. Apart from the guarantee
of entitlement to the rights of nationals, exemption from expropriation and
requisition, and privilege for repatriation, which have been discussed in this
chapter, there are other privileges which FIA investment can enjoy under the ROC
investment laws. These include the privilege of making inward remittances,
together with exemption from government requirements such as the mandatory
employee subscription right, the duty to make a public issue of shares, and
restrictions concerning corporate governance matters, as well as the ability to
transfer approved foreign investment.
11.4.1 Advantages under the Regulation for Non-Governmental Inward
Remittances
As discussed in Chapter 8.1.1 and Chapter 9.1.2, the liberalisation of foreign
exchange control has largely reduced the significance of obtaining an FIA status for
a foreign investment project. However, one advantage in obtaining the FIA status is
that the FIA investor will be guaranteed the right to remit foreign exchange funds
into Taiwan for conversion into NT dollars under the Inward Regulations in order
to fund the paid-in capital of the FIA company. Because the guarantee is granted by
a statutory authorisation, it gives more legal assurance to the investors than a
regulatory measure such as the Regulation for Non-Governmental Inward
Remittances (Inward Regulations) which has the status of secondary legislation.
i1
Although a non-FIA investor has a US$ 5 million annual quota for inward
transfers under Article 4 of the Inward Regulations, the foreign investor must have
a Foreigner's Residence Certificate (see Chapter 10.2.1(B) (ii) above) in order to
qualify as a recipient. Therefore, without an FIA, the foreign investor, who often is
not resident in Taiwan, would not have the right of inward remittance and
conversion in order to fund the investment in Taiwan with NT dollar-denominated
funds.
11.4.2 Exemption from Mandatory Employee Subscription
The SIFN and SIOC also exempt an FIA enterprise which has 45 per cent or
more collective FIA ownership from the mandatory employee subscription right.79
This is an important exemption, as it assures the ability of foreign investors to
control the FIA enterprise as it expands. The exemption is particularly popular for
the FIA investor who owns a small company or who is an individual.
Under Article 267 (I) of the Company Law, when a company limited by
shares issues new shares for cash it must allocate 10-15 per cent of the shares to be
issued to employees for their subscription at the same price. 80 This provision is the
dominant feature of employee stock-option arrangements in Taiwan. Thus,
whenever new shares are issued, unless the new shares represent capitalisation of
retained earnings or capital surplus, the employer's ownership will gradually be
diluted through the exercise of such subscription rights. Because it is virtually
Article 18 (II) of the SIFN and SIOC: "In case an investor's investment is 45 per cent or more of
the total capital of the enterprise in which he invests, the provision of Article 156 (IV) of the
Company Law requiring issuance of stock certificates to the public, and the provision of
Article 267 of the same Law requiring setting aside a certain percentage of new shares to be
issued for purchase by the employees of the invested enterprise shall not be applicable."
80 Article 267 (I) of the Company Law: "Unless otherwise approved specifically by the central
authority in charge of the object enterprise, when a company issues new shares, there shall be
ten to fifteen per cent of such new shares reserved for subscription by employees of the
company."
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inevitable that a successful company will in time need to make a cash offering in
order to increase its paid-in capital, in practice this has been a very important
concession to FIA investors.
However, since the 1987 liberalisation, Taiwan's securities market has
begun to increase its trading volumes and market capitalisation, and this exemption
has become slightly less significant. Some FIA investors have chosen to waive the
SIFN exemption and to transfer a minority interest to their employees in order to
keep quality employees within the company. Some companies, such as Wang
Laboratories, Inc., have even decided to take their subsidiary in Taiwan public.8'
This strategy enables them to raise funds by taking advantage of the higher
price/earnings ratios of listed companies in Taiwan. 82 It is also a useful technique in
the management of higher wages, labour awareness, and mobility. There are now a
significant number of FIA companies with employee ownership (Liu, 1994: 146).
11.4.3 Waiver of Requirement to Go Public
Under Article 1 56(IV) of the Company Law, companies with a certain
amount of paid-in capital must issue their shares to the public (i.e. list their shares
in Taiwan's securities market). 83 The threshold for a company to go public
according to the MOEA is NT$ 200 million. The rationale for having this
requirement is to counteract the prevalence of family ownership and holdings in
closed companies. However, an FIA company is exempt from the requirement to go
81 For more information about Taiwan's securities market, see 1-Isu and Liu (1988, 169).
82 Some American firms have successfully applied this strategy in the Japanese securities market, in
which listed companies enjoy similarly higher price-earnings ratios (Chandler, 1990: 1).
83 Article 156 (IV) of Company Law: "When the capital of a company has reached or exceeded a
specific amount fixed by the central authority, its share certificates shall be issued in public,
unless otherwise approved by the central authority in charge of the object enterprise."
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public, provided it has a collective FIA ownership of 45 per cent or more of its
paid-in capital of the FIA company (Article 18 of the SIFN and SIOC).
Unlike the employee subscription right, the requirement to go public under
the Company Law has long been problematic. Under the Securities and Exchange
Law, 84 those companies with more than NT$ 200 million of paid-in capital should
file a definitive prospectus to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
be subject to the continuous disclosure requirements. Because this is a complicated
procedure and because most companies are reluctant to disclose their financial
information to the Government, a significant number of companies have
deliberately kept their paid-in capital slightly under NT$ 200 million in order to
avoid the requirement of going public. The exemption from the requirement of
going public under the Company Law and the SEL is therefore very valuable to
FIA investors with large investments in Taiwan, who generally do not wish to be
subject to either mandatory dilution or continuous disclosure of financial and other
information to the SEC.
11.4.4 Waiver of Certain Corporate Governance Requirements
Article 18 (I) of the SIFN and SIOC stipulates that an FIA company is
exempt from certain Company Law provisions relating to domicile, nationality,
minimum shareholding by ROC nationals, and to nationality and domicile
requirements with respect to the chairman of the board of directors and the
supervisors. 85 Also, if an FIA company has all its shareholders outside Taiwan, it
Promulgated on April 30, 1968. Amended on November 13, 1981, May 11, 1983, and January 29,
1988.
85 Article 18 (1) of the SIFN and SIOC: "For an invested enterprise organised as a company
according to the Company Law, the investors may be exempt from the restrictions concerning
domicile in Chinese territory, Chinese nationality, and amount of investment contained in
Article 98 (I), 108 (II), 128 (I), 208 (V) and 216 (I) of the same law."
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will normally be permitted to hold its board of directors' and shareholders'
meetings abroad.
This exemption bypasses restrictions in the Company Law which where
installed to ensure Chinese control of companies incorporated under the Company
Law. In China, the first law regulating companies (known as "Kung-ssu Lu") was
promulgated in 190486 when it was perceived that there was undue foreign
influence in Ch'ing China and that disadvantageous treaties had been concluded
with the West (see Chapter 3 above). Such a rationale is no longer applicable in
circumstances where foreign investment is positively encouraged, and this
exemption reflects a quasi-national treatment of FIA investors in Taiwan
companies; the corporate governance of these FIA companies should not now be
restricted in such a way as to defeat the purpose of allowing FIA investment in
Taiwan.
11.4.5 Ability to Transfer Investment Entitlements
As discussed above, in Chapter 11.3, FIA investors enjoy a repatriation
privilege under the ROC investment laws. The SIFN and SIOC specifically
prohibits any assignment of this repatriation privilege, an entitlement personal to
the FIA investor, except to his legitimate heirs and successors (Article 12).
86 Enactment of the Kung-ssu Lu was one of the most important achievements in a series of law
reforms that occurred during the closing years of the Ch'ing Dynasty. A statute entitled "Shang
Jen Tung Lu" (General Regulations Governing Merchants) was enacted at the same time and
was a related statute to the "Kung-ssu Lu" (Hung, 1932: 10-1 1). The law reform was an
attempt to modernise and thereby maintain the Empire which was collapsing under the severe
internal pressures generated by foreign powers (Li, 1960: 171). The 131 articles of the Kung-
ssu Lu were primarily transplanted from the Japanese Commercial code of 1899 and
secondarily from the English Companies Act. As such, it was a hybrid of the civil system and
the common law system (Lai, 1985: 754). Since the establishment of the ROC in 1912, an
unceasing effort has been made to amend and update the Code. The Government use the new
term "Kung-ssu Fa" (Company Law) to replace "Kung-ssu Lu" and has revised the Company
Law for 11 times by the time of writing. For detailed discussion of the revision, see Liu (1974:
9) and Yang (1980: 1-14).
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However, an FIA investor may apply to transfer all of its entitlements under an
existing FIA to another foreign investor. Under this 'investment transfer FIA', the
repatriation right can be assigned to the new FIA investor who takes over the
former FIA investor's approved investment in Taiwan.87
Most transfers under such circumstances involve the sale, transfer, or other
disposition of the shares in the FIA company by the former FIA investor. Under the
Company Law such transfer will be valid as between the transferor and the
transferee when the stock certificates are delivered and duly endorsed, and is
binding upon the company when the new shareholder registers his name on the
shareholders' roster maintained by the company. 88 When the transfer is between
two foreign investors, the transfer is likely to be paid for outside Taiwan. However,
failure to obtain an FIA approval with respect to the share transfer may result in the
forfeiture of the former FIA investor's repatriation rights. 89 The transferee would
not be protected either, since the transfer would make him a non-FIA investor not
entitled to advantages accorded by the SIFN and SIOC.
87 Article 12 of the SIFN and Article 11 of the SIOC: "The investor shall be entitled to exchange
settlement in accordance with the provisions of this Statute. This privilege is not transferable
except to his legitimate heir or to other authorised foreign nationals or overseas Chinese to
whom he has assigned his investment."
88 Article 164 of the Company Law: "Registered share certificates may be transferred by
endorsement of the holder thereof."
Article 165 (I) of the Company Law: "The transfer of registered share certificate shall not be set up
as a defence against the company unless the true name or title of the transferee is inscribed in
the share certificate and the true name or title and domicile or residence of the transferee are
entered in the shareholders' roster".
89 Article 22 of the SIFN and Article 24 of the SIOC: "If the investor violates the provisions of this
Statute or fails to perform any matters approved by the Investment Commission, unless
otherwise provided for in this Statute, the Ministry of Economic Affairs may deal with the
situation in the following manner. 1. To revoke the right for exchange settlement against the
income of net and interest accrual for a prescribed period of time. 2. To revoke the investment
case and those rights conferred by this Statute."
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11.4.6 Exemption from Sectoral Investment Restrictions
Upon obtaining special approval from the Executive Yuan, an FIA company
will no longer be subject to the domicile and nationality requirements contained in
the Mining Law, Land Law, Maritime Law and Civil Aviation Law. With special
approval by the Executive YUan, the FIA investor or FIA enterprise may invest and
engage in certain business operations in the sectors of mining, land, navigation, and
civil aviation, which are not otherwise open to foreign investment.
11.4.7 Favourable Treatment on Dividend Withholding Tax
Under Article 11 of the SUI, a non-resident foreigner's and foreign business
enterprise's withholding tax for dividend distributed by the company is 20 per cent
(Article 1 6).° However, if the investments are not FIA-approved in accordance
with the SIOC and SIFN, the withholding tax is set at 35 per cent, the same as for
an ROC natural person. This distinction between FIA and non-FIA investment was
made in the SE! (and retained in the SUI when SET expired in 1990) described in
Chapter 7.2.2, it provides a big tax-rate disparity between FIA and non FIA
investments, being designed to direct FDI toward preferred industries and to keep
FDI under the control of specific FDI laws.
90 Article 11 (I) of the SUI: "When a non-resident individual or a non-resident profit-seeking
enterprise, having been approved to make investment in the Republic of China under the
Statute for Investment by Overseas Chinese or the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals,
receives dividend distributed by a company located in the Republic of China or profit
distributed by a partnership in the Republic of China, the income tax payable thereon by such
individual or enterprise shall be withheld at the time of payment thereof by the tax withholder
as specified in the Income Tax Law at the rate of twenty per cent of such distribution, and the
provisions provided in the Income Tax Law for filing final income tax return shall no apply."
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11.5 Settlement of Investment Disputes
Foreign investment in Taiwan is regulated by municipal laws, treaties, and
other similar instruments such as administrative orders; and these regulatory
instruments grant extensive incentives, concessions and some protection to foreign
investors. Occasionally, disputes may arise from the practical application of these
incentives or in the interpretation of the rights and obligations of the parties.
Because the existence of effective remedies may reduce the likelihood of hostile
measures against foreign-owned property (Pogany, 1988: 51), it is therefore
important to consider the nature and extent of the remedies available to foreign
investors in Taiwan. In this section, the methods of settlement of investment
disputes under international law will first be briefly introduced as a standard of
comparison. However, because of the unusual situation of Taiwan, i.e. it has been
excluded from the World Bank, MIGA and from other international organisations
and multilateral treaties, this has significantly limited the range of facilities and
techniques available for the settlement of an investment dispute where the
investment is located in Taiwan. Thus, the next section will examine only the
ROC's implementation of the International Convention on Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID
Convention), with emphasis on the technical problems between the ROC
government and foreign investors. Finally, dispute settlement methods provided for
in bilateral investment treaties concluded by Taiwan will be considered.
11.5.1 Settlement of Investment Disputes under International Law
(A) Methods of Settling In vestment Disputes in International Law
It is recognised that there is no obligation in customary international law to
settle disputes, and procedures for settlement by formal and legal procedures rest on
the consent of the parties (Brownlie, 1996: 708). Generally speaking, there are two
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categories of disputes settlement: diplomatic procedures and adjudication (Shaw,
1991: 629). The former are regarded as informal methods of settling disputes,
including investment disputes, and they include diplomatic intervention,
negotiation, good offices, and mediation (Brownlie, 1996: 709). The latter are
regarded as formal methods of settlement, and include decisions by courts such as
the International Court of Justice, the awards of ad hoc arbitral tribunals, of mixed
commissions, and of specialised tribunals of a semi-permanent character (Mosler
and Bernhardt, 1974: 83-190, 285-416).
Arbitration has been an important device for the settlement of investment
disputes. The practice of arbitration evolved as a sophisticated procedure similar to
judicial settlement (Brownlie, 1996: 709). There are two types of arbitration: one is
international institutional arbitration, such as by the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC), 9 ' the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA),92 and the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID); the other is ad
hoc arbitration. 93
 The latter category may be subdivided into national and
Disputes referred to ICC arbitration must be "business" disputes. Particularly, this would include
transactions and operations involving international trade and economic co-operation in public
works agreements for developing areas and investment contracts (Kronfol, 1972: 140).
92 The Permanent Court was an offspring of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes signed at the Hague on 29 July 1899. This Convention was revised and
replaced by the 1907 Convention of the same title concluded at the Second Peace Conference
at the Hague (Scott, 1972: 57). The PCA is actually neither a court nor a permanent institution.
It is merely a panel of arbitrators, members of which may be called to act as an arbitral
tribunal. Between 1900 and 1932, 20 cases were heard by the PCA, but no cases have been
dealt with since then (Brownlie, 1996: 710).
Ad hoc arbitration is frequently provided for in bilateral investment treaties which provide for the
settlement of disputes which may arise between the parties on the treaties' application or
interpretation. They usually give precedence to consultation between Governments as a first
step towards any settlement (e.g. Article 11(1) of the German-Pakistan Investment Treaty and
Article 9 of the Taipei-Indonesian Investment Treaty) (Kronfol. 1972: 136). If a dispute cannot
thus be settled, the treaty normally goes on to provide how the arbitrators are to be appointed,
if the parties fail to agree on the appointment. Reference is usually made to the President or
Vice-President of the International Court of Justice to make the necessary appointment (e.g.
Article 10 of the Sudan-Swiss Agreement).
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international arbitration. In addition, the technique of Conciliation can sometimes
be found in investment treaties for settling disputes; it is sometimes described as
having a "semi-judicial aspect" (Brownlie, 1996: 709).
(B) The Settlement of In vestment Disputes in Bilateral In vestment Treaties
It is accepted that, under customary international law, foreign natural and
juridical investors lack international legal personality. This is because, generally
speaking, States are regarded as subjects of international law whereas individuals or
companies are regard as mere objects. Consequently, investors cannot bring a claim
before an international tribunal without the consent of the host state (Brownlie,
1996: 67-69; Pogany, 1988: 164). This creates tremendous difficulties for investors
when the domestic law of the host state does not provide an adequate remedy for a
foreign investor and the home state is unwilling, or unable, to take up a claim on
their behalf. However, bilateral investment treaties can enlarge the scope of foreign
investors' remedies. Particularly in the context of arrangements with States,
disputes are normally resolved through negotiations. In case negotiations fail, the
courts of the host State will normally have jurisdiction over disputes arising out of
investments made in that country. In most treaties, exhaustion of local remedies is
required before any recourse is had to international arbitration (Shihata, 1986: 1;
Amerasinghe, 1990: 257-266; Westberg and Marchais, 1993: 353)•94 However, it is
usually possible for States and foreign investors voluntarily to refer their difference
However, the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies is sometimes dispensed with by treaty.
For example, claims heard by the US-Mexican General Claims Commission did not have to
satisf' this rule. In the ELSI Case, it was held by the International Court of Justice that such an
"important principle of customary international law" could not be held to have been "tacitly
dispensed with" (I.C.J. Reports, 1989: 15).
to alternative mechanisms such as conciliation or binding arbitration. Thus,
international arbitration is no longer the privilege of States.95
Normally, disputes arising under bilateral investment treaties include
'investment disputes' (i.e. disputes between a host State and an investor of the other
State concerning an investment) and disputes between the contracting parties
themselves concerning the interpretation or application of the treaty (Pogany, 1989:
51). In the case of ICSID, the conciliation and arbitration facilitates of ICSID are
only available for the settlement of disputes between States and nationals of other
States provided both the host State and the home State are parties of the ICSID
Convention; disputes between States over the interpretation of bilateral investment
treaties provisions are, in all cases, referable to other international systems of
arbitration (Khalil, 1993: 264).
11.5.2 Investment Disputes Settlement in the ROC
Under the influence of Confucianism, the Chinese traditionally consider that
lawsuits are a disruption of social harmony, and view them as a regrettable
necessity rather than as an admirable means of settling disputes (MaClelland, 1985:
11; Hsiao, 1994: 9)96 One consequence of this, domestically, is that Chinese
There are precedents, such as the 1922 Polish-German Convention relating to Upper Silesia,
which empowered individuals to bring certain claims before an international tribunal. See
Steiner and Gross v. Polish State Case (4 Annual Digest [1927-28] vol. 4: 291).
96 Before the importation of Western law and a Western legal system, China had its own conception
of law and means for the administration ofjustice (disputes settlement), which prevailed in the
general traditional culture for thousands of years. To understand why the Chinese do not like
litigation for dispute settlement, it is essential to understand the development of two different
concepts, namely, Fa and Li. Fa, literally meaning law, was restricted to measures and
provisions having to do with crime and punishment. Li is often interpreted as rites, good
customs, mores, or propriety and covered a wide range of rules of individual and social
conduct, regulating, in large part, what today is understood as civil matters (Sang, 1992: 417-
418). Because Confucius (55 1-479 B.C.) and his followers advocated Li, Li eventually
dominated Fa or law as Confucianism became the authoritative doctrine of China during the
first century B.C. As a result, law was, primarily, to support and uphold the teachings and
institutions of Li and hence became highly ethics-oriented. As another result, law in fact only
played an inferior role in maintaining peace and order in traditional China (Ch'u, 1965). This
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society offers a favourable climate for dispute settlement: informal dispute
settlement procedures, such as negotiation and mediation, have been the most
popular methods for Chinese people. Litigation or arbitration is very much regarded
as a last resort (Huang, 1946: 219-221; Caidwell, 1992: 101). This psychological
factor should not be overlooked in examining the ROC Statute on the settlement of
investment dispute.
Because of Taiwan's political status, it is neither a member of many
important international organisations nor a party to many multilateral treaties.
Indeed, the only important convention regarding FDI to which Taiwan is a party is
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States. 97 The ICSID Convention was ratified by the ROC under
the Statute Governing the Enforcement of the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 1968
(hereinafter referred as the Statute Governing the ICSID Convention).98
had a lingering impact on the thought and action of the Chinese people. For instance, even
today, it is often extra-legal standards, formerly known as Li, rather than formal law that the
Chinese people in general would look up to as accepted criteria of social behaviour. However,
there is no denying that increasing international trade and foreign investment in the past three
decades have brought about considerable changes concerning the ideal of and attitude toward
law both on the part of the government and the people in the Chinese society in Taiwan (Ma,
1971).
The ICSID Convention came into force on 14 October, 1966. 575 U.N.T.S. 159; 4 I.L.M (1965:
532); U.K.T.S. (1967: No. 25) or Cmnd. 3255; 17 United States Treaty Series 1270; Treaties
and Other International Acts Series, p. 6090; Centre document ICSID/2; 60 A.J.LL. (1966:
892); Investment Laws of the World, vol. 1. For the negotiation history of the ICSID
Convention, see Schwarzenberger (1969: 135-13 8)
98 The Statute Governing the Enforcement of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States was promulgated on December 21,
1968.
j2j
(A) The ROC Laws Implementing the Convention on Settlement of In vestment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States
(i) Jurisdiction
(a) Nature of the Dispute
Article 2 (4) of the Statute Governing the ICSID Convention states:
"The term 'dispute' means any legal dispute between the government of the Republic of China and
a foreign investor, directly arising out of an investment, and directly affecting the right or obligation
of the party to the dispute to be enjoyed or fulfilled in accordance with the law or laws of the
Republic of China, or relating to the nature or scope of compensation to be paid by one of the
parties to the dispute for non-fulfilment of his legal obligation."
It is clear that the investment dispute must be a "legal dispute" to be within the
jurisdiction of ICSID. 99
 As well as this, however, it must be a dispute "arising out
of an investment". Article 2 (3) of the Statute Governing the ICSID Convention
states that "investment" means an investment "approved under the provisions of the
Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals" which is "operative in any type of
business as defined in Article 3 of the Statute for Encouragement of Investment". A
number of questions arise. First, the Statute for Encouragement of Investment had
been replaced by Statue for Upgrading Industry after 31 December 1990 (see
Chapter 8 above). I-low can Article 2 of the Statute Governing the ICSID
Convention be applied when it is based on a regulation that is no longer in force?
Obviously, the Statute Governing the ICSID Convention is out of date and needs to
be revised. Secondly, the Statute Governing the ICSID Convention excludes
investments made by overseas Chinese under the Statute for Investment by
Article 25 (1) of the ICSID Convention provides: "The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to
any legal dispute arising directly out of and investment, between a Contracting State (or any
constituent subdivision or agency of a contracting State designated to the centre by that State)
and a national of another contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing
to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its
consent unilaterally."
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Overseas Chinese. It is unclear why this is the case, and it seems unjustifiable that
investment disputes arising between overseas Chinese and the ROC government
cannot be submitted to ICSID. This point will be considered further below. Thirdly,
a definition of "legal dispute" is absent from the statute. The term would
presumably exclude disputes which are political in nature or which arise from
differences in priorities between the parties. But its precise extent is uncertain.
It is also noted that, instead of giving any general definition, the term
"investment" is defined in the Statute Governing the ICSID Convention by
reference to practical criteria. Thus the concept of "foreign investment" for the
purposes of dispute settlement may be different from the more general concept
which was discussed in Chapter 10.
(b) Identity of the Parties
The only governmental party recognised by the Statute Governing the
ICSID Convention is the central government of the ROC.'°° This narrows the range
of parties allowed under the ICSID Convention, Article 25(1) of which specifically
includes within its coverage any municipal government, ministers or agencies.'°'
A qualifying foreign investor must be "the national of another Contracting
State as defined in paragraph (2) of Article 25 of the Convention".' 02 In other
100 Article 2(I)(l) of the Statute Governing the ICSID Convention: "The term 'government of the
Republic of China' means the central government of the Republic of China."
101 See Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention: "The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any
legal dispute arising directly out of any investment, between a Contracting State (or any
constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designed to the Centre by the State)
and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing
to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its
consent unilaterally."
102 In accordance with Article 25(2) of the ICSID Convention: "National of another Contracting
State' means
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words, to qualify as a "foreign investor" under the Statute Governing the ICSID
Convention, the investor must not, in principle, have ROC nationality. As discussed
in Chapter 10, most overseas Chinese have dual nationality and under general
international law, a dual national (of a foreign country and the host state) is
considered a national of the host state. This may seem to answer the question raised
earlier as to why overseas Chinese investments are excluded under the present
Statute Governing the ICSID Convention. However, there are some ethnic Chinese
who do not have ROC nationality but who invest in Taiwan under the SIOC. Since
those ethnic Chinese are qualified to be parties under the ICSID Convention
(because they do not have ROC nationality), it is not clear why the ROC municipal
law should exclude them: It was stated earlier that the substantive provisions are
almost identical in the SIFN and SIOC; but if the Government's motive fot
distinguishing between these two categories is to give symbolic recognition to the
special status of 'overseas Chinese', it seems very odd to disadvantage them by
precluding access.
(c) Requirement of Consent
Consent to resort to ICSID is granted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs
(MOEA) of the ROC (Article 3). To request consent the foreign investor who is a
party to a dispute must meet the conditions set out above. In addition, Article 4 (I)
of the Statute Governing the ICSID Convention requires that:
(a) any natural person who had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party to the
dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or
arbitration as well as on the date on which the request was registered pursuant to paragraph (3)
of Article 28 or paragraph (3) of Article 36, but does no include any person who on either date
also had the nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute; and
(b) any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party to
the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or
arbitration and any juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting State party to
the dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control, the parties have agreed should
be treated as a national of another Contracting State for the purposes of this Convention."
"4. The amount of the capital for the investment in connection with the dispute imported into the
territory of the Republic of China exceeds one hundred thousand United States dollars (US$
100,000).
5. The dispute has arisen after this Statute has become effective.
6. The foreign investor who is a party to the dispute has not resorted to an administrative or judicial
remedy in connection with the dispute within the territory of the Republic of China"
The availability of local remedies is optional under the Statute Governing the
ICSID Convention. Assuming that the investor looks for local remedies, a relevant
question is whether the foreign investor is then prejudiced in his right to bring an
action in an ROC court. Article 2 of the Law Governing the Application of the
General Principles of the Civil Code provides that, "within the limits prescribed by
law or ordinances, a foreigner has the capacity to enjoy rights". As "whoever has
capacity to enjoy rights has the capacity to be a party to an action" (Article 40 of
the Code of Civil Procedure'° 3), it is clear that the rights of a foreign investor to sue
will be respected. Similarly a "recognised"° 4
 foreign company has the same
capacity to enjoy rights as an ROC company.'° 5
 However, can a 'non-recognised'
foreign company be a party to legal action? Although the law does not say much
about a 'non-recognised' foreign company's right to be a party to legal action, a
1961 Supreme Court ruling has affirmed that even a 'non-recognised' foreign
company may be a party to civil action. 106 It therefore seems clear that, so far as a
103 Promulgated on December 26, 1930; the last amendment was on August 20, 1990.
104 Article 371 (II) of the Company Law states: "A foreign company shall not transact business
within the territory of the Republic of China without a certificate of authority given after
admission, and cannot apply for admission without incorporation in its own country."
105 Article 12 of the Law Governing the Application of the General Principles of the Civil Code
reads: "Within the limits prescribed by law and ordinances, a recognised juridical person has
the same capacity of enjoying rights as a ROC juridical person."
106 The ROC Supreme Court rules as follows: "Although a foreign person not 'recognised' by ROC
authority is not deemed a juridical person under the ROC law, it is nevertheless a non-juridical
person organised under para. 3 of Article 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In other words, as
long as it has a representative or administrator, a non-juridical person or organisation may be a
plaintiff or defendant in the ROC Court. Whether the foreign juridical person has an office or
business in the ROC is not relevant for this purpose." Decision with reference number of T'ai-
shang-tzu 1898 (1961).
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civil action is concerned, the rights of a foreign litigant are equal to those of ROC
nationals and companies, and that a foreign litigant may not be prejudiced (Hsu et
al, 1985: 579-580).
However, the situation is less clear where a foreign investor has resorted to
the administrative or judicial authorities for a remedy, but has been turned down
improperly even according to the laws of the ROC. Would consent be given if the
investor requested it? Similarly in the case where, although compensation was
being offered by such authorities, it was manifestly inadequate under international
law; could the investor seek consent to go to ICSID? The answer to those questions
seem to be negative. Inevitably, this will lead to a return to the principle of
diplomatic protection.
Upon the request of the foreign investor for consent to submit the dispute to
ICSID, the MOEA shall decide such a request, if the investor meets the foregoing
conditions, "in accordance with the actual circumstances". 107 Vexatious or frivolous
cases are practically impossible after double screening by the MOEA and the
Secretary-General of ICSID.'° 8 The approval or disapproval of the request shall be
made in writing.'09
107 Article 4(fl)(2) of the Statute Governing the ICSID Convention provides: "The approval or
disapproval of the request which is in conformity with the conditions set forth in the preceding
paragraph shall be decided in accordance with the actual circumstances."
108 Article 28(3) of the ICSID Convention states: "The Secretary-General shall register the request
unless he finds, on the basis of the information contained in the request, that the dispute is
manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Centre. He shall forthwith notify the parties of
registration or refusal to register."
109 Article 4(11) provides: "Upon the request of the foreign investor for a consent to submit the
dispute to the Centre for conciliation or arbitration, the Ministry of Economic Affairs shall
decide in writing whether such request shall be dismissed, or shall be approved or
disapproved."
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In the case of an investment exceeding two million five hundred thousand
United States dollars (US$ 2,500,000), or of an investment making an important
contribution to the ROC economy and which exceeds four hundred thousand
United States dollars (US$ 400,000), the investor may obtain an advance consent
from the MOEA to take any future disputes arising out of its investment before the
ICSID for settlement, in writing at the time of approval of the investment.110
If the MOEA gives its consent to submit a dispute which is in violation of
Article 4 (I) of the Statute Governing the ICSID Convention, the consent is deemed
to be null and void ab initio. 111 Supposing that an investor, on the basis of such
consent given by the MOEA, resorts to ICSID and satisfies the Secretary-
General."2 Since the consent cannot be withdrawn unilaterally, what would be the
consequence?
Obviously, the purpose of Article 5 of the Statute Governing the ICSID
Convention is to increase the rigidity of the jurisdiction of the ICSID. However,
here the subject-matter is not concerned with a non-existent legal right, but rather
with the ultra vires decision of an administrative organ of the State: in other words,
a dispute concerning the compromis of the ICSID. Taking reality or 'universal
experience' into consideration, the absolute nullity of the consent must be
recognised, although "in fact, to say that action outside the limits expressed by the
rule is a nullity seems to be no more than another way of expressing the rule itself'
(Jennings, 1965: 81). The attack on jurisdiction would need to be launched before
° Article 4 (III) of the Statute Governing the Convention.
Article 5 of the Statute Governing the Convention.
112 The Secretary-General is the legal representative and the principal officer of the ICSID (Article
11 of the Convention). If the Secretary-General finds that the dispute is manifestly outside the
jurisdiction of the ICSID, he "shall forthwith notify the parties of registration or refusal to
register" (Article 28 and 36 of the ICSID Convention).
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the Commission (for conciliation) or Tribunal (for arbitration), as the case may be,
in the form of a preliminary objection. This is because it is up to the discretion of
the Commission or the Tribunal to decide "whether to deal with it as a preliminary
question or to join it to the merits of the dispute" according to Article 32(2) and
41(2) of the ICSID Convention respectively; the rejection of the report, in the case
of conciliation, and the annulment of the award, in the case of arbitration (Article
52 of the ICSID Convention), must necessarily follow from this.
(ii) The Applicable Law
Article 7 (I) of the Statute Governing the ICSID Convention provides that:
"The Ministry of Economic Affairs shall not, in negotiating with the other party to the dispute in
connection with the applicable law or laws for the settlement of the dispute pursuant to the
provisions of paragraph (1) of Article 42 of the Convention, agree to apply any law or laws other
than that of the Republic of China"
In case the above provision is violated, "it shall be deemed that no agreement in
connection with the applicable law or laws has been reached". 113
 In such
circumstances, the Tribunal is boundio apply the provision of Article 42 (1) of the
ICSID Convention.
(iii) Enforcement of the Award
Treaties, being regarded as equivalent to the ROC's municipal laws (see
Chapter 11.1 above), can be applied by courts. Foreign awards, rendered pursuant
to the provisions of a treaty, may also be enforced by ROC courts, provided that
they satisfy certain requirements which we shall discuss presently. According to
Article 30 of the Statute for Commercial Arbitration,' 14 foreign awards can be
113 Article 7(11) of the Statute Governing the ICSID Convention states: "In case the Ministry of
Economic Affairs gives its consent in violation of the provisions of the preceding paragraph, it
shall be deemed that no agreement in connection with the applicable law or laws has been
reached."
" Promulgated on January 20, 1961; Amended on June 11, 1982 and December 26, 1986.
enforced after they have obtained recognition from an ROC court. 115 Indeed, the
arbitral awards rendered pursuant to the ICSID Convention will be enforced
automatically by the ROC courts." 6 The relevant court under Article 1 of the
Compulsory Execution Law" 7 is the District Court. Article 43 of the Compulsory
Execution Law reads:
"With respect to an application for compulsory execution filed in reliance upon a final judgement of
a foreign court, execution may be carried out only when judgement of the foreign court is not made
in any of the events as prescribed in various items of Article 402 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
a permission for such execution has been pronounced by a ROC court by virtue of ajudgement."
Article 4 02(111) provides for the situation where "the judgement of the foreign court
is considered to be incompatible with public order or good morals". It is doubtful
whether the award rendered by the Tribunal must be enforced if it violates the
public policy of the ROC. On the other hand, if a foreign award contradicts a
precedent made by an ROC court, it may be that the award would be recognised.
On these matters, the enforcement provisions in the ROC laws do not offer much
help. Speculative as it would be to do so, no attempt is made here to predict future
enforcement in such circumstances.
(B) Bilateral Investment Treaties
As noted above, states have been reluctant to enter into bilateral investment
treaties with Taiwan, mainly because of the widespread non-recognition of Taiwan
115 The Statute for Commercial Arbitration uses the situs of an award to determine whether the
arbitral award is foreign or domestic. Article 30 (I) defines a "foreign arbitral award" as an
"arbitration award rendered by any arbitral tribunals sitting outside the territory of the Republic
of China". For further discussion, see Lee (1987: 138), Chen (1992: 13-21), and Chang (1988:
18). There have been roughly 20 cases concerning recognition of foreign arbitral awards in
Taiwan (Lin, 1993: 79).
Article 8 of the Statute Governing the ICSID Convention: "All or part of the arbitral award
rendered pursuant to the Convention requiring enforcement by the domestic court shall be
referred to the court for compulsory execution."
117 Promulgated on January 19, 1940; amended on May 16, 1945, December 21, 1948, and April 22,
1975.
and the fear that entry into a bilateral treaty with Taiwan would harm a country's
relationship with mainland China. Taiwan has only concluded 10 bilateral
investment treaties with other countries at the time of writing.
It is interesting to find that there are only slight differences between
individual bilateral investment treaties regarding dispute settlement in Taiwan. For
settlement of disputes between the Contracting Parties, most treaties provide that
the disputes should be settled "amicably" through "negotiations" or "consultations".
If the dispute cannot be settled within 6 months, it should be referred to an arbitral
tribunal on "terms and conditions as the contracting Parties may agree". A similar
standard applies for disputes between Contracting Parties and individual investors.
The common provision that, under certain circumstances the dispute can be
referred to ICSID, which is found in many bilateral investment treaties, 118 is not
found in any of the ROC bilateral treaties. Once again, this is the consequence of
the legal status of Taiwan. The ROC was a Contracting State to the ICSID
Convention, and ratified the ICSID Convention through its municipal procedures;
thus, theoretically, the ROC is a Member of ICSID. However, after the ROC
withdrew from the UN in 1971, it was excluded from all international organisations
related to the UN, including the World Bank. ICSID was established by the ICSID
Convention of 1965, which was in turn adopted under the auspices of the World
Bank. Although it has a juridical personality of its wn 19 ICSID is structurally
linked with the Bank.' 2° This relationship between the Bank and ICSID is explained
For instance, see, Article 8 (1) of the UK-Hungary Investment Treaty and Article 6 (3) (b) of the
UK-Turkey Investment Treaty.
119 Article 18 of the ICSID Convention states: "The Centre shall have full international legal
personality."
120 Article 2 of the ICSID Convention provides: "The seat of the Centre shall be at the principal
office of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development."
in Article 67 of the ICSID Convention, which stipulates that any State is eligible to
be a party if it is a member of the World Bank.' 2 ' Thus, although the Statute
Governing the ICSID Convention remains valid, technically it appears that the
ROC is not eligible for membership of ICSID after 1971. This is also the reason
why there is no provision in any ROC bilateral investment treaties regarding
ICSID. Fortunately, to date, in all cases involving the ROC, investment disputes
have been resolved at an early stage by diplomatic means or by amicable
negotiations. However, it seems clear that the ROC government will have in future
to make its own luck. It must continue, on its own initiative, to create a favourable
investment environment through imaginative economic policies and legal
instruments in order to facilitate its ongoing economic growth. Only with a strong
economy can the ROC continue to survive in a politically hostile world.
121 In addition, any State party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice will be eligible to
sign the ICSID Convention and be a party to the Centre if it is invited thereto by two-thirds of
the Administrative Council (Article 67 of the ICSID Convention).
Chapter 12
Conclusions
12.1 An Assessment of the Interaction between Law, FDI and
Economic Development
This research, based upon an empirical study, has demonstrated how the
development experience of Taiwan challenges the traditional views of development
theoiy and of law and development theory. In addition, the analysis has shown the
dynamic interaction of law, FDI and economic development in Taiwan's
development process, confirming the propositions which I put forward in Chapter
1:
1. FDI can facilitate economic development only if the appropriate laws are
adopted.
2. As FDI facilitates economic development, and the level of economic
development changes, the Government responds with new laws or legal reforms in
order to encourage further economic development. The content of these laws is
shaped by the levels of economic development.
3. The restrictions and incentives provided for by law (and by legal reforms) affect
the performance of FDI. Consequently, the performance of FDI affects the
performance of a country's economic development.
4. In the case of Taiwan, appropriate liberalisation of the law leads to more inflows
of FDI, which leads to further successful economic development.
Taiwan's history and geographic location has affected its political and
constitutional status, which in turn have also determined its early economic
development. The various political changes illustrate the complexity of Taiwan's
development history: the Dutch, the Cheng regime, the Ch'ing dynasty and
Japanese colonisation represent periods embracing different cultures, languages,
and ethnic groups. The economic policies adopted by these different rulers reflect
their different political and economic interests in Taiwan. In particular, Japanese
colonial economic policy has had an important impact on Taiwan's later
development. With no intention of helping Taiwan's development, the Japanese
strategy was a typical colonial one - to exploit Taiwan's economic resources for
Japan's benefit. However, in order to achieve this aim, the Japanese necessarily
improved Taiwan's agriculture and agriculture-related industrial development. In
addition, while preparing for war, the Japanese invested in heavy industries in the
193 Os and thus benefited Taiwan's industrial sector.
After the civil war, the KMT government moved to Taiwan from the
mainland in 1949. As was stated in Part II, Taiwan's new Government was
implanted from the mainland and did not represent the political expression of
domestic economic or social relations. The Government reshaped and dominated
social forces, removing politics from society's agenda, but at the same time
providing numerous other channels for mobility and status. It subordinated the
political environment for the purpose of economic development, and for almost
four decades did not allow emerging economic interests to influence social relations
through the political process. While the Government concentrated on Taiwan's
economic development, its visible economic success helped dampen potential
political disaffection.
This process occurred in stages. The Government's ideological commitment
to social equality and the absence of entrenched connections between the
Government and local businessman first led to the successful land reforms of the
early 1 95Os, helping to ensure a wider level of participation in economic activity
and wealth. In turn, this would lay down a basis for later economic development. At
the same time, US aid stabilised post-war inflation and, more importantly, provided
psychological support for the Taiwanese people. Once its political status stabilised,
the Government could then endeavour to improve Taiwan's economic situation.
Never taking a laissez-faire approach, the Government has played a very
active role in Taiwan's economic development. Regularly re-evaluating Taiwan's
economic performance as a whole, the Government has adopted various economic
policies to stimulate and to reshape Taiwan's economic growth. Import-
substitution, export-substitution, secondary import and export substitution and
industrial upgrading represent stages in the Government's response to evolving
internal and international economic factors. Additionally, based upon the notion of
using foreign capital to help national development, in accordance with the Mm-
sheng philosophy, the Government has a positive attitude towards FDI. At a general
level, its macroeconomic policies have created an advantageous macroeconomic
environment for foreign investors to invest in Taiwan.' More specifically, the FDI
policy refined the macroeconomic policy and provided incentives to selective
strategic industries for foreign investment. Simultaneously, the Government has
constantly monitored and reformed Taiwan's FDI laws to maintain a balance
between incentives to attract FDI and restrictions to control it. This study
demonstrates that Taiwan's FDI laws have gradually been liberalised in the
development process. The FDI inflows have also gradually increased, consistent
with the legal liberalisation. The increase of FDI inflows neither decreased
Taiwan's economic growth rate, nor worsened Taiwan's economic performance.
Conversely, various economic indictors show that Taiwan is now moving towards
becoming a matured economic entity.
Most economists today accept the argument that a stable and predictable macroeconomic
environment arising from political stability and prudent macroeconomic policies is most
important in attracting FDI (Chen, 1993: 57).
More recently, economic liberalisation created pressures for political
liberalisation. The Government lifted martial law in 1987 and held the first
popularly-elected presidential election in 1996. With political liberalisation, the
macroeconomic environment in Taiwan has experienced significant change. The
Government has speeded up the pace for economic liberalisation and privatisation,
thus providing FDI with more opportunity to invest in Taiwan. Indeed, in the latest
survey by the US-based Business Environment Risk Information Company, Taiwan
and Japan ranked as the third highest business investment profit-return in the world,
slightly behind Switzerland and Singapore (CDN, August 9, 1997).
History shows that major social reforms have always encountered
resistance, as they tend to undercut the entrenched interests of existing influential
groups. More often than not, violent confrontations have accompanied sweeping
reforms, as was demonstrated in recent years with the changes occurring in the ex-
Soviet republics and the former communist states of Eastern Europe. Why did this
not happen in Taiwan during its various economic reforms? There are two key
criteria for evaluating whether major social reform initiatives will succeed in
promoting the overall well-being of a given society. The first is the goals of the
reforms themselves, and the second involves the process by which they are
introduced. Because the KMT government was implanted from the mainland, it did
not have connections with local entrepreneurs. Consequently, its economic reforms
were targeted at benefiting the entire citizenry and not the interests of any particular
political party or social subgroup. Secondly, the method by which economic reform
was introduced by the Government has always been mild rather than radical.
Finally, its national economic success - in achieving growth with equality - is the
most important reason that decreases the possibility for class conflicts.
The traditional dependentistas have argued that the MNEs' capital-intensive
technology excludes a large portion of the working class from the modern sector,
and that only an elite segment of the bourgeoisie can profit from the MINEs. MINEs'
dependence on imported materials prevents the development of linkages with
domestic suppliers and fabricators. The goods produced by the MNEs are designed
for core country consumers, and thus promote a wealthy class divorced from local
production and tastes (Evan, 1979: 38).
Taiwan has not experienced these adverse effects from MNE penetration.
Nor has it experienced an increasing dependence on foreign resources, or
unemployment or underemployment in the manner which many Latin American
countries have experienced. Why? It seems that the crucial factor explaining such
differences is not so much the national origin and types of MNEs that have gone to
the developing countries. Rather, such differences are mainly explained by the
different development strategies and varying domestic economic environments of
the host countries.
In Chapter 6, we saw that the choice of development strategy, whether
export substitution or import substitution, seems to be crucial in this regard. A
country adopting an export substitution strategy has a less-protected domestic
economic environment, so that FDI is forced to use resources in a more appropriate
way to maintain a high degree of international competitiveness. Taiwan's
experience of competition under an export-oriented environment is important in
explaining the choice of technology by MNE affiliates. The closed and
monopolistic nature of the economic environment prevailing under an import-
substitution regime gives foreign investors little incentive to adapt foreign
technology to local conditions and to achieve maximum efficiency. The choice of
adopting an export-substitution strategy was crucial in ensuring continued growth
of Taiwan's economic performance. The case of Taiwan illustrates the potential of
a well-integrated and committed developing state, with competent human resources,
to seek out opportunities within the world system and to successfully mediate
between domestic and global forces to attain maximum benefit.
In terms of the role of law in Taiwan's economic development, the evidence
in this thesis suggests that law is effectively used in Taiwan as an instrument to
facilitate the implementation of the Government's policies. Because the goals of
economic policy have been to improve national and individual wealth, this in
principle excludes the possibility for law to serve only the rich and powerful. The
legal regime in Taiwan is designed ideally to ensure appropriate commercial and
labour relations, to maintain a fair and sound social operation, to allow fair
competition for both domestic and foreign investors, to provide a mechanism to
meet the needs of existing development policy, and to ensure a favourable
environment for further development. Taiwan's success suggests that those ideals
have not been beyond reach.
Although Taiwan has a welcoming policy towards FDI, we have seen that in
order to protect domestic enterprises and preserve the national control of some
sectors, the Government has used state regulation to closely control the activity of
FDI. Taiwan's experience illustrates the moderate theory of foreign investment
which I introduced in Chapter 1. 1-lowever, it is important to note that, with
Taiwan's modern economic growth, the Government has liberalised the law. With
legal liberalisation, State intervention in FDI has been significant reduced. What
does this imply? Does it mean that the role of law is not as important as it used to
be? The answer is no. As Part III demonstrates, the role of law remains no less
important even as a country emerges from its development phase. This study
suggests that an appropriate legal regime is a 'doorkeeper' for preventing MNEs
from exploiting a host country's economic resources through FDI. The
'appropriateness' of such a regime should be carefully evaluated, and re-evaluated,
by the government in accordance with the country's economic performance and
changing needs. Even in developed countries, regulations regarding the admission
of FDI are still very common. Without the constraint of law, not only would a
country not be able to benefit efficiently from FDI, but it would also be likely to
suffer from the adverse effects of FDI. In the worst case, a country might lose
control of its economy. This research suggests that developing countries should
carefully evaluate their economic performance on a continual basis and carefully
adjust their legal regime accordingly, in order to shape their investment
environment for the benefit of national development.
Finally, since Government policy has played such an important part in
shaping and reshaping Taiwan's economic development, it may be appropriate to
reflect this by slightly modifying as follows the model which I proposed in Chapter
1:
Figure 12.1 Foreign Direct Investment: Legal and Economic
Interaction Model
By emphasising the importance of government policy, this revised model offers a
more informative explanation of the interaction between law, FDI, and economic
development in Taiwan.
12.2 Where Should Taiwan Go? Taiwan's Future FDI Law
Reforms
Foreign investors in Taiwan are regulated by FDI laws and treaties.
However, the current FDI legal regime in Taiwan, as analysed in this thesis, is not
an unproblematic one. In considering the existing regime, I have noted a number of
possibilities for legal reform which I will not repeat here. Nevertheless, at a policy
level, further legal reform in the future may be expected to facilitate Taiwan's
continued economic development.
From the point of view of international law, the most effective instruments
for the protection of foreign investment are bilateral treaties which reaffirm the
rules of customary international law. However, Taiwan's political status has limited
the opportunities for concluding such treaties with other countries. None of the
major investors in Taiwan, such as Japan, the US and the West European countries,
have concluded bilateral investment treaties with Taiwan. Certainly, Taiwan should
not take the blame for its failure to ensure protection for foreign investments by this
means.
As noted in Chapter 8, the Government has begun to liberalise its economic
control since 1984. In recent years, political liberalisation has also necessitated a
more liberal economic policy. Correspondingly, in the context of FDI, the
Government has sought to widen Taiwan's investment fields and capital-flow
channels for foreigners and for overseas Chinese. A further proposal to
substantially ease restrictions on foreign investment was approved by the ROC
Executive Yuan on January 26, 1997 and has gone to the Legislative YUan for
review. Because of the well-known inefficiency of that body, it is expected that the
review process will take some time.
In the above-mentioned proposal, investment in certain public facilities
currently off-limits to foreign concerns - such as oil refining, power generation, tap
water supply, ports and railways - is to be permitted on a case-by-case basis.
Selective consideration will also be given to overseas investors who wish to invest
in pollution-prone industries like asbestos, coal refining, and monosodium
glutamate, as well as in lethal chemicals like sodium cyanide and potassium
cyanide. The draft law calls for a complete freeing-up of investment in businesses
like gas stations, travel agencies, animal feed factories, leather production and the
making of chemical fertilisers. Currently, these areas are barred to foreign
investment. Current regulations require foreign investors in Taiwan to wait at least
one year before remitting profits out of the island. The proposed amendment
abolishes this requirement.
Moreover, companies with less than 20 per cent foreign or overseas Chinese
capital will have absolute freedom to make reinvestments in other fields. They will
no longer need prior government approval for such activities. Foreign and overseas
Chinese investors will also be allowed to use the New Taiwan dollar, instead of
foreign currencies, to make payments on investment projects in Taiwan. By
bringing investment regulations in line with international trends, Taiwan will be
better-positioned to participate in international organisations, including WTO.2
In the future, it seems that only a few industrial sectors will remain off-
limits to foreign investment. Mainly, these will include areas where outside
2 As explained in Chapter 8, the ROC has applied to join WTO by using "The Separated Customs
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu" for its application. Taiwan has now
completed 20 bilateral talks with the Member States of WTO for full support of the ROC's
membership (CDN, July 23, 1997), and 13 countries have signed bilateral agreements with
Taiwan (CDN, May 10, 1997).
participation could threaten national security, public order, social mores or national
health. Due to limited resources, foreign investors will continue to be prohibited
from purchasing land in Taiwan. However, they can engage in real estate marketing
and construction projects after gaining the Economics Ministry's approval. In an
administrative streamlining measure, the draft amendment designates the
Economics Ministry's Investment Commission as the agency responsible for
screening foreign investment applications. The commission is also made
responsible for screening foreign firms' applications to set up branches in Taiwan.
These various revisions are in tandem with the government's overall effort to
liberalise and intemationalise Taiwan's markets. The changes will, it is hoped,
encourage MNEs to establish their Asian-Pacific operations headquarters on the
island (FCJ, February 10, 1997).
It is obvious that these draft laws represent a significant further
liberalisation of Taiwan's FDI legal regime for the future. Some of the reforms are
consistent with suggestions I made when analysing Taiwan's FDI laws in Part III;
others are not. For example, the draft laws call for abolishing the one-year lock-up
period for repatriation of profits, but still do not give a working definition of either
"FDI" or "foreigners".
Furthermore, there is an important consideration mentioned in this thesis
that is not sufficiently reflected in the draft laws - increased efficiency in the
legislative and administrative system. According to a survey, released on May 17,
1997 by the Switzerland-based International Institute for Management and
Development, the Taiwan government's efficiency is ranked 20th among the 46
countries and territories surveyed, which is down from sixth place in the 1996
survey (CDN, May 20, 1997; FCJ, May 23, 1997). It is questionable whether there
is a need for Taiwan to have two different FDI regimes, under the Statute for
Investment by Overseas Chinese and the Statute for Investment by Foreign
Nationals, which certainly contributes to bureaucratic inefficiency.
In the context of a different political and economic environment 40 years
ago, it is not surprising that the Government afforded preferential incentives to
overseas Chinese investors rather than foreign nationals. They were intended to
attract more overseas Chinese to invest in Taiwan, in order to advance Taiwan's
claim of speaking for China. The overseas Chinese were an object of aggressive
propaganda by both the Taipei and the Peking regimes, which desired their loyalty
and financial support as well as the benefits of investors' influence within their
home states. However, 40 years later, the FDI laws discriminating between
overseas Chinese and foreign nationals have not only slowed down the legislative
process but have also increased administrative inefficiency. The distinction needs to
be re-evaluated by the Government.
If this is done, however, the re-evaluation will not be the last. Like time,
societies and their economies do not stand still. As they evolve, so too the economic
and developmental needs of Taiwan will change. And the law, if it is to facilitate
and control the FDI that best satisfies those needs, must constantly grow and adapt
with them.
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Regulations Governing the Limitation on the Amount of Gold, Silver, foreign
Currency and New Taiwan Dollars Carried by Inbound and Outbound Passengers
(1955)
Regulations Governing the Offsetting or Refund of Duties and Taxes on the Raw
Materials of Export Products (1958)
Regulations Governing the Use of Patent Rights and Technical Know-How As Equity
Investment (1968)
Regulations Governing the Use of Patent Rights and Technology Know-how As
Equity Investment (1968)
Rules Governing Encouragement of Overseas Chinese, Hong Kong Chinese and
Macau Chinese Establishing Productive Enterprises (1952)
Rules Governing Products Imported for Establishing Productive Enterprises Against
Self-Provided Foreign Exchange (1952)
Securities and Exchange Law (1968)
Standard Regarding the Minimum Total Capital For a Limited Company or a
Company Limited By Shares (1980)
Statute for Encouragement of Investment (1960) (repealed)
Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals (1954)
Statute for Investment by Overseas Chinese (1955)
Statute for Technical Co-operation (1962)
Statute for the Administration of Foreign Exchange (1970)
Statute for the Establishment and Administration of A Science-based Industrial Park
(1979)
Statute for the Establishment and Management of Export Processing Zones (1965)
Statute for Upgrading Industries (1990)
Statute Governing the Enforcement of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (1968)
Statute Governing the Enforcement of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (1968)
Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion (1948)
IV. Statutes of other Countries
British Nationality Act (1981)
Canada Foreign Investment Review Act (1972) (repealed)
Indonesian Foreign Investment Law of 1967 (chap 10)
Kenya Foreign Investment Protection Act (1964)
Nicaragua's investment laws, Article 1, Decree No. 10, 1935
Philippines Republic Act (1967)
Spanish Decree Liberalisation Procedures for Foreign Majority Ownership of Certain
Investments, Decree-Law No. 701/1963, 18 April 1963
Sudan Encouragement of Investment Act (1980)
US Harmonised Tariff Schedule (1988)
US Immigration and Nationality Act (1952)
US Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (1988)
US Taiwan Relations Act (1979)
US Trade Act (1974)
Zaire Investment Code
LIST OF TREATIES
1842 Treaty of Naking
1858 Treaty of Aigun
1858 Treaty of Tientsin
1860 Treaty of Peking
1894 British Proclamation of Neutrality
1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki
1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes
1922 Polish-German Convention relating to Upper Silesia
1926 Hague Codification Conference
1928 Convention establishing the UK-Mexican Claims Commission
1930 Hague Convention on the Conflict of Nationality Laws
1933 Montrvideo Convention on Rightd and Duties of States
1943 Cairo Declaration
1945 Potsdam Proclamation
1948 Havana Convention on the Status of Aliens
1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedom
1954 Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights
1954 Sino-American Mutual Security Treaty
1955 The European Convention on Establishment
1956 The European Convention on Human Rights
1956 The Hague Convention concerning the Recognition of the Legal Personality
of Foreign Corporations, Partnerships and Foundations
1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investment Abroad
1959 Pakistan-US Treaty of Friendship and Commerce
1961 German-Pakistan Investment Treaty
1961 Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for
Injuries to Aliens
1962 The Draft Restatement of the Foreign Law Relations of the United States
dealing with State responsibility for economic injury to aliens
1963 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property
1963 US-Bulgarian Claims Agreement
1966 The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States
1967 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
1972 US-PRC Shanghai Communiqué
1974 Sudan-Swiss Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment
1974 US-Peru Claims Settlement Agreement
1975 Lomé Convention
1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
1982 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of China and the
Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho for Promotion and Protection of
Investments
1982 US-PRC Shanghai II Communiqué
1984 France-China investment treaty
1987 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
1987 UK-Hungary Investment Treaty
1988 Australia-China Investment Treaty
1988 Seoul Declaration of the International Law Association
1990 Agreement between the Industrial Development and Investment Centre in
Taipei and the Economic Development board in Singapore on the Promotion
and Protection of Investments
1990 Agreement between the Taipei Economic and Trade Office and the
Indonesian Chamber of Commerce to Taipei for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments.
1992 Agreement between the Government of Republic of China and the
Government of Nicaragua for Guarantee of Investments
1992 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of China and the
Government of Republic of Panama for Treatment and Protection of
Investments
1996 Agreement between the Taipei Economic and Trade Office in Thailand and
the Thailand Trade and Economic Office in Taipei for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments
